I think this quote might have the analysis backwards. Politicians are not irrational for spouting irrational nonsense—because that is what voters want to hear. I’m not sure if that is accurately described as “epistemically irrational” because some of the politicians probably know what the correct answers are.
None of that creates incentives on voters to be epistemically irrational—except for game-theoric reasons. There certainly are costs to voters being epistemically irrational (assuming one believes there are meaningful differences between the political parties—which may not be the local consensus.
Except that an individual vote have a negligible effect on who wins an election, so voters have no incentive to figure out which political party best represents their goals.
I think this quote might have the analysis backwards. Politicians are not irrational for spouting irrational nonsense—because that is what voters want to hear. I’m not sure if that is accurately described as “epistemically irrational” because some of the politicians probably know what the correct answers are.
None of that creates incentives on voters to be epistemically irrational—except for game-theoric reasons. There certainly are costs to voters being epistemically irrational (assuming one believes there are meaningful differences between the political parties—which may not be the local consensus.
Except that an individual vote have a negligible effect on who wins an election, so voters have no incentive to figure out which political party best represents their goals.
Someone recently wrote a post analyzing optimal voter behavior. It turns out that anyone who would vote in a country where a random voter is selected to decide the election should vote in the current setup. Plus, voting has knock-on effects for future elections.
And most people wouldn’t vote rationally in that country either.