if a number of nearly-equally-powerful yet different beings were trying to run the physics of the universe, then we would almost certainly by now have spotted some areas of blatant disagreement between different beings
And if there was a God, and there was a Devil who opposed him, we’d almost certainly have spotted some areas of disagreement between them. (You could claim that yes, we have spotted such things, but of course the same claim could be made for pagan gods.)
Also, pagan gods needn’t necessarily run the physics of the universe in the sense of changing the cosmological constant.
I’d expect to see at least one type of mildly telepathic animal, exploiting this.
This would be true for certain types of psychic powers, but there are other things which can be done only by humans. Sorcerers with spellbooks have to be able to read, for instance, and even if you quibble about whether animals can read, they wouldn’t be able to read well enough to use a spellbook.
I know that I didn’t have electrodes in my brain, I hadn’t taken drugs, I wasn’t starved, and I’m mentally healthy.
The point is that mystical experiences are known to have physical causes other than the existence of a supernatural being. I would expect milder versions of those to occasionally produce mystical experiences too. Nobody may have put an electrode in your brain, but the brain is complex and can occasionally misfire by itself.
No, I simply need to assert that such experiences are more likely given the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent being than they are without the existence of such a being.
No, that’s not enough. Given that this is lesswrong, I hope you are aware of Bayseianism. The extent to which an experience is evidence of a God compared to evidence of other things that produce mystical experiences depends on your priors.It may be that a God is more likely to produce a mystical experience than anything else, but the prior for the existence of God is low enough that a mystical experience is still most likely to have been caused by something other than God.
And if there was a God, and there was a Devil who opposed him, we’d almost certainly have spotted some areas of disagreement between them.
Only if they were roughly equal in power and ability. If God is so comparatively powerful that the Devil doesn’t get to make changes to the laws of physics, then we wouldn’t see any such disagreements (because physics as a whole is still then under control of one being)
Also, pagan gods needn’t necessarily run the physics of the universe in the sense of changing the cosmological constant.
In that case, can you please explain to me what exactly you mean by the phrase ‘pagan gods’?
No, that’s not enough. Given that this is lesswrong, I hope you are aware of Bayseianism.
Yes, I am aware of Bayesianism.
The extent to which an experience is evidence of a God compared to evidence of other things that produce mystical experiences depends on your priors.It may be that a God is more likely to produce a mystical experience than anything else, but the prior for the existence of God is low enough that a mystical experience is still most likely to have been caused by something other than God.
My prior for the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient being was set pretty high; somewhere over 50%. Why do you claim that that prior has to be set “low enough that a mystical experience is still most likely to have been caused by something other than God”?
If God is so comparatively powerful that the Devil doesn’t get to make changes to the laws of physics, then we wouldn’t see any such disagreements
I was thinking more of the Devil causing small-scale events like, oh, killing someone’s child to tempt them into committing revenge, or sending people mystical experiences in order to increase religious strife. The Devil is commonly described as being able to do things like that and God doesn’t stop him, for whatever reason. I don’t care if the Devil can change the speed of light.
In that case, can you please explain to me what exactly you mean by the phrase ‘pagan gods’?
A being who has powers other than those currently recognized by science, has an area of concern and a level of power over its area of concern that is relatively high in the hierarchy if applicable, and either was worshipped or is in a class of beings that is generally worshipped.
As defining words is difficult even for well-known concepts like “chair” I reserve the right to update this definition. (If a chair is defined as being for sitting, does that mean that a chair designed as a museum art exhibit is not a chair? You try to define it and end up with locutions like “is either meant for sitting, or has features that would be considered to be designed for sitting if it was intended for sitting”.)
My prior for the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient being was set pretty high;
If you set your prior high enough, anything can become evidence for God, in which case your belief that given that prior a mystical experience is evidence for God is correct but uninteresting.
I was thinking more of the Devil causing small-scale events like, oh, killing someone’s child to tempt them into committing revenge, or sending people mystical experiences in order to increase religious strife.
But that would leave physics down to a single Being, with a single agenda; so there wouldn’t be signs of disagreement to be seen in the laws of physics themselves
In that case, can you please explain to me what exactly you mean by the phrase ‘pagan gods’?
A being who has powers other than those currently recognized by science, has an area of concern and a level of power over its area of concern that is relatively high in the hierarchy if applicable, and either was worshipped or is in a class of beings that is generally worshipped.
Ah, I see. So it’s a very powerful being, with that power limited (whether by force or by choice) to a single area of concern (or possibly to multiple areas of concern), capable of feats not explainable by current scientific theories, possibly but not necessarily with the power to alter physics directly?
Such a being could presumably create a mystical experience, yes. And if they are able to alter physics directly, then I would expect a messier physics; on the other hand, if they are [i]not[/i], then, though powerful, they are no less subject to the laws of physics than we are and would eventually be explained as science progresses towards a better understanding of the universe.
If you set your prior high enough, anything can become evidence for God, in which case your belief that given that prior a mystical experience is evidence for God is correct but uninteresting.
Not quite anything, no. And I have to be wary of anthropic reasoning.
No matter where my prior is set, though, I still consider such an experience evidence of the existence of God; in that it is more likely that I’d have the experience if God exists than if not. The only difference that the prior makes is in deciding whether or not the evidence is sufficient prove God’s existence.
I don’t understand why you insist on wondering whether some being has the power to change the laws of physics. Giving someone a mystical experience doesn’t change the laws of physics (at least not nontrivially—by some definitions anything a supernatural being does “changes the laws of physics”), and the fact that a devil-like being without an adversary, a pagan god, or a sorcerer could give you one doesn’t mean they can change the laws of physics.
if they are [i]not[/i], then, though powerful, they are no less subject to the laws of physics than we are and would eventually be explained as science progresses towards a better understanding of the universe.
“Eventually” isn’t now. You don’t believe the Devil can change the laws of physics, yet surely you acknowledge that science has no understanding of him or his powers.
Why can’t there be other types of beings like pagan gods or sorcerers, that science also doesn’t yet understand yet (regardless of whether science might understand them sometime in the future)?
No matter where my prior is set, though, I still consider such an experience evidence of the existence of God; in that it is more likely that I’d have the experience if God exists than if not.
You presumably believe God created typhoid fever and that it is more likely we would see that if God existed than if he didn’t. If all you mean is that mystical experiences are evidence for God in the same sense that typhoid fever is, then that falls under “true but uninteresting”. On the other hand, if you believe that mystical experiences are evidence for God in some stronger sense than typhoid fever, please elaborate.
I don’t understand why you insist on wondering whether some being has the power to change the laws of physics.
Because, from the start, I was presenting my experience as a piece of evidence in favour of the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent being; and ‘omnipotent’ involves, among other things, being able to alter physics.
Yes, it is possible to have a sense of presence without being able to change the laws of physics. But that’s not the point.
Right now, I honestly think that you and I are having completely different arguments. I am trying to discuss the probability of existence of an omnipotent, omniscient being; while you, as far as I can tell, are simply trying to list off alternate explanations for something I once saw. And yes, they are valid alternate explanations, but that’s not the point.
If, to take an analogy, I find a leaf on the ground (and assuming for the moment that I can’t identify a tree by its leaves) then this would be evidence in favour of the hypothesis that there is an apple tree nearby. Listing other types of tree that the leaf could have come from does not change that.
You presumably believe God created typhoid fever and that it is more likely we would see that if God existed than if he didn’t.
No; on the contrary, typhoid fever (along with virtually any other illness) is a side effect of the evolutionary process; as soon as a sufficiently large creature evolves, its body in turn forms a new environment in which other creatures (germs) can survive and grow. Illnesses, I’d think, would be almost certain to appear in any life-bearing world in the absence of God; and since I don’t understand why they exist, I can’t make the assumption that they must exist without engaging in circular reasoning. Which makes them weak evidence against the idea that God exists.
The experience I had in front of the church, on the other hand, is an experience that is very likely in a universe where an omnipotent, omniscient being exists; and seems very unlikely in a universe where that is false. Therefore, it is evidence in favour of the idea that such a being exists.
The experience I had in front of the church, on the other hand, is an experience that is very likely in a universe where an omnipotent, omniscient being exists; and seems very unlikely in a universe where that is false
This is phrased in a subtly different way from how you phrased it before, because “seems very unlikely in a universe where that is false” isn’t a conditional probability (even though you use it to find a conditional probability).
Given the way you phrased it this time, in order to say that mystical experiences are unlikely in a universe without God, you have to show that the list of other things that cause mystical experiences is unlikely in a universe without God.
I certainly don’t agree that brain malfunctions are unlikely in a universe without God. In fact, I’d say that they are very likely, especially since we know that mystical experiences can be caused by purely physical processes. And I can’t see any reason why according to your standards, pagan gods, devil-like beings, or sorcerers are unlikely.
This is phrased in a subtly different way from how you phrased it before, because “seems very unlikely in a universe where that is false” isn’t a conditional probability (even though you use it to find a conditional probability).
...that’s what my paragraph was trying to communicate.
Given the way you phrased it this time, in order to say that mystical experiences are unlikely in a universe without God, you have to show that the list of other things that cause mystical experiences is unlikely in a universe without God.
I merely need to show that the experience is more likely in a universe with God than in a universe without God.
I certainly don’t agree that brain malfunctions are unlikely in a universe without God. In fact, I’d say that they are very likely
Let us consider the set of all possible universes in which brains develop through evolutionary means, without the aid of any external beings, omnipotent or otherwise. Now, the resultant brains will, in general, merely be sufficient to result in a creature with a high chance of having grandchildren. Non-debilitating brain malfunctions are not merely likely; I’d think that they’re almost certain.
However, the effects of such malfunctions will be more-or-less random. One type of malfunction might cause the sufferer to temporarily perceive green as red and vice versa. Another might cause some form of synesthesia. Yet another might result in a sudden burst of emotion, such as rage or fear.
The odds that a malfunction will give someone the impression of an approaching Presence would be a lot lower than the odds of a random malfunction. And it is the odds of that specific malfunction that I expect to be fairly low; not the odds of brain malfunctions in general.
And I can’t see any reason why according to your standards, pagan gods, devil-like beings, or sorcerers are unlikely.
In two cases, those are immaterial beings; if one type of immaterial being exists, that’s weak evidence that another may also exist. So that implies that those two are marginally more likely in a universe that contains an omnipotent, omniscient being than in one that does not.
Aside from that very weak point, I see no reason to assume that any of those are more likely in either sort of universe. And if the probability of those are equal, and there is another potential source of mystical experiences in the universe with the omnipotent, omniscient being, then such an experience is weak evidence in favour of the existence of such a being.
No, because you phrased it differently. “The experience I had in front of the church, on the other hand, is an experience that is very likely in a universe where an omnipotent, omniscient being exists; and seems very unlikely in a universe where that is false” amounts to “P (experience | God) is high && P(experience | no God) is low”, not “P (experience | God) > P(experience | no God)”.
However, the effects of such malfunctions will be more-or-less random.
Brain malfunctions are more likely to produce some effects than others. And mystical experiences are the sort of thing brain malfunctions are likely to produce. That’s why people starve themselves and see mystical experiences, but they rarely starve themselves and start thinking they have 12 fingers. While you gave examples of other things brain malfunctions can produce, those are just other things which they are more likely than normal to produce; they don’t mean that the chance of everything is equal.
that implies that those two are marginally more likely in a universe that contains an omnipotent, omniscient being than in one that does not
Those things are only marginally more likely in a universe with a God if you believe all types of God are equally likely. It is my impression that you think a Biblical-type God is more likely.
Even if they are more likely, this falls under “true but uninteresting”. There are lots of things that are marginally more likely in a universe with God. Claiming that mystical experiences are evidence for God is only interesting if it’s better evidence than those other things. Nobody says “I saw the Loch Ness Monster, so God is marginally more likely” (seeing the Loch Ness Monster implies that science, which says there is no such thing, can fail, and if science can fail, God is marginally more likely).
No, because you phrased it differently. “The experience I had in front of the church, on the other hand, is an experience that is very likely in a universe where an omnipotent, omniscient being exists; and seems very unlikely in a universe where that is false” amounts to “P (experience | God) is high && P(experience | no God) is low”, not “P (experience | God) > P(experience | no God)”.
Well, I do think that “P (experience | God) is high && P(experience | no God) is low”. However, in order to take the experience as evidence for the existence of God, it is necessary only to show the weaker point that “P (experience | God) > P(experience | no God)”
Brain malfunctions are more likely to produce some effects than others.
True.
And mystical experiences are the sort of thing brain malfunctions are likely to produce.
For human brains as they exist in this universe, perhaps. But for every possible type of brain, as may exist in every possible type of universe?
I consider that unlikely. I could be wrong about that, of course. But remember, in order to consider the probability of brains being prone to that exact malfunction, one must consider the possibility of brains constructed very differently to the ones we have. And, quite honestly, that’s such a wide and unexplored field that there’s not much I can say about it at all...
Those things are only marginally more likely in a universe with a God if you believe all types of God are equally likely. It is my impression that you think a Biblical-type God is more likely.
No, not all types are equally likely. Yes, I do think that an omniscient, omnipotent being very probably exists.
“I saw the Loch Ness Monster, so God is marginally more likely” (seeing the Loch Ness Monster implies that science, which says there is no such thing, can fail, and if science can fail, God is marginally more likely).
...why on earth would the idea that ‘science can fail’ lead to ‘God is marginally more likely’?
If an omnipotent, omniscient being exists, then it is reasonable to postulate that said being created our universe (or, at the very least, knew about it and didn’t stop it from existing). If such a being created our universe, then it is reasonable to assume that it would have been created with some care; because most craftsmen take a lot of care in their work. A bit of observation shows that our universe runs on rules; and if those rules were created with care, then it is reasonable to assume that they will work, that there are not going to be any obvious seams visible in the rules.
In short, if God exists, then science (being a systematic attempt to discover those rules) should work.
But remember, in order to consider the probability of brains being prone to that exact malfunction, one must consider the possibility of brains constructed very differently to the ones we have.
To figure out the odds of the existence of God based on you having a certain type of experience, you can’t just ignore the knowledge about what kind of brain you have. If you do that, you’re throwing out evidence that affects your conclusion. The type of brain you actually have is one where malfunctions produce mystical experiences more readily than they produce arbitrary other effects.
why on earth would the idea that ‘science can fail’ lead to ‘God is marginally more likely’?… there are not going to be any obvious seams visible in the rules.
Yes, there would. If people normally disintegrate only when exposed to thousands of degrees of temperature, but God can disintegrate people whenever he wants, every time God stays hidden but disintegrates a person who is not hidden, that’s a seam in the rules and science will not be able to explain that event.
To figure out the odds of the existence of God based on you having a certain type of experience, you can’t just ignore the knowledge about what kind of brain you have.
The figures that I am using to find P(God | experience) include P(experience | no God) and P(experience | God). P(experience | no God) must surely integrate over every possible universe in which there is no God, or else it will be P(experience | a specific universe), which is the wrong figure. Similarly, P(experience | God) must integrate over every universe in which an omnipotent, omniscient being exists; or else, once again, it is P(experience | specific universe), and is the wrong figure.
I’m trying to simplify the equation, for purposes of debate, to an update on exactly one piece of evidence. If we start including the specifics of the brain, then that opens up the question of P(God | human brain), which is an entire, and much bigger, debate on its own. And one that I have no intention of entering into with you; the inferential distance between us is simply too large, and I’ve been having enough trouble trying to communicate with you as it is.
Yes, there would. If people normally disintegrate only when exposed to thousands of degrees of temperature, but God can disintegrate people whenever he wants, every time God stays hidden but disintegrates a person who is not hidden, that’s a seam in the rules and science will not be able to explain that event.
That’s a very good point.
It’s rather unlikely that it could be replicated under laboratory conditions, which would mean it’s not an obvious seam… but yes, I see your point, it could be a bit of a seam. (Or it could be as-yet undiscovered physics of some sort, of course).
I’m trying to simplify the equation, for purposes of debate, to an update on exactly one piece of evidence. If we start including the specifics of the brain, then that opens up the question of P(God | human brain), which is an entire, and much bigger, debate on its own.
You can’t simplify that equation. If you simplify the equation that way it’s only useful when figuring out if there is a god, given a creature of unknown type who has a mystical experience. You are not a creature of unknown type, and throwing out the information that you have a brain that is inordinately prone to malfunctions that produce mystical experiences will distort the answer.
It’s like concluding there is a high probability that someone is insane because he thinks he’s Napoleon, while discarding the information that he’s ruling France in the year 1805. P(insane|claim Napoleon) is high, but P(insane|claim Napoleon && rules France in 1805)” is not high. Discarding this information is wrong.
If you simplify the equation that way it’s only useful when figuring out if there is a god, given a creature of unknown type who has a mystical experience.
That is exactly the point I was trying to make; that the fact that such an experience happened is a piece of evidence in favour of the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient being.
You are not a creature of unknown type, and throwing out the information that you have a brain that is inordinately prone to malfunctions that produce mystical experiences will distort the answer.
The trouble with this, if you start insisting that certain information cannot be left out, is that you are cherry-picking what information that is, and specifically selecting information that you believe leads to the conclusion that you want. I could probably name a dozen other pieces of information which support the idea that an omniscient, omnipotent being exists and insist on including them too (for example; consider P(God | intelligent life exists)).
If we start down this path, then we could both simply throw new pieces of information into the discussion again and again; it will take months, and it would lead absolutely nowhere.
It’s like concluding there is a high probability that someone is insane because he thinks he’s Napoleon, while discarding the information that he’s ruling France in the year 1805. P(insane|claim Napoleon) is high, but P(insane|claim Napoleon && rules France in 1805)” is not high. Discarding this information is wrong.
I would like to refer you to a short story that discusses that point in greater detail.
In short, yes, P(insane | claims Napoleon) is high, and if I meet someone who tells me ‘One of my ancestors claimed he was Napoleon’ then I will consider it a high probability that that ancestor was insane.
That is exactly the point I was trying to make; that the fact that such an experience happened is a piece of evidence in favour of the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient being.
The fact that such an experience happened, given no other information, may be evidence for God. But you have other information and are ignoring it.
Furthermore, even as evidence for God, it’s only evidence in a very weak sense compared to typical cases where one speaks about something being evidence. It makes it more likely that there’s a God, but it also makes it more likely that there is a pagan god, or a sorcerer, or an extraterrestrial with a mind-control ray.
The trouble with this, if you start insisting that certain information cannot be left out, is that you are cherry-picking what information that is
It’s not cherry picking to refuse to discard information which affects the result by orders of magnitude more than the probability you’re hoping to get from it. A mystical experience in a human brain is much better evidence for a brain malfunction than it is for God.
In short, yes, P(insane | claims Napoleon) is high, and if I meet someone who tells me ‘One of my ancestors claimed he was Napoleon’
My scenario not only involves being in 1805, but also ruling France. If you use the information that someone is your ancestor (presumably from 1805), but you omit the information that he was ruling France then, you have still discarded relevant information and as a result will come up with a probability of insanity that is much too high.
The fact that such an experience happened, given no other information, may be evidence for God. But you have other information and are ignoring it.
sigh
Very well. If you insist that I not ignore information, then there is a lot more information that needs to be properly considered. Decades of experiences that need to be sorted and categorised. Hundreds of writings, ancient and modern; thousands of accounts, of one sort or another.
We’ll just have to go through it all, piece by piece. Only the bits that are relevant, of course, but there’s a lot that is relevant.
For a start, let me consider the probability of the existence of God, given the existence of brains (or any form of hardware capable of supporting intelligence in some or other form).
Where, just to be clear, I use the word ‘God’ to refer to any omniscient, omnipotent being.
For that, we need to consider the probability that a randomly chosen universe will contain brains, at some or other point in its history.
In order to do that, let us consider all possible universes.
Here, I start by considering the null universe; a universe that contains no matter. Since it contains no matter, it cannot contain brains.
Then, let us add a piece of matter; a single quark. this one-quark universe also cannot contain brains, as there is insufficient matter to form the brains.
I don’t think it’s sensible to consider different one-quark universes as different; no matter where the quark is, or how fast it is moving, it’s just a coordinate transform to make it identical to any other one-quark universe.
Then, let us add a second quark. Now, it is sensible to differentiate between different two-quark universes, because there is a measurement that can change from one universe to another; and that is the distance between the two quarks. There is also another measurement that can change from one universe to another, and that is their relative velocity. However, it is not always clear whether two diffferent snapshots of two-quark universes are different universes, or the same universe at different times. Still, no brains are possible.
There are even more three-quark than two-quark universes; at a rough estimate, I’d say that the number of three-quark universes is half of the square of the number of two-quark universes. Still no brains.
Four-quark universes; here, I expect the total number of universes to be roughly x^3/6 where x is the number of two-quark universes.
For an N-quark universe, in general, I expect that the total number of possible universes would be roughly x^(N-1)/(N-1)!. This is an interesting function; it grows exponentially for low N, the rate of increase slows as N approaches x, and finally, when N exceeds x, the number of possible N-particle universes actually begins to drop. Of course, x is either infinite or at least very very large, so we can expect that most universes will have quite a lot of matter; more than enough to form brains.
Now, what are the odds of a universe which contains enough matter containing brains? Note that the universes under consideration here contain a number of quarks, in what is essentially a random configuration. All possible configurations are under consideration here, so at least some of them will have brains (in some cases, Boltzman brains; in other cases, brains with bodies and whole civilisations around them). However, since every possible random configuration is permitted, it would seem to me that a highly ordered set of particles, like a brain, must be relatively rare.
So, P(Brain | no God) seems like it should be fairly low.
Now, let us consider P(Brain | God). This time, we do not have to consider every possible universe; only those universes that could exist in the presence of an omniscient, omnipotent being. It seems likely that such a being will adjust any universe to His liking, and possibly create one if one does not exist.
It also seems quite probable, to me, that if a single intelligent being exists, then that being is quite likely to realise that he (or she) would like a conversation with someone else. Being omnipotent, it seems likely that God would create someone to talk with, and thus create brains.
So, it seems likely that P(Brains | God) is high.
Putting a high value for P(Brains | God) and a low value for P(Brains | no God) into the equation from earlier:
...will produce the result that P(God | Brains) > P(God). This seems to be a fairly major effect.
A mystical experience in a human brain is much better evidence for a brain malfunction than it is for God.
Do you have any figures for the likelihood of such a brain malfunction? Or any form of data at all to back up this assertion?
My scenario not only involves being in 1805, but also ruling France.
Yes. That is quite a lot of bits of information; since it eliminates all but one of the people throughout all of history who thought they were Napoleon.
It’s a bit like the difference between asking “what are the odds of getting a six on a fair die roll?” and “what are the odds that I got a six on the fair die I rolled on Thursday 10 April 2014 at 21:10?”—though the difference is a bit more pronounced, as I’m sure there were more than six people throughout history who claimed to be Napoleon.
And if there was a God, and there was a Devil who opposed him, we’d almost certainly have spotted some areas of disagreement between them. (You could claim that yes, we have spotted such things, but of course the same claim could be made for pagan gods.)
Also, pagan gods needn’t necessarily run the physics of the universe in the sense of changing the cosmological constant.
This would be true for certain types of psychic powers, but there are other things which can be done only by humans. Sorcerers with spellbooks have to be able to read, for instance, and even if you quibble about whether animals can read, they wouldn’t be able to read well enough to use a spellbook.
The point is that mystical experiences are known to have physical causes other than the existence of a supernatural being. I would expect milder versions of those to occasionally produce mystical experiences too. Nobody may have put an electrode in your brain, but the brain is complex and can occasionally misfire by itself.
No, that’s not enough. Given that this is lesswrong, I hope you are aware of Bayseianism. The extent to which an experience is evidence of a God compared to evidence of other things that produce mystical experiences depends on your priors.It may be that a God is more likely to produce a mystical experience than anything else, but the prior for the existence of God is low enough that a mystical experience is still most likely to have been caused by something other than God.
Only if they were roughly equal in power and ability. If God is so comparatively powerful that the Devil doesn’t get to make changes to the laws of physics, then we wouldn’t see any such disagreements (because physics as a whole is still then under control of one being)
In that case, can you please explain to me what exactly you mean by the phrase ‘pagan gods’?
Yes, I am aware of Bayesianism.
My prior for the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient being was set pretty high; somewhere over 50%. Why do you claim that that prior has to be set “low enough that a mystical experience is still most likely to have been caused by something other than God”?
I was thinking more of the Devil causing small-scale events like, oh, killing someone’s child to tempt them into committing revenge, or sending people mystical experiences in order to increase religious strife. The Devil is commonly described as being able to do things like that and God doesn’t stop him, for whatever reason. I don’t care if the Devil can change the speed of light.
A being who has powers other than those currently recognized by science, has an area of concern and a level of power over its area of concern that is relatively high in the hierarchy if applicable, and either was worshipped or is in a class of beings that is generally worshipped.
As defining words is difficult even for well-known concepts like “chair” I reserve the right to update this definition. (If a chair is defined as being for sitting, does that mean that a chair designed as a museum art exhibit is not a chair? You try to define it and end up with locutions like “is either meant for sitting, or has features that would be considered to be designed for sitting if it was intended for sitting”.)
If you set your prior high enough, anything can become evidence for God, in which case your belief that given that prior a mystical experience is evidence for God is correct but uninteresting.
But that would leave physics down to a single Being, with a single agenda; so there wouldn’t be signs of disagreement to be seen in the laws of physics themselves
Ah, I see. So it’s a very powerful being, with that power limited (whether by force or by choice) to a single area of concern (or possibly to multiple areas of concern), capable of feats not explainable by current scientific theories, possibly but not necessarily with the power to alter physics directly?
Such a being could presumably create a mystical experience, yes. And if they are able to alter physics directly, then I would expect a messier physics; on the other hand, if they are [i]not[/i], then, though powerful, they are no less subject to the laws of physics than we are and would eventually be explained as science progresses towards a better understanding of the universe.
Not quite anything, no. And I have to be wary of anthropic reasoning.
No matter where my prior is set, though, I still consider such an experience evidence of the existence of God; in that it is more likely that I’d have the experience if God exists than if not. The only difference that the prior makes is in deciding whether or not the evidence is sufficient prove God’s existence.
I don’t understand why you insist on wondering whether some being has the power to change the laws of physics. Giving someone a mystical experience doesn’t change the laws of physics (at least not nontrivially—by some definitions anything a supernatural being does “changes the laws of physics”), and the fact that a devil-like being without an adversary, a pagan god, or a sorcerer could give you one doesn’t mean they can change the laws of physics.
“Eventually” isn’t now. You don’t believe the Devil can change the laws of physics, yet surely you acknowledge that science has no understanding of him or his powers.
Why can’t there be other types of beings like pagan gods or sorcerers, that science also doesn’t yet understand yet (regardless of whether science might understand them sometime in the future)?
You presumably believe God created typhoid fever and that it is more likely we would see that if God existed than if he didn’t. If all you mean is that mystical experiences are evidence for God in the same sense that typhoid fever is, then that falls under “true but uninteresting”. On the other hand, if you believe that mystical experiences are evidence for God in some stronger sense than typhoid fever, please elaborate.
Because, from the start, I was presenting my experience as a piece of evidence in favour of the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent being; and ‘omnipotent’ involves, among other things, being able to alter physics.
Yes, it is possible to have a sense of presence without being able to change the laws of physics. But that’s not the point.
Right now, I honestly think that you and I are having completely different arguments. I am trying to discuss the probability of existence of an omnipotent, omniscient being; while you, as far as I can tell, are simply trying to list off alternate explanations for something I once saw. And yes, they are valid alternate explanations, but that’s not the point.
If, to take an analogy, I find a leaf on the ground (and assuming for the moment that I can’t identify a tree by its leaves) then this would be evidence in favour of the hypothesis that there is an apple tree nearby. Listing other types of tree that the leaf could have come from does not change that.
No; on the contrary, typhoid fever (along with virtually any other illness) is a side effect of the evolutionary process; as soon as a sufficiently large creature evolves, its body in turn forms a new environment in which other creatures (germs) can survive and grow. Illnesses, I’d think, would be almost certain to appear in any life-bearing world in the absence of God; and since I don’t understand why they exist, I can’t make the assumption that they must exist without engaging in circular reasoning. Which makes them weak evidence against the idea that God exists.
The experience I had in front of the church, on the other hand, is an experience that is very likely in a universe where an omnipotent, omniscient being exists; and seems very unlikely in a universe where that is false. Therefore, it is evidence in favour of the idea that such a being exists.
This is phrased in a subtly different way from how you phrased it before, because “seems very unlikely in a universe where that is false” isn’t a conditional probability (even though you use it to find a conditional probability).
Given the way you phrased it this time, in order to say that mystical experiences are unlikely in a universe without God, you have to show that the list of other things that cause mystical experiences is unlikely in a universe without God.
I certainly don’t agree that brain malfunctions are unlikely in a universe without God. In fact, I’d say that they are very likely, especially since we know that mystical experiences can be caused by purely physical processes. And I can’t see any reason why according to your standards, pagan gods, devil-like beings, or sorcerers are unlikely.
P(experience | no omnipotent, omniscient being) < P(experience | omnipotent, omniscient being)
...that’s what my paragraph was trying to communicate.
I merely need to show that the experience is more likely in a universe with God than in a universe without God.
Let us consider the set of all possible universes in which brains develop through evolutionary means, without the aid of any external beings, omnipotent or otherwise. Now, the resultant brains will, in general, merely be sufficient to result in a creature with a high chance of having grandchildren. Non-debilitating brain malfunctions are not merely likely; I’d think that they’re almost certain.
However, the effects of such malfunctions will be more-or-less random. One type of malfunction might cause the sufferer to temporarily perceive green as red and vice versa. Another might cause some form of synesthesia. Yet another might result in a sudden burst of emotion, such as rage or fear.
The odds that a malfunction will give someone the impression of an approaching Presence would be a lot lower than the odds of a random malfunction. And it is the odds of that specific malfunction that I expect to be fairly low; not the odds of brain malfunctions in general.
In two cases, those are immaterial beings; if one type of immaterial being exists, that’s weak evidence that another may also exist. So that implies that those two are marginally more likely in a universe that contains an omnipotent, omniscient being than in one that does not.
Aside from that very weak point, I see no reason to assume that any of those are more likely in either sort of universe. And if the probability of those are equal, and there is another potential source of mystical experiences in the universe with the omnipotent, omniscient being, then such an experience is weak evidence in favour of the existence of such a being.
No, because you phrased it differently. “The experience I had in front of the church, on the other hand, is an experience that is very likely in a universe where an omnipotent, omniscient being exists; and seems very unlikely in a universe where that is false” amounts to “P (experience | God) is high && P(experience | no God) is low”, not “P (experience | God) > P(experience | no God)”.
Brain malfunctions are more likely to produce some effects than others. And mystical experiences are the sort of thing brain malfunctions are likely to produce. That’s why people starve themselves and see mystical experiences, but they rarely starve themselves and start thinking they have 12 fingers. While you gave examples of other things brain malfunctions can produce, those are just other things which they are more likely than normal to produce; they don’t mean that the chance of everything is equal.
Those things are only marginally more likely in a universe with a God if you believe all types of God are equally likely. It is my impression that you think a Biblical-type God is more likely.
Even if they are more likely, this falls under “true but uninteresting”. There are lots of things that are marginally more likely in a universe with God. Claiming that mystical experiences are evidence for God is only interesting if it’s better evidence than those other things. Nobody says “I saw the Loch Ness Monster, so God is marginally more likely” (seeing the Loch Ness Monster implies that science, which says there is no such thing, can fail, and if science can fail, God is marginally more likely).
Well, I do think that “P (experience | God) is high && P(experience | no God) is low”. However, in order to take the experience as evidence for the existence of God, it is necessary only to show the weaker point that “P (experience | God) > P(experience | no God)”
True.
For human brains as they exist in this universe, perhaps. But for every possible type of brain, as may exist in every possible type of universe?
I consider that unlikely. I could be wrong about that, of course. But remember, in order to consider the probability of brains being prone to that exact malfunction, one must consider the possibility of brains constructed very differently to the ones we have. And, quite honestly, that’s such a wide and unexplored field that there’s not much I can say about it at all...
No, not all types are equally likely. Yes, I do think that an omniscient, omnipotent being very probably exists.
...why on earth would the idea that ‘science can fail’ lead to ‘God is marginally more likely’?
If an omnipotent, omniscient being exists, then it is reasonable to postulate that said being created our universe (or, at the very least, knew about it and didn’t stop it from existing). If such a being created our universe, then it is reasonable to assume that it would have been created with some care; because most craftsmen take a lot of care in their work. A bit of observation shows that our universe runs on rules; and if those rules were created with care, then it is reasonable to assume that they will work, that there are not going to be any obvious seams visible in the rules.
In short, if God exists, then science (being a systematic attempt to discover those rules) should work.
To figure out the odds of the existence of God based on you having a certain type of experience, you can’t just ignore the knowledge about what kind of brain you have. If you do that, you’re throwing out evidence that affects your conclusion. The type of brain you actually have is one where malfunctions produce mystical experiences more readily than they produce arbitrary other effects.
Yes, there would. If people normally disintegrate only when exposed to thousands of degrees of temperature, but God can disintegrate people whenever he wants, every time God stays hidden but disintegrates a person who is not hidden, that’s a seam in the rules and science will not be able to explain that event.
The figures that I am using to find P(God | experience) include P(experience | no God) and P(experience | God). P(experience | no God) must surely integrate over every possible universe in which there is no God, or else it will be P(experience | a specific universe), which is the wrong figure. Similarly, P(experience | God) must integrate over every universe in which an omnipotent, omniscient being exists; or else, once again, it is P(experience | specific universe), and is the wrong figure.
I’m trying to simplify the equation, for purposes of debate, to an update on exactly one piece of evidence. If we start including the specifics of the brain, then that opens up the question of P(God | human brain), which is an entire, and much bigger, debate on its own. And one that I have no intention of entering into with you; the inferential distance between us is simply too large, and I’ve been having enough trouble trying to communicate with you as it is.
That’s a very good point.
It’s rather unlikely that it could be replicated under laboratory conditions, which would mean it’s not an obvious seam… but yes, I see your point, it could be a bit of a seam. (Or it could be as-yet undiscovered physics of some sort, of course).
You can’t simplify that equation. If you simplify the equation that way it’s only useful when figuring out if there is a god, given a creature of unknown type who has a mystical experience. You are not a creature of unknown type, and throwing out the information that you have a brain that is inordinately prone to malfunctions that produce mystical experiences will distort the answer.
It’s like concluding there is a high probability that someone is insane because he thinks he’s Napoleon, while discarding the information that he’s ruling France in the year 1805. P(insane|claim Napoleon) is high, but P(insane|claim Napoleon && rules France in 1805)” is not high. Discarding this information is wrong.
That is exactly the point I was trying to make; that the fact that such an experience happened is a piece of evidence in favour of the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient being.
The trouble with this, if you start insisting that certain information cannot be left out, is that you are cherry-picking what information that is, and specifically selecting information that you believe leads to the conclusion that you want. I could probably name a dozen other pieces of information which support the idea that an omniscient, omnipotent being exists and insist on including them too (for example; consider P(God | intelligent life exists)).
If we start down this path, then we could both simply throw new pieces of information into the discussion again and again; it will take months, and it would lead absolutely nowhere.
I would like to refer you to a short story that discusses that point in greater detail.
In short, yes, P(insane | claims Napoleon) is high, and if I meet someone who tells me ‘One of my ancestors claimed he was Napoleon’ then I will consider it a high probability that that ancestor was insane.
The fact that such an experience happened, given no other information, may be evidence for God. But you have other information and are ignoring it.
Furthermore, even as evidence for God, it’s only evidence in a very weak sense compared to typical cases where one speaks about something being evidence. It makes it more likely that there’s a God, but it also makes it more likely that there is a pagan god, or a sorcerer, or an extraterrestrial with a mind-control ray.
It’s not cherry picking to refuse to discard information which affects the result by orders of magnitude more than the probability you’re hoping to get from it. A mystical experience in a human brain is much better evidence for a brain malfunction than it is for God.
My scenario not only involves being in 1805, but also ruling France. If you use the information that someone is your ancestor (presumably from 1805), but you omit the information that he was ruling France then, you have still discarded relevant information and as a result will come up with a probability of insanity that is much too high.
sigh
Very well. If you insist that I not ignore information, then there is a lot more information that needs to be properly considered. Decades of experiences that need to be sorted and categorised. Hundreds of writings, ancient and modern; thousands of accounts, of one sort or another.
We’ll just have to go through it all, piece by piece. Only the bits that are relevant, of course, but there’s a lot that is relevant.
For a start, let me consider the probability of the existence of God, given the existence of brains (or any form of hardware capable of supporting intelligence in some or other form).
Where, just to be clear, I use the word ‘God’ to refer to any omniscient, omnipotent being.
So, what is P(God | Brains)?
According to Bayes’ Theorem:
P(God | Brains) = P(Brains | God)*P(God)/P(Brains)
Of course, P(Brains) = P(Brains | God)P(God)+P(Brains | no God)P(no God).
Thus, a simple substitution gives:
P(God | Brains) = P(Brains | God)P(God)/[P(Brains | God)P(God)+P(Brains | no God)*P(no God)]
So. What is P(Brains | no God)?
For that, we need to consider the probability that a randomly chosen universe will contain brains, at some or other point in its history.
In order to do that, let us consider all possible universes.
Here, I start by considering the null universe; a universe that contains no matter. Since it contains no matter, it cannot contain brains.
Then, let us add a piece of matter; a single quark. this one-quark universe also cannot contain brains, as there is insufficient matter to form the brains.
I don’t think it’s sensible to consider different one-quark universes as different; no matter where the quark is, or how fast it is moving, it’s just a coordinate transform to make it identical to any other one-quark universe.
Then, let us add a second quark. Now, it is sensible to differentiate between different two-quark universes, because there is a measurement that can change from one universe to another; and that is the distance between the two quarks. There is also another measurement that can change from one universe to another, and that is their relative velocity. However, it is not always clear whether two diffferent snapshots of two-quark universes are different universes, or the same universe at different times. Still, no brains are possible.
There are even more three-quark than two-quark universes; at a rough estimate, I’d say that the number of three-quark universes is half of the square of the number of two-quark universes. Still no brains.
Four-quark universes; here, I expect the total number of universes to be roughly x^3/6 where x is the number of two-quark universes.
For an N-quark universe, in general, I expect that the total number of possible universes would be roughly x^(N-1)/(N-1)!. This is an interesting function; it grows exponentially for low N, the rate of increase slows as N approaches x, and finally, when N exceeds x, the number of possible N-particle universes actually begins to drop. Of course, x is either infinite or at least very very large, so we can expect that most universes will have quite a lot of matter; more than enough to form brains.
Now, what are the odds of a universe which contains enough matter containing brains? Note that the universes under consideration here contain a number of quarks, in what is essentially a random configuration. All possible configurations are under consideration here, so at least some of them will have brains (in some cases, Boltzman brains; in other cases, brains with bodies and whole civilisations around them). However, since every possible random configuration is permitted, it would seem to me that a highly ordered set of particles, like a brain, must be relatively rare.
So, P(Brain | no God) seems like it should be fairly low.
Now, let us consider P(Brain | God). This time, we do not have to consider every possible universe; only those universes that could exist in the presence of an omniscient, omnipotent being. It seems likely that such a being will adjust any universe to His liking, and possibly create one if one does not exist.
It also seems quite probable, to me, that if a single intelligent being exists, then that being is quite likely to realise that he (or she) would like a conversation with someone else. Being omnipotent, it seems likely that God would create someone to talk with, and thus create brains.
So, it seems likely that P(Brains | God) is high.
Putting a high value for P(Brains | God) and a low value for P(Brains | no God) into the equation from earlier:
P(God | Brains) = P(Brains | God)P(God)/[P(Brains | God)P(God)+P(Brains | no God)*P(no God)]
...will produce the result that P(God | Brains) > P(God). This seems to be a fairly major effect.
Do you have any figures for the likelihood of such a brain malfunction? Or any form of data at all to back up this assertion?
Yes. That is quite a lot of bits of information; since it eliminates all but one of the people throughout all of history who thought they were Napoleon.
It’s a bit like the difference between asking “what are the odds of getting a six on a fair die roll?” and “what are the odds that I got a six on the fair die I rolled on Thursday 10 April 2014 at 21:10?”—though the difference is a bit more pronounced, as I’m sure there were more than six people throughout history who claimed to be Napoleon.