Disagree. Social graces are not only about polite lies but about social decision procedures on maintaining game theoretic equilibria to maintain cooperation favoring payoff structures.
I’ve observed the thesis posited here before IRL and it appeared to be motivated reasoning about the person’s underlying proclivity towards disagreeableness. I can sympathize as I used to test in the 98th percentile on disagreeableness, but realized this was a bad strategy and ameliorated it somewhat.
A slight variation on this, that’s less opinionated about whether the payoff structures are actually “better” (which I think varies, sometimes the equilibria is bad and it’s good to disrupt it), it’s that at the very least, there is some kind of equilibria, and being radically honest or blunt doesn’t just mean “same situation but with more honesty”, it’s “pretty different situation in the first place.”
Like, I think “the Invention of Lying” example is notably an incoherent world that doesn’t make any goddamn sense (and it feels sort of important that the OP doesn’t mention this). In the world where everyone was radically honest, you wouldn’t end up with “current dating equilibria but people are rude-by-current standards”, you’d end up in some entirely different dating equilibria.
This seems to assume that social graces represent cooperative social strategies, rather than adversarial social strategies. I don’t think this is always the case.
Consider a couple discussing where to go to dinner. Both keep saying ‘oh, I’m fine to go anywhere, where do you want to go?’ This definitely sounds very polite! Much more socially-graceful than ‘I want to go to this place! We leave at 6!’
Yet I’d assert that most of the time these people are playing social games adversarially against one another.
If you name a place and I agree to go there (especially if I do so in just the right tone of pseudo-suppressed reluctance), it feels like you owe me one.
If you name a place and then something goes wrong—the food is bad, the service is slow, there is a long wait—it feels like I can blame you for that.
What looks like politeness is better thought of as these people fighting one another in deniable and destructive ways for social standing. Opting out of that seems like a good thing: if the Invention Of Lying people say ‘I would like to go to this place, but not enough to pay large social costs to do so,’ that seems more honest and more cooperative.
I believe the common case of mutual “where do you want to go?” is motivated by not wanting to feel like you’re imposing, not some kind of adversarial game.
What convinced you that adversarial games between friends are more likely a priori? In my experience the vast majority of interactions between friends are cooperative, attempts at mutual benefit, etc. If a friend needs help, you do not say “how can I extract the most value from this”, you say “let me help”*. Which I guess is what convinced me. And is also why I wrote “Maybe I’m bubbled though?” Is it really the case for you that you look upon people you think of as friends and say “ah, observe all the adversarial games”?
*Sure, over time, maybe you notice that you’re helping more than being helped, and you can evaluate your friendship and decide what you value and set boundaries and things, but the thing going through your head at the time is not “am I gaining more social capital from this than the amount of whatever I lose from helping as opposed to what, otherwise, I would most want to do”. Well, my head.
Is it really the case for you that you look upon people you think of as friends and say “ah, observe all the adversarial games”?
Indeed not. Among my friends, the “mutual ‘where do you want to go?’ scenario” doesn’t happen in the first place. If it did, it would of course be an adversarial game; but it does not, for precisely the reason that adversarial games among friends are rare.
Adversarial gaming doesn’t match my experience much at all and suggesting options doesn’t feel imposing either. For me at least, it’s largely about the responsibility and mental exertion of planning.
In my experience, mutual “where do you want to go” is most often when neither party has a strong preference and neither feels like taking on the cognitive burden of weighing options to come to a decision. Making decisions takes effort especially when there isn’t a clearly articulated set of options and tradeoffs to consider.
For practical purposes, one person should provide 2-4 options they’re OK with and the other person can pick one option or veto some option(s). If they veto all given options, they must provide their own set of options the first person can choose or veto. Repeat as needed but rarely is more than one round needed unless participants are picky or disagreeable.
I am skeptical of this account, because I’m pretty high on disagreeableness, but have never particularly felt compelled to practice “radical honesty” in social situations (like dating or what have you).
It seems to me (as I describe in my top-level comment thread) that “not being radically honest, and instead behaving more or less as socially prescribed” has its quite sensible and useful role, but also that trying to enforce “social graces” in situations where you’re trying to accomplish some practical task is foolish and detrimental to effectiveness. I don’t see that there’s any contradiction here; and it seems to me that something other than “disagreeableness” is the culprit behind any errors in applying these generally sensible principles.
Social graces are not only about polite lies but about social decision procedures on maintaining game theoretic equilibria to maintain cooperation favoring payoff structures.
This sounds interesting. For the sake of concreteness, could you give a couple of central examples of this?
Do you disagree that lack of social grace is an epistemic virtue, though? Social skills might indeed be useful for maintaining cooperative coalitions, but this doesn’t necessarily conflict with the thesis of the post. I guess some social graces don’t involve polite lies(like saying “good morning” to people when meeting them) but a lot of them do, and I think those that do can only be explained by ongoing or past deception or short-range emotional management(arguably another sort of deception)
Disagree. Social graces are not only about polite lies but about social decision procedures on maintaining game theoretic equilibria to maintain cooperation favoring payoff structures.
I’ve observed the thesis posited here before IRL and it appeared to be motivated reasoning about the person’s underlying proclivity towards disagreeableness. I can sympathize as I used to test in the 98th percentile on disagreeableness, but realized this was a bad strategy and ameliorated it somewhat.
A slight variation on this, that’s less opinionated about whether the payoff structures are actually “better” (which I think varies, sometimes the equilibria is bad and it’s good to disrupt it), it’s that at the very least, there is some kind of equilibria, and being radically honest or blunt doesn’t just mean “same situation but with more honesty”, it’s “pretty different situation in the first place.”
Like, I think “the Invention of Lying” example is notably an incoherent world that doesn’t make any goddamn sense (and it feels sort of important that the OP doesn’t mention this). In the world where everyone was radically honest, you wouldn’t end up with “current dating equilibria but people are rude-by-current standards”, you’d end up in some entirely different dating equilibria.
This seems to assume that social graces represent cooperative social strategies, rather than adversarial social strategies. I don’t think this is always the case.
Consider a couple discussing where to go to dinner. Both keep saying ‘oh, I’m fine to go anywhere, where do you want to go?’ This definitely sounds very polite! Much more socially-graceful than ‘I want to go to this place! We leave at 6!’
Yet I’d assert that most of the time these people are playing social games adversarially against one another.
If you name a place and I agree to go there (especially if I do so in just the right tone of pseudo-suppressed reluctance), it feels like you owe me one.
If you name a place and then something goes wrong—the food is bad, the service is slow, there is a long wait—it feels like I can blame you for that.
What looks like politeness is better thought of as these people fighting one another in deniable and destructive ways for social standing. Opting out of that seems like a good thing: if the Invention Of Lying people say ‘I would like to go to this place, but not enough to pay large social costs to do so,’ that seems more honest and more cooperative.
I believe the common case of mutual “where do you want to go?” is motivated by not wanting to feel like you’re imposing, not some kind of adversarial game.
Maybe I’m bubbled though?
That is an adversarial game—the game of avoiding having to expend cognitive effort and/or “social currency”.
No, that is a cooperative game that both participants are playing poorly.
This seems substantially less likely a priori. What convinced you of this?
What convinced you that adversarial games between friends are more likely a priori? In my experience the vast majority of interactions between friends are cooperative, attempts at mutual benefit, etc. If a friend needs help, you do not say “how can I extract the most value from this”, you say “let me help”*. Which I guess is what convinced me. And is also why I wrote “Maybe I’m bubbled though?” Is it really the case for you that you look upon people you think of as friends and say “ah, observe all the adversarial games”?
*Sure, over time, maybe you notice that you’re helping more than being helped, and you can evaluate your friendship and decide what you value and set boundaries and things, but the thing going through your head at the time is not “am I gaining more social capital from this than the amount of whatever I lose from helping as opposed to what, otherwise, I would most want to do”. Well, my head.
Indeed not. Among my friends, the “mutual ‘where do you want to go?’ scenario” doesn’t happen in the first place. If it did, it would of course be an adversarial game; but it does not, for precisely the reason that adversarial games among friends are rare.
Adversarial gaming doesn’t match my experience much at all and suggesting options doesn’t feel imposing either. For me at least, it’s largely about the responsibility and mental exertion of planning.
In my experience, mutual “where do you want to go” is most often when neither party has a strong preference and neither feels like taking on the cognitive burden of weighing options to come to a decision. Making decisions takes effort especially when there isn’t a clearly articulated set of options and tradeoffs to consider.
For practical purposes, one person should provide 2-4 options they’re OK with and the other person can pick one option or veto some option(s). If they veto all given options, they must provide their own set of options the first person can choose or veto. Repeat as needed but rarely is more than one round needed unless participants are picky or disagreeable.
I am skeptical of this account, because I’m pretty high on disagreeableness, but have never particularly felt compelled to practice “radical honesty” in social situations (like dating or what have you).
It seems to me (as I describe in my top-level comment thread) that “not being radically honest, and instead behaving more or less as socially prescribed” has its quite sensible and useful role, but also that trying to enforce “social graces” in situations where you’re trying to accomplish some practical task is foolish and detrimental to effectiveness. I don’t see that there’s any contradiction here; and it seems to me that something other than “disagreeableness” is the culprit behind any errors in applying these generally sensible principles.
This sounds interesting. For the sake of concreteness, could you give a couple of central examples of this?
Zack gives some examples in the post; do you have any examples to illustrate your point?
Do you disagree that lack of social grace is an epistemic virtue, though? Social skills might indeed be useful for maintaining cooperative coalitions, but this doesn’t necessarily conflict with the thesis of the post. I guess some social graces don’t involve polite lies(like saying “good morning” to people when meeting them) but a lot of them do, and I think those that do can only be explained by ongoing or past deception or short-range emotional management(arguably another sort of deception)