The median is almost always around 7, for almost anything.
I tried to take that into account when reading.
treating the indexes as utilities
Please explain.
The median is almost always around 7, for almost anything.
I tried to take that into account when reading.
treating the indexes as utilities
Please explain.
“Is there evidence this will be worthwhile according to my values now, independently of how it might change my values?”
“Is there evidence that this is instrumentally useful for more than warm fuzzies?”
“Is there evidence that for the probable benefit of this event the costs are substantially optimized for it? I.e., if the benefit is substantially social, even if this would be worth flying around the world for, a program could actually be optimized for social benefits, and/or I could attend a closer/cheaper/shorter program with similar benefits to me.”
“Regardless of anyone’s intent, what is this program optimized for?”
“How’s the food?”
7b) Is there any evidence I’ll be glad I went that a Christian brainwashing retreat could not produce just as easily?
If you went to a Jehovah’s Witness retreat, and were in an accident, and you were conscious enough to refuse a blood transfusion, you’d be glad for having learned what you did at the retreat, even if you knew the refusal would be fatal.
In general, anything that is compelling and affects your decisions will make you glad for it, and its being compelling is probably not inversely related to its being true. So I’m not too concerned that my tentative answer to this question is “no.”
you’ll find that people are searching for “less wrong cult” and “singularity institute cult” with some frequency.
Maybe a substantial number of people are searching for the posts about cultishness.
I entirely agree with this.
That’s what I intended.
Can someone provide the full text of this?
Slippery slope arguments (SSAs) have a bad philosophical reputation. They seem, however, to be widely used and frequently accepted in many legal, political, and ethical contexts. Hahn and Oaksford (2007) argued that distinguishing strong and weak SSAs may have a rational basis in Bayesian decision theory. In this paper three experiments investigated the mechanism of the slippery slope showing that they may have an objective basis in category boundary re-appraisal.
Also this:
...he argued that the very reasons that can make SSAs strong arguments mean that we should be poor at abiding by the distinction between good and bad SSAs, making SSAs inherently undesirable. We argue that Enoch’s meta-level SSA fails on both conceptual and empirical grounds.
depending on how those techniques are applied,
But as far as I know there’s nothing in Cox’s theorem or the axioms of probability theory or anything like those that says I had to use that particular prior
The way I interpret hypotheticals in which one person is said to be able to do something other than what they will do, such as “depending on how those techniques are applied,” all of the person’s priors are to be held constant in the hypothetical. This is the most charitable interpretation of the OP because the claim is that, under Bayesian reasoning, results do not depend on how the same data is applied. This seems obviously wrong if the OP is interpreted as discussing results reached after decision processes with identical data but differing priors, so it’s more interesting to talk about agents with other things differing, such as perhaps likelihood-generating models, than it is to talk about agents with different priors.
I could just as easily have used a different...likelihood model, and gotten a totally different posterior that’s nonetheless legitimate.
Can you give an example?
Cigarette smoking: an underused tool in high-performance endurance training
In summary, existing literature supports the use of cigarettes to enhance endurance performance through weight loss and increased serum hemoglobin levels and lung volumes.
musical contrast and chronological rejuvenation
...people were nearly a year-and-a-half younger after listening to “When I’m Sixty-Four” (adjusted M = 20.1 years) rather than to “Kalimba” (adjusted M = 21.5 years), F(1, 17) = 4.92, p = .040.
Length of stay in hospital and duration of fever were significantly shorter in the intervention group than in the control group (P=0.01 and P=0.04, respectively)...Remote, retroactive [emphasis added] intercessory prayer said for a group is associated with a shorter stay in hospital and shorter duration of fever in patients with a bloodstream infection and should be considered for use in clinical practice.
depending on how those techniques are applied, can lead to different results when analyzing the same data
But two Bayesian inferences from the same data can also give different results. How could this be a non-issue for Bayesian inference while being indicative of a central problem for NHST?
If the OP is read to hold constant everything not mentioned as a difference, that includes the prior beliefs of the person doing the analysis, as against the hypothetical analysis that wasn’t performed by that person.
Does “two Bayesian inferences” imply it is two different people making those inferences, with two people not possibly having identical prior beliefs? Could a person performing axiom-obeying Bayesian inference reach different conclusions than that same person hypothetically would have had they performed a different axiom-obeying Bayesian inference?
Is the sunk cost fallacy a fallacy?
I ask myself about many statements: would this have the same meaning if the word “really” were inserted? As far as my imagination can project, any sentence that can have “really” inserted into it without changing the sentence’s meaning is at least somewhat a wrong question, one based on an unnatural category or an argument by definition.
If a tree falls in the forest, does it make a sound? --> If a tree falls in the forest, does it really make a sound?
Is Terry Schiavo alive? --> Is Terry Schiavo really alive?
Is the sunk cost fallacy a fallacy? --> Is the sunk cost fallacy really a fallacy?
When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. Do not press a desperate foe too hard.
Game theory won out over good wishes.
Not that it’s bad, for that would be confusing levels, even if “shit” were being used in its usual figurative sense. For example, I would consider some true things said that are self-harmful violations of social norms “shit.”
Like others I read it from a link on LW, I think...thanks for posting.
Shit and Bullshit Rationalists Don’t Say:
“I’ve read more papers by Scott Aaronson than just the one.” “Which one?” (Both of these.)
Quantity of experience: brain-duplication and degrees of consciousness Nick Bostrom
Decision Tree: Roots of Knowledge.
Decision Tree: Applied Wisdom.
Decision Tree: Our mascot is a thinly veiled rip-off of an Ent! Sweet!
I have friends and relatives who live in the area. How central to the camp is the communal living aspect? What would you charge to commute to it, if that is possible?