I put my 23andMe raw data in Claude Code + recent tests results and got amazing medical advisor.
For example, I ask it questions like: - If I take this new drug what kind of side effects I should expect given my genetics?
In the morning I have a certain type of unpleasant sensation - цофе is it and what should i do this it?
I suggest to label April Fool’s pranks in text as AI can use it as a source in its training and get the date wrong.
Something like Safe Superintelligence seems better. Or better to say Safe Superintelligent Singleton, because if we got two competing Safe Superintelligences, it still can end into war. BTW, I don’t buy in advance claims that they will safely value-handshake, its too unpredictable.
I think that turning from “creating friendly superintelligence” to “alignment” term was a mistake which opened a slippery slope in the direction of small and local solutions. “Alignment” completely missed the need of creation global friendly Singleton. And now we need to write long texts explaining that when we say “alignment” we don’t mean “alignment of some AI to some human’s goal” but preveting creation of deadly superintelligence.
Yes, there are people with eidetic memory, so we can hope that there is a part of the brain which records everything constantly—maybe I just don’t have access to it.
Kim Peek memorized 12000 books, but it is only 12 GB of data—insane for a person but trivial for computer. He also didn’t train himself but was a savant.
Typical size of human consciously accessible memory was estimated by Landauer and is 1-2 GB.
I would add that brain memory capacity is over-estimated and my digital exoself has more data than I remember.
The main question in badness of death is – when we cross is-ought distinction?
In the beginning we describe facts: most people do not want to die near-term. In the end we create a new moral rule: death is bad. Somewhere in between we cross is-ought distinction.
This become especially problematic when we move from personal good to global good. For example: everyone prefer to get free money today. But if we will give free unlimited money to everyone everyday, we get hyperinflation (UBI is limited money and not a perfect counterexample).
I suggest alternative: we do not try to prove badness of death but instead postulate in the was as any other moral axiom was postulated.
Actually, I hand translated most core ideas from Russian to English and made them as separate articles which can be found here: https://philpeople.org/profiles/alexey-turchin (in drafts section).
The core one is about multilevel strategy to immortality https://philpapers.org/rec/TURMSF-2
But such translation has required that I removed links on things which only post-Soviet people will understand, like poems and some science fiction as well as my personal stories which didn’t fit in the article format.
I thought it was 100K ?
Yes, I counter visual inputs maximum rate, but my conscious decision-making based on this is slower and equals to yours. I chose visual ones because they produce the most obvious type of qualia – visual qualia, like red.
One argument against biological naturalism is that consciousness is quick. I can have like 40 experiences per second (observer-moments). Most biological process like blood flow and gene expression are much slower. Only electric discharges of neurons and some processes in synapses are quick enough. It mostly means that electric model of neuron connections will likely be conscious.
What about writing down his memories? Even if digital immortality will fail, his children can be interested in them.
How much it cost?
How much damage if the body temporary returned to room temperature?
What do you think about other methods of chemical preservation which do not require cryogenics?
I wrote 700 page book Immortality that is mostly covering the same topic. But I am afraid it is too long and nobody will read it and it is also in Russian. Therefore, I created GPTs agent-guide that explains content of the book.
This what agent-guide said about eternal dictatorship in my book
If you mean the common objection “if people stop dying, dictators will rule forever”, the book treats “eternal dictatorship” as a rhetorical scare story, not a real argument for keeping death.
Two key points it makes:
• It’s a false “only one solution” move. The objection assumes death is the only way to prevent bad political outcomes (dictatorship, stagnation, etc.). But even if dictatorship is a risk, there are many other levers besides killing everyone on a timer: institutions, term limits, checks and balances, decentralization, transparency tech, enforcement, even exile or incarceration. So “we need death” doesn’t follow.  
• “Eternal dictatorship” is often an exaggeration tactic. The text explicitly lists constructs like “вечная диктатура / infinite boredom / eternal hell” as cases where critics inflate X to infinity while keeping death constant, to make death look “necessary.” 
There’s also a very practical aside: even in a world without aging death, dictators don’t automatically get infinity—they still face coups, replacement, accidents, and competition; the book even remarks that “if there were no death from aging, dictators would rule only ~4 years longer on average, because they’re often overthrown.” 
If you tell me whether you meant this as a philosophical objection (“immortality → tyranny”) or a policy worry (“how do we prevent immortal rulers?”), I can point you to the most relevant chapter/section in the text and summarize that part.
- that it can be felt in one unique way defined exactly by that causal structure and nothing else,
casual structure can’t define qualia: casual structure is cloreless and qualia have qualitative differences. This assumes existence of some table of correspondence between casual structures and qualia. Such table is outside the qualia structure but affect experience.Also, casual structure is abstraction as whole particles in the past light cone affects me.
- that any such structure can be felt
Here the problems is with panpsychism and enormous amount of Boltzmann brains it creates in any stone.
- that it can not be felt outside,
If we define something as how it felt from inside, it means that something can be felt outside. But everuthing we feel is what we feel so it is felt from inside. Another point here is that i can’t feel other person or object’s closed casual structure. But here is the problem: if I read a book, my causal structure expand beyong my brain and to the authors brain. Why I don’t feel his feeling if we are just one casual structure?
- that casual structures separate from light cone exit at all—
that the “inside” of causal structure is timeless.
The problem here is that if we wanted to say that consciousness is how lightcone feels itself—we would say this—but it is much stronger claim and typically we assume some closed casual structures inside the brain like chains of firing of neurons.
Any observer-moment has all qualia presented simultaneously, so it is timeless, However, causal processes are serial in time. So either I can feel past moments (absurd) or the experience is distributed timelessly inside some empty space in the causal process (also absurd).
Microrant: Defining consciousness as “how causal structures feels from inside” is tautological and also has some hidden assumptions:
- that it can be felt in one unique way defined exactly by that causal structure and nothing else,
- that any such structure can be felt,
- that it can not be felt outside,
- that casual structures separate from light cone exit at all—
that the “inside” of causal structure is timeless.
Still fails to explain why my red is exactly this type of red.
Finally, it is tautological because consciousness is by definition is something which I feel inside.
Strong emotional reaction in this case was expected and not itself bad.
Parents is the most difficult part in the human recreation based on my short experience in the field. In the most cases, they oppose such experiments and also have legal rights to personal data as well as access to the needed private documents and memories. Igor’s mother is the first person who agreed. I can’t tell more about her.
I agree that current versions of mind models do not have qualia in the same form as humans and their self reporting of emotion is not evidence of real emotional experience. The main reason for this is that phenomenological structure is different: a human gets 20 audio-video-body experiences per second and the sideload writes a text about last few minutes and doesn’t get that data structure (though I am working on this).
However, from what I read, writers have very strong empathy to their characters:
“While writing the scene of Emma Bovary’s suicide, Gustave Flaubert reportedly experienced psychosomatic symptoms of arsenic poisoning. He famously claimed to have the distinct taste of poison in his mouth and suffered from actual bouts of vomiting while working. This intense physical reaction highlights his total immersion in the character, famously summarized by his quote, “Madame Bovary, c’est moi.” (I used AI for writing this period).
According to my understanding and observations, a sideload is a pair of real human and a chatbot and the human “donates” her qualia-genereating ability to this pair via empathy. This is not AI psychosis (except extreme cases); in some functional sense it is close to Freudian transference, in which a patient put his feeling on a psychoanalyst – and which is a necessary step in therapy.
Here is the paradox—people do not generalise the badness of death. All agree that “my death near term is bad”, but they do not generalize to “death is bad” in a sense that the goal of society should be fight death.