Rationality Quotes December 2012
Once again, here’s the new thread for posting quotes, with the usual rules:
Please post all quotes separately, so that they can be voted up/down separately. (If they are strongly related, reply to your own comments. If strongly ordered, then go ahead and post them together.)
Do not quote yourself
Do not quote comments/posts on LW/OB
No more than 5 quotes per person per monthly thread, please.
David Graeber, Debt: The First 5,000 Years
Reminds me of http://xkcd.com/125/
chairman of the UN Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Water and Sanitation
The quote was brought to my attention by a student in my Economics of Future Technology course who is writing on sanitation in the developing world.
Vespasian
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-- Screwtape, from “Screwtape Proposes a Toast” by C. S. Lewis.
I can’t find a source for the quote at the moment, but I remember reading that F. A. Hayek once said something along the lines of “The greatest enemy of capitalism is the capitalists.”
Hayek was right. Capitalists in a mixed-economy seem to be in something analogous to a prisoner’s dilemma. It would benefit any individual capitalist to seek monopoly privileges for their own firm, but it hurts all of them if any significant number of them do so.
Not to mention this.
-Stanley Kubrick
-A Softer World
Derleth on Hacker News.
the past is a third-world country
The past is in some respects worse than a third world country. In the United States around 1900, the life expectancy ranged from around 50 climbing steadily to reach around 60 around 1930 (curiously the Great Depression didn’t cause a slump in life expectancy, although the rate of growth did slow). Source with related data(pdf). But, if one looks at current life expectancy in many countries in the developing world, most countries exceed the US-1900 numbers. Similar comparisons can be made for literacy and many other metrics of success. The middling developing countries today are better in many ways than most of the US was in 1900.
Also, third world countries can buy the used stuff we don’t want anymore. The past can’t do that.
… do we actually sell a lot of used goods overseas like that?
I think ‘slightly obsolete’ holds up a lot better.
This is why my family only buys computers while on vacation in the US.
Life expectancy can be misleading.
The poorest countries are still caught in a Malthusian trap, so that when modern medicine and other technology extend life, the increased population means that everyone is poorer.
So, increased life expectancy can correlate with greater poverty. See George Clark, A Farewell to Alms.
I dunno… Generally people will have fewer children if they expect all of them to survive to adulthood than if they expect most of them to die before, and fewer children per couple all other things being equal means that each of them will be better off. I think I’ve seen a few TED talks about that.
NYT article titled “Can a Jellyfish Unlock the Secret of Immortality?”
The next line of the article after the above quote is “But none of this happened.”
Ariex
Ah. Positive bias.
Brandon Watson.
I thought that “agree to disagree” had become a fixed expression meaning something like “stop discussing this for now even though we don’t agree, because we have more productive things to do/talk about”.
Yes, but understanding that makes it harder to get annoyed at people.
Not really. I usually see it used more as “I think you’re an idiot, but don’t want to bother explaining why, so let’s talk about / do something else instead.”
I believe the most appropriate corresponding expression is that the disagreement is “swept under the rug”.
--Nate Silver Parody Twitter Account @fivethirtynate, on the night of the presidential election
--Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind
--Steve Sailer, here
“It’s frightening to think that you might not know something, but more frightening to think that, by and large, the world is run by people who have faith that they know exactly what is going on.”—Amos Tversky
Washington Post’s Wonkblog
Devil’s advocate time:
They don’t know nothing about it. They know two things.
It’s a debt reduction plan
It’s named after Panetta and Burns
Here are some reasons to oppose the plan, based on the above knowledge:
We don’t need a debt reduction plan, just keep doing what we’re doing and it will sort itself out.
I like another existing plan, and this is not that one, so I oppose it.
I’ve heard of Panetta and (s)he’s a complete douchebag. Anything they’ve come up with is clearly junk.
I haven’t even heard of either of them, so what the heck would they know about debt reduction?
They’re from different parties, there’s no way they could have come up with something sensible.
I’ve heard 10 different plans described, and surely this is one of them. I can’t remember which one this is, but I hated all of them so I must oppose this too.
And of course you can make a very similar set of reasons to support it. Not trying to rationalise people’s stupidity or make excuses for them as such, just present the opposing argument in all its glory. Ok maybe making excuses for them is exactly what I’m doing. But honestly, how many of your political opinions, as a percentage, including all those that you don’t know you have until asked, are really much better than the reasons above?
If you were being polled about an unfamiliar plan, would you more likely think that a) the pollster was asking you about a fictional plan, or b) that the pollster was doing a genuine survey, and that you just hadn’t heard about that plan yet? Granted, forming an opinion about something in the absence of any knowledge, just because someone asked you for your opinion, is another matter entirely.
This might be a distinction without a difference. The trick was to get people to think they knew about some topic X well enough to profess an opinion on it, even though in fact they didn’t know the first thing about X. Making sure that X doesn’t exist is just a cheap way to implement this trick.
I would think b), and say that.
Isn’t it damning either way, and this dilemma the point of the setup?
Depending on the phrasing and any specifics of the plan presented to me, I might conclude that it was not only fictional but deliberate FUD; that sort of misdirection’s not unheard of. If I were given nothing but a label, though, I’d likely assume B.
The actual question was “Do you support or oppose the Panetta-Burns plan?” (The previous question was ”… the Bowles-Simpson plan?”) So you could infer that the two were related, and possibly partisan/opposing plans, but not much more than that.
Thanks for linking to the full results, very interesting.
I was surprised at first glance by:
both because I assumed more people had heard of him (which shows, I guess, I live in a bubble and don’t correct enough for it), and because I had assumed a more favorable score, with perhaps only extreme Republicans having an unfavorable opinion. I guess I was failing to take into account that the kind of people who follow polls with so much dedication to have heard of Silver are almost all committed partisans.
Nitpick: ‘not sure’ isn’t the same as ‘haven’t heard of him’. There are lots of things I know about that I don’t have an opinion on.
This maybe makes more sense in an open thread than as a rationality quote.
This certainly is interesting. While at a glance, really bad metacognition looks like the chief culprit, there are other explanations. For example, they could be confusing Panetta-Burns with something else they’ve heard of. I’d be curious in particular if the poll asked the same people about Panetta-Burns it asked about Simpson-Bowles. One could conceive of someone not remembering the name and thinking that is what was being talked about. Also, this may to some extent be purely a demonstration that people don’t like to look ignorant, and so they’ve said yes, but that that vocalized knowledge wouldn’t have any impact on their actual behavior.
What intrigues me the most is not that people said they knew of it, but that they had a formed opinion for or against. If they didn’t ask about Simpson-Bowles to the same people, then maybe as you suggest people had an opinion on S-B but misremembered and thought that this was the topic. But if they did, then the only explanation I can think of is that 8% of the people have such a strong positive prior for “bipartisan plans devised by a Clinton Chief of Staff/former western Republican Senator combo” that they agree with them without knowing what they are, and the reverse is true for 17% of the people.
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Related saying which I can’t find a legit source for.
Long quote to make a simple point, but relevant. (Context: this is from a Star Wars novel, so it’s fiction.)
Mace Windu, in Shatterpoint by Matthew Stover
I have a rule—I only read Star Wars fiction when it’s by Matthew Stover. (He made the Revenge of the Sith novelization way better than it had any reason to be)
Another of this books, “Traitor”, has an interesting example of a “true” prisoner’s dilemma.
I’ve read two non-Stover Star Wars novels and judging from those, your rule might be a good idea.
What’s this about an example of a prisoner’s dilemma in Traitor, though? I read that one too, but I don’t remember what part you’re referring to. (Well, there was a prisoner who had a dilemma, but...)
Traitor is a really good book and you should not read the following unless you’ve already read it:
Va gur svefg unys (ol sne gur zbfg vagrerfgvat unys), lbh unir Wnpra yrneavat gb pbzzhavpngr jvgu na vasnag jbeyq-zvaq ivn cnva. Gurl unir n ybg bs vagrerfgvat artbgvngvbaf (n ybg bs arng rknzvangvba bs Wnpra’f—naq znal cebonoyl ernqref—anvir zbenyvgl). Wnpra vf n fynir, ohg unf rabhtu cbjre gb erfvfg gung gur zvaqfrrq unf gb jnfgr n ybg bs gvzr oernxvat uvz.
Wnpra pnerf nobhg gur yvirf bs gur bgure cevfbaref, gur zvaqfrrq bayl pnerf nobhg gur urnygu gur jbeyq. Bire gur pbhefr bs frireny jrrxf/zbaguf (hapyrne), ng svefg jvgu zhghny qrsrpgvba, gurl obgu yrnea gb pbbcrengr jvgu rnpu bgure, naq gur erfhyg vf gung Wnpra vzcebirf dhnyvgl bs yvsr sbe gur cevfbaref, naq gur zvaqfrrq orpbzrf gur zbfg cebfcrebhf bs gur bgure eviny zvaqfrrqf.
Hagvy gur svany vgrengvba bs gur qvyrzzn pbzrf. Gurl pbzr gb n qrny jvgu rnpu bgure—Wnpra jvyy xvyy nyy gur eviny zvaqfrrqf gb rafher “uvf” zvaqfrrq orpbzrf qbzvanag, naq va erghea uvf zvaqfrrq jvyy frg gur cevfbaref serr. (Jub bgurejvfr jbhyq unir orra xvyyrq, fvapr gurl jrer ab ybatre arprffnel)
Ubjrire, arvgure bs gurz jvyy arrq rnpu bgure nsgrejneqf. Wnpra vf fgvyy orggre bss vs ur pna pbzcyrgryl fnobgntr uvf pncgbe’f cynaf (xvyyvat “uvf” zvaqfrrq nf jryy nf gur bguref), naq gur zvaqfrrq vf ng yrnfg fbzrjung orggre bss vs vg yrgf nyy gur cevfbaref trg xvyyrq.
Nf vg gheaf bhg, Wnpra qrpvqrf gb qrsrpg (ohg vf ceriragrq sebz qbvat fb ol n guveq cnegl), ohg gur zvaqfrrq sbyybjf guebhtu ba vgf cebzvfr gb frg gur bguref serr.
Oh, right. I see.
Jason Brennan, The Ethics of Voting, p.173-74
I think this quote might have the analysis backwards. Politicians are not irrational for spouting irrational nonsense—because that is what voters want to hear. I’m not sure if that is accurately described as “epistemically irrational” because some of the politicians probably know what the correct answers are.
None of that creates incentives on voters to be epistemically irrational—except for game-theoric reasons. There certainly are costs to voters being epistemically irrational (assuming one believes there are meaningful differences between the political parties—which may not be the local consensus.
Except that an individual vote have a negligible effect on who wins an election, so voters have no incentive to figure out which political party best represents their goals.
Someone recently wrote a post analyzing optimal voter behavior. It turns out that anyone who would vote in a country where a random voter is selected to decide the election should vote in the current setup. Plus, voting has knock-on effects for future elections.
And most people wouldn’t vote rationally in that country either.
I wish we would reconsider the upvote/downvote mechanics on LW.
Could you elaborate?
Well,
it is exactly what the quote said:
In the case of LW, voting irrationally has almost zero costs. You don’t get penalized for voting wrongly(Incidentally I suggested trying to implement some measure of this kind and guess what… I was downvoted). The penalties are more indirect, like diminishing the amount of epistemically correct contributions.
So why would you assume that LW would be less prone to have this sort of problem?
The evidence suggests that the problem should actually be worse on LW, see1, 2.
— Yagyū Munenori, The Life-Giving Sword
--Dr. House
-Francis Bacon
This is a duplicate from 2009.
— Confucius, allegedly (quoted in The Meeting Place Cannot Be Changed)
Edit: The rationality relevance might need some explanation. The way I’ve seen this aphorism used is this: it’s sometimes hard to distinguish between a task that’s achievable but very difficult (and that it therefore might make sense to spend time/effort on), and a task that is impossible (and thus is a complete waste of time/effort).
If you spend some time searching for the cat in the dark room, you might not find it. Is that because finding it is difficult (after all, this is what you might quite plausibly expect, if you assume that the cat is there), or because the cat is not there and you’re wasting your time?
See also the anonymous expanded version.
John Cleese
transcript
— Yagyū Munenori, The Life-Giving Sword
— Yagyū Munenori, The Life-Giving Sword
A: Embodies the Way. B: Has studied. P(A|B)>P(A|~B). P(A|B)0.
“it is quite difficult to approach the Way without studying” is more like P(A|~B) << 1.
In fact, the quote says nothing at all about lower bounds on P(A|B). It’s possible that it’s even more difficult to approach the Way by studying.
True, but only if P(B) > P(~B) (that is, if more people study than don’t study).
Ah, we are forgetting that sometimes books may be actively misleading, and may deviate one from truth (no matter how much you read those propaganda books, they probably won’t tell you what you really need to know).
Ah, I had misread the quote, and confused P(A|B) with P(B|A). Nevertheless, I think your objection is with the statement that P(A|B) > P(A|~B).
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The sounds interesting, but could use more context.
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I am loving LessWrong so much right now, you guys.
I read that as meaning something along the lines of, “if Nature is truly so wonderful, why did dogs leave it (to become domesticated)?”
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Someone responded:
and @afoolswisdom replied:
-- Eden Phillpotts
Yes, the universe is full of things waiting for our wits to grow sharp enough that we stop anthropomorphizing them...
TELL ME ABOUT IT.
The universe is full of sharp things, waiting to skewer us.
No idea what I got the sudden urge to respond with that.
Subnormality
Roadside Picnic, Boris and Arkady Strugatsky
Derek Lowe, In the Pipeline
--William J. Stuntz, discussing his cancer diagnosis
Apologies for the length, but I wanted to include the full substantive point and hated to snip lines here and there. For what it’s worth, Prof. Stuntz was a devout Christian, and the linked post went on to discuss his theological views on why “something deep within us expects, even demands moral order—in a world that shouts from the rooftops that no such order exists.” Obviously I draw a different conclusion about this conflict, but I still respect that he could take such an unflinching view of how morally empty nature really is.
That reminded me of this:
Sometimes I lie awake at night and ask: “Why me?” And a voice answers: “Nothing personal, your name just happened to come up”.
Charlie Brown
This conclusion is accurate unless he used a specifically Christian definition of “moral order”.
Catharine G. Evans
Catharine, peasant.
fixed.
Robert Peele
Why the British police are still almost entirely unarmed
Wow! I had no idea (and approve wholeheartedly, given that it does seem to work). Thanks Nancy.
Homer: Not a bear in sight. The Bear Patrol must be working like a charm.
Lisa: That’s specious reasoning, Dad.
Homer: Thank you, dear.
Lisa: By your logic I could claim that this rock keeps tigers away.
Homer: Oh, how does it work?
Lisa: It doesn’t work.
Homer: Uh-huh.
Lisa: It’s just a stupid rock.
Homer: Uh-huh.
Lisa: But I don’t see any tigers around, do you?
Homer: Lisa, I want to buy your rock.
Perhaps he should have said “conspicuous absence”. An absence of tigers is only conspicuous if you would otherwise expect tigers everywhere.
In principle, yes. In practice, it would be very hard to tell how many more crimes per year, divided per X, there would be if counterfactually the police’s budget was reduced by $X/year all other things being equal (looking at how other countries are doing will have huuuge confounding effects), and I suspect most people would overestimate that.
Specious, not spacious.
Fixed.
Ok, now, which character from the Simpsons would be capable of reading the causality sequence, understand the math and reliably evaluate the evidence actually given about police efficiency by absence of crime and disorder? Because if Lisa said directly or herself intended the above story to be analogous then I’d call her naive and confused. Given what is known about the relevance of law enforcement, not considering low crime to be—all else even remotely approximating equal—strong evidence about the effectiveness of the police would be utterly absurd.
By my count, three: Lisa, Professor Frink, and “Stephen Hawking” (the caricatured version of himself that Hawking played on the several occasions he guest-starred on the show).
Jumping to Lisa’s defense here, as the quoted dialogue was about the Bear Patrol, a costly government initiative to keep the town safe from bears, launched in response to the only bear sighting in decades. It was army1987 who applied it to regular (human) crime.
I know this is meant to be an ideal for the police, but it could also be read as a descriptive claim about public favor, and it’s worth noting that that claim is sometimes false: how often do people approve of police bashing the heads of $OUTGROUP?
This is true—and it’s also the case that sometimes the law supports abuse of an outgroup.
I don’t know enough about Peele’s era to have an opinion about how those issues played out for his police force.
Agreed. It’s also not the lack of police visibly dealing with crime.
Johanna Schroeder
Another example: a person who commits a murder may be able to point to a troubled past—for example, an abusive parent. The implication is that responsibility is a conserved quantity (like probability mass), so if the parent is guilty, then the murderer must be LESS guilty—that’s what the ‘Officer Kripke’ defense wants us to conclude, and that is the (characteristically leftist) misunderstanding of responsibility.
The symmetrical (characteristically conservative) mistake is to imagine that any discourse about exogenous factors contributing to a willful bad act (bad education etc.) is ‘letting the criminals off the hook.’
Broadly speaking, we want to increase the prevalence of moral luck (perhaps by some manner of social engineering) while still holding individuals as morally responsible as before.
I would like to point out that this is more-or-less what the system was focused on doing before “liberals” started disassembling it.
What?
“Speed is what distinguishes intelligence. No bird discovers how to fly: evolution used a trillion bird-years to ‘discover’ that—where merely hundreds of person-years sufficed.”—Marvin Minsky
http://web.media.mit.edu/~minsky/papers/AlienIntelligence.html
It may be easier with already evolved intelligence.
-- Ozy Frantz
-- Sherlock (BBC series), season 1, episode 3 “The Great Game”
Yes, I know that if you correct for differences in caring due to distance/scope insensitivity/etc. it does help save them, and that caring doesn’t preclude skepticism about which actions are helpful, and that in this particular case Sherlock should have refused to respond to blackmail and there’d have been fewer deaths. But it works as a retort to “can’t say no” spending. Don’t give to some counterproductive charity because you care about starving kids in Africa, give to the Against Malaria Foundation because it makes fewer kids dead.
I might quote that the next time I see “like this if you care” on Facebook.
--John Maynard Keynes on Bertrand Russell
--Charles Munger http://ycombinator.com/munger.html
Any serious experiment proving this? There are ways to win at life that don’t require understanding of many things.
And certainly ways to succeed in a school environment without understanding what you’re supposed to be learning about.
Eh. That could have maybe been phrased better with less hyperbole. But I don’t think he is literally making a prediction about practical life outcomes. I think he A) implicitly classes understanding as a terminal value here and B) is using failure to mean not achieving your goals (in this case understanding). That seems reasonable enough. I think a decent chunk of folks on lesswrong would value epistemic rationality even if it was proven that it didn’t make their lives any better along other axes. In any case you can dump the “fail” part from the quote and the general idea about mental models is fine.
selenite on Yvain’s blog
Reading the context (it’s said in response to an evangelical trying to use Lewis’ Trilemma) just makes it plain badass.
Bad-ass, but not instrumentally rational. I’m going to be polite to the police chief’s (or mafia boss’, etc.) son, even if the boy is rather a jerk. (Yes, I know it’s possible to be polite even when forming a poor judgement, but the context was “Doesn’t it matter”)
Very good point.
David Mitchell, Cloud Atlas
Edit: Yup, apparently that’s a famous quote by Bradley which I read for the first time in that book. Good catch.
A Google search attributes this to Gen. Omar Bradley.
G. K. Chesterton
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Are you serious? Just about every job out there from plumbing and electric line repair, to clerk at the DMV.
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That’s not how Chesterton is using it, though; he’s using it about the myths and stories that justify a profession: doctors talk about saving lives (rather than making money), soldiers talk about saving the country from vicious greedy foreigners (rather than making money), etc. He regards these myths as ennobling in the best sense: adding meaning to life, a raison d’etre, ikigai etc.; you could read his Napoleon of Notting Hill as an illustration of this idea, especially towards the end.
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Not quite. The plumber and electrician are necessary for the existence of the city. The DMV clerk is needed only for the enforcement of a licensing scheme—if his office shut down completely the city would go on functioning with little or no change.
There would need to be some sort of alternate mechanism for ensuring that people learn to drive a car safely before driving a car. Presumably that mechanism would involve some replacement job for the former DMV clerk.
Such a mechanism may be desirable, but it isn’t necessary for the existence of cities. There are plenty of third world countries that don’t bother with licensing, and still manage to have major metropolises.
But my point was just that when people talk about ‘trades and crafts on which the existence of the modern city depends’ they generally mean carpenters, plumbers, electricians and other hands-on trades, not clerks and bureaucrats.
Police, judges, and lawyers would be OK in this respect. (I’m not advocating elimination of the DMV, but now that I think about it, it sounds not-too-bad. Court orders to stop repeat offenders from driving sounds like, potentially, a better system than licensing?)
Given their already heavy workload, they’d need to create a separate department just to deal with all the traffic violations. Hmm...
Besides, and perhaps more importantly, I’d rather instill a social expectation that driving requires a certificate, which in turn requires some training, than deal with “repeat offenders” after they’d run someone over because they couldn’t steer properly.
Is it really a modern city without conservatives whining about poor service at the DMV? Although I guess if you got rid of all the clerks service would probably get even worse.
I would argue that everybody complains about poor service at the DMV.
I’d point to myself as a counterexample, I appreciate the DMV sticking it to those externality-creating motorists while I enjoy proper liberal low-emissions modes of transportation.
But as that is not the purpose of the DMV, I find your appreciation only validates complaints. That is, you share the view that the DMV creates some amount of misery of automobile drivers, you just don’t happen to object to that group being that miserable.
Randall Munroe
-- Algernon Blackwood, The Damned
Edgeworth, from Phoenix Wright (which I haven’t actually played)
If you are hiding in a basement from the Nazis, this isn’t true. If you are going to be tortured for the whereabouts of people hiding from the Nazis, you should also avert your eyes and avoid finding out where they are hiding. The fact that instrumental and epistemic rationality are sometimes at odds is another tragic truth.
Just remember, most people most of the time are not about to learn the location of a refugee just before being tortured by Nazis.
Which we should not avert our eyes from.
Very good point!
Fixed that for you.
“Science is a differential equation. Religion is a boundary condition.”
Alan Turing, Alan Turing: the Enigma (Vintage edition 1992), p. 513
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I’d say that is a fair answer. Without more context it’s hard to say exactly what Turing meant; he might have been referring to the different ways science and religion each handle causality. In science, causes are local in space and time—perfectly modeled by a differential equation. In religion, causality is placed by fiat: a First Cause (boundary condition at the beginning of time) or final causes (teleology).
Another way of looking at the quote is to notice that physics especially concerns itself with continuous changes in space and time. Each infinitesimal chunk of spacetime is governed by its immediate neighbor. But this leads to a difficult question as you expand the system under consideration: who or what determines the ultimate boundary conditions of the differential equation?
Myiamoto Musashi, Book of the Five Rings.
Although I would infer him to have already been aware of certain exceptions, e.g.:
If you and your opponent both know eachother to be skilled and masters of the way, then attempting the same tactic a third time becomes a different tactic; you are making an attack which your opponent would never expect you to try again.
It’s a common failure mode of intermediate-level students of a competitive discipline to fall prey to the simplest tactics used by the weakest beginners, simply because they expect their opponent not to use said weak and simple tactics. For example, experienced chess players losing repeatedly to a complete beginner because they’re used to playing against stronger and stronger opponents as they were gaining their experience. I’ve seen it happen often, and it’s happened to me too.
ETA: I acknowledge that the example above isn’t quite what is seen out there. What I had in mind was a one-off thing—of intermediate players, a “significant amount” (not the majority, but I’d guess “enough so that most experienced players have seen it happen more than once”) go through a point at least once where they repeatedly lose against a player much less experienced than them, because of the reasons above. This second point is also debatable, but I think it’s worth splitting and distinguishing between the two.
Huh? AFAIK, chess players pretty much never lose to players rated 400 Elo less, and higher rated players are more consistent. This applies double for Go.
I think a weaker version of this statement (“repeatedly”->”more often than one naively might expect”) might be true for poker.
I defy the data.
What works in chess does not necessarily generalize to swordfights. In a duel your responses to your opponent’s techniques are mostly cached actions carried out on reflex, and and any ideas you might have about how many times your opponent is likely to try any particular move are not likely to have that much influence on how you react.
How you set up the move certainly makes a difference, the same technique can be used in many different ways, but if you take a specific approach and your opponent defeats it once, you shouldn’t count on it working the next time, and if they defeat it twice, you should be even more confident it won’t work if you try it again.
From my experience as a fencer, I can affirm that facing a beginner can be disorienting, because when you train to respond to intelligent and efficient techniques, unintelligent and inefficient ones are just confusing. I’ve never known an experienced fencer to lose to a newbie, because when one person is using efficient techniques and the other isn’t, and both are unfamiliar with how to respond to their opponent, the efficient one will win, but it can be pretty frustrating.
On the other hand, having a newbie opponent try the same thing repeatedly even when it’s not working is one of the least troublesome things they’re likely to do.
Chess openings are largely cached among professionals.
They’re usually not cached at the level where you have any chance at all of losing to a complete beginner.
Not in a ten-point bout. Very rarely in a five-point bout. I’ve seen it happen in one-point bouts, though.
Agreed on trying the same thing multiple times. Part of this is that fencing (whether epee fencing or the slower katana play that Musashi was talking about) is decided on the quarter-second level, a couple orders of magnitude below what you’d get even in speed chess, but I think informational effects are just as important in this case. A great deal of the metagame of martial arts depends on having the correct low-level reactions to your opponent’s moves, and working memory has a lot to do with this; trying the same thing twice will prime your opponent quite strongly to respond to it a third time, no matter how strong a fencer you are. (It’s possible to exploit this by trying a superficially similar move that’ll defeat the expected counter, or to feint a move you previously used and go to a second-intention attack.)
At my club, I don’t think anyone really fenced one-point bouts. Three rarely. The newbie would sometimes get points though, so if they had been fencing one point bouts, they would have had a chance. Five was the standard where I fenced, and I don’t remember seeing a newbie ever win one.
Anything else would have surprised me. Fencing would probably not have acquired its current status and reputation had it been so reliant on things other than training and skill.
Yes, I fully agree that things will work differently depending on the specific rules of the specific competition.
I’m mostly referring to questions of strategy and metagame. In terms of a specific type of strike in fencing, for instance, things have to become a bit more contrived for this to become applicable. Two really great fencers could, for instance, face off in a duel of mindgame meta, where one strikes twice in a manner that is unlikely to succeed, but is an attack on the pacing of the duel, attempting to take control of it, which the other will respond to.
On the third attempt of this technique, the opponent might anticipate a slight change in the technique, such as the strike turning into an actual attack, and prepare a more diverse set of reactions to counter how their opponent might avoid their default reaction (which they have now seen twice, and may have figured out a way to circumvent). Then, the game takes more depth, as both fencers become aware that there are more possible reactions, but that who takes control of the battle’s pacing will depend on the attacker’s anticipation of their opponents’ style and possible reactions.
As I said, very contrived, but I could plausibly see this happening in high-caliber duels, naturally occurring at the quarter-second level or faster, particularly for fencing from what I know.
Are you sure you aren’t just remembering outliers or some other explanation? I’ve had superficially similar experiences but as far as I can tell, it was due to a simple lack of thinking on my part when playing against the very weak players.
In context, this particular quote seems to be talking more about large-scale battles than individual duels. So, if you’ve already launched your cavalry at the enemy twice, and they were driven off in disarray each time, then another try is probably not going to work even if your enemy doesn’t expect it.
I didn’t see any discussion of strategy or leadership in the Book of the Five Rings.
I have, however, seen many cases in competitive gaming where correctly judging what my opponent was expecting me to do allowed me to counter them more effectively. There are a large number of meta-levels there, and operating two levels above your opponent is typically as bad as operating one level below them.
It appears to me that Musashi intends his principles to be applicable to either duel or battle. There are several illustrations that imply that he is not just talking about duels:
I suspect that ‘flanks’ might be a more idiomatic translation of that last. But at any rate it is clear that Musashi does not limit his advice to individual combat.
One interesting question here is what are the features of games where this does happen? In my view a much weaker player may win against a much stronger player in a game where the following features are present:
(a) There is strong “metagame” (that is, multiple equilibria). A beginner may not be aware of the current equilibrium and may defect in hard to predict ways that may give an advantage.
(b) There is randomness. A much stronger player may be modelled as a computationally omnipotent adversary. Such adversaries still cannot “read the minds” of randomness sources. A game that interprets a beginner’s flailing as randomness can make it situationally powerful.
(c) The game is short enough such that the stronger player cannot learn what’s going on due to (a) or (b) quickly enough to turn the tide.
Unless, say, you’re going to overwhelm a critical position with superior numbers and superior technology at a tactically convenient time.
In some such cases being utterly predictable even has benefits. People who know they are going to lose and die if they fight are more inclined to surrender or flee. (This has obvious advantages if you are a pirate with a fearsome who doesn’t want casualties.)
That actually sounds like solid advice in most situations. (Assuming ‘fail’ excludes ‘weakened them significantly but did not quite defeat them’. Obviously a second attack then should be evaluated as a different approach.)
Yes. The whole thing should be read as elaboration of one piece of advice—the individual sentences are not meant to stand on their own. If you’re overwhelming the enemy with multiple attacks, then none of them should be counted as failure.
And FWIW, Musashi was primarily writing about swordsmanship, not command.
Steven Pinker
-John Hunter
John Preskill
--Robert Heinlein, Starship Troopers
I’m not talking about the mindkilling politics of Starship Troopers today. The quote’s about doing the impossible. A while back Kyre posted a link to Minus #37, and without context, it hit me like a knife in the guts. I didn’t know that she was a godlike reality-bender. To me she was just a kid who stepped up to take a swing, she was Tiffany Aching.
In the matter of reforming things, as distinct from deforming them, there is one plain and simple principle; a principle which will probably be called a paradox. There exists in such a case a certain institution or law; let us say, for the sake of simplicity, a fence or gate erected across a road. The more modern type of reformer goes gaily up to it and says, “I don’t see the use of this; let us clear it away.” To which the more intelligent type of reformer will do well to answer: “If you don’t see the use of it, I certainly won’t let you clear it away. Go away and think. Then, when you can come back and tell me that you do see the use of it, I may allow you to destroy it.”
This paradox rests on the most elementary common sense. The gate or fence did not grow there. It was not set up by somnambulists who built it in their sleep. It is highly improbable that it was put there by escaped lunatics who were for some reason loose in the street. Some person had some reason for thinking it would be a good thing for somebody. And until we know what the reason was, we really cannot judge whether the reason was reasonable. It is extremely probable that we have overlooked some whole aspect of the question, if something set up by human beings like ourselves seems to be entirely meaningless and mysterious.
Chesterton’s Fence, G.K. Chesterton, The Thing: Why I Am A Catholic
It’s not terribly useful in its original form—as the title of the book suggests, it’s used heavily to support a rather primitive appeal to tradition (and through that, an appeal to consequences of a belief). The underlying knowledge, however, is useful: complex structures, especially designed ones but even randomly developed ones, often reflect complex environmental stimuli. Sometimes these stimuli are not useful; indeed, the nature of complex environmental stimuli means that they often change significantly over time. But as much use as there can be in reinventing the wheel to better grok how a wheel works, there are just as equally advantages and uses in using researching backwards from end results.
That’s been posted before, and appears to have made it far enough into the LW vernacular to be used without explanation although not without scare quotes. You do give more context for it, though.
“They’re running on the same neural architecture that I am and I’m a person.”
Florence Ambrose (Fictional Biological AI, referring to machine AIs)
-- Richard Wilbur, At Moorditch
Leonardo da Vinci
In discussions I’m a lot less interested in which of us is more intelligent than which of us is correct. I don’t see what’s wrong with using one’s memory.
There’s nothing wrong with appeal to authority either.
Wikipedia tell me that this is true.
There is nothing wrong with appeal to authority jointed with all the evidence that said authority uses in their argument, subject to disagreement and rebuttal the same as everything else. That’s not how most people appeal to authority, though.
No, you don’t have to understand why someone believes something to believe justified that they are justified in believing it. All I need is to believe justifiably that they’re generally a good judge of facts in this domain. To hold otherwise would be an extremely unreasonable standard that would prevent me from ever learning pretty much anything. Whereas in fact, I’m perfectly justified in believing in, say, the existence of Argentina, even though I’ve never observed it myself.
Galileo Galilei, Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems
-- Imre Lakatos, ‘‘Criticism and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes,’’
http://lc.zju.edu.cn/STS/LunWen%5Cupfiles%5C718d4c37-99a5-4424-a715-3251456eae2c.pdf pg 162
--Seth Roberts, Online Teaching vs. What?, which also makes the point that the best books on a subject are rarely if ever textbooks
Most improvement mechanisms have diminishing returns.
-John Hunter
In the context of probability theory:
Don’t prove, try the Monte Carlo.
soreff’s point applies to that too, though I won’t give any concrete examples for (ahem) acausal reasons.
Whether that is good advice or not depends on the evidence already in hand, and the difficulty of the experiment. Will ice survive heating to a million kelvin at standard pressure?
Confucius, Analects V.14
P.W. Anderson
I’m having a bit of trouble parsing this… an “implausible fact that nature presents us with” like what? And when the author speaks of a “reasonable mechanism” do they mean a reasonable hand-wavy reduction to QM, or a reasonable mechanism in the language of the special science being discussed?
All of this being a long way of saying, an example would help.
The specific context is that of the surprising behavior of magnetic impurities in metals. When one writes down a quantum mechanical model to describe putting magnetic impurities into a metal, it turns out that one can leave out quite a lot (e.g. lattice structure) and still get the right answer.
Because the right answer is “so implausible given the simplicities” etc etc, one doesn’t expect to get the right answer more than one way, so the insight from the simplest model necessary is sufficient.
Oscar Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Grey
-Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, Book 8
Do you know where in the Meditations this quote arises? I tried searching for “worth” in a couple online versions, but all I found was from the end of Book Seven here:
...which, in this version, reads:
It is in Book 8. I edited the original post to make this clear.
The George Long translation reads:
My Latin version (I don’t know who translated it) reads:
I’m not sure which version is the most accurate, since I can’t understand Koine Greek.
Depending on what one means by “pointlessly”, that’s either incorrect (there are such thing as terminal values) or obviously tautological.
Something being obviously tautological doesn’t preclude it from being useful advise (for humans).
My Brain: “If I completed this task, would it actually amount to anything of value?”
Another Part of My Brain: “Uh, not really.”
My Brain: “I should stop doing this task.”
George Washington
-Buttercup Dew (@NationalistPony)
“Proof is for mathematics and alcohol.”
-- Common response to requests for proof of scientific results
-- Emily Dickinson
@zizek_ebooks, a Twitter account remixing quotes from Slavoj Zizek’s texts.
Ernesto Che Guevara (ironically enough)
I think we’ve got too much focus here on criticizing bad stuff, deconstructing lies, weighing and doubting between options, and dreaming of uncertain futures. As opposed to working hard, building stuff, making decisions, and starting on it right now..
@Akrasia, @WhyOurKindCan’tCooperate, @HalfARationalist @ApologistVSRevolutionary @SelfImprovementVSShinyDistraction
-Today’s A Softer World. Not the first time that it’s had transhumanist sentiments.
Ashleigh Brilliant
--Hark! The Herald Angels Sing (traditionally, the third verse—starts at 2:52 in the linked video)
An unusual choice, to be sure. But notwithstanding the obvious religious content, I actually find this piece of the hymn to be a beautiful expression of genuine transhumanist sentiment. We’ve previously discussed how rationalism doesn’t seem to leave much room for “Glory be to Gauss in the Highest!”, but even if the sentiment of “highest praise” is a little Dark Artsy, I find myself thinking of something like a Friendly AI Singularity when I hear these lines. Sung in the right way, the song can actually give me chills to a degree rivaling HP:MoR—you know, that chapter. Just listen to it from that perspective see if you don’t find it inspiring.
I will note that I had a hard time finding a version of the song sung exactly how I wanted. It’s usually performed slow, often by a choir, whereas I imagine it brisk, sung by one person with a deep voice, and with strong accenting—as in, “Mild he lays his glory by/Born that man no more may die/Born to raise the sons of earth . . .”
Goblins 4.49 [1], [2]
And then she loses, hard, and he wins. I’m not feeling it.
Inception movie
I don’t think that really true. Human’s are quite capable of changing their mind. They are also capable of forgetting.
They are especially prone to forgetting that they had changed their mind.
They’re especially prone to forgetting what caused them to believe an idea, and only remembering that it was well justified.
Often times people don’t even know what causes them to believe an idea the moment they adopt that idea.
I’m inclined to think that ideas are more likely to be overwritten with some remnants showing through than to be completely forgotten.
It turns out that facts, when viewed as a large body of knowledge, are just as predictable. Facts, in the aggregate, have half-lives: we can measure the amount of time for half of a subject’s knowledge to be overturned.
Samuel Abesman, The Half-Life of Facts: Why Everything We Know Has an Expiration Date.
Radioactive atoms, in the aggregate, don’t have a half-life. If you measure the nuclear radiation coming from a heterogenous glob of radioactive material, and it takes N hours to drop to 50% of that level, then it will take more than N hours to drop to 25% of the original level. The original material had both shorter-lived substances with a half-life of less than N hours and longer-lived substances with a half-life of more than N hours (and possibly non-radioactive elements as well), and since the former materials decay faster than the latter, the ratio between them falls until the latter materials dominate.
I suspect the same process holds true for facts.
The tricky part there is figuring out which half.
Also, this book was a horrible agglomeration of irrelevant and un-analyzed factoids. If you’ve already read any two Malcolm Gladwell books or Freakonomics, It’d be considerably more educational to skip this book and just read the cards in a Trivial Pursuit box.
“To paraphrase Mayor Daley, logic is not there to create truth, logic is there to preserve truth.” - Eliezer Yudkowsky
Reason for downvotes please?
We really don’t like that Yudkowsky guy.
More seriously, I think quotes in these threads are supposed to be from external sources, and he recently made a big post expressing this sentiment...
Thanks—makes sense. My fault, I don’t know how I missed that post… I love this blog!
You’re not suppposed to quote things from LW or OB.
Mencius Moldbug