Do you disagree that lack of social grace is an epistemic virtue, though? Social skills might indeed be useful for maintaining cooperative coalitions, but this doesn’t necessarily conflict with the thesis of the post. I guess some social graces don’t involve polite lies(like saying “good morning” to people when meeting them) but a lot of them do, and I think those that do can only be explained by ongoing or past deception or short-range emotional management(arguably another sort of deception)
Do you disagree that lack of social grace is an epistemic virtue, though? Social skills might indeed be useful for maintaining cooperative coalitions, but this doesn’t necessarily conflict with the thesis of the post. I guess some social graces don’t involve polite lies(like saying “good morning” to people when meeting them) but a lot of them do, and I think those that do can only be explained by ongoing or past deception or short-range emotional management(arguably another sort of deception)