Why is your prior so strong ? Is this due to the usual somewhat arbitrary combination of your genetics and upbringing—which, IMO, is where most of our priors come from—or is there some other reason ?
Virtually entirely due to my upbringing.
Hmm, well, I hope you don’t see me as one of those people.
No, I don’t see you as one of those people. Such people are to atheism as militant fundamentalists are to any religion; they’re there, they’re outspoken, they won’t listen to anyone who disagrees with them, and they’re fortunately very rare.
All of the evidence for the existence of gods (of any kind) that I have ever seen was either faked for a profit (weeping statues, faith healing, etc.), hearsay (friend of a friend of a cousin who heard about this one time...), or unfalsifiable (“god acts in mysterious ways”). What’s worse, many phenomena that have been historically attributed to direct intervention by gods—such as thunder, lightning, living tissue, formation of planets, rainbows, volcanic eruptions, disease, etc. -- have since then been explained in terms of purely natural mechanisms. This leads me to believe that future acts of god(s) would likewise be reduced.
I’ve given a bit of thought to the idea of proving the existence of miracles in a laboratory setting. It runs into a few problems.
For a start, let’s divide miracles into two types; the once-off miracle, which happens only once and cannot be reproduced under laboratory conditions, and the repeatable miracle, which happens every time the right conditions are in place.
For obvious reasons, the once-off miracle is not suitable; since it cannot be reproduced, it cannot be used in a scientific context to show more than coincidence.
So let us then consider the repeatable miracle. For the purposes of discussion, I will pick out one potential example; let us say that all fires refuse to burn any orphan. This would be reproducible in a laboratory, and it would be clearly miraculous, by our current understanding of science.
Now, let us consider a world where no fire had ever burnt an orphan. How would it differ from our world? Well, there are a few obvious ways—almost all firemen would be orphans, it would be possible to prove a parent’s death by checking if their children are burnt by a candle flame, and some psychopaths would kill their own parents to become fireproof.
And scientists would struggle to find a mechanism for the fireproofness of orphans. Sooner or later, someone would suggest something that sounded vaguely believable… and it would be tested. If it fails the test, then someone else will suggest something else, and so on. The history of science is full of theories that later turned out to be false—phlogiston, luminiferous aether—and were replaced by better theories. In this case, the theory would be wrong (since it’s direct divine influence saving all the orphans) - but unless it could be disproved, it would be accepted (and if it could be disproved, it would be replaced).
Either way, the laboratory tests wouldn’t say ‘miracle’.
If you posit the existence of an incredibly powerful and mysterious entity—be it a god, or an AI, or a Matrix Lord, or whatever—then how can I prove to you that any given phenomenon was not caused by him (it/them/etc.) ?
Quite honestly, I haven’t the faintest idea. Trying to prove the non-existence of God is exactly like proving a negative, because it is a negative.
What criteria do you use to judge whether any given event was caused by the god, or by some perfectly natural mechanism (the exact nature of which may or may not be known to you).
All perfectly natural mechanisms were set in place by God as well.
Hmm, I think I do disagree with you on something (other than our conclusions, that is). When I consider a piece of writing, I consider all the things that you mention, but I also compare the setting and the events in the book to those in the real world.
Thus, for example, if I were to read a story that is written in the style of a news report, about perfectly ordinary people who live in modern-day San Francisco, behave in ways consistent with human nature, and fight vampires—then I would still discount the story as fiction, because I am quite certain that vampires don’t exist (given the total lack of evidence for them). The same applies to elves, magic users, alien visitors, etc.
That said, I am still not clear about your own approach. From my perspective, the vast majority of the Old and New testaments is written in the same way as the Book of Job, with the possible exception of commandments (“thou shalt not do X” / “thou must do Y”) and the infamous “begats” in Chronicles.
Presumably, you would disagree, so could you perhaps contrast Job with some other passage, which you do take to be literal ?
The infamous ‘begats’ in Chronicles have a problem, in that they assume that Adam and Eve were real (that’s where the biblical literalists get their ‘the Earth is six thousand years old’ from; counting generations and making some assumptions about how long people live).
As for literal; that’s a very high bar to meet. I often hear (and even make) statements which are intended to communicate a true fact, but which are not literally true; and even in court, eye-witness statements may and often do conflict on minor details.
So, given that I hold it to the bar of ‘eye-witness statement’ or, in parts, ‘hearsay’ rather than to the higher bar of ‘every last literal word perfectly true’, I shall present to you the four Gospels as an example
For a start, let’s divide miracles into two types; the once-off miracle, which happens only once and cannot be reproduced under laboratory conditions, and the repeatable miracle, which happens every time the right conditions are in place.
I can see a couple of issues with this formulation, defining a miracle for the moment as a suspension of natural law by divine fiat. First, while a one-time miracle presumably wouldn’t be reproducible under laboratory conditions, most miracles that I can think of would leave an inconsistency with known physical law and could be analyzed by working backwards from the available evidence. Some would be more obvious or easier to evaluate than others; if the face of the Virgin Mary appeared in my cornflakes one morning, I’d have only until they got soggy to publicize the event, but if a volcanic eruption in Luzon generated a pyroclastic cloud that scoured the rest of a town down to bedrock but left every board of a flimsy wooden church unharmed, there’s still plenty of lahar sediments to analyze. You don’t need to grow evidence in a Petri dish for it to be real science.
(Though it’s worth mentioning here that lots of religions, plus Charles Fort, allege odd phenomena. Incorrupt corpses are alleged for a number of Catholic saints, for example, and the corpses in question certainly look less corrupt than I’d expect them to be, but they also show up among Buddhist monks.)
Then there’s the idea that miracles might show signs of agency, i.e. be directed at some goal; God’s motives in the context of Christianity are of course famously ineffable, but the miracles alleged in the Bible do show certain patterns (protection of the innocent or of a chosen people; glorification of God; etc.) and we might reasonably expect these to continue. We can pick these out with statistical methods: if preachers of one particular sect are indistinguishable from those of another in terms of habits and demographics and there’s enough of both to make a good sample, but the rate of lethal accidents for one is zero, that’s certainly suggestive.
Finally, many alleged miracles are persistent in time but limited in space: Lourdes water, weeping statues. These leave an inconsistency that’s laboratory testable (many have been tested, generally with negative results) but wouldn’t be factored into models of physical law, or which at least would lead to much less elegant physics than we observe.
First, while a one-time miracle presumably wouldn’t be reproducible under laboratory conditions, most miracles that I can think of would leave an inconsistency with known physical law and could be analyzed by working backwards from the available evidence.
That is an excellent point, and some analyses of the sort have been done. The Shroud of Turin being a famous example (conclusion: radiocarbon dating suggests it was likely from a thousand years or so too late, but it’s not yet quite clear how it was made; lots of argument and disagreement). Another, perhaps a little less well-known, would be the Miracle of Lanciano
Though it’s worth mentioning here that lots of religions, plus Charles Fort, allege odd phenomena.
It’s not impossible that God might respond equally to anyone who fulfills a certain list of criteria, regardless of what religion the person follows. A devout Buddhist may have as much chance of leaving an incorrupt corpse as a devout Catholic.
...which leads, of course, to the immediate question of what the relevant criteria are. I don’t know. I have a few guesses, but they’re speculative.
Then there’s the idea that miracles might show signs of agency
This is an excellent point. However; in order to detect the agency, it would be necessary to have some idea of the goal. Considering that omniscience and omnipotence are often considered divine attributes, the best idea that we can have for the goal is to consider that what is happening is what was intended; but that quickly becomes a circular argument, because it is trivially clear that if what is happening is what was intended, then it was successful.
if preachers of one particular sect are indistinguishable from those of another in terms of habits and demographics and there’s enough of both to make a good sample, but the rate of lethal accidents for one is zero, that’s certainly suggestive.
It would be very suggestive and, quite honestly, a little worrying. It would imply that there was nothing worthwhile in the preachers of one sect, and at the same time, that none of the preachers of the the sect joined for selfish motives (such as, for example, immunity to fatal accidents) and don’t really care about doing their duties correctly.
Finally, many alleged miracles are persistent in time but limited in space: Lourdes water, weeping statues. These leave an inconsistency that’s laboratory testable (many have been tested, generally with negative results) but wouldn’t be factored into models of physical law, or which at least would lead to much less elegant physics than we observe.
That is true. I guess that would fall under laboratory-testable. I imagine a number of them would be faked, or turn out to be a one-in-a-billion statistical fluke—the genuine ones may get lost in the noise.
It’s not impossible that God might respond equally to anyone who fulfills a certain list of criteria, regardless of what religion the person follows. A devout Buddhist may have as much chance of leaving an incorrupt corpse as a devout Catholic.
On the other hand, it’s also quite possible that the phenomenon of incorrupt corpses occurs regardless of the virtues of the individuals in question, but then corpses of the particularly virtuous are held up as examples of divine grace, while the incorrupt corpses of ordinary people, not being seen as evidence of anything in particular, are ignored.
You mentioned before the possibility of militant atheists cherrypicking evidence to support their position. This is certainly a consideration that has to be accounted for, but so is the possibility that the evidence favoring religion only appears compelling because it is cherrypicked. This also occurs to a considerable extent with nigh-certainty. Consider, for example, the healing miracles of Lourdes, which Nornagest mentioned above, which have made it an international pilgrimage destination, despite the fact that statistical analyses of the recovery rates of pilgrims do not suggest that the location has any particular healing power. Counting every unexplained recovery, while not counting the nonrecoveries, can create the appearance of persistent miracles.
Hard-to-explain things happen all the time, and we’re much more likely to notice them if they seem indicative of something important to us than if they don’t.
On the other hand, it’s also quite possible that the phenomenon of incorrupt corpses occurs regardless of the virtues of the individuals in question, but then corpses of the particularly virtuous are held up as examples of divine grace, while the incorrupt corpses of ordinary people, not being seen as evidence of anything in particular, are ignored.
That is also a possibility. And it can be tested for; if it is true, then the percentage of incorrupt corpses should be constant whether the people were virtuous before dying or whether they were legally executed for crimes committed (and not later exonerated by, say, DNA evidence).
...I have no idea what the results of actually checking that would be, but it would certainly be interesting.
You mentioned before the possibility of militant atheists cherrypicking evidence to support their position. This is certainly a consideration that has to be accounted for, but so is the possibility that the evidence favoring religion only appears compelling because it is cherrypicked. This also occurs to a considerable extent with nigh-certainty.
That is a very strong possibility that must be borne in mind, yes.
Consider, for example, the healing miracles of Lourdes, which Nornagest mentioned above, which have made it an international pilgrimage destination, despite the fact that statistical analyses of the recovery rates of pilgrims do not suggest that the location has any particular healing power. Counting every unexplained recovery, while not counting the nonrecoveries, can create the appearance of persistent miracles.
From the Wikipedia article on Lourdes:
An estimated 200 million people have visited the shrine since 1860,[4] and the Roman Catholic Church has officially recognised 69 healings considered miraculous. Cures are examined using Church criteria for authenticity and authentic miracle healing with no physical or psychological basis other than the healing power of the water.[5]
Both references were retrieved on 5 May 2009, though the second was dated 21 October 2003. There we have a rate; 69 miraculous cures, out of 200 million people (and any number of non-miraculous cures as well, of course).
If there is nothing to Lourdes, then this should be similar to the number of miraculous cures among a random sampling of 200 million people with various illnesses.
(Sixty-nine out of two hundred million is low enough to give the appearance of statistical noise; that’s odds of close to one in three milllion)
Makes sense. This may not be a fair question to ask, but do you believe that, given all available evidence, you’d still be a theist if your prior was a bit lower—say, about 50% ?
Regarding miracles, I think you and I mean different things by the term.
Both of the kinds of miracles you described sound fairly mundane to me. The first kind is basically a rare unexplained occurrence; these happen every day, and, given what we now know of statistics, it would in fact be quite odd if they did not occur. For example, last week I was filling up my car and saw that my odometer read “123455”; that was neat, but I wouldn’t call it miraculous.
The second kind of miracle sounds like a natural law to me, just like gravity or heat transfer or something. You say that “all perfectly natural mechanisms were set in place by God as well”; does this mean that pretty much everything that happens is a miracle ? Doesn’t that rather dilute the word “miracle” to the point where it just means, “stuff that happens” ?
So, given that I hold it to the bar of ‘eye-witness statement’ or, in parts, ‘hearsay’ rather than to the higher bar of ‘every last literal word perfectly true’, I shall present to you the four Gospels as an example
Huh, that’s odd. When I read the Gospels, I get the same exact impression as the one you described regarding the book of Job. The Gospels basically consist of a thin plot that serves to hold together several tangentially related morality tales, as well as monologues by the main character which are explicitly meant to be metaphorical (involving olive trees, donkeys, and such, borrowing some tropes from Aesop’s fables). Jesus does some fantastical things in the book, but these always serve to illustrate some moral lesson or another; in this, he is pretty similar to other characters in the Bible who summon bears, survive inside whales, etc.
So, could you contrast the two stories (the Gospels, or perhaps some specific passage from the New Testament, vs. Job), to illustrate why you believe that one is mostly fiction, and the other mostly fact ?
Makes sense. This may not be a fair question to ask, but do you believe that, given all available evidence, you’d still be a theist if your prior was a bit lower—say, about 50% ?
I cannot say for sure. I’d like to say ‘yes’… but too much of my history would need to change for that to be true. I can’t say anything for certain about that counterfactual me.
Regarding miracles, I think you and I mean different things by the term.
Both of the kinds of miracles you described sound fairly mundane to me. The first kind is basically a rare unexplained occurrence; these happen every day
Yes, but some are mere coincidences, like your odometer; while others appear to subvert the natural order, like the Sun doing a dance.
The second kind of miracle sounds like a natural law to me, just like gravity or heat transfer or something.
Yes, that was more-or-less my point.
You say that “all perfectly natural mechanisms were set in place by God as well”; does this mean that pretty much everything that happens is a miracle ? Doesn’t that rather dilute the word “miracle” to the point where it just means, “stuff that happens” ?
I’d say that any kind of natural law is exactly as miraculous as a permanently-repeatable miracle. I don’t really think that dilutes the work ‘miracle’ all that much; after all, some pretty amazing stuff happens on a continual basis. (It may inflate the phrase ‘stuff that happens’ somewhat; but when one considers all that goes into stuff happening, it can be pretty impressive in any case).
So, could you contrast the two stories (the Gospels, or perhaps some specific passage from the New Testament, vs. Job), to illustrate why you believe that one is mostly fiction, and the other mostly fact ?
Hmmm.
For Job, I shall pick out Job chapters 4 and 5; a very long, wordy speech by one speaker. Note that this is framed as being one of Job’s friends, taking to Job after Job has lost everything and moaned about it a bit. Completely overblown. I can’t imagine anyone speaking like that in a conversation.
Compare this passage from the Gospel of John (specifically, John 18:28-19:16); wherein Jesus is taken before Pilate by a mob who want to have him killed; what people say here is a lot shorter and more to-the-point. It’s easier to see Pilate as a civil servant who just really doesn’t want anything to do with this mess that’s been thrown on his lap; his reactions seem far more plausible than Job’s friends’ speeches.
For Job, I shall pick out Job chapters 4 and 5; a very long, wordy speech by one speaker. Note that this is framed as being one of Job’s friends, taking to Job after Job has lost everything and moaned about it a bit. Completely overblown. I can’t imagine anyone speaking like that in a conversation.
Jesus has a similar overblown speech spanning multiple chapters in John (14-18)
Compare this passage from the Gospel of John (specifically, John 18:28-19:16); wherein Jesus is taken before Pilate by a mob who want to have him killed; what people say here is a lot shorter and more to-the-point. It’s easier to see Pilate as a civil servant who just really doesn’t want anything to do with this mess that’s been thrown on his lap; his reactions seem far more plausible than Job’s friends’ speeches.
Just FYI, Pilate’s behavior in the Gospels is almost completely at odds with how he’s described in literature that’s actually contemporary with when Pilate lived. Pilate in the Gospels is depicted as a patient, if not a slightly annoyed, judge of character. Only succumbing to executing Jesus because he doesn’t want a riot to start. Pilate depicted by Philo (who was writing when Pilate was still alive) describes Pilate as stubborn, inflexible, greedy, impatient, executing multiple people without trials, and has no qualms about ignoring the will of Jewish mobs. Pilate is actually relieved of his duty because he was such a corrupt prefect.
Also, Barabbas, the character that the Jews want released in Jesus’ stead: His name “Barabbas” literally means “son of the father” which just so happens to be Jesus’ identity. Not only would Pilate not have acquiesced to releasing a (presumably) convicted criminal to appease a Jewish crowd, but there was no tradition of letting a prisoner go during Passover.
The whole trial scene with Pilate is exceedingly improbable if one knows the history of the time period, even if Pilate uses more to the point wording; that is easily fabricated.
Jesus has a similar overblown speech spanning multiple chapters in John (14-18)
It’s a long speech, yes, and spans multiple chapters; but it’s not the sort of overblown verbiage one finds in Job. The speeches in Job are long not because they have a lot to say, but because they insist on saying everything in the most drawn-out and overdone way possible; each entire speech could probably be replaced by two or three sentences easily. It would be a lot harder to replace Jesus’ speech in John 14-17 with a similarly few short phrases.
Just FYI, Pilate’s behavior in the Gospels is almost completely at odds with how he’s described in literature that’s actually contemporary with when Pilate lived.
Okay, I’ve followed up your link, and I don’t think it backs up your claim as completely as you seem to assume it does. (That’s aside from the fact that people are complex beings, and often do unexpected things.) I hadn’t really looked into other sources on Pilate before reading your comment, so this is just sortof off the top of my head.
So, the picture I get of Pilate from your link is of someone who really doesn’t like the Jews, and is quite willing to set his soldiers on them—even to the point of enticing a Jewish crowd to form in a place where he can arrange disguised soldiers in its midst, so that his disguised troops can cut up the nearby protestors. He has no qualms about sentencing people to death and really, really doesn’t like to change his mind.
So. Imagine a person like that, and then imagine that this Jewish mob turns up on his doorstep, all unexpected, clamouring to have this man put to death. Pilate may not have qualms about sentencing a man to death; but a stubborn and inflexible man who doesn’t like the Jewish mob isn’t going to want to give them what they want. No, he’s going to want to deny them out of sheer contrariness; he’s going to look for a way to get this guy out of his hair, alive, so that he can go back and bother the Jews more.
And then, of course, there’s the data point that he often turns against the mob. But he’s human; one man against a mob tends to go really badly for the one man, and he knows that. He doesn’t turn against the mob on his own—he turns against the mob when he’s backed up by enough soldiers. As in the example where he had the soldiers disguise themselves to join the mob, this takes planning. This takes forethought. This takes knowing that the mob is going to be there. In advance. A mob that turns up entirely unannounced, while Pilate’s busy with other stuff and perhaps some of his soldiers are on leave, is another matter entirely; that calls for defusing them now, and punishing them later, when there’s been time to plan it out. And hey, this mob gets defused by simply having this one Jewish guy killed. Not optimal, but better than a riot that the troops aren’t quite ready to deal with...
Not only would Pilate not have acquiesced to releasing a (presumably) convicted criminal to appease a Jewish crowd, but there was no tradition of letting a prisoner go during Passover.
Given the picture you’ve painted, as a corrupt prefect, he might well release some minor brigand who’d only preyed on the peasants and left anyone with soldiers alone.
I cannot say for sure. I’d like to say ‘yes’… but too much of my history would need to change for that to be true.
Yeah, that’s probably what I’d say, too.
Yes, but some are mere coincidences, like your odometer; while others appear to subvert the natural order, like the Sun doing a dance.
How do you know which is which; and how do you know when the natural order has truly been subverted ? For example, I personally don’t know much about that dancing sun event, but the fact that (according to Wikipedia, at least) it has not been recorded by any cameras or other instruments leads me to believe that human psychology, rather than divine intervention, was responsible.
That said, in your estimation, approximately how many miracles of that kind are occurring on Earth per year ?
after all, some pretty amazing stuff happens on a continual basis
Agreed. So, when we talk about miracles, let’s stick to unusual acts of divine intervention.
Compare this passage from the Gospel of John …
In addition to what JQuinton said, I’d like to add that, while the New Testament definitely contains more action than Job, it’s still pretty much full of parables, sermons, and long-winded speeches; for example, such as the one directly preceeding the passage you quoted—and that’s not even the longest one. I agree that the supporting characters are a bit more lifelike in the New Testament—but then, it’s also a much longer book, so there are more pages available to flesh them out.
Furthermore, there are many other works of literature with even better writing; for example, the Odyssey, Moby Dick, or, more recently, Harry Potter. Presumably, you don’t believe that these works describe real events; but if so, why not ?
How do you know which is which; and how do you know when the natural order has truly been subverted ?
Well, first you have to know what the natural order is. And that requires the help of the physicists and other scientists.
What a scientist cannot explain may or may not be a subversion of the natural order. (What a scientist can explain may or may not also be a subversion of the natural order—some scientists can be trapped into providing justifications for incorrect versions of events—but it’s still a useful filtering tool) Or it may be a thing that the physicist will have to update his model of physics to explain.
...it’s not an easy question.
For example, I personally don’t know much about that dancing sun event, but the fact that (according to Wikipedia, at least) it has not been recorded by any cameras or other instruments leads me to believe that human psychology, rather than divine intervention, was responsible.
That’s not impossible. (I don’t know much about it either; it was linked from the wikipedia article on ‘miracle’).
That said, in your estimation, approximately how many miracles of that kind are occurring on Earth per year ?
Ummm… if I had to guess… I’d guess less than one. I wouldn’t venture a guess as to how much less than one, though.
Agreed. So, when we talk about miracles, let’s stick to unusual acts of divine intervention.
Defining whether a given event is or is not an unusual act of divine intervention may be tricky; but fair enough, let’s go with that definition for the moment.
Furthermore, there are many other works of literature with even better writing; for example, the Odyssey, Moby Dick, or, more recently, Harry Potter. Presumably, you don’t believe that these works describe real events; but if so, why not ?
You’re right; nothing that’s written in the Gospels can raise it to a status of higher than ‘plausible’. Many clear works of fiction also reach the status of ‘plausible’; in order to reach the higher status of ‘probably true’, one needs a certain amount of external verification.
I find a good deal of that external verification in the fact that a number of people, in whom I place a great deal of trust, and at least some of whom are known to be better at identifying truth than I am, have told me that it is true.
What a scientist cannot explain may or may not be a subversion of the natural order. … it’s not an easy question.
Ok, I admit that science is hard. But about you ? How do you, personally, know what’s a subversion of the natural order and what isn’t ?
That’s not impossible.
Which possibility do you think is more likely in this case: genuine miracle, or mass confirmation bias ? That’s why I’d like you to clarify this:
I wouldn’t venture a guess as to how much less than one, though.
Well, can you put a ballpark figure on it ? Do miracles happen (on average) once a year ? Once a century ? Once a millennium ? Once per the lifetime of our Universe ?
I find a good deal of that external verification in the fact that a number of people, in whom I place a great deal of trust, and at least some of whom are known to be better at identifying truth than I am, have told me that it is true.
I think this is another difference between our methods; and I must confess that I find your approach quite weird. This doesn’t automatically mean that it’s wrong, of course; in fact, many theists (including C.S.Lewis) advocate it, so there might be something to it. I just don’t see what.
The big difference between your approach and mine is that you seem to be entirely discounting empirical evidence; or, if not discounting it, then trivializing it at the very least. So, for example, if a trusted friend told you that he was fishing in the pond behind his house and caught a Great White shark; and if all of your friends confirmed this; then you’d accept that as true. I, on the other hand, would ask to see the shark.
The reason for this is not that I’m some sort of a hateful, un-trusting person (or rather, that’s not the only reason, heh); but because we have mountains and mountains of data on sharks, and all of it tells us that they are incredibly unlikely to show up in ponds, and are also quite strong and thus nearly impossible to catch using an ordinary fishing line. Compared to this overwhelming pile of evidence, the testimony of a few people does not suffice to turn the tide of my belief.
So, is there a reason why you value empirical evidence as little as you do ? Alternatively, did I completely misunderstand your position ?
Ok, I admit that science is hard. But about you ? How do you, personally, know what’s a subversion of the natural order and what isn’t ?
I have at least as much difficulty as the hypothetical scientist. Possibly slightly more difficulty, because the hypothetical scientist will know more science than I do.
Which possibility do you think is more likely in this case: genuine miracle, or mass confirmation bias ?
Insufficient data for a firm conclusion.
Opposing the mass confirmation bias hypothesis, are the claims that the water on the ground and on people’s clothing was dried during the time; also apparently people ‘miles away’ (and thus unlikely to have been caught up in mass hysteria at the time) also reported having seen it.
Having said that, there is another explanation that occurs to me; the scene was described as the dancing sun appearing after a rainstorm, bursting through the clouds:
“As if like a bolt from the blue, the clouds were wrenched apart, and the sun at its zenith appeared in all its splendor.”
If the clouds were thick enough, it may be hard to see the Sun; the bright light could have been… something else sufficiently hot and bright. (I do not know what, but there’s room for a number of other hypotheses there).
I wouldn’t venture a guess as to how much less than one, though.
Well, can you put a ballpark figure on it ? Do miracles happen (on average) once a year ? Once a century ? Once a millennium ? Once per the lifetime of our Universe ?
I am very poorly calibrated on such low frequencies, so take what I say here is highly speculative. (Also, the rate seems very variable, with several a year in the time of the Gospels, for example).
At a rough guess, I’d say possibly somewhere between once a year and once a century. Might be more, might be less.
I find a good deal of that external verification in the fact that a number of people, in whom I place a great deal of trust, and at least some of whom are known to be better at identifying truth than I am, have told me that it is true.
I think this is another difference between our methods; and I must confess that I find your approach quite weird. This doesn’t automatically mean that it’s wrong, of course; in fact, many theists (including C.S.Lewis) advocate it, so there might be something to it. I just don’t see what.
Let me explain further, then, by means of an analogy. Consider the example you provide, of a trustworthy friend claiming to have found a great white shark in a nearby pond. For the sake of argument, I shall assume a rather large pond, in which a Great White could plausibly survive a day or two, but fed and drained by rivers too small for a Great White to swim along.
I shall further assume that you are aware that all your friends were on the fishing trip together (which you were unable to join due to a prior appointment).
Now, catching a Great White is a noteworthy accomplishment. If your friend were to accomplish this, it is reasonable to assign a high probability that he would tell you. Therefore, I assign the following:
P (Being told | Great White caught) = 0.95
It is also possible that your friends are collaborating on a prank, giving you an implausible story to see if they can convince you. If this is the case, they could have decided to do so while on the fishing trip, and laid out the necessary plans then. Exactly what probability you assign to this depends a lot on your friends; however, for the sake of argument, I shall assume that there’s a 20% chance of this scenario.
P (Being told | No great white caught) = 0.2
Now, furthermore, there is no plausible way for a Great White to have ended up in the pond; and no plausible way to catch one with a simple fishing line. There are a variety of implausible but physically possible ways to accomplish both actions, though. So the prior probability of a Great White being caught is very low:
P (Great White caught) = 0.05
(possibly less than that, but let’s go with that for the moment).
Thus, P(Being told) = P (Being told | Great White caught) P(Great White caught) + P (Being told | No great white caught) P(No great white caught)
= (0.95 0.05) + (0.2 0.95)
= 0.2375
Plugging this into Bayes, P(Great White caught | Being told) = P (Being told | Great White caught) P(Great White caught)/P(Being told)
= (0.95 0.05)/0.2375
= 0.2
So, given certain assumptions about how trustworthy your friends are, etc., I find that the probability that they have indeed captured a Great White is higher if they tell you that they have than if they do not. Mind you, the prior probability for capturing a Great White is very low to begin with; the end result is still that it is more probable that they are lying than that they have captured a Great White, and you would be perfectly sensible to request further proof, in the form of the shark in question, before believing their claims.
So, is there a reason why you value empirical evidence as little as you do ? Alternatively, did I completely misunderstand your position ?
It’s not that I completely discard empirical evidence; it’s just that empirical evidence, one way or another, is somewhat rare in the case of this particular question, and thus I am forced to rely on what evidence I can find.
I have, on at least one occasion, observed some evidence; but it’s the sort of evidence that doesn’t communicate well and is rather unconvincing at one remove (I know it happened, because I remember it, but I have no proof other than my unsupported word).
You yourself have said that the prior probability of a miracle occurring on any given day is relatively small, “somewhere between once a year and once a century”. You also said that, if a miracle were to occur, you would likely be unable to recognize it as such: “I have at least as much difficulty as the hypothetical scientist. Possibly slightly more difficulty...”. You also offered a plausible-sounding natural explanation for the event, and, as you mentioned, many other perfectly natural explanations exist. In addition, we have zero recorded evidence for this miracle, other than people’s testimonies; whereas any other spectacular events (such as volcano eruptions or Justin Bieber sightings) are usually accompanied by plenty of recorded data (including news reports, cellphone footage, instrument telemetry, etc. etc.).
Given all of this, I’d argue that the probability of this particular event being a miracle is quite low—even if we grant that a miracle-causing god of some sort does exist.
P (Great White caught) = 0.05
Whoa, whoa, wait a minute, 0.05 is huge ! It’s about 460 times greater than your odds of dying in a car accident during any given year, assuming you live in the USA. And that’s car accidents, which are pretty common events. Given that no recorded evidence of a backyard shark catch exists, I’d estimate its prior to be even lower. After all, meteorite strikes that damage people or property are extremely rare, and yet we do have recorded evidence of them happening, so pond sharks have got to be even more rare than that.
If we estimate the prior at something fairly optimistic, like 1 / 7e6 (meaning that we’d expect this rare event to happen to at least one person on any given day, seeing as there are 7e6 people on Earth), we still get a probability of something like 5.7e-7, which is about the same odds as winning the lottery (though I could be wrong, I don’t know much about lotteries).
It’s not that I completely discard empirical evidence; it’s just that empirical evidence, one way or another, is somewhat rare in the case of this particular question...
Wouldn’t this drive down the probability ? If I knew that people were catching great whites in ponds all the time, I’d be more likely to believe my friends when they told me they caught one, right ?
I have, on at least one occasion, observed some evidence; but it’s the sort of evidence that doesn’t communicate well and is rather unconvincing at one remove...
What makes you trust the evidence, then ?
If I went fishing in a pond one day, and caught what appears to be at first glance a great white shark, I wouldn’t trust my initial impressions. I’d start looking for a hidden camera. And maybe get an MRI, just in case. Those probabilities apply to everyone, including myself. Would you not agree ?
You yourself have said that the prior probability of a miracle occurring on any given day is relatively small, “somewhere between once a year and once a century”. You also said that, if a miracle were to occur, you would likely be unable to recognize it as such: “I have at least as much difficulty as the hypothetical scientist. Possibly slightly more difficulty...”. You also offered a plausible-sounding natural explanation for the event, and, as you mentioned, many other perfectly natural explanations exist.
All true.
In addition, we have zero recorded evidence for this miracle, other than people’s testimonies; whereas any other spectacular events (such as volcano eruptions or Justin Bieber sightings) are usually accompanied by plenty of recorded data (including news reports, cellphone footage, instrument telemetry, etc. etc.).
I would like to point out that, first of all, this occurred in 1917; there were no cellphones to take cellphone footage. And there were news reports at the time (there’s a scan of at least one relevant newspaper page on the wikipedia page)
I don’t think this detracts all that much from your point, but I felt I should point it out.
Given all of this, I’d argue that the probability of this particular event being a miracle is quite low—even if we grant that a miracle-causing god of some sort does exist.
I expect that there are significantly more events claimed to be miracles than there are actual miracles. So, given as cursory a look over the available evidence as we’ve taken in this discussion, it would be sensible to assign a low probability to this incident having been a miracle, yes.
P (Great White caught) = 0.05
Whoa, whoa, wait a minute, 0.05 is huge !
You’re right, it is really rather unreasonably large. (All of my assumed priors in my previous posts were multiples of 1⁄20, a level of granularity perhaps too coarse for this figure). However, I don’t believe that detracts from the point I was making at all.
Consider: P(Being told) = P (Being told | Great White caught) P(Great White caught) + P (Being told | No great white caught) P(No great white caught)
Taking the previously assumed values of P (Being told | Great White caught) = 0.95 and P (Being told | No great white caught) = 0.2, and taking P(Great White caught) as 1e(-10), that gives P(Being told) = (0.95 1e(-10)) + (0.2 (1 − 1e(-10))) = 0.200000000075
Now, substituting these values in Bayes: P(Great White caught | Being told) = P (Being told | Great White caught) P(Great White caught)/P(Being told) = (0.95 1e(-10))/0.200000000075 = 0.00000000047499999982; or approximately 4.75e-10. While this is minute, it is still over four times larger than the probability that they had caught a Great White had they not yet told you; being told that they had caught a Great White is still evidence in favour of a Great White having been caught. (Though not enough to make it probable that a Great White had actually been caught).
Wouldn’t this drive down the probability ? If I knew that people were catching great whites in ponds all the time, I’d be more likely to believe my friends when they told me they caught one, right ?
No, because the fact that great whites are not being caught in ponds all the time is evidence. It is very strong evidence for the hypothesis that great whites are not often found, or caught, in ponds.
When I say that empirical evidence is rare, I mean that many things can be adequately explained whether it is true that God exists or not. Therefore, those things do not act as evidence either for or against the hypothesis.
I have, on at least one occasion, observed some evidence; but it’s the sort of evidence that doesn’t communicate well and is rather unconvincing at one remove...
What makes you trust the evidence, then ?
If I went fishing in a pond one day, and caught what appears to be at first glance a great white shark, I wouldn’t trust my initial impressions. I’d start looking for a hidden camera. And maybe get an MRI, just in case. Those probabilities apply to everyone, including myself. Would you not agree ?
Rather than continue to talk in hypotheticals, I think I’ll take a moment to describe the incident in question (and I think you’ll see why I say I expect you to be unconvinced by it).
I was waiting outside Church; I had been nearby for some other reason, and it would not be economical to go home before mass (as I would then have had to leave immediately again), but there was still some time to wait. Having planned for this eventuality, I had a book to read with me. (I should perhaps mention, at this point, that I am notorious among my close acquaintances for the difficulty of interrupting me in the middle of a good book).
A little way outside the church, there is a large crucifix set up. While I was reading, a man walked by and knelt at the crucifix in prayer. And, for a brief while, I felt this very strong sense of Presence… strong enough that I found myself unable to continue reading my book until it had gone.
And that’s it. After a while, the man got up and walked away; the sense of Presence receded.
So, what makes me trust the evidence? I remember it; and I do not believe there was any way that any human could have faked that experience.
The obvious explanation is a brain malfunction, not fakery by another human.
(I also suspect confirmation bias. If you had had the same experience without a man praying nearby, you wouldn’t have decided that it proves that such experiences have nothing to do with prayer.)
But even ignoring that, plenty of Muslims and people of other religions have had similar experiences. Yet I doubt you believe that they were real. Since you believe that similar experiences by Muslims are not real, you obviously do believe that there are explanations other than the experience being real. Why not now, too?
The obvious explanation is a brain malfunction, not fakery by another human.
Possible; but I consider it an extremely low-probability possibility, for much the same reason as I consider the possibility that a given cloud I see in the sky is a hallucination has very low probability.
(I also suspect confirmation bias. If you had had the same experience without a man praying nearby, you wouldn’t have decided that it proves that such experiences have nothing to do with prayer.)
No… but I do believe I would still have interpreted it as evidence for the existence of God.
But even ignoring that, plenty of Muslims and people of other religions have had similar experiences. Yet I doubt you believe that they were real.
Ah—be careful of assumptions. I see no reason why some of them might not have been real. I’m not sure that the details of what building one goes into for worship, or the wording of the sermons, are what’s really important.
Consider Matthew 25:31-46, in which the Final Judgement is directly referenced, and the criteria under which that judgement will take place are given:
35 I was hungry and you fed me, thirsty and you gave me a drink; I was a stranger and you received me in your homes, 36 naked and you clothed me; I was sick and you took care of me, in prison and you visited me.
There’s nothing in there about belonging to a specific religion; it’s all about going out there and going good things for people.
So, given that there are Muslims who are good people and do good things, I see no reason why God wouldn’t on occasion answer their prayers, on the same criteria (which are hard to find and may take as input information not available without omniscience) as He uses to respond to anyone else.
Hm. Backing up a little: what’s your confidence that an arbitrarily selected perception is the result of processing signals from a distal stimulus that conforms in all significant ways to the perception?
Very very high. Short of strong evidence that a given perception is false (and not merely might be false), I tend to assume that all of my perceptions are caused by a distal stimulus that conforms in all significant ways to the perception in question (possibly filtered by intervening effects, e.g. dimmed if I am wearing sunglasses).
Well, yes, of course very very high. And, sure, in practice we behave as though all our perceptions are like this, because treating any given one as though it isn’t is typically unjustified.
I meant the question somewhat more precisely.
For example, out of 100,000 distinct perceptions, would you estimate the chance that at least one of those perceptions lacks a conforming distal stimulus as ~1? ~.1? ~.01? ~.00001? Other?
I’m afraid I can’t really give you an answer at the level of precision you’re asking for; I’m really not well calibrated for extimating extremely low probabilities. The best I can give you is “small enough as to be near indistinguishable from zero”.
And I’m not entirely sure where I should put the upper bound of that category, either.
Well, let’s approach it from the other direction, then. Would you say that the chance that I’ve experienced at least one perception not caused by processing signals from a distal stimulus that conforms in all significant ways to the perception within the last 12 months is indistinguishable from zero? Indistinguishable from one? Somewhere in between?
There are substances that, when ingested or perhaps inhaled, will trigger hallucinations.
There are certain mental conditions which may trigger hallucinations.
Dreams might also count, given the wording you’ve used.
If I assume that you haven’t ingested any hallucinogens, knowingly or not; and that you are mentally healthy, and not counting dreams, then I’d say it falls into the “small enough as to be near indistinguishable from zero” category. (If you have ingested hallucinogens, the probability shoots up; potentially quite a lot).
Possible; but I consider it an extremely low-probability possibility, for much the same reason as I consider the possibility that a given cloud I see in the sky is a hallucination has very low probability.
The possibility that a random cloud is a hallucination is low because clouds are well-studied and there is plenty of evidence for the existence of clouds—evidence of such a nature that anyone can see it. Furthermore, we know something about hallucinations—hallucinations don’t cause random people to see random objects under random circumstances. A random cloud in the sky is not the type of thing that hallucinations typically make people see.
Your mystical experience was observable only by yourself, and was of a type which is known to be caused by brain malfunction.
So, given that there are Muslims who are good people and do good things, I see no reason why God wouldn’t on occasion answer their prayers
But the more that different religions can do this, the less the meaning of the mystical experience. If God gives those experiences to people of all religions, then those experiences are no longer evidence for any particular religion. For all you know, the Muslim idea of God is the true one, the Christian one is false, and the Muslim God gives experiences to Christians in the same way you think that the Christian one gives experiences to Muslims. Maybe Christianity is really false, the pagans are right that there is a god and a goddess, and they give mystical experiences to Christians. Maybe some form of devil-worship is correct; I assume you believe that the Devil can’t hand out mystical experiences, but if you are wrong about just that part, your experience could just as well come from the Devil.
If God gives those experiences to people of all religions, then those experiences are no longer evidence for any particular religion.
It simply suggests that the criteria that God uses, when deciding when to make His presence known, are not limited to the professed religion of the person in question. Exactly what those criteria are, is not fully clear; but any religion which helped to foster those criteria amongst its adherents would be at least partially correct, in its effects if not necessarily in its dogma.
I assume you believe that the Devil can’t hand out mystical experiences
Why not? We’re talking about the what may be second-most powerful entity in existence. (Mind you, there’s a big difference between can and will; the existence of the Devil strongly implies the existence of God, and if the Devil is trying to discourage religion, then it would be counterproductive unless some other effects of said experience outweigh that risk.)
It simply suggests that the criteria that God uses, when deciding when to make His presence known, are not limited to the professed religion of the person in question.
That sounds like you’re agreeing with me. If God gives people mystical experiences no matter what their religion, mystical experiences are no good in showing that the religion is true. Of course this is a matter of degree. The wider the range of people get the experiences, the worse the experiences are at showing anything.
If beings other than God (such as the Devil) can give out mystical experiences, it’s even worse. Mystical experiences not only don’t show that the religion is true, they don’t even show that “God exists” is true. At this point I don’t see why you care that it’s not just a brain malfunction, because even if it wasn’t, you have no way to tell between an experience sent by God, one sent by the Devil, and there being a sorcerer on every block who occasionally pulls pranks by giving random people mystical experiences.
(As for why the Devil would want to do that? Maybe he knows that people interpret mystical experiences as evidence for their religion being true and he can incite religious conflict by giving people of opposing religions mystical experiences.)
That sounds like you’re agreeing with me. If God gives people mystical experiences no matter what their religion, mystical experiences are no good in showing that the religion is true. Of course this is a matter of degree. The wider the range of people get the experiences, the worse the experiences are at showing anything.
It does not prevent said experiences from showing the existence of God, or from hinting at the criteria He finds important.
If beings other than God (such as the Devil) can give out mystical experiences, it’s even worse. Mystical experiences not only don’t show that the religion is true, they don’t even show that “God exists” is true. At this point I don’t see why you care that it’s not just a brain malfunction, because even if it wasn’t, you have no way to tell between an experience sent by God, one sent by the Devil, and there being a sorcerer on every block who occasionally pulls pranks by giving random people mystical experiences.
The devil is defined more-or-less by being in oppostion to God. If the devil exists, then so does God, pretty much.
And humans capable of pulling off a trick like that would almost certainly have been discovered by now if they were common.
It does not prevent said experiences from showing the existence of God
The more different kinds of God you think can give out mystical experiences, the vaguer the “God” that those experiences demonstrate the existence of. If the Muslim version of God can send them, maybe it shows there’s a God but he’s not necessarily Christian. If polytheistic pagan gods can send them, maybe it shows that there’s a God but he’s not necessarily Christian and there isn’t necessarily one of him either. You’ve ended up “proving” there’s a God who has few attributes other than his name.
The devil is defined more-or-less by being in oppostion to God. If the devil exists, then so does God, pretty much.
That’s just a matter of semantics. Maybe a devil-like being without a God can’t strictly speaking be called the Devil, but whatever you call him, surely you believe that if the normal Devil can give out mystical experiences, so can that one, right?
And humans capable of pulling off a trick like that would almost certainly have been discovered by now if they were common
“Every block” is just an example. Suppose there were few but not no sorcerers in the world. Couldn’t they produce mystical experiences that you could not tell from God-borne ones?
(And how do you explain the fact that people can take drugs that cause mystical experiences, get electrical shocks to their brain that trigger mystical experiences, and why some known mental illnesses are associated with mystical experiences? None of these things happen for seeing clouds except in passing.)
I find your comment very confusing. Might I suggest that we continue this discussion, after tabooing the words ‘God’ and ‘Devil’?
I’ll start out by rewriting my previous post under those same constraints:
That sounds like you’re agreeing with me. If God gives people mystical experiences no matter what their religion, mystical experiences are no good in showing that the religion is true. Of course this is a matter of degree. The wider the range of people get the experiences, the worse the experiences are at showing anything.
It does not prevent said experiences from showing the existence of [an omnipotent, omniscient being], or from hinting at the criteria He finds important.
If beings other than God (such as the Devil) can give out mystical experiences, it’s even worse. Mystical experiences not only don’t show that the religion is true, they don’t even show that “God exists” is true. At this point I don’t see why you care that it’s not just a brain malfunction, because even if it wasn’t, you have no way to tell between an experience sent by God, one sent by the Devil, and there being a sorcerer on every block who occasionally pulls pranks by giving random people mystical experiences.
The [being opposing an omnipotent, omniscient being] is defined more-or-less by being in oppostion to [an omnipotent, omniscient being]. If the [being opposing an omnipotent, omniscient being] exists, then so does [said omnipotent, omniscient being], pretty much.
And humans capable of pulling off a trick like that would almost certainly have been discovered by now if they were common.
I find your comment very confusing. Might I suggest that we continue this discussion, after tabooing the words ‘God’ and ‘Devil’?
No, not unless the claim that you’re making fits whatever words you use instead of “God” and “Devil”. In order for it to work, you would have to assert that mystical experiences can come only from omnipotent, omniscient beings or other beings who share a cosmology, and from nobody else. I find that a very peculiar thing to claim.
I would think that, if they exist, pagan gods should be able to provide mystical experiences. Pagan gods aren’t omnipotent and omniscient. A being that resembled the devil but didn’t oppose anyone powerful could provide mystical experiences, and he wouldn’t be omniscient, omnipotent, or in opposition to someone who is. Sorcerers aren’t omniscient or omnipotent, yet they could make such experiences. And we know that brain stimulation, drugs, starvation, and mental illness can produce mystical experiences and they have nothing to do with omnipotence or omniscience.
And as for sorcerers being common, the argument doesn’t depend on them being common, just on them existing. Rare sorcerers are equally a problem for the theory as common ones. There’s also the possibility that sorcerers exist in a society that is intentionally kept hidden from discovery by the muggles. (And even then, who’s to say that sorcerers haven’t been discovered? They haven’t been discovered in a reproducible way in a laboratory, but neither has God. They certainly have been discovered in the sense that an awful lot of people over a wide range of times and places were confident that they are real.)
In order for it to work, you would have to assert that mystical experiences can come only from omnipotent, omniscient beings or other beings who share a cosmology, and from nobody else. I find that a very peculiar thing to claim.
No, I simply need to assert that such experiences are more likely given the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent being than they are without the existence of such a being.
Consider, for example; if I find a drop of oil on my driveway one morning, I may conclude that my car has an oil leak. There are other ways that the oil may have got there; someone else may have parked in my driveway for a few hours overnight, and he may have an oil leak. Or a neighbour may have dripped some oil on my driveway as a prank.
The mere existence of alternate hypothesis is not, on its own, sufficient to show that a conclusion cannot be correct.
I would think that, if they exist, pagan gods should be able to provide mystical experiences.
Okay, since you’re not tabooing ‘god’, I’m going to take a guess that you mean a very powerful and knowledgeable but neither omnipotent nor omniscient being which is part of a community of similarly powerful and knowledgeable beings, whose unified actions underlie the basic physics of the universe. Is that approximately correct?
If that is what you meant, then yes, you are correct; however, the chances that such beings exist is very small, because if a number of nearly-equally-powerful yet different beings were trying to run the physics of the universe, then we would almost certainly by now have spotted some areas of blatant disagreement between different beings; it would, in short, almost certainly be clearly impossible that a theory of everything could ever be produced. (If they never disagreed about anything ever, then are they really separate beings?)
A being that resembled the devil but didn’t oppose anyone powerful could provide mystical experiences, and he wouldn’t be omniscient, omnipotent, or in opposition to someone who is.
I’m guessing here (because I’m really not sure what you mean) that you mean a single powerful and knowledgeable but neither omnipotent nor omniscient being?
If so, then again, you’re right. Such a being could provide such an experience.
And we know that brain stimulation, drugs, starvation, and mental illness can produce mystical experiences and they have nothing to do with omnipotence or omniscience.
Yes. And I know that I didn’t have electrodes in my brain, I hadn’t taken drugs, I wasn’t starved, and I’m mentally healthy.
And as for sorcerers being common, the argument doesn’t depend on them being common, just on them existing. Rare sorcerers are equally a problem for the theory as common ones.
True. The occasional rare sorceror who doesn’t even know he’s a sorceror would work. This would imply some circumstance, possibly some rare genetic mutation, which would permit some human brain to have a very direct effect on another human brain. If this could be controlled—even slightly—and if it worked on non-human brains as well, it could have a drastic positive effect on an organism’s survival. If this were the case, I’d expect to see at least one type of mildly telepathic animal, exploiting this.
...I might not, of course. It might be that the ‘sorcerors’ are the first organism to exhibit this rare mutation.
if a number of nearly-equally-powerful yet different beings were trying to run the physics of the universe, then we would almost certainly by now have spotted some areas of blatant disagreement between different beings
And if there was a God, and there was a Devil who opposed him, we’d almost certainly have spotted some areas of disagreement between them. (You could claim that yes, we have spotted such things, but of course the same claim could be made for pagan gods.)
Also, pagan gods needn’t necessarily run the physics of the universe in the sense of changing the cosmological constant.
I’d expect to see at least one type of mildly telepathic animal, exploiting this.
This would be true for certain types of psychic powers, but there are other things which can be done only by humans. Sorcerers with spellbooks have to be able to read, for instance, and even if you quibble about whether animals can read, they wouldn’t be able to read well enough to use a spellbook.
I know that I didn’t have electrodes in my brain, I hadn’t taken drugs, I wasn’t starved, and I’m mentally healthy.
The point is that mystical experiences are known to have physical causes other than the existence of a supernatural being. I would expect milder versions of those to occasionally produce mystical experiences too. Nobody may have put an electrode in your brain, but the brain is complex and can occasionally misfire by itself.
No, I simply need to assert that such experiences are more likely given the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent being than they are without the existence of such a being.
No, that’s not enough. Given that this is lesswrong, I hope you are aware of Bayseianism. The extent to which an experience is evidence of a God compared to evidence of other things that produce mystical experiences depends on your priors.It may be that a God is more likely to produce a mystical experience than anything else, but the prior for the existence of God is low enough that a mystical experience is still most likely to have been caused by something other than God.
And if there was a God, and there was a Devil who opposed him, we’d almost certainly have spotted some areas of disagreement between them.
Only if they were roughly equal in power and ability. If God is so comparatively powerful that the Devil doesn’t get to make changes to the laws of physics, then we wouldn’t see any such disagreements (because physics as a whole is still then under control of one being)
Also, pagan gods needn’t necessarily run the physics of the universe in the sense of changing the cosmological constant.
In that case, can you please explain to me what exactly you mean by the phrase ‘pagan gods’?
No, that’s not enough. Given that this is lesswrong, I hope you are aware of Bayseianism.
Yes, I am aware of Bayesianism.
The extent to which an experience is evidence of a God compared to evidence of other things that produce mystical experiences depends on your priors.It may be that a God is more likely to produce a mystical experience than anything else, but the prior for the existence of God is low enough that a mystical experience is still most likely to have been caused by something other than God.
My prior for the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient being was set pretty high; somewhere over 50%. Why do you claim that that prior has to be set “low enough that a mystical experience is still most likely to have been caused by something other than God”?
If God is so comparatively powerful that the Devil doesn’t get to make changes to the laws of physics, then we wouldn’t see any such disagreements
I was thinking more of the Devil causing small-scale events like, oh, killing someone’s child to tempt them into committing revenge, or sending people mystical experiences in order to increase religious strife. The Devil is commonly described as being able to do things like that and God doesn’t stop him, for whatever reason. I don’t care if the Devil can change the speed of light.
In that case, can you please explain to me what exactly you mean by the phrase ‘pagan gods’?
A being who has powers other than those currently recognized by science, has an area of concern and a level of power over its area of concern that is relatively high in the hierarchy if applicable, and either was worshipped or is in a class of beings that is generally worshipped.
As defining words is difficult even for well-known concepts like “chair” I reserve the right to update this definition. (If a chair is defined as being for sitting, does that mean that a chair designed as a museum art exhibit is not a chair? You try to define it and end up with locutions like “is either meant for sitting, or has features that would be considered to be designed for sitting if it was intended for sitting”.)
My prior for the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient being was set pretty high;
If you set your prior high enough, anything can become evidence for God, in which case your belief that given that prior a mystical experience is evidence for God is correct but uninteresting.
I was thinking more of the Devil causing small-scale events like, oh, killing someone’s child to tempt them into committing revenge, or sending people mystical experiences in order to increase religious strife.
But that would leave physics down to a single Being, with a single agenda; so there wouldn’t be signs of disagreement to be seen in the laws of physics themselves
In that case, can you please explain to me what exactly you mean by the phrase ‘pagan gods’?
A being who has powers other than those currently recognized by science, has an area of concern and a level of power over its area of concern that is relatively high in the hierarchy if applicable, and either was worshipped or is in a class of beings that is generally worshipped.
Ah, I see. So it’s a very powerful being, with that power limited (whether by force or by choice) to a single area of concern (or possibly to multiple areas of concern), capable of feats not explainable by current scientific theories, possibly but not necessarily with the power to alter physics directly?
Such a being could presumably create a mystical experience, yes. And if they are able to alter physics directly, then I would expect a messier physics; on the other hand, if they are [i]not[/i], then, though powerful, they are no less subject to the laws of physics than we are and would eventually be explained as science progresses towards a better understanding of the universe.
If you set your prior high enough, anything can become evidence for God, in which case your belief that given that prior a mystical experience is evidence for God is correct but uninteresting.
Not quite anything, no. And I have to be wary of anthropic reasoning.
No matter where my prior is set, though, I still consider such an experience evidence of the existence of God; in that it is more likely that I’d have the experience if God exists than if not. The only difference that the prior makes is in deciding whether or not the evidence is sufficient prove God’s existence.
I don’t understand why you insist on wondering whether some being has the power to change the laws of physics. Giving someone a mystical experience doesn’t change the laws of physics (at least not nontrivially—by some definitions anything a supernatural being does “changes the laws of physics”), and the fact that a devil-like being without an adversary, a pagan god, or a sorcerer could give you one doesn’t mean they can change the laws of physics.
if they are [i]not[/i], then, though powerful, they are no less subject to the laws of physics than we are and would eventually be explained as science progresses towards a better understanding of the universe.
“Eventually” isn’t now. You don’t believe the Devil can change the laws of physics, yet surely you acknowledge that science has no understanding of him or his powers.
Why can’t there be other types of beings like pagan gods or sorcerers, that science also doesn’t yet understand yet (regardless of whether science might understand them sometime in the future)?
No matter where my prior is set, though, I still consider such an experience evidence of the existence of God; in that it is more likely that I’d have the experience if God exists than if not.
You presumably believe God created typhoid fever and that it is more likely we would see that if God existed than if he didn’t. If all you mean is that mystical experiences are evidence for God in the same sense that typhoid fever is, then that falls under “true but uninteresting”. On the other hand, if you believe that mystical experiences are evidence for God in some stronger sense than typhoid fever, please elaborate.
I don’t understand why you insist on wondering whether some being has the power to change the laws of physics.
Because, from the start, I was presenting my experience as a piece of evidence in favour of the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent being; and ‘omnipotent’ involves, among other things, being able to alter physics.
Yes, it is possible to have a sense of presence without being able to change the laws of physics. But that’s not the point.
Right now, I honestly think that you and I are having completely different arguments. I am trying to discuss the probability of existence of an omnipotent, omniscient being; while you, as far as I can tell, are simply trying to list off alternate explanations for something I once saw. And yes, they are valid alternate explanations, but that’s not the point.
If, to take an analogy, I find a leaf on the ground (and assuming for the moment that I can’t identify a tree by its leaves) then this would be evidence in favour of the hypothesis that there is an apple tree nearby. Listing other types of tree that the leaf could have come from does not change that.
You presumably believe God created typhoid fever and that it is more likely we would see that if God existed than if he didn’t.
No; on the contrary, typhoid fever (along with virtually any other illness) is a side effect of the evolutionary process; as soon as a sufficiently large creature evolves, its body in turn forms a new environment in which other creatures (germs) can survive and grow. Illnesses, I’d think, would be almost certain to appear in any life-bearing world in the absence of God; and since I don’t understand why they exist, I can’t make the assumption that they must exist without engaging in circular reasoning. Which makes them weak evidence against the idea that God exists.
The experience I had in front of the church, on the other hand, is an experience that is very likely in a universe where an omnipotent, omniscient being exists; and seems very unlikely in a universe where that is false. Therefore, it is evidence in favour of the idea that such a being exists.
The experience I had in front of the church, on the other hand, is an experience that is very likely in a universe where an omnipotent, omniscient being exists; and seems very unlikely in a universe where that is false
This is phrased in a subtly different way from how you phrased it before, because “seems very unlikely in a universe where that is false” isn’t a conditional probability (even though you use it to find a conditional probability).
Given the way you phrased it this time, in order to say that mystical experiences are unlikely in a universe without God, you have to show that the list of other things that cause mystical experiences is unlikely in a universe without God.
I certainly don’t agree that brain malfunctions are unlikely in a universe without God. In fact, I’d say that they are very likely, especially since we know that mystical experiences can be caused by purely physical processes. And I can’t see any reason why according to your standards, pagan gods, devil-like beings, or sorcerers are unlikely.
This is phrased in a subtly different way from how you phrased it before, because “seems very unlikely in a universe where that is false” isn’t a conditional probability (even though you use it to find a conditional probability).
...that’s what my paragraph was trying to communicate.
Given the way you phrased it this time, in order to say that mystical experiences are unlikely in a universe without God, you have to show that the list of other things that cause mystical experiences is unlikely in a universe without God.
I merely need to show that the experience is more likely in a universe with God than in a universe without God.
I certainly don’t agree that brain malfunctions are unlikely in a universe without God. In fact, I’d say that they are very likely
Let us consider the set of all possible universes in which brains develop through evolutionary means, without the aid of any external beings, omnipotent or otherwise. Now, the resultant brains will, in general, merely be sufficient to result in a creature with a high chance of having grandchildren. Non-debilitating brain malfunctions are not merely likely; I’d think that they’re almost certain.
However, the effects of such malfunctions will be more-or-less random. One type of malfunction might cause the sufferer to temporarily perceive green as red and vice versa. Another might cause some form of synesthesia. Yet another might result in a sudden burst of emotion, such as rage or fear.
The odds that a malfunction will give someone the impression of an approaching Presence would be a lot lower than the odds of a random malfunction. And it is the odds of that specific malfunction that I expect to be fairly low; not the odds of brain malfunctions in general.
And I can’t see any reason why according to your standards, pagan gods, devil-like beings, or sorcerers are unlikely.
In two cases, those are immaterial beings; if one type of immaterial being exists, that’s weak evidence that another may also exist. So that implies that those two are marginally more likely in a universe that contains an omnipotent, omniscient being than in one that does not.
Aside from that very weak point, I see no reason to assume that any of those are more likely in either sort of universe. And if the probability of those are equal, and there is another potential source of mystical experiences in the universe with the omnipotent, omniscient being, then such an experience is weak evidence in favour of the existence of such a being.
No, because you phrased it differently. “The experience I had in front of the church, on the other hand, is an experience that is very likely in a universe where an omnipotent, omniscient being exists; and seems very unlikely in a universe where that is false” amounts to “P (experience | God) is high && P(experience | no God) is low”, not “P (experience | God) > P(experience | no God)”.
However, the effects of such malfunctions will be more-or-less random.
Brain malfunctions are more likely to produce some effects than others. And mystical experiences are the sort of thing brain malfunctions are likely to produce. That’s why people starve themselves and see mystical experiences, but they rarely starve themselves and start thinking they have 12 fingers. While you gave examples of other things brain malfunctions can produce, those are just other things which they are more likely than normal to produce; they don’t mean that the chance of everything is equal.
that implies that those two are marginally more likely in a universe that contains an omnipotent, omniscient being than in one that does not
Those things are only marginally more likely in a universe with a God if you believe all types of God are equally likely. It is my impression that you think a Biblical-type God is more likely.
Even if they are more likely, this falls under “true but uninteresting”. There are lots of things that are marginally more likely in a universe with God. Claiming that mystical experiences are evidence for God is only interesting if it’s better evidence than those other things. Nobody says “I saw the Loch Ness Monster, so God is marginally more likely” (seeing the Loch Ness Monster implies that science, which says there is no such thing, can fail, and if science can fail, God is marginally more likely).
No, because you phrased it differently. “The experience I had in front of the church, on the other hand, is an experience that is very likely in a universe where an omnipotent, omniscient being exists; and seems very unlikely in a universe where that is false” amounts to “P (experience | God) is high && P(experience | no God) is low”, not “P (experience | God) > P(experience | no God)”.
Well, I do think that “P (experience | God) is high && P(experience | no God) is low”. However, in order to take the experience as evidence for the existence of God, it is necessary only to show the weaker point that “P (experience | God) > P(experience | no God)”
Brain malfunctions are more likely to produce some effects than others.
True.
And mystical experiences are the sort of thing brain malfunctions are likely to produce.
For human brains as they exist in this universe, perhaps. But for every possible type of brain, as may exist in every possible type of universe?
I consider that unlikely. I could be wrong about that, of course. But remember, in order to consider the probability of brains being prone to that exact malfunction, one must consider the possibility of brains constructed very differently to the ones we have. And, quite honestly, that’s such a wide and unexplored field that there’s not much I can say about it at all...
Those things are only marginally more likely in a universe with a God if you believe all types of God are equally likely. It is my impression that you think a Biblical-type God is more likely.
No, not all types are equally likely. Yes, I do think that an omniscient, omnipotent being very probably exists.
“I saw the Loch Ness Monster, so God is marginally more likely” (seeing the Loch Ness Monster implies that science, which says there is no such thing, can fail, and if science can fail, God is marginally more likely).
...why on earth would the idea that ‘science can fail’ lead to ‘God is marginally more likely’?
If an omnipotent, omniscient being exists, then it is reasonable to postulate that said being created our universe (or, at the very least, knew about it and didn’t stop it from existing). If such a being created our universe, then it is reasonable to assume that it would have been created with some care; because most craftsmen take a lot of care in their work. A bit of observation shows that our universe runs on rules; and if those rules were created with care, then it is reasonable to assume that they will work, that there are not going to be any obvious seams visible in the rules.
In short, if God exists, then science (being a systematic attempt to discover those rules) should work.
But remember, in order to consider the probability of brains being prone to that exact malfunction, one must consider the possibility of brains constructed very differently to the ones we have.
To figure out the odds of the existence of God based on you having a certain type of experience, you can’t just ignore the knowledge about what kind of brain you have. If you do that, you’re throwing out evidence that affects your conclusion. The type of brain you actually have is one where malfunctions produce mystical experiences more readily than they produce arbitrary other effects.
why on earth would the idea that ‘science can fail’ lead to ‘God is marginally more likely’?… there are not going to be any obvious seams visible in the rules.
Yes, there would. If people normally disintegrate only when exposed to thousands of degrees of temperature, but God can disintegrate people whenever he wants, every time God stays hidden but disintegrates a person who is not hidden, that’s a seam in the rules and science will not be able to explain that event.
To figure out the odds of the existence of God based on you having a certain type of experience, you can’t just ignore the knowledge about what kind of brain you have.
The figures that I am using to find P(God | experience) include P(experience | no God) and P(experience | God). P(experience | no God) must surely integrate over every possible universe in which there is no God, or else it will be P(experience | a specific universe), which is the wrong figure. Similarly, P(experience | God) must integrate over every universe in which an omnipotent, omniscient being exists; or else, once again, it is P(experience | specific universe), and is the wrong figure.
I’m trying to simplify the equation, for purposes of debate, to an update on exactly one piece of evidence. If we start including the specifics of the brain, then that opens up the question of P(God | human brain), which is an entire, and much bigger, debate on its own. And one that I have no intention of entering into with you; the inferential distance between us is simply too large, and I’ve been having enough trouble trying to communicate with you as it is.
Yes, there would. If people normally disintegrate only when exposed to thousands of degrees of temperature, but God can disintegrate people whenever he wants, every time God stays hidden but disintegrates a person who is not hidden, that’s a seam in the rules and science will not be able to explain that event.
That’s a very good point.
It’s rather unlikely that it could be replicated under laboratory conditions, which would mean it’s not an obvious seam… but yes, I see your point, it could be a bit of a seam. (Or it could be as-yet undiscovered physics of some sort, of course).
I’m trying to simplify the equation, for purposes of debate, to an update on exactly one piece of evidence. If we start including the specifics of the brain, then that opens up the question of P(God | human brain), which is an entire, and much bigger, debate on its own.
You can’t simplify that equation. If you simplify the equation that way it’s only useful when figuring out if there is a god, given a creature of unknown type who has a mystical experience. You are not a creature of unknown type, and throwing out the information that you have a brain that is inordinately prone to malfunctions that produce mystical experiences will distort the answer.
It’s like concluding there is a high probability that someone is insane because he thinks he’s Napoleon, while discarding the information that he’s ruling France in the year 1805. P(insane|claim Napoleon) is high, but P(insane|claim Napoleon && rules France in 1805)” is not high. Discarding this information is wrong.
If you simplify the equation that way it’s only useful when figuring out if there is a god, given a creature of unknown type who has a mystical experience.
That is exactly the point I was trying to make; that the fact that such an experience happened is a piece of evidence in favour of the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient being.
You are not a creature of unknown type, and throwing out the information that you have a brain that is inordinately prone to malfunctions that produce mystical experiences will distort the answer.
The trouble with this, if you start insisting that certain information cannot be left out, is that you are cherry-picking what information that is, and specifically selecting information that you believe leads to the conclusion that you want. I could probably name a dozen other pieces of information which support the idea that an omniscient, omnipotent being exists and insist on including them too (for example; consider P(God | intelligent life exists)).
If we start down this path, then we could both simply throw new pieces of information into the discussion again and again; it will take months, and it would lead absolutely nowhere.
It’s like concluding there is a high probability that someone is insane because he thinks he’s Napoleon, while discarding the information that he’s ruling France in the year 1805. P(insane|claim Napoleon) is high, but P(insane|claim Napoleon && rules France in 1805)” is not high. Discarding this information is wrong.
I would like to refer you to a short story that discusses that point in greater detail.
In short, yes, P(insane | claims Napoleon) is high, and if I meet someone who tells me ‘One of my ancestors claimed he was Napoleon’ then I will consider it a high probability that that ancestor was insane.
That is exactly the point I was trying to make; that the fact that such an experience happened is a piece of evidence in favour of the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient being.
The fact that such an experience happened, given no other information, may be evidence for God. But you have other information and are ignoring it.
Furthermore, even as evidence for God, it’s only evidence in a very weak sense compared to typical cases where one speaks about something being evidence. It makes it more likely that there’s a God, but it also makes it more likely that there is a pagan god, or a sorcerer, or an extraterrestrial with a mind-control ray.
The trouble with this, if you start insisting that certain information cannot be left out, is that you are cherry-picking what information that is
It’s not cherry picking to refuse to discard information which affects the result by orders of magnitude more than the probability you’re hoping to get from it. A mystical experience in a human brain is much better evidence for a brain malfunction than it is for God.
In short, yes, P(insane | claims Napoleon) is high, and if I meet someone who tells me ‘One of my ancestors claimed he was Napoleon’
My scenario not only involves being in 1805, but also ruling France. If you use the information that someone is your ancestor (presumably from 1805), but you omit the information that he was ruling France then, you have still discarded relevant information and as a result will come up with a probability of insanity that is much too high.
The fact that such an experience happened, given no other information, may be evidence for God. But you have other information and are ignoring it.
sigh
Very well. If you insist that I not ignore information, then there is a lot more information that needs to be properly considered. Decades of experiences that need to be sorted and categorised. Hundreds of writings, ancient and modern; thousands of accounts, of one sort or another.
We’ll just have to go through it all, piece by piece. Only the bits that are relevant, of course, but there’s a lot that is relevant.
For a start, let me consider the probability of the existence of God, given the existence of brains (or any form of hardware capable of supporting intelligence in some or other form).
Where, just to be clear, I use the word ‘God’ to refer to any omniscient, omnipotent being.
For that, we need to consider the probability that a randomly chosen universe will contain brains, at some or other point in its history.
In order to do that, let us consider all possible universes.
Here, I start by considering the null universe; a universe that contains no matter. Since it contains no matter, it cannot contain brains.
Then, let us add a piece of matter; a single quark. this one-quark universe also cannot contain brains, as there is insufficient matter to form the brains.
I don’t think it’s sensible to consider different one-quark universes as different; no matter where the quark is, or how fast it is moving, it’s just a coordinate transform to make it identical to any other one-quark universe.
Then, let us add a second quark. Now, it is sensible to differentiate between different two-quark universes, because there is a measurement that can change from one universe to another; and that is the distance between the two quarks. There is also another measurement that can change from one universe to another, and that is their relative velocity. However, it is not always clear whether two diffferent snapshots of two-quark universes are different universes, or the same universe at different times. Still, no brains are possible.
There are even more three-quark than two-quark universes; at a rough estimate, I’d say that the number of three-quark universes is half of the square of the number of two-quark universes. Still no brains.
Four-quark universes; here, I expect the total number of universes to be roughly x^3/6 where x is the number of two-quark universes.
For an N-quark universe, in general, I expect that the total number of possible universes would be roughly x^(N-1)/(N-1)!. This is an interesting function; it grows exponentially for low N, the rate of increase slows as N approaches x, and finally, when N exceeds x, the number of possible N-particle universes actually begins to drop. Of course, x is either infinite or at least very very large, so we can expect that most universes will have quite a lot of matter; more than enough to form brains.
Now, what are the odds of a universe which contains enough matter containing brains? Note that the universes under consideration here contain a number of quarks, in what is essentially a random configuration. All possible configurations are under consideration here, so at least some of them will have brains (in some cases, Boltzman brains; in other cases, brains with bodies and whole civilisations around them). However, since every possible random configuration is permitted, it would seem to me that a highly ordered set of particles, like a brain, must be relatively rare.
So, P(Brain | no God) seems like it should be fairly low.
Now, let us consider P(Brain | God). This time, we do not have to consider every possible universe; only those universes that could exist in the presence of an omniscient, omnipotent being. It seems likely that such a being will adjust any universe to His liking, and possibly create one if one does not exist.
It also seems quite probable, to me, that if a single intelligent being exists, then that being is quite likely to realise that he (or she) would like a conversation with someone else. Being omnipotent, it seems likely that God would create someone to talk with, and thus create brains.
So, it seems likely that P(Brains | God) is high.
Putting a high value for P(Brains | God) and a low value for P(Brains | no God) into the equation from earlier:
...will produce the result that P(God | Brains) > P(God). This seems to be a fairly major effect.
A mystical experience in a human brain is much better evidence for a brain malfunction than it is for God.
Do you have any figures for the likelihood of such a brain malfunction? Or any form of data at all to back up this assertion?
My scenario not only involves being in 1805, but also ruling France.
Yes. That is quite a lot of bits of information; since it eliminates all but one of the people throughout all of history who thought they were Napoleon.
It’s a bit like the difference between asking “what are the odds of getting a six on a fair die roll?” and “what are the odds that I got a six on the fair die I rolled on Thursday 10 April 2014 at 21:10?”—though the difference is a bit more pronounced, as I’m sure there were more than six people throughout history who claimed to be Napoleon.
And there were news reports at the time (there’s a scan of at least one relevant newspaper page on the wikipedia page)
Right, but there were no records of the event itself, just records of people’s testimonies. This is somewhat… odd. When e.g. a volcano erupts there is usually tons of footage of the actual event. People can be mistaken, or they can lie; but it’s hard to argue with a giant flaming mountain.
...being told that they had caught a Great White is still evidence in favour of a Great White having been caught.
Yes, but it’s also evidence for any number of other, more likely events: that my friends are pulling a prank, that they are mistaken, that a prank has been pulled on them, etc. etc. We don’t need to enumerate them all; what’s important here is only the posterior probability. If it is minute, then the reasonable course of action is to say, “until I see that shark, I won’t believe that you guys caught it, sorry”. There’s a huge difference between saying that, and saying, “even though the chances that you caught that shark are even smaller than the chances of a meteorite hitting me in the head anytime soon, I can’t come up with a better explanation off the top of my head so I’ll believe you, good job !”.
You said,
When I say that empirical evidence is rare, I mean that many things can be adequately explained whether it is true that God exists or not.
But beliefs do not exist in a vacuum. Instead, they form a Bayesian network: pieces of evidence affect the posterior probabilities of some beliefs; those beliefs change the prior probabilities of other beliefs, and so on. And the problem with the proposition G, which means “a god of some kind exists”, is that it’s starting to look like for any piece of evidence E, P(G|E) is lower than P(x|E), where x is pretty much any other non-divine explanation; and there is a lot of other evidence that can raise P(x). This is what I was driving at earlier with my hypothetical Alpha-god.
So, is there any piece of evidence E for which P(G|E) is much higher than any alternatives ? Moses, presumably, got exactly such a piece of evidence in the form of a burning bush. We don’t have that, however; what we’ve got is an ancient story about a guy who saw a burning bush, and experience tells us that ancient stories mostly can’t be trusted—or else we’d be forced to believe in Zeus, Shivah, the Jade Emperor, etc., possibly at the same time.
Rather than continue to talk in hypotheticals, I think I’ll take a moment to describe the incident in question (and I think you’ll see why I say I expect you to be unconvinced by it).
As you have anticipated, I am unconvinced by your report, but the question is, why are you convinced ? You say:
So, what makes me trust the evidence? I remember it; and I do not believe there was any way that any human could have faked that experience.
But these aren’t the only possibilities. Even if you cannot come up with any others (such as a random brain malfunction, as Jiro points out), why is this experience sufficient to convince you that a miracle occurred—given that, as you agreed above, the probability of such an event is minute ? Don’t you want to see the actual shark, before making your conclusions ?
Right, but there were no records of the event itself, just records of people’s testimonies. This is somewhat… odd. When e.g. a volcano erupts there is usually tons of footage of the actual event.
There appear to have been quite a few pictures—somewhat to my surprise. Most of them appear to be pictures of the crowd, rather than of the Sun… and, as with any google search, some appear to be unrelated.
Yes, but it’s also evidence for any number of other, more likely events: that my friends are pulling a prank, that they are mistaken, that a prank has been pulled on them, etc. etc.
That is true.
We don’t need to enumerate them all; what’s important here is only the posterior probability. If it is minute, then the reasonable course of action is to say, “until I see that shark, I won’t believe that you guys caught it, sorry”. There’s a huge difference between saying that, and saying, “even though the chances that you caught that shark are even smaller than the chances of a meteorite hitting me in the head anytime soon, I can’t come up with a better explanation off the top of my head so I’ll believe you, good job !”
But the posterior probability doesn’t just depend on the evidence; it also depends on the prior probability. The prior probability assigned to the shark being caught is substantially lower than the prior probability I’d assigned to the existence of God. The analogy breaks down at the selection of priors.
And the problem with the proposition G, which means “a god of some kind exists”, is that it’s starting to look like for any piece of evidence E, P(G|E) is lower than P(x|E), where x is pretty much any other non-divine explanation; and there is a lot of other evidence that can raise P(x).
I suspect that this is a rather severe exaggeration. I can easily propose an infinite number of proposals for ‘x’ where ‘x’ is non-divine but where P(G|E)>P(x|E) for almost any E. My method for finding these proposals for ‘x’ would be to string together a number of randomly selected grammatically correct sentence starting with the word ‘because’; this would result in a number of entirely nonsensical proposals. Similarly, I can randomly select evidences E, placing them before the ‘because’.
I shall assume you meant, therefore, that “there exists at least one non-divine explanation ‘x’ for which P(x|E)>P(G|E) for any given evidence E”.
So, is there any piece of evidence E for which P(G|E) is much higher than any alternatives ? Moses, presumably, got exactly such a piece of evidence in the form of a burning bush.
You’ve at least partially answered your own question; Moses saw the evidence in the burning bush. One particular monk saw the evidence in the Miracle of Lanciano. Several thousand people saw the evidence in the Miracle of the Sun. Doubting Thomas saw the evidence in the resurrected Jesus.
Lots of people saw evidence in first-hand observation of miracles.
We don’t have that, however; what we’ve got is an ancient story about a guy who saw a burning bush, and experience tells us that ancient stories mostly can’t be trusted—or else we’d be forced to believe in Zeus, Shivah, the Jade Emperor, etc., possibly at the same time.
That’s the trouble; as soon as you get to second-hand observation, the evidence is a whole lot less convincing. If you’ve set the prior for God’s existence sufficiently low, then there isn’t going to be enough second-hand evidence to alter that.
As you have anticipated, I am unconvinced by your report, but the question is, why are you convinced ? You say:
So, what makes me trust the evidence? I remember it; and I do not believe there was any way that any human could have faked that experience.
But these aren’t the only possibilities. Even if you cannot come up with any others (such as a random brain malfunction, as Jiro points out), why is this experience sufficient to convince you that a miracle occurred—given that, as you agreed above, the probability of such an event is minute ? Don’t you want to see the actual shark, before making your conclusions ?
Because I did see the shark, to extend the metaphor. And then it swam away, on its own business.
There appear to have been quite a few pictures—somewhat to my surprise. Most of them appear to be pictures of the crowd, rather than of the Sun...
Are there any photos (or preferably videos) of the event itself ? I’m looking for something along the lines of this—although, admittedly, volcano eruptions are relatively mundane events by comparison.
The prior probability assigned to the shark being caught is substantially lower than the prior probability I’d assigned to the existence of God.
Ah, I see, that is interesting. What is the ballpark prior probability you place on the existence of God (or any other god, for that matter) ?
I shall assume you meant, therefore, that “there exists at least one non-divine explanation ‘x’ for which P(x|E)>P(G|E) for any given evidence E”.
Yes, good call.
Lots of people saw evidence in first-hand observation of miracles.
It would be more accurate to say something like, “we have a lot of historical texts that describe people who claim to have seen miracles”. The distinction is important, because we have a veritable deluge of such texts regarding all major religions, as well as more modern phenomena such as alien abductions, Bigfoot, etc. The problem with such second- and third-hand accounts are that they—as you have pointed out—are notoriously unreliable.
I do not believe that little gray aliens have ever visited Earth, despite the claims of many, many “abductees”. Do you ? If not, why not, and what would it take to convince you ? You say:
Because I did see the shark, to extend the metaphor. And then it swam away, on its own business.
So, to recap: if someone told you about this shark, you would not believe him. Similarly, you do not believe that your shark story is convincing enough to convert another rational person to your belief. I think we are in agreement on these two points.
One thing I don’t understand, though, is why are you convinced ? Do you believe yourself to be that much better—orders of magnitude better—at detecting the presence of sharks (or gods) than any other person ? If so, then for what reason ? But if not, then why are you privileging your own perceptions, given that they are no better than anyone else’s ?
Think of all the alternative explanations you’d come up with if I told you, “guess what, I was abducted by little gray men from space yesterday”. Do not these explanations also apply to yourself ?
Are there any photos (or preferably videos) of the event itself ? I’m looking for something along the lines of this—although, admittedly, volcano eruptions are relatively mundane events by comparison.
There won’t be videos; the event in question happened in 1917, and the earliest video cameras were apparently first used in the 1930s. And I’m not sure that anyone can get a halfway reasonable photo of a very bright light source using 1917 camera technology—which doesn’t mean that no-one did, of course.
But if it doesn’t turn up in a Google search, then I have no idea where else to look for such a picture; should one even exist.
The prior probability assigned to the shark being caught is substantially lower than the prior probability I’d assigned to the existence of God.
Ah, I see, that is interesting. What is the ballpark prior probability you place on the existence of God (or any other god, for that matter) ?
To the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent being, I’d assigned a prior probability of somewhere over 50%.
It would be more accurate to say something like, “we have a lot of historical texts that describe people who claim to have seen miracles”
An excellent point. Very well, then; lots of people claim to have seen evidence in first-hand observation of miracles.
I do not believe that little gray aliens have ever visited Earth, despite the claims of many, many “abductees”. Do you ? If not, why not, and what would it take to convince you ?
I consider the prior probability that little gray aliens have ever visited Earth to be very small. Despite this, they have become sufficiently mimetic in modern culture that I would consider them a prime choice for hoaxsters; this, in turn, results in me sharply discounting second-hand accounts.
To convince me that aliens have visited Earth will require some piece of physical evidence; perhaps either something made from a material that can be proven not to have come from this planet (and considering what we can make, that might be a tough order) or some piece of technology not merely unavailable to humanity but significantly distant from what is available. I would not necessarily need to hold the evidence in my own hands; I would merely need to be convinced that said evidence exists (e.g. through news reports from reliable sources - ‘Scientists Study Alien Technology’).
So, to recap: if someone told you about this shark, you would not believe him.
This depends on my prior. For the existence of God, my prior is high enough that I would consider it plausible that he is telling the truth. For finding an actual shark in a lake fed and drained by small streams, my prior is far, far lower.
Similarly, you do not believe that your shark story is convincing enough to convert another rational person to your belief.
Yes, this is correct.
One thing I don’t understand, though, is why are you convinced ?
Largely because I started with a very high prior. My very high prior was contingent on the word of my parents, and particularly of my father, a wise and intelligent man who is far better than me at telling true from false. He’s not infallible, but if he says something is certainly true, then I consider that a good reason to set a high prior for that datum (before updating on any other available evidence, of course).
Think of all the alternative explanations you’d come up with if I told you, “guess what, I was abducted by little gray men from space yesterday”. Do not these explanations also apply to yourself ?
Many of them do not. I know that I am not making up the story. I know that I am not lying. I know that I was not dreaming. I know that I had not received any major head injuries at around the same time. That covers the majority of the probability with regard to reasons why you might claim to have been abducted by little gray aliens.
As a first-hand observer, I can discount all of those explanations.
Also, my prior for the existence of little gray men from space is fairly low; which would lead to me assigning extra probability to the various ‘lying’ categories.
If fires didn’t burn orphans, it may be technically true that science couldn’t prove it was caused by a God, but that’s because science can’t prove anything. Science certainly could rule out other explanations to the extent that a godlike being is pretty much the only reasonable possibility left. Science could discover that fires not burning orphans seemed to be a fundamental law of the universe that can’t be explained in terms of other laws. And a fundamental law of the universe that operates in terms of complicated human conceptual categories like “orphan” is a miracle.
You seem to think that science could never prove this is a miracle because science would just keep coming up with other theories (that would eventually be disproven). If that was actually true, no scientist would be able to conclude that anything is a fundamental law of the universe at all, whether miraculous or non-miraculous, since the scientist would keep coming up with theories that explain the law in terms of something else. In fact, at some point the scientist will run out of likely theories and will only be able to come up with theories so unlikely that “this is not based on some other law” is more reasonable.
You seem to think that science could never prove this is a miracle because science would just keep coming up with other theories (that would eventually be disproven).
They might not eventually be disproven, or they might take a very long time to disprove. Consider; we know that both general relativity and quantum mechanics are very, very, very good at predicting the universe as we know it. We also know that they are mutually incompatible in certain very hard-to-test situations; they cannot both be true (and it is quite possible that neither, in their current form, is completely true). Yet neither has, to the best of my knowledge, been disproven.
If that was actually true, no scientist would be able to conclude that anything is a fundamental law of the universe at all, whether miraculous or non-miraculous, since the scientist would keep coming up with theories that explain the law in terms of something else.
Well, we don’t actually have the fundamental laws of the universe yet. Once quantum gravity’s been sorted out, then we might be there.
I’m not sure that I can expect anyone in my example counterfactual universe to have done any better than we’ve done in the real historical universe.
Well, we don’t actually have the fundamental laws of the universe yet.
We have laws that are relatively more fundamental than others, and my argument doesn’t require that the law be fundamental in an absolute sense. If scientists discovered that orphans are fireproof, and ran out of explanations for why the category “orphans” is part of the rule, they would essentially have proven it’s supernatural, even if, oh, they don’t rule out the possibility that both orphans and priests are fireproof.
Proving things to 100% certainty requires running out of explanations. Proving things to reasonable certainty only requires running out of reasonable explanations, and that’s certainly possible. And the latter is all that people mean when they speak of science proving something—science never proves anything to 100% certainty anyway.
We have the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum physics. We have time and space twisting around in order to preserve the constancy of the speed of light. We have subatomic particles whose position is an approximation if their velocity is known.
The bar for ‘reasonable’ in scientific endeavours is ‘it led to a number of predictions and, when we did the experiments, the predictions turned out to be all correct’.
The disadvantage, from a scientific point of view, of the ‘it was all a miracle’ explanation is that it doesn’t lead to much in the way of useful predictions which can be checked. This makes experimental verification somewhat tricky. I don’t think a scientific theory can be considered reasonably certain without at least a little experimental verification (and simply repeating the observation that led to the development of the theory doesn’t count, because any theory that attempts to explain that observation will explain it).
The evidence that all perfectly natural mechanisms were set in place by God relies on the existence of God in the first place. Should an omnipotent and omniscient being exist, it’s trivial to show that the current universe must have at least avoided the disapproval of such a being; and it is quite possible that the universe was constructed or altered into its current form.
The evidence that all perfectly natural mechanisms were set in place by God relies on the existence of God in the first place.
That sounds less like evidence and more like an assumption. You say:
Should an omnipotent and omniscient being exist, it’s trivial to show that the current universe must have at least avoided the disapproval of such a being; and it is quite possible that the universe was constructed or altered into its current form.
I completely agree; however, I am not sure how you could get from “our Universe exists” to “an omni-being exists and takes notice of our Universe”. I do agree that going the other way is pretty easy; but we are not omniscient, so we don’t have that option.
I’m not going from “our Universe exists” to “an omni-being exists and takes notice of our Universe”. I’m going from “an omni-being exists and takes notice of our Universe” to “said being controls the universe”.
I may not have been perfectly clear upthread, so let me try rephrasing and explicitly stating what I had been taking implicitly: If God exists, then all perfectly natural mechanisms were set in place by God.
Understood; but this means that you can’t look at any natural mechanisms and interpret them as evidence for the existence of a God. That would be circular reasoning.
Insofar as scientists have disproved dozens of theories for why certain things happen, I don’t see a reason why scientists wouldn’t be able to conclude that god was doing the orphan thing. I don’t think science in general is as die-hard atheist as you’d like to portray it. Remember that the many of the natural philosophers historically were in fact looking FOR evidence of god.
Plus it’d probably be a big tip-off that the only holy book with no factual errors also mentioned the orphans being fireproof thing.
Insofar as scientists have disproved dozens of theories for why certain things happen, I don’t see a reason why scientists wouldn’t be able to conclude that god was doing the orphan thing.
In the same way as scientists could conclude that God is directly responsible for the strong nuclear force?
While I don’t deny that it could be advanced as a theory, I don’t see how it could be tested. And I don’t see a theory gaining much traction unless it can make falsifiable predictions.
Plus it’d probably be a big tip-off that the only holy book with no factual errors also mentioned the orphans being fireproof thing.
If orphans really were fireproof, I’d expect it to be mentioned, at least in passing, in most holy books. Mainly because orphans being fireproof is something that people will tend to notice.
While I don’t deny that it could be advanced as a theory, I don’t see how it could be tested.
If your hypothesis cannot be tested, then why does it even matter whether it’s true or false ? Since you cannot—by definition—ever find out whether it is true, what’s the point in believing or disbelieving in it ?
To put it another way, what’s the difference between believing in a god who is so subtle that all of his actions are completely indistinguishable from inaction; and in not believing in any gods at all ?
If your hypothesis cannot be tested, then why does it even matter whether it’s true or false ?
There’s a difference between finding out whether something is true, and finding enough evidence to prove to my neighbour that that thing is true. Fishermen are notorious for exaggerated descriptions of the fish that got away; should I go fishing, and a fish get away, I have no doubt that few of my neighbours would believe my assertions with regard to the fish’s size (even if I somehow managed to measure it before it escaped)
To put it another way, what’s the difference between believing in a god who is so subtle that all of his actions are completely indistinguishable from inaction; and in not believing in any gods at all ?
Well, for one thing, it affects my actions in non-trivial ways. My actions affect other people, and they then affect other people… and so on, rippling out.
One difference, for example, is the fact that we are having this conversation in the first place.
There’s a difference between finding out whether something is true, and finding enough evidence to prove to my neighbour that that thing is true.
What’s the difference ? I mean, obviously your neighbour could be entirely irrational and refuse to listen to anything you say. However, let’s pretend instead that your neighbour is a rational, intelligent, and patient person… who also happens to be from Mars. He speaks English, but he doesn’t really know all that much about our human culture. He does know about physics, though, since physics is the same on any planet.
So, you tell your Martian neighbour, “I believe that God is directly responsible for the strong nuclear force”. Naturally, he asks you, “who is this God guy ?”; after you’ve explained that, he asks you, “ok, and why do you believe that ?”. What’s your answer ?
Well, for one thing, it affects my actions in non-trivial ways.
How so ? Let’s say there exist two parallel worlds. In one world, a perfectly unfalsifiable god exists; all of his actions are indistinguishable from chance. This is our world; let’s call it Alpha. The other world is called Beta, and it contains no gods at all. The two worlds are completely identical; except that, whenever something happens in Alpha, sometimes the god is responsible, and sometimes it just happens for mundane natural causes. When the same thing also happens in Beta, it’s always due to mundane natural causes.
If you were somehow transported in your sleep from Alpha to Beta, how could you tell that this had occurred ? If you could tell, what would you do differently ?
What’s the difference ? I mean, obviously your neighbour could be entirely irrational and refuse to listen to anything you say.
Let us say that I have gone fishing. I return from my fishing trip, and describe to my neighbour how I hooked a six-foot-long great white shark, but my fishing line snapped and it got away. Unfortunately, I failed to get a photograph or any other piece of hard evidence.
Assume that my neighbour is rational, intelligent, and patient. Would he be convinced by my account?
after you’ve explained that, he asks you, “ok, and why do you believe that ?”. What’s your answer ?
Short version; I started with a high prior, and certain experiences in my life have caused me to update that original prior in an upward direction.
This is our world; let’s call it Alpha. The other world is called Beta, and it contains no gods at all. The two worlds are completely identical; except that, whenever something happens in Alpha, sometimes the god is responsible, and sometimes it just happens for mundane natural causes. When the same thing also happens in Beta, it’s always due to mundane natural causes.
...hold on a minute. You are postulating that there is some way to set up the natural laws of a universe such that everything that God would want to do in Alpha happens anyway, even without direct involvement. Should that be the case, an omniscient being would know how to set up the physical laws in such a way; and an omnipotent being would be able to do that, and it would probably be much less effort than having to go back and fiddle with the universe every now and then.
Assume that my neighbour is rational, intelligent, and patient. Would he be convinced by my account ?
No. Should he be ?
That said, one big difference (among many) between shark-fishing and religion, however, is that in the shark-fishing scenario you do have plenty of fairly unambiguous evidence for the shark’s existence (despite failing to bring back any of it). Furthermore, the exercise is repeatable; you could go into the same waters, and attempt to find another shark. You could consult other fishermen, and look at the photographs of any sharks they may have caught. You could talk to marine biologists, and ask them how likely you were to catch a shark… etc., etc. You don’t need to rely solely on your own thoughts or feelings; there is objective evidence that you can collect.
You are postulating that there is some way to set up the natural laws of a universe such that everything that God would want to do in Alpha happens anyway
Remember hat the stuff that Alpha’s god does is indistinguishable from chance. Thus, for example, if I roll over 7 tiny pebbles on my way to work in Alpha, it could very well be that the 7th pebble was placed there by Alpha’s god. I may not encounter that pebble in Beta; or I may encounter 8 pebbles. However, by definition, that 7th pebble (or lack thereof) will have no significant effect on anything.
Alpha’s god could not, for example, affect the outcome of dice rolls so that the unrighteous sinners are less likely to roll 7s in games of chance; I mean, he could, but according to out scenario, he wouldn’t.
That said, your scenario could be relevant as well. Given that we currently have no access to the Multiverse (assuming one exists), how would you distinguish a Universe that was created by a god who set everything up and then went away; from a Universe that arose due to purely undirected natural mechanisms ?
You are right that there are a lot of differences between shark-fishing and religion; my point is merely that evidence which convinces one rational human being may yet be insufficient to convince another, when experienced by the first but merely communicated to the second.
You don’t need to rely solely on your own thoughts or feelings; there is objective evidence that you can collect.
This is one thing that is not a difference between shark-fishing and religion. There is objective evidence that can be collected. Consider, for example, comparing the rate of the appearance of uncorrupted corpses between virtuous and nonvirtuous people; if virtuous people are more likely to leave uncorrupted corpses, then that’s a bit of a hint.
Remember hat the stuff that Alpha’s god does is indistinguishable from chance. Thus, for example, if I roll over 7 tiny pebbles on my way to work in Alpha, it could very well be that the 7th pebble was placed there by Alpha’s god. I may not encounter that pebble in Beta; or I may encounter 8 pebbles. However, by definition, that 7th pebble (or lack thereof) will have no significant effect on anything.
Which raises the question of why put that seventh pebble there in the first place?
A lot of miracles are done with clear agency; most of Jesus’ miracles, for example, were done with the clear purpose of proving his credentials as Son of God. Many other people performed miracles as signs of particular divine favour.
If, in Alpha, there exists a God who has a plan, then I would expect that the results of most miracles would tend to work towards the outcome of that plan. (Which would mean that it might be possible to detect agency in Alpha, if one knew what the plan was).
So, for example, if instead of a seventh pebble you drive over a nail, then have to go get your tyre patched, and at the tyre shop you meet someone and interact with him in some way that furthers Alpha’s God’s plans… then you might not be able to prove (or even notice) that it was a miracle, but the effect still makes Alpha divergent from Beta.
That said, your scenario could be relevant as well. Given that we currently have no access to the Multiverse (assuming one exists), how would you distinguish a Universe that was created by a god who set everything up and then went away; from a Universe that arose due to purely undirected natural mechanisms ?
Very tricky.
If an omniscient, omnipotent being exists, then He exists equally in all reachable universes. Therefore, either all universes have the same God ruling over them, or none do.
Which means that, whichever case is true, we only have examples of a single class of universe.
So. If God exists, then it is reasonable to assume that He has some plan for every universe. The plans may differ from universe to universe, or may be the same in every universe.
If I assume that there are similar plans for a number of universes, then it seems likely that there are psychologically similar beings existing in a number of universes; that is, they may look alien, but they will have understandable motivations (not necessarily immediately understandable).
So. I estimate the probability that non-human intelligent life (whether in this or another universe) has an understandable psychology is higher if God exists than if not.
evidence which convinces one rational human being may yet be insufficient to convince another, when experienced by the first but merely communicated to the second.
I agree, but then, how reliable are your own experiences ?
To use a rather trivial example, I have on numerous occasions woken up from sleep with an absolute, unshakable conviction that I was late for some critical appointment or other. I would then check the calendar, and see that the appointment either already happened several years in the past (along the lines of “attend college physics exam”); or was entirely imaginary (along the lines of “inspect warp core”). And yet, even at that very moment, I would still be experiencing a strong conviction that I need to go and take that test / inspect that warp core right now. How do you know whether your experiences are likewise confused ?
There is objective evidence that can be collected. Consider, for example, comparing the rate of the appearance of uncorrupted corpses between virtuous and nonvirtuous people; if virtuous people are more likely to leave uncorrupted corpses, then that’s a bit of a hint.
As far as I know, corpses of virtuous people and those of iniquitous people decay at the same rate in our own Universe. Orphans aren’t all that likely to be fireproof, either (although I’d expect a slightly higher proportion of orphans to have survived at least one fire, sadly). Multiple studies have failed to find any effect of intercessory prayer (by comparison with placebo). So, can you think of any reasonably unambiguous evidence for the existence of a god in our current Universe ?
Which would mean that it might be possible to detect agency in Alpha, if one knew what the plan was.
Let’s assume that we don’t know what the plan is (which, as far as I understand the Christian belief system, we do not). Would it still be possible to detect agency in Alpha ?
So. I estimate the probability that non-human intelligent life (whether in this or another universe) has an understandable psychology is higher if God exists than if not.
Right, that would be an interesting piece of evidence, but it’s unobtainable for now. In addition, I would expect all intelligent life within our own Universe to have at least some similarities. We all live in the same cosmos, we all are subject to the same laws of physics, so it’s reasonable to assume that our brains would evolve in functionally similar ways. That’s pure speculation, though, since the only intelligent life we know of is our own.
I agree, but then, how reliable are your own experiences ?
I tend to assume that my own experiences are more reliable than second-hand data (people telling me about their experiences). This is largely because when I start questioning my own experiences, I quickly find myself questioning reality as a whole; whether anything that I observe actually exists or not.
I think that, in order to retain a functional relationship with reality, I have to assume that my memories and experiences are mostly true; that is, that the majority of them are true, and any contradictions in my memories are best resolved in the manner that results in the fewest of my memories being false.
While I don’t experience convictions that I am late for imaginary appointments, as you do, I have on occasion woken up convinced that I am late for an important appointment which is due the following day, or late that evening. In such a case, I find that the conviction vanishes almost immediately on checking the time, and finding that the time for the appointment has not yet arrived.
As far as I know, corpses of virtuous people and those of iniquitous people decay at the same rate in our own Universe.
While this would certainly be the prediction of a hypothetical atheist physicist, I would like to ask; do you have any evidence to back up this assertion?
I do not know of a statistical study of rates of corruption in the bodies of (say) canonised saints versus people lawfully executed for criminal activity, but this is a study which could in theory have been completed.
So, can you think of any reasonably unambiguous evidence for the existence of a god in our current Universe ?
Nothing more convincing than the Miracle of Lanciano, which I’m pretty sure I’ve already mentioned.
Which would mean that it might be possible to detect agency in Alpha, if one knew what the plan was.
Let’s assume that we don’t know what the plan is (which, as far as I understand the Christian belief system, we do not). Would it still be possible to detect agency in Alpha ?
I don’t know.
I can’t think of any way, off the top of my head, to do it; but that doesn’t mean it can’t be done.
Right, that would be an interesting piece of evidence, but it’s unobtainable for now.
I know. I don’t think I can present any predictions that can be easily and rapidly checked, though; since I don’t know the purpose of the universe.
And if very convincing evidence of God’s existence was easy to find, then churches would present it for all the world to see; in much the same way as the Bible is presented for all the world to see.
In addition, I would expect all intelligent life within our own Universe to have at least some similarities. We all live in the same cosmos, we all are subject to the same laws of physics, so it’s reasonable to assume that our brains would evolve in functionally similar ways.
In the same way as it’s reasonable to assume that humans and centipedes, living in the same environment on the same planet, would evolve similar body structures?
I think that, in order to retain a functional relationship with reality, I have to assume that my memories and experiences are mostly true...
Given a specific memory or experience, how would you estimate the probability of it being true ?
While this would certainly be the prediction of a hypothetical atheist physicist, I would like to ask; do you have any evidence to back up this assertion?
No, but this seems highly likely, given what we know about basic biology (and we do know quite a lot, down to the molecular level). That said, if you are making the positive claim that corpses decay at different rates based on the morality of the deceased, then the burden of proof is on you, since your hypothesis is more complex than the null hypothesis.
Nothing more convincing than the Miracle of Lanciano, which I’m pretty sure I’ve already mentioned.
I am unfamiliar with this specific miracle, but Wikipedia says that it was reported to occur “around 700”, and that at least one source confirms the items in question to consist of human tissue. I don’t mean to sound too negative, but… is this really the best evidence for the existence of miracles that you’ve got ? If so, then shouldn’t you be—just for example—a Hellinist instead of a Christian, given that we’ve found the entire city of Troy, which was described in the Iliad ? That’s an entire city, after all, not just some blood globules...
And if very convincing evidence of God’s existence was easy to find, then churches would present it for all the world to see...
Right, so it’s starting to sound more and more that the Christian God is kind of like my hypothetical Alpha-god. He may exist, but the actions he takes are so subtle that no one has been able to detect them. By comparison, we are at the point now where we can detect individual neutrinos. Given this, I’ve got to go back to my original question: does it even matter whether such a god exists, if he has an even smaller effect on our affairs than neutrinos do ?
In the same way as it’s reasonable to assume that humans and centipedes, living in the same environment on the same planet, would evolve similar body structures?
Yes, that’s a pretty good analogy. Both organisms have respiratory and digestive systems; articulated legs for means of locomotion on hard surfaces; optical/chemical/tacticle/etc. sensors; and even sexual reproduction systems (which serve similar functions despite being mechanically very different).
Similarly, I would expect any kind of an intelligent life to have a similar grasp of concepts such as object permanence, causality, and communication (just to name a few off the top of my head). Of course, if these aliens have any kind of technology, then I’d expect them to have notions of e.g. physics and chemistry that are compatible with ours.
There are many kinds of limbs and skeletons and eyes in the world, but there’s only one physics. Hydrogen is still hydrogen, even on Mars.
Given a specific memory or experience, how would you estimate the probability of it being true ?
If I detect no contradictions with other memories or experiences, I treat it as true until some evidence is provided to show that it may be false. I imagine that would count as a very high prior.
No, but this seems highly likely, given what we know about basic biology (and we do know quite a lot, down to the molecular level). That said, if you are making the positive claim that corpses decay at different rates based on the morality of the deceased, then the burden of proof is on you, since your hypothesis is more complex than the null hypothesis.
Pity.
Unfortunately, I can provide no data in support of the hypothesis, either. You’re right about the burden of proof; but I don’t think I’m quite ready to go around digging up dead bodies to try to produce a proper answer to this question just yet. And a quick and very cursory google search has failed to pick out anyone else who’s tried.
I am unfamiliar with this specific miracle, but Wikipedia says that it was reported to occur “around 700”, and that at least one source confirms the items in question to consist of human tissue. I don’t mean to sound too negative, but… is this really the best evidence for the existence of miracles that you’ve got ?
It’s the best that I can find in, oh, half a minute on Wikipedia. It’s quite probably not the best that there is.
If so, then shouldn’t you be—just for example—a Hellinist instead of a Christian, given that we’ve found the entire city of Troy, which was described in the Iliad ? That’s an entire city, after all, not just some blood globules...
We also know where Egypt is. And Bethlehem. And Nazareth. All of which were placed mentioned in the Gospels (and in the case of Egypt, it’s an entire country, not just a city). The existence of a place mentioned in ancient writing is, at best, very weak evidence that the writing is true.
The blood globules have nothing to do with my belief in Christianity. They’re just the best evidence that I can find, in a very brief visit to Wikipedia, that at least one miracle occurred at some point in the past.
Right, so it’s starting to sound more and more that the Christian God is kind of like my hypothetical Alpha-god. He may exist, but the actions he takes are so subtle that no one has been able to detect them.
No. Plenty of people claim to have been able to detect them; all the people who saw the Miracle of the Sun, for example. There may have been millions more people who could have detected His actions, had they just looked in the right place, but they didn’t. (That was likely intentional; omniscience means knowing where people won’t look for tampering, after all).
By comparison, we are at the point now where we can detect individual neutrinos. Given this, I’ve got to go back to my original question: does it even matter whether such a god exists, if he has an even smaller effect on our affairs than neutrinos do ?
Detectability is not necessary correlated with how much effect something has on our affairs.
In the same way as it’s reasonable to assume that humans and centipedes, living in the same environment on the same planet, would evolve similar body structures?
Yes, that’s a pretty good analogy. Both organisms have respiratory and digestive systems; articulated legs for means of locomotion on hard surfaces; optical/chemical/tacticle/etc. sensors; and even sexual reproduction systems (which serve similar functions despite being mechanically very different).
Similarly, I would expect any kind of an intelligent life to have a similar grasp of concepts such as object permanence, causality, and communication (just to name a few off the top of my head). Of course, if these aliens have any kind of technology, then I’d expect them to have notions of e.g. physics and chemistry that are compatible with ours.
If I detect no contradictions with other memories or experiences
That’s the same method I use, except that I also include other people’s experiences. For example, I’ve personally never tried jumping off a bridge; but I am reluctant to try this, since, based on what I know of biology, physics, and, indeed, attempts to do so by other people, I know that the experience will likely be fatal.
I think that the main difference between you and me is that you place an extremely high level of confidence on your own experiences. Is that right ? If so, what is the reason ? After all, you are a regular human just like anyone else, so what is it that makes your experiences so much more reliable than those of other people ?
You’re right about the burden of proof; but I don’t think I’m quite ready to go around digging up dead bodies to try to produce a proper answer to this question just yet.
Since the burden of proof is on you; and since no evidence exists; are you not then compelled to disbelieve in the proposition ? By analogy, it is possible that I personally am immune to the effects of jumping off of a bridge, but, in the absence of evidence for this positive claim, I am forced to reject it (despite its obvious appeal).
They’re just the best evidence that I can find, in a very brief visit to Wikipedia, that at least one miracle occurred at some point in the past.
What makes you think that the best explanation for all the fact is, in fact, “a miracle occurred”, as opposed anything else ? Given that other events (honest mistakes, deliberate fraud, etc.) occur much more often than miracles (i.e., they have higher priors); and given that the evidence is compatible with all of these explanations; why do you keep the “miracle” explanation and discard the others ?
There may have been millions more people who could have detected His actions, had they just looked in the right place, but they didn’t… That was likely intentional...
Wait, doesn’t this support what I said ? It sounds like your God does indeed make his actions “so subtle that no one has been able to detect them” (as I put it originally), just like my hypothetical Alpha-God.
Detectability is not necessary correlated with how much effect something has on our affairs.
How can something be completely undetectable and yet have any effect on anything ? Effects are how we detect things.
That’s the same method I use, except that I also include other people’s experiences. For example, I’ve personally never tried jumping off a bridge; but I am reluctant to try this, since, based on what I know of biology, physics, and, indeed, attempts to do so by other people, I know that the experience will likely be fatal.
At the moment I, too, am reluctant to try jumping off a bridge, for similar reasons. However, if I had jumped off a bridge and inexplicably survived, I would weigh that experience very heavily in future decisions with regard to whether or not to jump off bridges.
I don’t ignore other people’s reported experiences; I just consider my own experiences a far more reliable indicator of reality. This is partially because other people’s experiences are by necessity incomplete; it’s very hard for me to be sure that someone else has told me every detail that I would consider important about a given situation.
Since the burden of proof is on you; and since no evidence exists; are you not then compelled to disbelieve in the proposition ?
No. I am merely in no position to compel your belief in the proposition, and etiquette requires that I should not claim that the question is resolved in my favour. (Which it isn’t). My options at this point are to either go out and gather evidence, or to drop the question entirely.
As I understand it, etiquette does permit you to assume that the question is resolved in favour of the null hypothesis; but without proof, you cannot compel my disbelief in the proposition.
What makes you think that the best explanation for all the fact is, in fact, “a miracle occurred”, as opposed anything else ? Given that other events (honest mistakes, deliberate fraud, etc.) occur much more often than miracles (i.e., they have higher priors); and given that the evidence is compatible with all of these explanations; why do you keep the “miracle” explanation and discard the others ?
I don’t discard all the others; I simply consider them less probable than the miracle hypothesis. And the reason for that is that a number of people whose job involves the investigation of miracles, and who have looked far more deeply into the matter than I have (and who would not benefit from incorrectly calling something a miracle and having it later revealedd as a mistake or a fraud) consider it a miracle. In short, I place my confidence in the hands of those I recognise as experts in the field.
That said experts were also largely members of the Catholic clergy does not diminish my confidence in their results, though it may affect yours.
There may have been millions more people who could have detected His actions, had they just looked in the right place, but they didn’t… That was likely intentional...
Wait, doesn’t this support what I said ? It sounds like your God does indeed make his actions “so subtle that no one has been able to detect them” (as I put it originally), just like my hypothetical Alpha-God.
No. Again, people have detected His actions. Consider Moses, for example; when Moses approached the burning bush, he detected God’s actions.
Or consider the monk present at the Miracle of Lanciano; when he saw the bread and wine literally transform into flesh and blood, he detected God’s actions.
Detectability is not necessary correlated with how much effect something has on our affairs.
How can something be completely undetectable and yet have any effect on anything ? Effects are how we detect things.
If it is completely undetectable by any means, then yes, it can have no effect. But something can be hard to detect while still having a great effect.
Consider, for example, a man living on a mountaintop. He finds it very easy to detect the stars; he sees them often. But they have little to no effect on him. On the other hand, he finds it very hard to detect the radioactivity of the rocks around him (he would need to go to the trouble of getting a geiger counter); but if the rocks are signifiantly radioactive, that could potentially have a very large long-term effect on him.
So, while I agree that something has to be detectable in order to have any effect (on the basis that it can be detected by its effect), it is nonetheless possible for something to be hard to detect while having a very large effect.
Virtually entirely due to my upbringing.
No, I don’t see you as one of those people. Such people are to atheism as militant fundamentalists are to any religion; they’re there, they’re outspoken, they won’t listen to anyone who disagrees with them, and they’re fortunately very rare.
I’ve given a bit of thought to the idea of proving the existence of miracles in a laboratory setting. It runs into a few problems.
For a start, let’s divide miracles into two types; the once-off miracle, which happens only once and cannot be reproduced under laboratory conditions, and the repeatable miracle, which happens every time the right conditions are in place.
For obvious reasons, the once-off miracle is not suitable; since it cannot be reproduced, it cannot be used in a scientific context to show more than coincidence.
So let us then consider the repeatable miracle. For the purposes of discussion, I will pick out one potential example; let us say that all fires refuse to burn any orphan. This would be reproducible in a laboratory, and it would be clearly miraculous, by our current understanding of science.
Now, let us consider a world where no fire had ever burnt an orphan. How would it differ from our world? Well, there are a few obvious ways—almost all firemen would be orphans, it would be possible to prove a parent’s death by checking if their children are burnt by a candle flame, and some psychopaths would kill their own parents to become fireproof.
And scientists would struggle to find a mechanism for the fireproofness of orphans. Sooner or later, someone would suggest something that sounded vaguely believable… and it would be tested. If it fails the test, then someone else will suggest something else, and so on. The history of science is full of theories that later turned out to be false—phlogiston, luminiferous aether—and were replaced by better theories. In this case, the theory would be wrong (since it’s direct divine influence saving all the orphans) - but unless it could be disproved, it would be accepted (and if it could be disproved, it would be replaced).
Either way, the laboratory tests wouldn’t say ‘miracle’.
Quite honestly, I haven’t the faintest idea. Trying to prove the non-existence of God is exactly like proving a negative, because it is a negative.
All perfectly natural mechanisms were set in place by God as well.
The infamous ‘begats’ in Chronicles have a problem, in that they assume that Adam and Eve were real (that’s where the biblical literalists get their ‘the Earth is six thousand years old’ from; counting generations and making some assumptions about how long people live).
As for literal; that’s a very high bar to meet. I often hear (and even make) statements which are intended to communicate a true fact, but which are not literally true; and even in court, eye-witness statements may and often do conflict on minor details.
So, given that I hold it to the bar of ‘eye-witness statement’ or, in parts, ‘hearsay’ rather than to the higher bar of ‘every last literal word perfectly true’, I shall present to you the four Gospels as an example
I can see a couple of issues with this formulation, defining a miracle for the moment as a suspension of natural law by divine fiat. First, while a one-time miracle presumably wouldn’t be reproducible under laboratory conditions, most miracles that I can think of would leave an inconsistency with known physical law and could be analyzed by working backwards from the available evidence. Some would be more obvious or easier to evaluate than others; if the face of the Virgin Mary appeared in my cornflakes one morning, I’d have only until they got soggy to publicize the event, but if a volcanic eruption in Luzon generated a pyroclastic cloud that scoured the rest of a town down to bedrock but left every board of a flimsy wooden church unharmed, there’s still plenty of lahar sediments to analyze. You don’t need to grow evidence in a Petri dish for it to be real science.
(Though it’s worth mentioning here that lots of religions, plus Charles Fort, allege odd phenomena. Incorrupt corpses are alleged for a number of Catholic saints, for example, and the corpses in question certainly look less corrupt than I’d expect them to be, but they also show up among Buddhist monks.)
Then there’s the idea that miracles might show signs of agency, i.e. be directed at some goal; God’s motives in the context of Christianity are of course famously ineffable, but the miracles alleged in the Bible do show certain patterns (protection of the innocent or of a chosen people; glorification of God; etc.) and we might reasonably expect these to continue. We can pick these out with statistical methods: if preachers of one particular sect are indistinguishable from those of another in terms of habits and demographics and there’s enough of both to make a good sample, but the rate of lethal accidents for one is zero, that’s certainly suggestive.
Finally, many alleged miracles are persistent in time but limited in space: Lourdes water, weeping statues. These leave an inconsistency that’s laboratory testable (many have been tested, generally with negative results) but wouldn’t be factored into models of physical law, or which at least would lead to much less elegant physics than we observe.
That is an excellent point, and some analyses of the sort have been done. The Shroud of Turin being a famous example (conclusion: radiocarbon dating suggests it was likely from a thousand years or so too late, but it’s not yet quite clear how it was made; lots of argument and disagreement). Another, perhaps a little less well-known, would be the Miracle of Lanciano
It’s not impossible that God might respond equally to anyone who fulfills a certain list of criteria, regardless of what religion the person follows. A devout Buddhist may have as much chance of leaving an incorrupt corpse as a devout Catholic.
...which leads, of course, to the immediate question of what the relevant criteria are. I don’t know. I have a few guesses, but they’re speculative.
This is an excellent point. However; in order to detect the agency, it would be necessary to have some idea of the goal. Considering that omniscience and omnipotence are often considered divine attributes, the best idea that we can have for the goal is to consider that what is happening is what was intended; but that quickly becomes a circular argument, because it is trivially clear that if what is happening is what was intended, then it was successful.
It would be very suggestive and, quite honestly, a little worrying. It would imply that there was nothing worthwhile in the preachers of one sect, and at the same time, that none of the preachers of the the sect joined for selfish motives (such as, for example, immunity to fatal accidents) and don’t really care about doing their duties correctly.
That is true. I guess that would fall under laboratory-testable. I imagine a number of them would be faked, or turn out to be a one-in-a-billion statistical fluke—the genuine ones may get lost in the noise.
On the other hand, it’s also quite possible that the phenomenon of incorrupt corpses occurs regardless of the virtues of the individuals in question, but then corpses of the particularly virtuous are held up as examples of divine grace, while the incorrupt corpses of ordinary people, not being seen as evidence of anything in particular, are ignored.
You mentioned before the possibility of militant atheists cherrypicking evidence to support their position. This is certainly a consideration that has to be accounted for, but so is the possibility that the evidence favoring religion only appears compelling because it is cherrypicked. This also occurs to a considerable extent with nigh-certainty. Consider, for example, the healing miracles of Lourdes, which Nornagest mentioned above, which have made it an international pilgrimage destination, despite the fact that statistical analyses of the recovery rates of pilgrims do not suggest that the location has any particular healing power. Counting every unexplained recovery, while not counting the nonrecoveries, can create the appearance of persistent miracles.
Hard-to-explain things happen all the time, and we’re much more likely to notice them if they seem indicative of something important to us than if they don’t.
That is also a possibility. And it can be tested for; if it is true, then the percentage of incorrupt corpses should be constant whether the people were virtuous before dying or whether they were legally executed for crimes committed (and not later exonerated by, say, DNA evidence).
...I have no idea what the results of actually checking that would be, but it would certainly be interesting.
That is a very strong possibility that must be borne in mind, yes.
From the Wikipedia article on Lourdes:
Both references were retrieved on 5 May 2009, though the second was dated 21 October 2003. There we have a rate; 69 miraculous cures, out of 200 million people (and any number of non-miraculous cures as well, of course).
If there is nothing to Lourdes, then this should be similar to the number of miraculous cures among a random sampling of 200 million people with various illnesses.
(Sixty-nine out of two hundred million is low enough to give the appearance of statistical noise; that’s odds of close to one in three milllion)
Makes sense. This may not be a fair question to ask, but do you believe that, given all available evidence, you’d still be a theist if your prior was a bit lower—say, about 50% ?
Regarding miracles, I think you and I mean different things by the term.
Both of the kinds of miracles you described sound fairly mundane to me. The first kind is basically a rare unexplained occurrence; these happen every day, and, given what we now know of statistics, it would in fact be quite odd if they did not occur. For example, last week I was filling up my car and saw that my odometer read “123455”; that was neat, but I wouldn’t call it miraculous.
The second kind of miracle sounds like a natural law to me, just like gravity or heat transfer or something. You say that “all perfectly natural mechanisms were set in place by God as well”; does this mean that pretty much everything that happens is a miracle ? Doesn’t that rather dilute the word “miracle” to the point where it just means, “stuff that happens” ?
Huh, that’s odd. When I read the Gospels, I get the same exact impression as the one you described regarding the book of Job. The Gospels basically consist of a thin plot that serves to hold together several tangentially related morality tales, as well as monologues by the main character which are explicitly meant to be metaphorical (involving olive trees, donkeys, and such, borrowing some tropes from Aesop’s fables). Jesus does some fantastical things in the book, but these always serve to illustrate some moral lesson or another; in this, he is pretty similar to other characters in the Bible who summon bears, survive inside whales, etc.
So, could you contrast the two stories (the Gospels, or perhaps some specific passage from the New Testament, vs. Job), to illustrate why you believe that one is mostly fiction, and the other mostly fact ?
I cannot say for sure. I’d like to say ‘yes’… but too much of my history would need to change for that to be true. I can’t say anything for certain about that counterfactual me.
Yes, but some are mere coincidences, like your odometer; while others appear to subvert the natural order, like the Sun doing a dance.
Yes, that was more-or-less my point.
I’d say that any kind of natural law is exactly as miraculous as a permanently-repeatable miracle. I don’t really think that dilutes the work ‘miracle’ all that much; after all, some pretty amazing stuff happens on a continual basis. (It may inflate the phrase ‘stuff that happens’ somewhat; but when one considers all that goes into stuff happening, it can be pretty impressive in any case).
Hmmm.
For Job, I shall pick out Job chapters 4 and 5; a very long, wordy speech by one speaker. Note that this is framed as being one of Job’s friends, taking to Job after Job has lost everything and moaned about it a bit. Completely overblown. I can’t imagine anyone speaking like that in a conversation.
Compare this passage from the Gospel of John (specifically, John 18:28-19:16); wherein Jesus is taken before Pilate by a mob who want to have him killed; what people say here is a lot shorter and more to-the-point. It’s easier to see Pilate as a civil servant who just really doesn’t want anything to do with this mess that’s been thrown on his lap; his reactions seem far more plausible than Job’s friends’ speeches.
Jesus has a similar overblown speech spanning multiple chapters in John (14-18)
Just FYI, Pilate’s behavior in the Gospels is almost completely at odds with how he’s described in literature that’s actually contemporary with when Pilate lived. Pilate in the Gospels is depicted as a patient, if not a slightly annoyed, judge of character. Only succumbing to executing Jesus because he doesn’t want a riot to start. Pilate depicted by Philo (who was writing when Pilate was still alive) describes Pilate as stubborn, inflexible, greedy, impatient, executing multiple people without trials, and has no qualms about ignoring the will of Jewish mobs. Pilate is actually relieved of his duty because he was such a corrupt prefect.
Also, Barabbas, the character that the Jews want released in Jesus’ stead: His name “Barabbas” literally means “son of the father” which just so happens to be Jesus’ identity. Not only would Pilate not have acquiesced to releasing a (presumably) convicted criminal to appease a Jewish crowd, but there was no tradition of letting a prisoner go during Passover.
The whole trial scene with Pilate is exceedingly improbable if one knows the history of the time period, even if Pilate uses more to the point wording; that is easily fabricated.
It’s a long speech, yes, and spans multiple chapters; but it’s not the sort of overblown verbiage one finds in Job. The speeches in Job are long not because they have a lot to say, but because they insist on saying everything in the most drawn-out and overdone way possible; each entire speech could probably be replaced by two or three sentences easily. It would be a lot harder to replace Jesus’ speech in John 14-17 with a similarly few short phrases.
Okay, I’ve followed up your link, and I don’t think it backs up your claim as completely as you seem to assume it does. (That’s aside from the fact that people are complex beings, and often do unexpected things.) I hadn’t really looked into other sources on Pilate before reading your comment, so this is just sortof off the top of my head.
So, the picture I get of Pilate from your link is of someone who really doesn’t like the Jews, and is quite willing to set his soldiers on them—even to the point of enticing a Jewish crowd to form in a place where he can arrange disguised soldiers in its midst, so that his disguised troops can cut up the nearby protestors. He has no qualms about sentencing people to death and really, really doesn’t like to change his mind.
So. Imagine a person like that, and then imagine that this Jewish mob turns up on his doorstep, all unexpected, clamouring to have this man put to death. Pilate may not have qualms about sentencing a man to death; but a stubborn and inflexible man who doesn’t like the Jewish mob isn’t going to want to give them what they want. No, he’s going to want to deny them out of sheer contrariness; he’s going to look for a way to get this guy out of his hair, alive, so that he can go back and bother the Jews more.
And then, of course, there’s the data point that he often turns against the mob. But he’s human; one man against a mob tends to go really badly for the one man, and he knows that. He doesn’t turn against the mob on his own—he turns against the mob when he’s backed up by enough soldiers. As in the example where he had the soldiers disguise themselves to join the mob, this takes planning. This takes forethought. This takes knowing that the mob is going to be there. In advance. A mob that turns up entirely unannounced, while Pilate’s busy with other stuff and perhaps some of his soldiers are on leave, is another matter entirely; that calls for defusing them now, and punishing them later, when there’s been time to plan it out. And hey, this mob gets defused by simply having this one Jewish guy killed. Not optimal, but better than a riot that the troops aren’t quite ready to deal with...
Given the picture you’ve painted, as a corrupt prefect, he might well release some minor brigand who’d only preyed on the peasants and left anyone with soldiers alone.
Yeah, that’s probably what I’d say, too.
How do you know which is which; and how do you know when the natural order has truly been subverted ? For example, I personally don’t know much about that dancing sun event, but the fact that (according to Wikipedia, at least) it has not been recorded by any cameras or other instruments leads me to believe that human psychology, rather than divine intervention, was responsible.
That said, in your estimation, approximately how many miracles of that kind are occurring on Earth per year ?
Agreed. So, when we talk about miracles, let’s stick to unusual acts of divine intervention.
In addition to what JQuinton said, I’d like to add that, while the New Testament definitely contains more action than Job, it’s still pretty much full of parables, sermons, and long-winded speeches; for example, such as the one directly preceeding the passage you quoted—and that’s not even the longest one. I agree that the supporting characters are a bit more lifelike in the New Testament—but then, it’s also a much longer book, so there are more pages available to flesh them out.
Furthermore, there are many other works of literature with even better writing; for example, the Odyssey, Moby Dick, or, more recently, Harry Potter. Presumably, you don’t believe that these works describe real events; but if so, why not ?
Well, first you have to know what the natural order is. And that requires the help of the physicists and other scientists.
What a scientist cannot explain may or may not be a subversion of the natural order. (What a scientist can explain may or may not also be a subversion of the natural order—some scientists can be trapped into providing justifications for incorrect versions of events—but it’s still a useful filtering tool) Or it may be a thing that the physicist will have to update his model of physics to explain.
...it’s not an easy question.
That’s not impossible. (I don’t know much about it either; it was linked from the wikipedia article on ‘miracle’).
Ummm… if I had to guess… I’d guess less than one. I wouldn’t venture a guess as to how much less than one, though.
Defining whether a given event is or is not an unusual act of divine intervention may be tricky; but fair enough, let’s go with that definition for the moment.
You’re right; nothing that’s written in the Gospels can raise it to a status of higher than ‘plausible’. Many clear works of fiction also reach the status of ‘plausible’; in order to reach the higher status of ‘probably true’, one needs a certain amount of external verification.
I find a good deal of that external verification in the fact that a number of people, in whom I place a great deal of trust, and at least some of whom are known to be better at identifying truth than I am, have told me that it is true.
Ok, I admit that science is hard. But about you ? How do you, personally, know what’s a subversion of the natural order and what isn’t ?
Which possibility do you think is more likely in this case: genuine miracle, or mass confirmation bias ? That’s why I’d like you to clarify this:
Well, can you put a ballpark figure on it ? Do miracles happen (on average) once a year ? Once a century ? Once a millennium ? Once per the lifetime of our Universe ?
I think this is another difference between our methods; and I must confess that I find your approach quite weird. This doesn’t automatically mean that it’s wrong, of course; in fact, many theists (including C.S.Lewis) advocate it, so there might be something to it. I just don’t see what.
The big difference between your approach and mine is that you seem to be entirely discounting empirical evidence; or, if not discounting it, then trivializing it at the very least. So, for example, if a trusted friend told you that he was fishing in the pond behind his house and caught a Great White shark; and if all of your friends confirmed this; then you’d accept that as true. I, on the other hand, would ask to see the shark.
The reason for this is not that I’m some sort of a hateful, un-trusting person (or rather, that’s not the only reason, heh); but because we have mountains and mountains of data on sharks, and all of it tells us that they are incredibly unlikely to show up in ponds, and are also quite strong and thus nearly impossible to catch using an ordinary fishing line. Compared to this overwhelming pile of evidence, the testimony of a few people does not suffice to turn the tide of my belief.
So, is there a reason why you value empirical evidence as little as you do ? Alternatively, did I completely misunderstand your position ?
I have at least as much difficulty as the hypothetical scientist. Possibly slightly more difficulty, because the hypothetical scientist will know more science than I do.
Insufficient data for a firm conclusion.
Opposing the mass confirmation bias hypothesis, are the claims that the water on the ground and on people’s clothing was dried during the time; also apparently people ‘miles away’ (and thus unlikely to have been caught up in mass hysteria at the time) also reported having seen it.
Having said that, there is another explanation that occurs to me; the scene was described as the dancing sun appearing after a rainstorm, bursting through the clouds:
If the clouds were thick enough, it may be hard to see the Sun; the bright light could have been… something else sufficiently hot and bright. (I do not know what, but there’s room for a number of other hypotheses there).
I am very poorly calibrated on such low frequencies, so take what I say here is highly speculative. (Also, the rate seems very variable, with several a year in the time of the Gospels, for example).
At a rough guess, I’d say possibly somewhere between once a year and once a century. Might be more, might be less.
Let me explain further, then, by means of an analogy. Consider the example you provide, of a trustworthy friend claiming to have found a great white shark in a nearby pond. For the sake of argument, I shall assume a rather large pond, in which a Great White could plausibly survive a day or two, but fed and drained by rivers too small for a Great White to swim along.
I shall further assume that you are aware that all your friends were on the fishing trip together (which you were unable to join due to a prior appointment).
Now, catching a Great White is a noteworthy accomplishment. If your friend were to accomplish this, it is reasonable to assign a high probability that he would tell you. Therefore, I assign the following:
P (Being told | Great White caught) = 0.95
It is also possible that your friends are collaborating on a prank, giving you an implausible story to see if they can convince you. If this is the case, they could have decided to do so while on the fishing trip, and laid out the necessary plans then. Exactly what probability you assign to this depends a lot on your friends; however, for the sake of argument, I shall assume that there’s a 20% chance of this scenario.
P (Being told | No great white caught) = 0.2
Now, furthermore, there is no plausible way for a Great White to have ended up in the pond; and no plausible way to catch one with a simple fishing line. There are a variety of implausible but physically possible ways to accomplish both actions, though. So the prior probability of a Great White being caught is very low:
P (Great White caught) = 0.05
(possibly less than that, but let’s go with that for the moment).
Thus, P(Being told) = P (Being told | Great White caught) P(Great White caught) + P (Being told | No great white caught) P(No great white caught) = (0.95 0.05) + (0.2 0.95) = 0.2375
Plugging this into Bayes, P(Great White caught | Being told) = P (Being told | Great White caught) P(Great White caught)/P(Being told) = (0.95 0.05)/0.2375 = 0.2
So, given certain assumptions about how trustworthy your friends are, etc., I find that the probability that they have indeed captured a Great White is higher if they tell you that they have than if they do not. Mind you, the prior probability for capturing a Great White is very low to begin with; the end result is still that it is more probable that they are lying than that they have captured a Great White, and you would be perfectly sensible to request further proof, in the form of the shark in question, before believing their claims.
It’s not that I completely discard empirical evidence; it’s just that empirical evidence, one way or another, is somewhat rare in the case of this particular question, and thus I am forced to rely on what evidence I can find.
I have, on at least one occasion, observed some evidence; but it’s the sort of evidence that doesn’t communicate well and is rather unconvincing at one remove (I know it happened, because I remember it, but I have no proof other than my unsupported word).
You yourself have said that the prior probability of a miracle occurring on any given day is relatively small, “somewhere between once a year and once a century”. You also said that, if a miracle were to occur, you would likely be unable to recognize it as such: “I have at least as much difficulty as the hypothetical scientist. Possibly slightly more difficulty...”. You also offered a plausible-sounding natural explanation for the event, and, as you mentioned, many other perfectly natural explanations exist. In addition, we have zero recorded evidence for this miracle, other than people’s testimonies; whereas any other spectacular events (such as volcano eruptions or Justin Bieber sightings) are usually accompanied by plenty of recorded data (including news reports, cellphone footage, instrument telemetry, etc. etc.).
Given all of this, I’d argue that the probability of this particular event being a miracle is quite low—even if we grant that a miracle-causing god of some sort does exist.
Whoa, whoa, wait a minute, 0.05 is huge ! It’s about 460 times greater than your odds of dying in a car accident during any given year, assuming you live in the USA. And that’s car accidents, which are pretty common events. Given that no recorded evidence of a backyard shark catch exists, I’d estimate its prior to be even lower. After all, meteorite strikes that damage people or property are extremely rare, and yet we do have recorded evidence of them happening, so pond sharks have got to be even more rare than that.
If we estimate the prior at something fairly optimistic, like 1 / 7e6 (meaning that we’d expect this rare event to happen to at least one person on any given day, seeing as there are 7e6 people on Earth), we still get a probability of something like 5.7e-7, which is about the same odds as winning the lottery (though I could be wrong, I don’t know much about lotteries).
Wouldn’t this drive down the probability ? If I knew that people were catching great whites in ponds all the time, I’d be more likely to believe my friends when they told me they caught one, right ?
What makes you trust the evidence, then ?
If I went fishing in a pond one day, and caught what appears to be at first glance a great white shark, I wouldn’t trust my initial impressions. I’d start looking for a hidden camera. And maybe get an MRI, just in case. Those probabilities apply to everyone, including myself. Would you not agree ?
All true.
I would like to point out that, first of all, this occurred in 1917; there were no cellphones to take cellphone footage. And there were news reports at the time (there’s a scan of at least one relevant newspaper page on the wikipedia page)
I don’t think this detracts all that much from your point, but I felt I should point it out.
I expect that there are significantly more events claimed to be miracles than there are actual miracles. So, given as cursory a look over the available evidence as we’ve taken in this discussion, it would be sensible to assign a low probability to this incident having been a miracle, yes.
You’re right, it is really rather unreasonably large. (All of my assumed priors in my previous posts were multiples of 1⁄20, a level of granularity perhaps too coarse for this figure). However, I don’t believe that detracts from the point I was making at all.
Consider: P(Being told) = P (Being told | Great White caught) P(Great White caught) + P (Being told | No great white caught) P(No great white caught)
Taking the previously assumed values of P (Being told | Great White caught) = 0.95 and P (Being told | No great white caught) = 0.2, and taking P(Great White caught) as 1e(-10), that gives P(Being told) = (0.95 1e(-10)) + (0.2 (1 − 1e(-10))) = 0.200000000075
Now, substituting these values in Bayes: P(Great White caught | Being told) = P (Being told | Great White caught) P(Great White caught)/P(Being told) = (0.95 1e(-10))/0.200000000075 = 0.00000000047499999982; or approximately 4.75e-10. While this is minute, it is still over four times larger than the probability that they had caught a Great White had they not yet told you; being told that they had caught a Great White is still evidence in favour of a Great White having been caught. (Though not enough to make it probable that a Great White had actually been caught).
No, because the fact that great whites are not being caught in ponds all the time is evidence. It is very strong evidence for the hypothesis that great whites are not often found, or caught, in ponds.
When I say that empirical evidence is rare, I mean that many things can be adequately explained whether it is true that God exists or not. Therefore, those things do not act as evidence either for or against the hypothesis.
Rather than continue to talk in hypotheticals, I think I’ll take a moment to describe the incident in question (and I think you’ll see why I say I expect you to be unconvinced by it).
I was waiting outside Church; I had been nearby for some other reason, and it would not be economical to go home before mass (as I would then have had to leave immediately again), but there was still some time to wait. Having planned for this eventuality, I had a book to read with me. (I should perhaps mention, at this point, that I am notorious among my close acquaintances for the difficulty of interrupting me in the middle of a good book).
A little way outside the church, there is a large crucifix set up. While I was reading, a man walked by and knelt at the crucifix in prayer. And, for a brief while, I felt this very strong sense of Presence… strong enough that I found myself unable to continue reading my book until it had gone.
And that’s it. After a while, the man got up and walked away; the sense of Presence receded.
So, what makes me trust the evidence? I remember it; and I do not believe there was any way that any human could have faked that experience.
The obvious explanation is a brain malfunction, not fakery by another human.
(I also suspect confirmation bias. If you had had the same experience without a man praying nearby, you wouldn’t have decided that it proves that such experiences have nothing to do with prayer.)
But even ignoring that, plenty of Muslims and people of other religions have had similar experiences. Yet I doubt you believe that they were real. Since you believe that similar experiences by Muslims are not real, you obviously do believe that there are explanations other than the experience being real. Why not now, too?
Possible; but I consider it an extremely low-probability possibility, for much the same reason as I consider the possibility that a given cloud I see in the sky is a hallucination has very low probability.
No… but I do believe I would still have interpreted it as evidence for the existence of God.
Ah—be careful of assumptions. I see no reason why some of them might not have been real. I’m not sure that the details of what building one goes into for worship, or the wording of the sermons, are what’s really important.
Consider Matthew 25:31-46, in which the Final Judgement is directly referenced, and the criteria under which that judgement will take place are given:
There’s nothing in there about belonging to a specific religion; it’s all about going out there and going good things for people.
So, given that there are Muslims who are good people and do good things, I see no reason why God wouldn’t on occasion answer their prayers, on the same criteria (which are hard to find and may take as input information not available without omniscience) as He uses to respond to anyone else.
Hm.
Backing up a little: what’s your confidence that an arbitrarily selected perception is the result of processing signals from a distal stimulus that conforms in all significant ways to the perception?
Very very high. Short of strong evidence that a given perception is false (and not merely might be false), I tend to assume that all of my perceptions are caused by a distal stimulus that conforms in all significant ways to the perception in question (possibly filtered by intervening effects, e.g. dimmed if I am wearing sunglasses).
Well, yes, of course very very high.
And, sure, in practice we behave as though all our perceptions are like this, because treating any given one as though it isn’t is typically unjustified.
I meant the question somewhat more precisely.
For example, out of 100,000 distinct perceptions, would you estimate the chance that at least one of those perceptions lacks a conforming distal stimulus as ~1? ~.1? ~.01? ~.00001? Other?
Ah. I see.
I’m afraid I can’t really give you an answer at the level of precision you’re asking for; I’m really not well calibrated for extimating extremely low probabilities. The best I can give you is “small enough as to be near indistinguishable from zero”.
And I’m not entirely sure where I should put the upper bound of that category, either.
Well, let’s approach it from the other direction, then. Would you say that the chance that I’ve experienced at least one perception not caused by processing signals from a distal stimulus that conforms in all significant ways to the perception within the last 12 months is indistinguishable from zero? Indistinguishable from one? Somewhere in between?
Hmmm. Tricky.
There are substances that, when ingested or perhaps inhaled, will trigger hallucinations.
There are certain mental conditions which may trigger hallucinations.
Dreams might also count, given the wording you’ve used.
If I assume that you haven’t ingested any hallucinogens, knowingly or not; and that you are mentally healthy, and not counting dreams, then I’d say it falls into the “small enough as to be near indistinguishable from zero” category. (If you have ingested hallucinogens, the probability shoots up; potentially quite a lot).
OK, cool… that answers the question I was trying to get answered. Thank you.
The possibility that a random cloud is a hallucination is low because clouds are well-studied and there is plenty of evidence for the existence of clouds—evidence of such a nature that anyone can see it. Furthermore, we know something about hallucinations—hallucinations don’t cause random people to see random objects under random circumstances. A random cloud in the sky is not the type of thing that hallucinations typically make people see.
Your mystical experience was observable only by yourself, and was of a type which is known to be caused by brain malfunction.
But the more that different religions can do this, the less the meaning of the mystical experience. If God gives those experiences to people of all religions, then those experiences are no longer evidence for any particular religion. For all you know, the Muslim idea of God is the true one, the Christian one is false, and the Muslim God gives experiences to Christians in the same way you think that the Christian one gives experiences to Muslims. Maybe Christianity is really false, the pagans are right that there is a god and a goddess, and they give mystical experiences to Christians. Maybe some form of devil-worship is correct; I assume you believe that the Devil can’t hand out mystical experiences, but if you are wrong about just that part, your experience could just as well come from the Devil.
It simply suggests that the criteria that God uses, when deciding when to make His presence known, are not limited to the professed religion of the person in question. Exactly what those criteria are, is not fully clear; but any religion which helped to foster those criteria amongst its adherents would be at least partially correct, in its effects if not necessarily in its dogma.
Why not? We’re talking about the what may be second-most powerful entity in existence. (Mind you, there’s a big difference between can and will; the existence of the Devil strongly implies the existence of God, and if the Devil is trying to discourage religion, then it would be counterproductive unless some other effects of said experience outweigh that risk.)
That sounds like you’re agreeing with me. If God gives people mystical experiences no matter what their religion, mystical experiences are no good in showing that the religion is true. Of course this is a matter of degree. The wider the range of people get the experiences, the worse the experiences are at showing anything.
If beings other than God (such as the Devil) can give out mystical experiences, it’s even worse. Mystical experiences not only don’t show that the religion is true, they don’t even show that “God exists” is true. At this point I don’t see why you care that it’s not just a brain malfunction, because even if it wasn’t, you have no way to tell between an experience sent by God, one sent by the Devil, and there being a sorcerer on every block who occasionally pulls pranks by giving random people mystical experiences.
(As for why the Devil would want to do that? Maybe he knows that people interpret mystical experiences as evidence for their religion being true and he can incite religious conflict by giving people of opposing religions mystical experiences.)
It does not prevent said experiences from showing the existence of God, or from hinting at the criteria He finds important.
The devil is defined more-or-less by being in oppostion to God. If the devil exists, then so does God, pretty much.
And humans capable of pulling off a trick like that would almost certainly have been discovered by now if they were common.
The more different kinds of God you think can give out mystical experiences, the vaguer the “God” that those experiences demonstrate the existence of. If the Muslim version of God can send them, maybe it shows there’s a God but he’s not necessarily Christian. If polytheistic pagan gods can send them, maybe it shows that there’s a God but he’s not necessarily Christian and there isn’t necessarily one of him either. You’ve ended up “proving” there’s a God who has few attributes other than his name.
That’s just a matter of semantics. Maybe a devil-like being without a God can’t strictly speaking be called the Devil, but whatever you call him, surely you believe that if the normal Devil can give out mystical experiences, so can that one, right?
“Every block” is just an example. Suppose there were few but not no sorcerers in the world. Couldn’t they produce mystical experiences that you could not tell from God-borne ones?
(And how do you explain the fact that people can take drugs that cause mystical experiences, get electrical shocks to their brain that trigger mystical experiences, and why some known mental illnesses are associated with mystical experiences? None of these things happen for seeing clouds except in passing.)
I find your comment very confusing. Might I suggest that we continue this discussion, after tabooing the words ‘God’ and ‘Devil’?
I’ll start out by rewriting my previous post under those same constraints:
It does not prevent said experiences from showing the existence of [an omnipotent, omniscient being], or from hinting at the criteria He finds important.
The [being opposing an omnipotent, omniscient being] is defined more-or-less by being in oppostion to [an omnipotent, omniscient being]. If the [being opposing an omnipotent, omniscient being] exists, then so does [said omnipotent, omniscient being], pretty much.
And humans capable of pulling off a trick like that would almost certainly have been discovered by now if they were common.
No, not unless the claim that you’re making fits whatever words you use instead of “God” and “Devil”. In order for it to work, you would have to assert that mystical experiences can come only from omnipotent, omniscient beings or other beings who share a cosmology, and from nobody else. I find that a very peculiar thing to claim.
I would think that, if they exist, pagan gods should be able to provide mystical experiences. Pagan gods aren’t omnipotent and omniscient. A being that resembled the devil but didn’t oppose anyone powerful could provide mystical experiences, and he wouldn’t be omniscient, omnipotent, or in opposition to someone who is. Sorcerers aren’t omniscient or omnipotent, yet they could make such experiences. And we know that brain stimulation, drugs, starvation, and mental illness can produce mystical experiences and they have nothing to do with omnipotence or omniscience.
And as for sorcerers being common, the argument doesn’t depend on them being common, just on them existing. Rare sorcerers are equally a problem for the theory as common ones. There’s also the possibility that sorcerers exist in a society that is intentionally kept hidden from discovery by the muggles. (And even then, who’s to say that sorcerers haven’t been discovered? They haven’t been discovered in a reproducible way in a laboratory, but neither has God. They certainly have been discovered in the sense that an awful lot of people over a wide range of times and places were confident that they are real.)
No, I simply need to assert that such experiences are more likely given the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent being than they are without the existence of such a being.
Consider, for example; if I find a drop of oil on my driveway one morning, I may conclude that my car has an oil leak. There are other ways that the oil may have got there; someone else may have parked in my driveway for a few hours overnight, and he may have an oil leak. Or a neighbour may have dripped some oil on my driveway as a prank.
The mere existence of alternate hypothesis is not, on its own, sufficient to show that a conclusion cannot be correct.
Okay, since you’re not tabooing ‘god’, I’m going to take a guess that you mean a very powerful and knowledgeable but neither omnipotent nor omniscient being which is part of a community of similarly powerful and knowledgeable beings, whose unified actions underlie the basic physics of the universe. Is that approximately correct?
If that is what you meant, then yes, you are correct; however, the chances that such beings exist is very small, because if a number of nearly-equally-powerful yet different beings were trying to run the physics of the universe, then we would almost certainly by now have spotted some areas of blatant disagreement between different beings; it would, in short, almost certainly be clearly impossible that a theory of everything could ever be produced. (If they never disagreed about anything ever, then are they really separate beings?)
I’m guessing here (because I’m really not sure what you mean) that you mean a single powerful and knowledgeable but neither omnipotent nor omniscient being?
If so, then again, you’re right. Such a being could provide such an experience.
Yes. And I know that I didn’t have electrodes in my brain, I hadn’t taken drugs, I wasn’t starved, and I’m mentally healthy.
True. The occasional rare sorceror who doesn’t even know he’s a sorceror would work. This would imply some circumstance, possibly some rare genetic mutation, which would permit some human brain to have a very direct effect on another human brain. If this could be controlled—even slightly—and if it worked on non-human brains as well, it could have a drastic positive effect on an organism’s survival. If this were the case, I’d expect to see at least one type of mildly telepathic animal, exploiting this.
...I might not, of course. It might be that the ‘sorcerors’ are the first organism to exhibit this rare mutation.
And if there was a God, and there was a Devil who opposed him, we’d almost certainly have spotted some areas of disagreement between them. (You could claim that yes, we have spotted such things, but of course the same claim could be made for pagan gods.)
Also, pagan gods needn’t necessarily run the physics of the universe in the sense of changing the cosmological constant.
This would be true for certain types of psychic powers, but there are other things which can be done only by humans. Sorcerers with spellbooks have to be able to read, for instance, and even if you quibble about whether animals can read, they wouldn’t be able to read well enough to use a spellbook.
The point is that mystical experiences are known to have physical causes other than the existence of a supernatural being. I would expect milder versions of those to occasionally produce mystical experiences too. Nobody may have put an electrode in your brain, but the brain is complex and can occasionally misfire by itself.
No, that’s not enough. Given that this is lesswrong, I hope you are aware of Bayseianism. The extent to which an experience is evidence of a God compared to evidence of other things that produce mystical experiences depends on your priors.It may be that a God is more likely to produce a mystical experience than anything else, but the prior for the existence of God is low enough that a mystical experience is still most likely to have been caused by something other than God.
Only if they were roughly equal in power and ability. If God is so comparatively powerful that the Devil doesn’t get to make changes to the laws of physics, then we wouldn’t see any such disagreements (because physics as a whole is still then under control of one being)
In that case, can you please explain to me what exactly you mean by the phrase ‘pagan gods’?
Yes, I am aware of Bayesianism.
My prior for the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient being was set pretty high; somewhere over 50%. Why do you claim that that prior has to be set “low enough that a mystical experience is still most likely to have been caused by something other than God”?
I was thinking more of the Devil causing small-scale events like, oh, killing someone’s child to tempt them into committing revenge, or sending people mystical experiences in order to increase religious strife. The Devil is commonly described as being able to do things like that and God doesn’t stop him, for whatever reason. I don’t care if the Devil can change the speed of light.
A being who has powers other than those currently recognized by science, has an area of concern and a level of power over its area of concern that is relatively high in the hierarchy if applicable, and either was worshipped or is in a class of beings that is generally worshipped.
As defining words is difficult even for well-known concepts like “chair” I reserve the right to update this definition. (If a chair is defined as being for sitting, does that mean that a chair designed as a museum art exhibit is not a chair? You try to define it and end up with locutions like “is either meant for sitting, or has features that would be considered to be designed for sitting if it was intended for sitting”.)
If you set your prior high enough, anything can become evidence for God, in which case your belief that given that prior a mystical experience is evidence for God is correct but uninteresting.
But that would leave physics down to a single Being, with a single agenda; so there wouldn’t be signs of disagreement to be seen in the laws of physics themselves
Ah, I see. So it’s a very powerful being, with that power limited (whether by force or by choice) to a single area of concern (or possibly to multiple areas of concern), capable of feats not explainable by current scientific theories, possibly but not necessarily with the power to alter physics directly?
Such a being could presumably create a mystical experience, yes. And if they are able to alter physics directly, then I would expect a messier physics; on the other hand, if they are [i]not[/i], then, though powerful, they are no less subject to the laws of physics than we are and would eventually be explained as science progresses towards a better understanding of the universe.
Not quite anything, no. And I have to be wary of anthropic reasoning.
No matter where my prior is set, though, I still consider such an experience evidence of the existence of God; in that it is more likely that I’d have the experience if God exists than if not. The only difference that the prior makes is in deciding whether or not the evidence is sufficient prove God’s existence.
I don’t understand why you insist on wondering whether some being has the power to change the laws of physics. Giving someone a mystical experience doesn’t change the laws of physics (at least not nontrivially—by some definitions anything a supernatural being does “changes the laws of physics”), and the fact that a devil-like being without an adversary, a pagan god, or a sorcerer could give you one doesn’t mean they can change the laws of physics.
“Eventually” isn’t now. You don’t believe the Devil can change the laws of physics, yet surely you acknowledge that science has no understanding of him or his powers.
Why can’t there be other types of beings like pagan gods or sorcerers, that science also doesn’t yet understand yet (regardless of whether science might understand them sometime in the future)?
You presumably believe God created typhoid fever and that it is more likely we would see that if God existed than if he didn’t. If all you mean is that mystical experiences are evidence for God in the same sense that typhoid fever is, then that falls under “true but uninteresting”. On the other hand, if you believe that mystical experiences are evidence for God in some stronger sense than typhoid fever, please elaborate.
Because, from the start, I was presenting my experience as a piece of evidence in favour of the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent being; and ‘omnipotent’ involves, among other things, being able to alter physics.
Yes, it is possible to have a sense of presence without being able to change the laws of physics. But that’s not the point.
Right now, I honestly think that you and I are having completely different arguments. I am trying to discuss the probability of existence of an omnipotent, omniscient being; while you, as far as I can tell, are simply trying to list off alternate explanations for something I once saw. And yes, they are valid alternate explanations, but that’s not the point.
If, to take an analogy, I find a leaf on the ground (and assuming for the moment that I can’t identify a tree by its leaves) then this would be evidence in favour of the hypothesis that there is an apple tree nearby. Listing other types of tree that the leaf could have come from does not change that.
No; on the contrary, typhoid fever (along with virtually any other illness) is a side effect of the evolutionary process; as soon as a sufficiently large creature evolves, its body in turn forms a new environment in which other creatures (germs) can survive and grow. Illnesses, I’d think, would be almost certain to appear in any life-bearing world in the absence of God; and since I don’t understand why they exist, I can’t make the assumption that they must exist without engaging in circular reasoning. Which makes them weak evidence against the idea that God exists.
The experience I had in front of the church, on the other hand, is an experience that is very likely in a universe where an omnipotent, omniscient being exists; and seems very unlikely in a universe where that is false. Therefore, it is evidence in favour of the idea that such a being exists.
This is phrased in a subtly different way from how you phrased it before, because “seems very unlikely in a universe where that is false” isn’t a conditional probability (even though you use it to find a conditional probability).
Given the way you phrased it this time, in order to say that mystical experiences are unlikely in a universe without God, you have to show that the list of other things that cause mystical experiences is unlikely in a universe without God.
I certainly don’t agree that brain malfunctions are unlikely in a universe without God. In fact, I’d say that they are very likely, especially since we know that mystical experiences can be caused by purely physical processes. And I can’t see any reason why according to your standards, pagan gods, devil-like beings, or sorcerers are unlikely.
P(experience | no omnipotent, omniscient being) < P(experience | omnipotent, omniscient being)
...that’s what my paragraph was trying to communicate.
I merely need to show that the experience is more likely in a universe with God than in a universe without God.
Let us consider the set of all possible universes in which brains develop through evolutionary means, without the aid of any external beings, omnipotent or otherwise. Now, the resultant brains will, in general, merely be sufficient to result in a creature with a high chance of having grandchildren. Non-debilitating brain malfunctions are not merely likely; I’d think that they’re almost certain.
However, the effects of such malfunctions will be more-or-less random. One type of malfunction might cause the sufferer to temporarily perceive green as red and vice versa. Another might cause some form of synesthesia. Yet another might result in a sudden burst of emotion, such as rage or fear.
The odds that a malfunction will give someone the impression of an approaching Presence would be a lot lower than the odds of a random malfunction. And it is the odds of that specific malfunction that I expect to be fairly low; not the odds of brain malfunctions in general.
In two cases, those are immaterial beings; if one type of immaterial being exists, that’s weak evidence that another may also exist. So that implies that those two are marginally more likely in a universe that contains an omnipotent, omniscient being than in one that does not.
Aside from that very weak point, I see no reason to assume that any of those are more likely in either sort of universe. And if the probability of those are equal, and there is another potential source of mystical experiences in the universe with the omnipotent, omniscient being, then such an experience is weak evidence in favour of the existence of such a being.
No, because you phrased it differently. “The experience I had in front of the church, on the other hand, is an experience that is very likely in a universe where an omnipotent, omniscient being exists; and seems very unlikely in a universe where that is false” amounts to “P (experience | God) is high && P(experience | no God) is low”, not “P (experience | God) > P(experience | no God)”.
Brain malfunctions are more likely to produce some effects than others. And mystical experiences are the sort of thing brain malfunctions are likely to produce. That’s why people starve themselves and see mystical experiences, but they rarely starve themselves and start thinking they have 12 fingers. While you gave examples of other things brain malfunctions can produce, those are just other things which they are more likely than normal to produce; they don’t mean that the chance of everything is equal.
Those things are only marginally more likely in a universe with a God if you believe all types of God are equally likely. It is my impression that you think a Biblical-type God is more likely.
Even if they are more likely, this falls under “true but uninteresting”. There are lots of things that are marginally more likely in a universe with God. Claiming that mystical experiences are evidence for God is only interesting if it’s better evidence than those other things. Nobody says “I saw the Loch Ness Monster, so God is marginally more likely” (seeing the Loch Ness Monster implies that science, which says there is no such thing, can fail, and if science can fail, God is marginally more likely).
Well, I do think that “P (experience | God) is high && P(experience | no God) is low”. However, in order to take the experience as evidence for the existence of God, it is necessary only to show the weaker point that “P (experience | God) > P(experience | no God)”
True.
For human brains as they exist in this universe, perhaps. But for every possible type of brain, as may exist in every possible type of universe?
I consider that unlikely. I could be wrong about that, of course. But remember, in order to consider the probability of brains being prone to that exact malfunction, one must consider the possibility of brains constructed very differently to the ones we have. And, quite honestly, that’s such a wide and unexplored field that there’s not much I can say about it at all...
No, not all types are equally likely. Yes, I do think that an omniscient, omnipotent being very probably exists.
...why on earth would the idea that ‘science can fail’ lead to ‘God is marginally more likely’?
If an omnipotent, omniscient being exists, then it is reasonable to postulate that said being created our universe (or, at the very least, knew about it and didn’t stop it from existing). If such a being created our universe, then it is reasonable to assume that it would have been created with some care; because most craftsmen take a lot of care in their work. A bit of observation shows that our universe runs on rules; and if those rules were created with care, then it is reasonable to assume that they will work, that there are not going to be any obvious seams visible in the rules.
In short, if God exists, then science (being a systematic attempt to discover those rules) should work.
To figure out the odds of the existence of God based on you having a certain type of experience, you can’t just ignore the knowledge about what kind of brain you have. If you do that, you’re throwing out evidence that affects your conclusion. The type of brain you actually have is one where malfunctions produce mystical experiences more readily than they produce arbitrary other effects.
Yes, there would. If people normally disintegrate only when exposed to thousands of degrees of temperature, but God can disintegrate people whenever he wants, every time God stays hidden but disintegrates a person who is not hidden, that’s a seam in the rules and science will not be able to explain that event.
The figures that I am using to find P(God | experience) include P(experience | no God) and P(experience | God). P(experience | no God) must surely integrate over every possible universe in which there is no God, or else it will be P(experience | a specific universe), which is the wrong figure. Similarly, P(experience | God) must integrate over every universe in which an omnipotent, omniscient being exists; or else, once again, it is P(experience | specific universe), and is the wrong figure.
I’m trying to simplify the equation, for purposes of debate, to an update on exactly one piece of evidence. If we start including the specifics of the brain, then that opens up the question of P(God | human brain), which is an entire, and much bigger, debate on its own. And one that I have no intention of entering into with you; the inferential distance between us is simply too large, and I’ve been having enough trouble trying to communicate with you as it is.
That’s a very good point.
It’s rather unlikely that it could be replicated under laboratory conditions, which would mean it’s not an obvious seam… but yes, I see your point, it could be a bit of a seam. (Or it could be as-yet undiscovered physics of some sort, of course).
You can’t simplify that equation. If you simplify the equation that way it’s only useful when figuring out if there is a god, given a creature of unknown type who has a mystical experience. You are not a creature of unknown type, and throwing out the information that you have a brain that is inordinately prone to malfunctions that produce mystical experiences will distort the answer.
It’s like concluding there is a high probability that someone is insane because he thinks he’s Napoleon, while discarding the information that he’s ruling France in the year 1805. P(insane|claim Napoleon) is high, but P(insane|claim Napoleon && rules France in 1805)” is not high. Discarding this information is wrong.
That is exactly the point I was trying to make; that the fact that such an experience happened is a piece of evidence in favour of the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient being.
The trouble with this, if you start insisting that certain information cannot be left out, is that you are cherry-picking what information that is, and specifically selecting information that you believe leads to the conclusion that you want. I could probably name a dozen other pieces of information which support the idea that an omniscient, omnipotent being exists and insist on including them too (for example; consider P(God | intelligent life exists)).
If we start down this path, then we could both simply throw new pieces of information into the discussion again and again; it will take months, and it would lead absolutely nowhere.
I would like to refer you to a short story that discusses that point in greater detail.
In short, yes, P(insane | claims Napoleon) is high, and if I meet someone who tells me ‘One of my ancestors claimed he was Napoleon’ then I will consider it a high probability that that ancestor was insane.
The fact that such an experience happened, given no other information, may be evidence for God. But you have other information and are ignoring it.
Furthermore, even as evidence for God, it’s only evidence in a very weak sense compared to typical cases where one speaks about something being evidence. It makes it more likely that there’s a God, but it also makes it more likely that there is a pagan god, or a sorcerer, or an extraterrestrial with a mind-control ray.
It’s not cherry picking to refuse to discard information which affects the result by orders of magnitude more than the probability you’re hoping to get from it. A mystical experience in a human brain is much better evidence for a brain malfunction than it is for God.
My scenario not only involves being in 1805, but also ruling France. If you use the information that someone is your ancestor (presumably from 1805), but you omit the information that he was ruling France then, you have still discarded relevant information and as a result will come up with a probability of insanity that is much too high.
sigh
Very well. If you insist that I not ignore information, then there is a lot more information that needs to be properly considered. Decades of experiences that need to be sorted and categorised. Hundreds of writings, ancient and modern; thousands of accounts, of one sort or another.
We’ll just have to go through it all, piece by piece. Only the bits that are relevant, of course, but there’s a lot that is relevant.
For a start, let me consider the probability of the existence of God, given the existence of brains (or any form of hardware capable of supporting intelligence in some or other form).
Where, just to be clear, I use the word ‘God’ to refer to any omniscient, omnipotent being.
So, what is P(God | Brains)?
According to Bayes’ Theorem:
P(God | Brains) = P(Brains | God)*P(God)/P(Brains)
Of course, P(Brains) = P(Brains | God)P(God)+P(Brains | no God)P(no God).
Thus, a simple substitution gives:
P(God | Brains) = P(Brains | God)P(God)/[P(Brains | God)P(God)+P(Brains | no God)*P(no God)]
So. What is P(Brains | no God)?
For that, we need to consider the probability that a randomly chosen universe will contain brains, at some or other point in its history.
In order to do that, let us consider all possible universes.
Here, I start by considering the null universe; a universe that contains no matter. Since it contains no matter, it cannot contain brains.
Then, let us add a piece of matter; a single quark. this one-quark universe also cannot contain brains, as there is insufficient matter to form the brains.
I don’t think it’s sensible to consider different one-quark universes as different; no matter where the quark is, or how fast it is moving, it’s just a coordinate transform to make it identical to any other one-quark universe.
Then, let us add a second quark. Now, it is sensible to differentiate between different two-quark universes, because there is a measurement that can change from one universe to another; and that is the distance between the two quarks. There is also another measurement that can change from one universe to another, and that is their relative velocity. However, it is not always clear whether two diffferent snapshots of two-quark universes are different universes, or the same universe at different times. Still, no brains are possible.
There are even more three-quark than two-quark universes; at a rough estimate, I’d say that the number of three-quark universes is half of the square of the number of two-quark universes. Still no brains.
Four-quark universes; here, I expect the total number of universes to be roughly x^3/6 where x is the number of two-quark universes.
For an N-quark universe, in general, I expect that the total number of possible universes would be roughly x^(N-1)/(N-1)!. This is an interesting function; it grows exponentially for low N, the rate of increase slows as N approaches x, and finally, when N exceeds x, the number of possible N-particle universes actually begins to drop. Of course, x is either infinite or at least very very large, so we can expect that most universes will have quite a lot of matter; more than enough to form brains.
Now, what are the odds of a universe which contains enough matter containing brains? Note that the universes under consideration here contain a number of quarks, in what is essentially a random configuration. All possible configurations are under consideration here, so at least some of them will have brains (in some cases, Boltzman brains; in other cases, brains with bodies and whole civilisations around them). However, since every possible random configuration is permitted, it would seem to me that a highly ordered set of particles, like a brain, must be relatively rare.
So, P(Brain | no God) seems like it should be fairly low.
Now, let us consider P(Brain | God). This time, we do not have to consider every possible universe; only those universes that could exist in the presence of an omniscient, omnipotent being. It seems likely that such a being will adjust any universe to His liking, and possibly create one if one does not exist.
It also seems quite probable, to me, that if a single intelligent being exists, then that being is quite likely to realise that he (or she) would like a conversation with someone else. Being omnipotent, it seems likely that God would create someone to talk with, and thus create brains.
So, it seems likely that P(Brains | God) is high.
Putting a high value for P(Brains | God) and a low value for P(Brains | no God) into the equation from earlier:
P(God | Brains) = P(Brains | God)P(God)/[P(Brains | God)P(God)+P(Brains | no God)*P(no God)]
...will produce the result that P(God | Brains) > P(God). This seems to be a fairly major effect.
Do you have any figures for the likelihood of such a brain malfunction? Or any form of data at all to back up this assertion?
Yes. That is quite a lot of bits of information; since it eliminates all but one of the people throughout all of history who thought they were Napoleon.
It’s a bit like the difference between asking “what are the odds of getting a six on a fair die roll?” and “what are the odds that I got a six on the fair die I rolled on Thursday 10 April 2014 at 21:10?”—though the difference is a bit more pronounced, as I’m sure there were more than six people throughout history who claimed to be Napoleon.
Right, but there were no records of the event itself, just records of people’s testimonies. This is somewhat… odd. When e.g. a volcano erupts there is usually tons of footage of the actual event. People can be mistaken, or they can lie; but it’s hard to argue with a giant flaming mountain.
Yes, but it’s also evidence for any number of other, more likely events: that my friends are pulling a prank, that they are mistaken, that a prank has been pulled on them, etc. etc. We don’t need to enumerate them all; what’s important here is only the posterior probability. If it is minute, then the reasonable course of action is to say, “until I see that shark, I won’t believe that you guys caught it, sorry”. There’s a huge difference between saying that, and saying, “even though the chances that you caught that shark are even smaller than the chances of a meteorite hitting me in the head anytime soon, I can’t come up with a better explanation off the top of my head so I’ll believe you, good job !”.
You said,
But beliefs do not exist in a vacuum. Instead, they form a Bayesian network: pieces of evidence affect the posterior probabilities of some beliefs; those beliefs change the prior probabilities of other beliefs, and so on. And the problem with the proposition G, which means “a god of some kind exists”, is that it’s starting to look like for any piece of evidence E, P(G|E) is lower than P(x|E), where x is pretty much any other non-divine explanation; and there is a lot of other evidence that can raise P(x). This is what I was driving at earlier with my hypothetical Alpha-god.
So, is there any piece of evidence E for which P(G|E) is much higher than any alternatives ? Moses, presumably, got exactly such a piece of evidence in the form of a burning bush. We don’t have that, however; what we’ve got is an ancient story about a guy who saw a burning bush, and experience tells us that ancient stories mostly can’t be trusted—or else we’d be forced to believe in Zeus, Shivah, the Jade Emperor, etc., possibly at the same time.
As you have anticipated, I am unconvinced by your report, but the question is, why are you convinced ? You say:
But these aren’t the only possibilities. Even if you cannot come up with any others (such as a random brain malfunction, as Jiro points out), why is this experience sufficient to convince you that a miracle occurred—given that, as you agreed above, the probability of such an event is minute ? Don’t you want to see the actual shark, before making your conclusions ?
There appear to have been quite a few pictures—somewhat to my surprise. Most of them appear to be pictures of the crowd, rather than of the Sun… and, as with any google search, some appear to be unrelated.
That is true.
But the posterior probability doesn’t just depend on the evidence; it also depends on the prior probability. The prior probability assigned to the shark being caught is substantially lower than the prior probability I’d assigned to the existence of God. The analogy breaks down at the selection of priors.
I suspect that this is a rather severe exaggeration. I can easily propose an infinite number of proposals for ‘x’ where ‘x’ is non-divine but where P(G|E)>P(x|E) for almost any E. My method for finding these proposals for ‘x’ would be to string together a number of randomly selected grammatically correct sentence starting with the word ‘because’; this would result in a number of entirely nonsensical proposals. Similarly, I can randomly select evidences E, placing them before the ‘because’.
I shall assume you meant, therefore, that “there exists at least one non-divine explanation ‘x’ for which P(x|E)>P(G|E) for any given evidence E”.
You’ve at least partially answered your own question; Moses saw the evidence in the burning bush. One particular monk saw the evidence in the Miracle of Lanciano. Several thousand people saw the evidence in the Miracle of the Sun. Doubting Thomas saw the evidence in the resurrected Jesus.
Lots of people saw evidence in first-hand observation of miracles.
That’s the trouble; as soon as you get to second-hand observation, the evidence is a whole lot less convincing. If you’ve set the prior for God’s existence sufficiently low, then there isn’t going to be enough second-hand evidence to alter that.
Because I did see the shark, to extend the metaphor. And then it swam away, on its own business.
Are there any photos (or preferably videos) of the event itself ? I’m looking for something along the lines of this—although, admittedly, volcano eruptions are relatively mundane events by comparison.
Ah, I see, that is interesting. What is the ballpark prior probability you place on the existence of God (or any other god, for that matter) ?
Yes, good call.
It would be more accurate to say something like, “we have a lot of historical texts that describe people who claim to have seen miracles”. The distinction is important, because we have a veritable deluge of such texts regarding all major religions, as well as more modern phenomena such as alien abductions, Bigfoot, etc. The problem with such second- and third-hand accounts are that they—as you have pointed out—are notoriously unreliable.
I do not believe that little gray aliens have ever visited Earth, despite the claims of many, many “abductees”. Do you ? If not, why not, and what would it take to convince you ? You say:
So, to recap: if someone told you about this shark, you would not believe him. Similarly, you do not believe that your shark story is convincing enough to convert another rational person to your belief. I think we are in agreement on these two points.
One thing I don’t understand, though, is why are you convinced ? Do you believe yourself to be that much better—orders of magnitude better—at detecting the presence of sharks (or gods) than any other person ? If so, then for what reason ? But if not, then why are you privileging your own perceptions, given that they are no better than anyone else’s ?
Think of all the alternative explanations you’d come up with if I told you, “guess what, I was abducted by little gray men from space yesterday”. Do not these explanations also apply to yourself ?
There won’t be videos; the event in question happened in 1917, and the earliest video cameras were apparently first used in the 1930s. And I’m not sure that anyone can get a halfway reasonable photo of a very bright light source using 1917 camera technology—which doesn’t mean that no-one did, of course.
But if it doesn’t turn up in a Google search, then I have no idea where else to look for such a picture; should one even exist.
To the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent being, I’d assigned a prior probability of somewhere over 50%.
An excellent point. Very well, then; lots of people claim to have seen evidence in first-hand observation of miracles.
I consider the prior probability that little gray aliens have ever visited Earth to be very small. Despite this, they have become sufficiently mimetic in modern culture that I would consider them a prime choice for hoaxsters; this, in turn, results in me sharply discounting second-hand accounts.
To convince me that aliens have visited Earth will require some piece of physical evidence; perhaps either something made from a material that can be proven not to have come from this planet (and considering what we can make, that might be a tough order) or some piece of technology not merely unavailable to humanity but significantly distant from what is available. I would not necessarily need to hold the evidence in my own hands; I would merely need to be convinced that said evidence exists (e.g. through news reports from reliable sources - ‘Scientists Study Alien Technology’).
This depends on my prior. For the existence of God, my prior is high enough that I would consider it plausible that he is telling the truth. For finding an actual shark in a lake fed and drained by small streams, my prior is far, far lower.
Yes, this is correct.
Largely because I started with a very high prior. My very high prior was contingent on the word of my parents, and particularly of my father, a wise and intelligent man who is far better than me at telling true from false. He’s not infallible, but if he says something is certainly true, then I consider that a good reason to set a high prior for that datum (before updating on any other available evidence, of course).
Many of them do not. I know that I am not making up the story. I know that I am not lying. I know that I was not dreaming. I know that I had not received any major head injuries at around the same time. That covers the majority of the probability with regard to reasons why you might claim to have been abducted by little gray aliens.
As a first-hand observer, I can discount all of those explanations.
Also, my prior for the existence of little gray men from space is fairly low; which would lead to me assigning extra probability to the various ‘lying’ categories.
If fires didn’t burn orphans, it may be technically true that science couldn’t prove it was caused by a God, but that’s because science can’t prove anything. Science certainly could rule out other explanations to the extent that a godlike being is pretty much the only reasonable possibility left. Science could discover that fires not burning orphans seemed to be a fundamental law of the universe that can’t be explained in terms of other laws. And a fundamental law of the universe that operates in terms of complicated human conceptual categories like “orphan” is a miracle.
You seem to think that science could never prove this is a miracle because science would just keep coming up with other theories (that would eventually be disproven). If that was actually true, no scientist would be able to conclude that anything is a fundamental law of the universe at all, whether miraculous or non-miraculous, since the scientist would keep coming up with theories that explain the law in terms of something else. In fact, at some point the scientist will run out of likely theories and will only be able to come up with theories so unlikely that “this is not based on some other law” is more reasonable.
They might not eventually be disproven, or they might take a very long time to disprove. Consider; we know that both general relativity and quantum mechanics are very, very, very good at predicting the universe as we know it. We also know that they are mutually incompatible in certain very hard-to-test situations; they cannot both be true (and it is quite possible that neither, in their current form, is completely true). Yet neither has, to the best of my knowledge, been disproven.
Well, we don’t actually have the fundamental laws of the universe yet. Once quantum gravity’s been sorted out, then we might be there.
I’m not sure that I can expect anyone in my example counterfactual universe to have done any better than we’ve done in the real historical universe.
We have laws that are relatively more fundamental than others, and my argument doesn’t require that the law be fundamental in an absolute sense. If scientists discovered that orphans are fireproof, and ran out of explanations for why the category “orphans” is part of the rule, they would essentially have proven it’s supernatural, even if, oh, they don’t rule out the possibility that both orphans and priests are fireproof.
Why would they run out of explanations? All that leads to is “we don’t know why yet, but we’ll think of something”.
And maybe trying to get funding for a bigger particle accelerator.
Proving things to 100% certainty requires running out of explanations. Proving things to reasonable certainty only requires running out of reasonable explanations, and that’s certainly possible. And the latter is all that people mean when they speak of science proving something—science never proves anything to 100% certainty anyway.
We have the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum physics. We have time and space twisting around in order to preserve the constancy of the speed of light. We have subatomic particles whose position is an approximation if their velocity is known.
The bar for ‘reasonable’ in scientific endeavours is ‘it led to a number of predictions and, when we did the experiments, the predictions turned out to be all correct’.
The disadvantage, from a scientific point of view, of the ‘it was all a miracle’ explanation is that it doesn’t lead to much in the way of useful predictions which can be checked. This makes experimental verification somewhat tricky. I don’t think a scientific theory can be considered reasonably certain without at least a little experimental verification (and simply repeating the observation that led to the development of the theory doesn’t count, because any theory that attempts to explain that observation will explain it).
And the evidence for this is … ?
Very similar to the evidence for the existence of God in the first place. (In fact, it starts with that).
Sorry, I’m not sure what you mean… what starts with what ?
Maybe I should have expanded on that a little.
The evidence that all perfectly natural mechanisms were set in place by God relies on the existence of God in the first place. Should an omnipotent and omniscient being exist, it’s trivial to show that the current universe must have at least avoided the disapproval of such a being; and it is quite possible that the universe was constructed or altered into its current form.
That sounds less like evidence and more like an assumption. You say:
I completely agree; however, I am not sure how you could get from “our Universe exists” to “an omni-being exists and takes notice of our Universe”. I do agree that going the other way is pretty easy; but we are not omniscient, so we don’t have that option.
I’m not going from “our Universe exists” to “an omni-being exists and takes notice of our Universe”. I’m going from “an omni-being exists and takes notice of our Universe” to “said being controls the universe”.
I may not have been perfectly clear upthread, so let me try rephrasing and explicitly stating what I had been taking implicitly: If God exists, then all perfectly natural mechanisms were set in place by God.
Understood; but this means that you can’t look at any natural mechanisms and interpret them as evidence for the existence of a God. That would be circular reasoning.
Well, not merely on the basis of the existence of natural mechanisms at all; that would, yes, be circular reasoning.
Insofar as scientists have disproved dozens of theories for why certain things happen, I don’t see a reason why scientists wouldn’t be able to conclude that god was doing the orphan thing. I don’t think science in general is as die-hard atheist as you’d like to portray it. Remember that the many of the natural philosophers historically were in fact looking FOR evidence of god.
Plus it’d probably be a big tip-off that the only holy book with no factual errors also mentioned the orphans being fireproof thing.
In the same way as scientists could conclude that God is directly responsible for the strong nuclear force?
While I don’t deny that it could be advanced as a theory, I don’t see how it could be tested. And I don’t see a theory gaining much traction unless it can make falsifiable predictions.
If orphans really were fireproof, I’d expect it to be mentioned, at least in passing, in most holy books. Mainly because orphans being fireproof is something that people will tend to notice.
If your hypothesis cannot be tested, then why does it even matter whether it’s true or false ? Since you cannot—by definition—ever find out whether it is true, what’s the point in believing or disbelieving in it ?
To put it another way, what’s the difference between believing in a god who is so subtle that all of his actions are completely indistinguishable from inaction; and in not believing in any gods at all ?
There’s a difference between finding out whether something is true, and finding enough evidence to prove to my neighbour that that thing is true. Fishermen are notorious for exaggerated descriptions of the fish that got away; should I go fishing, and a fish get away, I have no doubt that few of my neighbours would believe my assertions with regard to the fish’s size (even if I somehow managed to measure it before it escaped)
Well, for one thing, it affects my actions in non-trivial ways. My actions affect other people, and they then affect other people… and so on, rippling out.
One difference, for example, is the fact that we are having this conversation in the first place.
What’s the difference ? I mean, obviously your neighbour could be entirely irrational and refuse to listen to anything you say. However, let’s pretend instead that your neighbour is a rational, intelligent, and patient person… who also happens to be from Mars. He speaks English, but he doesn’t really know all that much about our human culture. He does know about physics, though, since physics is the same on any planet.
So, you tell your Martian neighbour, “I believe that God is directly responsible for the strong nuclear force”. Naturally, he asks you, “who is this God guy ?”; after you’ve explained that, he asks you, “ok, and why do you believe that ?”. What’s your answer ?
How so ? Let’s say there exist two parallel worlds. In one world, a perfectly unfalsifiable god exists; all of his actions are indistinguishable from chance. This is our world; let’s call it Alpha. The other world is called Beta, and it contains no gods at all. The two worlds are completely identical; except that, whenever something happens in Alpha, sometimes the god is responsible, and sometimes it just happens for mundane natural causes. When the same thing also happens in Beta, it’s always due to mundane natural causes.
If you were somehow transported in your sleep from Alpha to Beta, how could you tell that this had occurred ? If you could tell, what would you do differently ?
Let us say that I have gone fishing. I return from my fishing trip, and describe to my neighbour how I hooked a six-foot-long great white shark, but my fishing line snapped and it got away. Unfortunately, I failed to get a photograph or any other piece of hard evidence.
Assume that my neighbour is rational, intelligent, and patient. Would he be convinced by my account?
Short version; I started with a high prior, and certain experiences in my life have caused me to update that original prior in an upward direction.
...hold on a minute. You are postulating that there is some way to set up the natural laws of a universe such that everything that God would want to do in Alpha happens anyway, even without direct involvement. Should that be the case, an omniscient being would know how to set up the physical laws in such a way; and an omnipotent being would be able to do that, and it would probably be much less effort than having to go back and fiddle with the universe every now and then.
No. Should he be ?
That said, one big difference (among many) between shark-fishing and religion, however, is that in the shark-fishing scenario you do have plenty of fairly unambiguous evidence for the shark’s existence (despite failing to bring back any of it). Furthermore, the exercise is repeatable; you could go into the same waters, and attempt to find another shark. You could consult other fishermen, and look at the photographs of any sharks they may have caught. You could talk to marine biologists, and ask them how likely you were to catch a shark… etc., etc. You don’t need to rely solely on your own thoughts or feelings; there is objective evidence that you can collect.
Remember hat the stuff that Alpha’s god does is indistinguishable from chance. Thus, for example, if I roll over 7 tiny pebbles on my way to work in Alpha, it could very well be that the 7th pebble was placed there by Alpha’s god. I may not encounter that pebble in Beta; or I may encounter 8 pebbles. However, by definition, that 7th pebble (or lack thereof) will have no significant effect on anything.
Alpha’s god could not, for example, affect the outcome of dice rolls so that the unrighteous sinners are less likely to roll 7s in games of chance; I mean, he could, but according to out scenario, he wouldn’t.
That said, your scenario could be relevant as well. Given that we currently have no access to the Multiverse (assuming one exists), how would you distinguish a Universe that was created by a god who set everything up and then went away; from a Universe that arose due to purely undirected natural mechanisms ?
No, he shouldn’t.
You are right that there are a lot of differences between shark-fishing and religion; my point is merely that evidence which convinces one rational human being may yet be insufficient to convince another, when experienced by the first but merely communicated to the second.
This is one thing that is not a difference between shark-fishing and religion. There is objective evidence that can be collected. Consider, for example, comparing the rate of the appearance of uncorrupted corpses between virtuous and nonvirtuous people; if virtuous people are more likely to leave uncorrupted corpses, then that’s a bit of a hint.
Which raises the question of why put that seventh pebble there in the first place?
A lot of miracles are done with clear agency; most of Jesus’ miracles, for example, were done with the clear purpose of proving his credentials as Son of God. Many other people performed miracles as signs of particular divine favour.
If, in Alpha, there exists a God who has a plan, then I would expect that the results of most miracles would tend to work towards the outcome of that plan. (Which would mean that it might be possible to detect agency in Alpha, if one knew what the plan was).
So, for example, if instead of a seventh pebble you drive over a nail, then have to go get your tyre patched, and at the tyre shop you meet someone and interact with him in some way that furthers Alpha’s God’s plans… then you might not be able to prove (or even notice) that it was a miracle, but the effect still makes Alpha divergent from Beta.
Very tricky.
If an omniscient, omnipotent being exists, then He exists equally in all reachable universes. Therefore, either all universes have the same God ruling over them, or none do.
Which means that, whichever case is true, we only have examples of a single class of universe.
So. If God exists, then it is reasonable to assume that He has some plan for every universe. The plans may differ from universe to universe, or may be the same in every universe.
If I assume that there are similar plans for a number of universes, then it seems likely that there are psychologically similar beings existing in a number of universes; that is, they may look alien, but they will have understandable motivations (not necessarily immediately understandable).
So. I estimate the probability that non-human intelligent life (whether in this or another universe) has an understandable psychology is higher if God exists than if not.
I agree, but then, how reliable are your own experiences ?
To use a rather trivial example, I have on numerous occasions woken up from sleep with an absolute, unshakable conviction that I was late for some critical appointment or other. I would then check the calendar, and see that the appointment either already happened several years in the past (along the lines of “attend college physics exam”); or was entirely imaginary (along the lines of “inspect warp core”). And yet, even at that very moment, I would still be experiencing a strong conviction that I need to go and take that test / inspect that warp core right now. How do you know whether your experiences are likewise confused ?
As far as I know, corpses of virtuous people and those of iniquitous people decay at the same rate in our own Universe. Orphans aren’t all that likely to be fireproof, either (although I’d expect a slightly higher proportion of orphans to have survived at least one fire, sadly). Multiple studies have failed to find any effect of intercessory prayer (by comparison with placebo). So, can you think of any reasonably unambiguous evidence for the existence of a god in our current Universe ?
Let’s assume that we don’t know what the plan is (which, as far as I understand the Christian belief system, we do not). Would it still be possible to detect agency in Alpha ?
Right, that would be an interesting piece of evidence, but it’s unobtainable for now. In addition, I would expect all intelligent life within our own Universe to have at least some similarities. We all live in the same cosmos, we all are subject to the same laws of physics, so it’s reasonable to assume that our brains would evolve in functionally similar ways. That’s pure speculation, though, since the only intelligent life we know of is our own.
I tend to assume that my own experiences are more reliable than second-hand data (people telling me about their experiences). This is largely because when I start questioning my own experiences, I quickly find myself questioning reality as a whole; whether anything that I observe actually exists or not.
I think that, in order to retain a functional relationship with reality, I have to assume that my memories and experiences are mostly true; that is, that the majority of them are true, and any contradictions in my memories are best resolved in the manner that results in the fewest of my memories being false.
While I don’t experience convictions that I am late for imaginary appointments, as you do, I have on occasion woken up convinced that I am late for an important appointment which is due the following day, or late that evening. In such a case, I find that the conviction vanishes almost immediately on checking the time, and finding that the time for the appointment has not yet arrived.
While this would certainly be the prediction of a hypothetical atheist physicist, I would like to ask; do you have any evidence to back up this assertion?
I do not know of a statistical study of rates of corruption in the bodies of (say) canonised saints versus people lawfully executed for criminal activity, but this is a study which could in theory have been completed.
Nothing more convincing than the Miracle of Lanciano, which I’m pretty sure I’ve already mentioned.
I don’t know.
I can’t think of any way, off the top of my head, to do it; but that doesn’t mean it can’t be done.
I know. I don’t think I can present any predictions that can be easily and rapidly checked, though; since I don’t know the purpose of the universe.
And if very convincing evidence of God’s existence was easy to find, then churches would present it for all the world to see; in much the same way as the Bible is presented for all the world to see.
In the same way as it’s reasonable to assume that humans and centipedes, living in the same environment on the same planet, would evolve similar body structures?
Given a specific memory or experience, how would you estimate the probability of it being true ?
No, but this seems highly likely, given what we know about basic biology (and we do know quite a lot, down to the molecular level). That said, if you are making the positive claim that corpses decay at different rates based on the morality of the deceased, then the burden of proof is on you, since your hypothesis is more complex than the null hypothesis.
I am unfamiliar with this specific miracle, but Wikipedia says that it was reported to occur “around 700”, and that at least one source confirms the items in question to consist of human tissue. I don’t mean to sound too negative, but… is this really the best evidence for the existence of miracles that you’ve got ? If so, then shouldn’t you be—just for example—a Hellinist instead of a Christian, given that we’ve found the entire city of Troy, which was described in the Iliad ? That’s an entire city, after all, not just some blood globules...
Right, so it’s starting to sound more and more that the Christian God is kind of like my hypothetical Alpha-god. He may exist, but the actions he takes are so subtle that no one has been able to detect them. By comparison, we are at the point now where we can detect individual neutrinos. Given this, I’ve got to go back to my original question: does it even matter whether such a god exists, if he has an even smaller effect on our affairs than neutrinos do ?
Yes, that’s a pretty good analogy. Both organisms have respiratory and digestive systems; articulated legs for means of locomotion on hard surfaces; optical/chemical/tacticle/etc. sensors; and even sexual reproduction systems (which serve similar functions despite being mechanically very different).
Similarly, I would expect any kind of an intelligent life to have a similar grasp of concepts such as object permanence, causality, and communication (just to name a few off the top of my head). Of course, if these aliens have any kind of technology, then I’d expect them to have notions of e.g. physics and chemistry that are compatible with ours.
There are many kinds of limbs and skeletons and eyes in the world, but there’s only one physics. Hydrogen is still hydrogen, even on Mars.
If I detect no contradictions with other memories or experiences, I treat it as true until some evidence is provided to show that it may be false. I imagine that would count as a very high prior.
Pity.
Unfortunately, I can provide no data in support of the hypothesis, either. You’re right about the burden of proof; but I don’t think I’m quite ready to go around digging up dead bodies to try to produce a proper answer to this question just yet. And a quick and very cursory google search has failed to pick out anyone else who’s tried.
It’s the best that I can find in, oh, half a minute on Wikipedia. It’s quite probably not the best that there is.
We also know where Egypt is. And Bethlehem. And Nazareth. All of which were placed mentioned in the Gospels (and in the case of Egypt, it’s an entire country, not just a city). The existence of a place mentioned in ancient writing is, at best, very weak evidence that the writing is true.
The blood globules have nothing to do with my belief in Christianity. They’re just the best evidence that I can find, in a very brief visit to Wikipedia, that at least one miracle occurred at some point in the past.
No. Plenty of people claim to have been able to detect them; all the people who saw the Miracle of the Sun, for example. There may have been millions more people who could have detected His actions, had they just looked in the right place, but they didn’t. (That was likely intentional; omniscience means knowing where people won’t look for tampering, after all).
Detectability is not necessary correlated with how much effect something has on our affairs.
...you make a very good point here.
That’s the same method I use, except that I also include other people’s experiences. For example, I’ve personally never tried jumping off a bridge; but I am reluctant to try this, since, based on what I know of biology, physics, and, indeed, attempts to do so by other people, I know that the experience will likely be fatal.
I think that the main difference between you and me is that you place an extremely high level of confidence on your own experiences. Is that right ? If so, what is the reason ? After all, you are a regular human just like anyone else, so what is it that makes your experiences so much more reliable than those of other people ?
Since the burden of proof is on you; and since no evidence exists; are you not then compelled to disbelieve in the proposition ? By analogy, it is possible that I personally am immune to the effects of jumping off of a bridge, but, in the absence of evidence for this positive claim, I am forced to reject it (despite its obvious appeal).
What makes you think that the best explanation for all the fact is, in fact, “a miracle occurred”, as opposed anything else ? Given that other events (honest mistakes, deliberate fraud, etc.) occur much more often than miracles (i.e., they have higher priors); and given that the evidence is compatible with all of these explanations; why do you keep the “miracle” explanation and discard the others ?
Wait, doesn’t this support what I said ? It sounds like your God does indeed make his actions “so subtle that no one has been able to detect them” (as I put it originally), just like my hypothetical Alpha-God.
How can something be completely undetectable and yet have any effect on anything ? Effects are how we detect things.
At the moment I, too, am reluctant to try jumping off a bridge, for similar reasons. However, if I had jumped off a bridge and inexplicably survived, I would weigh that experience very heavily in future decisions with regard to whether or not to jump off bridges.
I don’t ignore other people’s reported experiences; I just consider my own experiences a far more reliable indicator of reality. This is partially because other people’s experiences are by necessity incomplete; it’s very hard for me to be sure that someone else has told me every detail that I would consider important about a given situation.
No. I am merely in no position to compel your belief in the proposition, and etiquette requires that I should not claim that the question is resolved in my favour. (Which it isn’t). My options at this point are to either go out and gather evidence, or to drop the question entirely.
As I understand it, etiquette does permit you to assume that the question is resolved in favour of the null hypothesis; but without proof, you cannot compel my disbelief in the proposition.
I don’t discard all the others; I simply consider them less probable than the miracle hypothesis. And the reason for that is that a number of people whose job involves the investigation of miracles, and who have looked far more deeply into the matter than I have (and who would not benefit from incorrectly calling something a miracle and having it later revealedd as a mistake or a fraud) consider it a miracle. In short, I place my confidence in the hands of those I recognise as experts in the field.
That said experts were also largely members of the Catholic clergy does not diminish my confidence in their results, though it may affect yours.
No. Again, people have detected His actions. Consider Moses, for example; when Moses approached the burning bush, he detected God’s actions.
Or consider the monk present at the Miracle of Lanciano; when he saw the bread and wine literally transform into flesh and blood, he detected God’s actions.
If it is completely undetectable by any means, then yes, it can have no effect. But something can be hard to detect while still having a great effect.
Consider, for example, a man living on a mountaintop. He finds it very easy to detect the stars; he sees them often. But they have little to no effect on him. On the other hand, he finds it very hard to detect the radioactivity of the rocks around him (he would need to go to the trouble of getting a geiger counter); but if the rocks are signifiantly radioactive, that could potentially have a very large long-term effect on him.
So, while I agree that something has to be detectable in order to have any effect (on the basis that it can be detected by its effect), it is nonetheless possible for something to be hard to detect while having a very large effect.