What kind of person instance is “perceiving themselves to black out” (that is, having blacked out)?
It’s not a person instance, it’s an event that happens to the person’s stream of consciousness. Either the stream of consciousness truly, objectively ends, and a same-pattern copy will appear on Mars, mistakenly believing they’re the very same stream-of-consciousness as that of the original person.
Or the stream is truly, objectively preserved, and the person can calmly enter, knowing that their consciousness will continue on Mars.
I don’t think a 3rd-person analysis answers this question.
(With the correct answer being, of course, that the stream is truly, objectively preserved.)
Since I don’t think a 3rd person analysis answers the original problem, I also don’t think it answers it in case we massively complicate it like the OP has.
(Edited for clarity.)
Because it’s not accompanied by the belief itself, only by the computational pattern combined with behavior. If we hypothetically could subtract the first-person belief (which we can’t), what would be left would be everything else but the belief itself.
That’s what I claimed, right.
I don’t think so. That specific argument had a form of me illustrating how absurd it would be on the intuitive level. It doesn’t assume functionalism, it only appeals to our intuition.
That doesn’t sound coherent—either I believe_2 I’m in pain, or I believe_2 I’m not.
That’s true, but my claim was a little more specific than that.
Right, but why think it matters if some change occurred naturally or not? For the universe, everything is natural, for one thing.
Well… I guess we have to draw the line somewhere.