Makes sense. This may not be a fair question to ask, but do you believe that, given all available evidence, you’d still be a theist if your prior was a bit lower—say, about 50% ?
I cannot say for sure. I’d like to say ‘yes’… but too much of my history would need to change for that to be true. I can’t say anything for certain about that counterfactual me.
Regarding miracles, I think you and I mean different things by the term.
Both of the kinds of miracles you described sound fairly mundane to me. The first kind is basically a rare unexplained occurrence; these happen every day
Yes, but some are mere coincidences, like your odometer; while others appear to subvert the natural order, like the Sun doing a dance.
The second kind of miracle sounds like a natural law to me, just like gravity or heat transfer or something.
Yes, that was more-or-less my point.
You say that “all perfectly natural mechanisms were set in place by God as well”; does this mean that pretty much everything that happens is a miracle ? Doesn’t that rather dilute the word “miracle” to the point where it just means, “stuff that happens” ?
I’d say that any kind of natural law is exactly as miraculous as a permanently-repeatable miracle. I don’t really think that dilutes the work ‘miracle’ all that much; after all, some pretty amazing stuff happens on a continual basis. (It may inflate the phrase ‘stuff that happens’ somewhat; but when one considers all that goes into stuff happening, it can be pretty impressive in any case).
So, could you contrast the two stories (the Gospels, or perhaps some specific passage from the New Testament, vs. Job), to illustrate why you believe that one is mostly fiction, and the other mostly fact ?
Hmmm.
For Job, I shall pick out Job chapters 4 and 5; a very long, wordy speech by one speaker. Note that this is framed as being one of Job’s friends, taking to Job after Job has lost everything and moaned about it a bit. Completely overblown. I can’t imagine anyone speaking like that in a conversation.
Compare this passage from the Gospel of John (specifically, John 18:28-19:16); wherein Jesus is taken before Pilate by a mob who want to have him killed; what people say here is a lot shorter and more to-the-point. It’s easier to see Pilate as a civil servant who just really doesn’t want anything to do with this mess that’s been thrown on his lap; his reactions seem far more plausible than Job’s friends’ speeches.
For Job, I shall pick out Job chapters 4 and 5; a very long, wordy speech by one speaker. Note that this is framed as being one of Job’s friends, taking to Job after Job has lost everything and moaned about it a bit. Completely overblown. I can’t imagine anyone speaking like that in a conversation.
Jesus has a similar overblown speech spanning multiple chapters in John (14-18)
Compare this passage from the Gospel of John (specifically, John 18:28-19:16); wherein Jesus is taken before Pilate by a mob who want to have him killed; what people say here is a lot shorter and more to-the-point. It’s easier to see Pilate as a civil servant who just really doesn’t want anything to do with this mess that’s been thrown on his lap; his reactions seem far more plausible than Job’s friends’ speeches.
Just FYI, Pilate’s behavior in the Gospels is almost completely at odds with how he’s described in literature that’s actually contemporary with when Pilate lived. Pilate in the Gospels is depicted as a patient, if not a slightly annoyed, judge of character. Only succumbing to executing Jesus because he doesn’t want a riot to start. Pilate depicted by Philo (who was writing when Pilate was still alive) describes Pilate as stubborn, inflexible, greedy, impatient, executing multiple people without trials, and has no qualms about ignoring the will of Jewish mobs. Pilate is actually relieved of his duty because he was such a corrupt prefect.
Also, Barabbas, the character that the Jews want released in Jesus’ stead: His name “Barabbas” literally means “son of the father” which just so happens to be Jesus’ identity. Not only would Pilate not have acquiesced to releasing a (presumably) convicted criminal to appease a Jewish crowd, but there was no tradition of letting a prisoner go during Passover.
The whole trial scene with Pilate is exceedingly improbable if one knows the history of the time period, even if Pilate uses more to the point wording; that is easily fabricated.
Jesus has a similar overblown speech spanning multiple chapters in John (14-18)
It’s a long speech, yes, and spans multiple chapters; but it’s not the sort of overblown verbiage one finds in Job. The speeches in Job are long not because they have a lot to say, but because they insist on saying everything in the most drawn-out and overdone way possible; each entire speech could probably be replaced by two or three sentences easily. It would be a lot harder to replace Jesus’ speech in John 14-17 with a similarly few short phrases.
Just FYI, Pilate’s behavior in the Gospels is almost completely at odds with how he’s described in literature that’s actually contemporary with when Pilate lived.
Okay, I’ve followed up your link, and I don’t think it backs up your claim as completely as you seem to assume it does. (That’s aside from the fact that people are complex beings, and often do unexpected things.) I hadn’t really looked into other sources on Pilate before reading your comment, so this is just sortof off the top of my head.
So, the picture I get of Pilate from your link is of someone who really doesn’t like the Jews, and is quite willing to set his soldiers on them—even to the point of enticing a Jewish crowd to form in a place where he can arrange disguised soldiers in its midst, so that his disguised troops can cut up the nearby protestors. He has no qualms about sentencing people to death and really, really doesn’t like to change his mind.
So. Imagine a person like that, and then imagine that this Jewish mob turns up on his doorstep, all unexpected, clamouring to have this man put to death. Pilate may not have qualms about sentencing a man to death; but a stubborn and inflexible man who doesn’t like the Jewish mob isn’t going to want to give them what they want. No, he’s going to want to deny them out of sheer contrariness; he’s going to look for a way to get this guy out of his hair, alive, so that he can go back and bother the Jews more.
And then, of course, there’s the data point that he often turns against the mob. But he’s human; one man against a mob tends to go really badly for the one man, and he knows that. He doesn’t turn against the mob on his own—he turns against the mob when he’s backed up by enough soldiers. As in the example where he had the soldiers disguise themselves to join the mob, this takes planning. This takes forethought. This takes knowing that the mob is going to be there. In advance. A mob that turns up entirely unannounced, while Pilate’s busy with other stuff and perhaps some of his soldiers are on leave, is another matter entirely; that calls for defusing them now, and punishing them later, when there’s been time to plan it out. And hey, this mob gets defused by simply having this one Jewish guy killed. Not optimal, but better than a riot that the troops aren’t quite ready to deal with...
Not only would Pilate not have acquiesced to releasing a (presumably) convicted criminal to appease a Jewish crowd, but there was no tradition of letting a prisoner go during Passover.
Given the picture you’ve painted, as a corrupt prefect, he might well release some minor brigand who’d only preyed on the peasants and left anyone with soldiers alone.
I cannot say for sure. I’d like to say ‘yes’… but too much of my history would need to change for that to be true.
Yeah, that’s probably what I’d say, too.
Yes, but some are mere coincidences, like your odometer; while others appear to subvert the natural order, like the Sun doing a dance.
How do you know which is which; and how do you know when the natural order has truly been subverted ? For example, I personally don’t know much about that dancing sun event, but the fact that (according to Wikipedia, at least) it has not been recorded by any cameras or other instruments leads me to believe that human psychology, rather than divine intervention, was responsible.
That said, in your estimation, approximately how many miracles of that kind are occurring on Earth per year ?
after all, some pretty amazing stuff happens on a continual basis
Agreed. So, when we talk about miracles, let’s stick to unusual acts of divine intervention.
Compare this passage from the Gospel of John …
In addition to what JQuinton said, I’d like to add that, while the New Testament definitely contains more action than Job, it’s still pretty much full of parables, sermons, and long-winded speeches; for example, such as the one directly preceeding the passage you quoted—and that’s not even the longest one. I agree that the supporting characters are a bit more lifelike in the New Testament—but then, it’s also a much longer book, so there are more pages available to flesh them out.
Furthermore, there are many other works of literature with even better writing; for example, the Odyssey, Moby Dick, or, more recently, Harry Potter. Presumably, you don’t believe that these works describe real events; but if so, why not ?
How do you know which is which; and how do you know when the natural order has truly been subverted ?
Well, first you have to know what the natural order is. And that requires the help of the physicists and other scientists.
What a scientist cannot explain may or may not be a subversion of the natural order. (What a scientist can explain may or may not also be a subversion of the natural order—some scientists can be trapped into providing justifications for incorrect versions of events—but it’s still a useful filtering tool) Or it may be a thing that the physicist will have to update his model of physics to explain.
...it’s not an easy question.
For example, I personally don’t know much about that dancing sun event, but the fact that (according to Wikipedia, at least) it has not been recorded by any cameras or other instruments leads me to believe that human psychology, rather than divine intervention, was responsible.
That’s not impossible. (I don’t know much about it either; it was linked from the wikipedia article on ‘miracle’).
That said, in your estimation, approximately how many miracles of that kind are occurring on Earth per year ?
Ummm… if I had to guess… I’d guess less than one. I wouldn’t venture a guess as to how much less than one, though.
Agreed. So, when we talk about miracles, let’s stick to unusual acts of divine intervention.
Defining whether a given event is or is not an unusual act of divine intervention may be tricky; but fair enough, let’s go with that definition for the moment.
Furthermore, there are many other works of literature with even better writing; for example, the Odyssey, Moby Dick, or, more recently, Harry Potter. Presumably, you don’t believe that these works describe real events; but if so, why not ?
You’re right; nothing that’s written in the Gospels can raise it to a status of higher than ‘plausible’. Many clear works of fiction also reach the status of ‘plausible’; in order to reach the higher status of ‘probably true’, one needs a certain amount of external verification.
I find a good deal of that external verification in the fact that a number of people, in whom I place a great deal of trust, and at least some of whom are known to be better at identifying truth than I am, have told me that it is true.
What a scientist cannot explain may or may not be a subversion of the natural order. … it’s not an easy question.
Ok, I admit that science is hard. But about you ? How do you, personally, know what’s a subversion of the natural order and what isn’t ?
That’s not impossible.
Which possibility do you think is more likely in this case: genuine miracle, or mass confirmation bias ? That’s why I’d like you to clarify this:
I wouldn’t venture a guess as to how much less than one, though.
Well, can you put a ballpark figure on it ? Do miracles happen (on average) once a year ? Once a century ? Once a millennium ? Once per the lifetime of our Universe ?
I find a good deal of that external verification in the fact that a number of people, in whom I place a great deal of trust, and at least some of whom are known to be better at identifying truth than I am, have told me that it is true.
I think this is another difference between our methods; and I must confess that I find your approach quite weird. This doesn’t automatically mean that it’s wrong, of course; in fact, many theists (including C.S.Lewis) advocate it, so there might be something to it. I just don’t see what.
The big difference between your approach and mine is that you seem to be entirely discounting empirical evidence; or, if not discounting it, then trivializing it at the very least. So, for example, if a trusted friend told you that he was fishing in the pond behind his house and caught a Great White shark; and if all of your friends confirmed this; then you’d accept that as true. I, on the other hand, would ask to see the shark.
The reason for this is not that I’m some sort of a hateful, un-trusting person (or rather, that’s not the only reason, heh); but because we have mountains and mountains of data on sharks, and all of it tells us that they are incredibly unlikely to show up in ponds, and are also quite strong and thus nearly impossible to catch using an ordinary fishing line. Compared to this overwhelming pile of evidence, the testimony of a few people does not suffice to turn the tide of my belief.
So, is there a reason why you value empirical evidence as little as you do ? Alternatively, did I completely misunderstand your position ?
Ok, I admit that science is hard. But about you ? How do you, personally, know what’s a subversion of the natural order and what isn’t ?
I have at least as much difficulty as the hypothetical scientist. Possibly slightly more difficulty, because the hypothetical scientist will know more science than I do.
Which possibility do you think is more likely in this case: genuine miracle, or mass confirmation bias ?
Insufficient data for a firm conclusion.
Opposing the mass confirmation bias hypothesis, are the claims that the water on the ground and on people’s clothing was dried during the time; also apparently people ‘miles away’ (and thus unlikely to have been caught up in mass hysteria at the time) also reported having seen it.
Having said that, there is another explanation that occurs to me; the scene was described as the dancing sun appearing after a rainstorm, bursting through the clouds:
“As if like a bolt from the blue, the clouds were wrenched apart, and the sun at its zenith appeared in all its splendor.”
If the clouds were thick enough, it may be hard to see the Sun; the bright light could have been… something else sufficiently hot and bright. (I do not know what, but there’s room for a number of other hypotheses there).
I wouldn’t venture a guess as to how much less than one, though.
Well, can you put a ballpark figure on it ? Do miracles happen (on average) once a year ? Once a century ? Once a millennium ? Once per the lifetime of our Universe ?
I am very poorly calibrated on such low frequencies, so take what I say here is highly speculative. (Also, the rate seems very variable, with several a year in the time of the Gospels, for example).
At a rough guess, I’d say possibly somewhere between once a year and once a century. Might be more, might be less.
I find a good deal of that external verification in the fact that a number of people, in whom I place a great deal of trust, and at least some of whom are known to be better at identifying truth than I am, have told me that it is true.
I think this is another difference between our methods; and I must confess that I find your approach quite weird. This doesn’t automatically mean that it’s wrong, of course; in fact, many theists (including C.S.Lewis) advocate it, so there might be something to it. I just don’t see what.
Let me explain further, then, by means of an analogy. Consider the example you provide, of a trustworthy friend claiming to have found a great white shark in a nearby pond. For the sake of argument, I shall assume a rather large pond, in which a Great White could plausibly survive a day or two, but fed and drained by rivers too small for a Great White to swim along.
I shall further assume that you are aware that all your friends were on the fishing trip together (which you were unable to join due to a prior appointment).
Now, catching a Great White is a noteworthy accomplishment. If your friend were to accomplish this, it is reasonable to assign a high probability that he would tell you. Therefore, I assign the following:
P (Being told | Great White caught) = 0.95
It is also possible that your friends are collaborating on a prank, giving you an implausible story to see if they can convince you. If this is the case, they could have decided to do so while on the fishing trip, and laid out the necessary plans then. Exactly what probability you assign to this depends a lot on your friends; however, for the sake of argument, I shall assume that there’s a 20% chance of this scenario.
P (Being told | No great white caught) = 0.2
Now, furthermore, there is no plausible way for a Great White to have ended up in the pond; and no plausible way to catch one with a simple fishing line. There are a variety of implausible but physically possible ways to accomplish both actions, though. So the prior probability of a Great White being caught is very low:
P (Great White caught) = 0.05
(possibly less than that, but let’s go with that for the moment).
Thus, P(Being told) = P (Being told | Great White caught) P(Great White caught) + P (Being told | No great white caught) P(No great white caught)
= (0.95 0.05) + (0.2 0.95)
= 0.2375
Plugging this into Bayes, P(Great White caught | Being told) = P (Being told | Great White caught) P(Great White caught)/P(Being told)
= (0.95 0.05)/0.2375
= 0.2
So, given certain assumptions about how trustworthy your friends are, etc., I find that the probability that they have indeed captured a Great White is higher if they tell you that they have than if they do not. Mind you, the prior probability for capturing a Great White is very low to begin with; the end result is still that it is more probable that they are lying than that they have captured a Great White, and you would be perfectly sensible to request further proof, in the form of the shark in question, before believing their claims.
So, is there a reason why you value empirical evidence as little as you do ? Alternatively, did I completely misunderstand your position ?
It’s not that I completely discard empirical evidence; it’s just that empirical evidence, one way or another, is somewhat rare in the case of this particular question, and thus I am forced to rely on what evidence I can find.
I have, on at least one occasion, observed some evidence; but it’s the sort of evidence that doesn’t communicate well and is rather unconvincing at one remove (I know it happened, because I remember it, but I have no proof other than my unsupported word).
You yourself have said that the prior probability of a miracle occurring on any given day is relatively small, “somewhere between once a year and once a century”. You also said that, if a miracle were to occur, you would likely be unable to recognize it as such: “I have at least as much difficulty as the hypothetical scientist. Possibly slightly more difficulty...”. You also offered a plausible-sounding natural explanation for the event, and, as you mentioned, many other perfectly natural explanations exist. In addition, we have zero recorded evidence for this miracle, other than people’s testimonies; whereas any other spectacular events (such as volcano eruptions or Justin Bieber sightings) are usually accompanied by plenty of recorded data (including news reports, cellphone footage, instrument telemetry, etc. etc.).
Given all of this, I’d argue that the probability of this particular event being a miracle is quite low—even if we grant that a miracle-causing god of some sort does exist.
P (Great White caught) = 0.05
Whoa, whoa, wait a minute, 0.05 is huge ! It’s about 460 times greater than your odds of dying in a car accident during any given year, assuming you live in the USA. And that’s car accidents, which are pretty common events. Given that no recorded evidence of a backyard shark catch exists, I’d estimate its prior to be even lower. After all, meteorite strikes that damage people or property are extremely rare, and yet we do have recorded evidence of them happening, so pond sharks have got to be even more rare than that.
If we estimate the prior at something fairly optimistic, like 1 / 7e6 (meaning that we’d expect this rare event to happen to at least one person on any given day, seeing as there are 7e6 people on Earth), we still get a probability of something like 5.7e-7, which is about the same odds as winning the lottery (though I could be wrong, I don’t know much about lotteries).
It’s not that I completely discard empirical evidence; it’s just that empirical evidence, one way or another, is somewhat rare in the case of this particular question...
Wouldn’t this drive down the probability ? If I knew that people were catching great whites in ponds all the time, I’d be more likely to believe my friends when they told me they caught one, right ?
I have, on at least one occasion, observed some evidence; but it’s the sort of evidence that doesn’t communicate well and is rather unconvincing at one remove...
What makes you trust the evidence, then ?
If I went fishing in a pond one day, and caught what appears to be at first glance a great white shark, I wouldn’t trust my initial impressions. I’d start looking for a hidden camera. And maybe get an MRI, just in case. Those probabilities apply to everyone, including myself. Would you not agree ?
You yourself have said that the prior probability of a miracle occurring on any given day is relatively small, “somewhere between once a year and once a century”. You also said that, if a miracle were to occur, you would likely be unable to recognize it as such: “I have at least as much difficulty as the hypothetical scientist. Possibly slightly more difficulty...”. You also offered a plausible-sounding natural explanation for the event, and, as you mentioned, many other perfectly natural explanations exist.
All true.
In addition, we have zero recorded evidence for this miracle, other than people’s testimonies; whereas any other spectacular events (such as volcano eruptions or Justin Bieber sightings) are usually accompanied by plenty of recorded data (including news reports, cellphone footage, instrument telemetry, etc. etc.).
I would like to point out that, first of all, this occurred in 1917; there were no cellphones to take cellphone footage. And there were news reports at the time (there’s a scan of at least one relevant newspaper page on the wikipedia page)
I don’t think this detracts all that much from your point, but I felt I should point it out.
Given all of this, I’d argue that the probability of this particular event being a miracle is quite low—even if we grant that a miracle-causing god of some sort does exist.
I expect that there are significantly more events claimed to be miracles than there are actual miracles. So, given as cursory a look over the available evidence as we’ve taken in this discussion, it would be sensible to assign a low probability to this incident having been a miracle, yes.
P (Great White caught) = 0.05
Whoa, whoa, wait a minute, 0.05 is huge !
You’re right, it is really rather unreasonably large. (All of my assumed priors in my previous posts were multiples of 1⁄20, a level of granularity perhaps too coarse for this figure). However, I don’t believe that detracts from the point I was making at all.
Consider: P(Being told) = P (Being told | Great White caught) P(Great White caught) + P (Being told | No great white caught) P(No great white caught)
Taking the previously assumed values of P (Being told | Great White caught) = 0.95 and P (Being told | No great white caught) = 0.2, and taking P(Great White caught) as 1e(-10), that gives P(Being told) = (0.95 1e(-10)) + (0.2 (1 − 1e(-10))) = 0.200000000075
Now, substituting these values in Bayes: P(Great White caught | Being told) = P (Being told | Great White caught) P(Great White caught)/P(Being told) = (0.95 1e(-10))/0.200000000075 = 0.00000000047499999982; or approximately 4.75e-10. While this is minute, it is still over four times larger than the probability that they had caught a Great White had they not yet told you; being told that they had caught a Great White is still evidence in favour of a Great White having been caught. (Though not enough to make it probable that a Great White had actually been caught).
Wouldn’t this drive down the probability ? If I knew that people were catching great whites in ponds all the time, I’d be more likely to believe my friends when they told me they caught one, right ?
No, because the fact that great whites are not being caught in ponds all the time is evidence. It is very strong evidence for the hypothesis that great whites are not often found, or caught, in ponds.
When I say that empirical evidence is rare, I mean that many things can be adequately explained whether it is true that God exists or not. Therefore, those things do not act as evidence either for or against the hypothesis.
I have, on at least one occasion, observed some evidence; but it’s the sort of evidence that doesn’t communicate well and is rather unconvincing at one remove...
What makes you trust the evidence, then ?
If I went fishing in a pond one day, and caught what appears to be at first glance a great white shark, I wouldn’t trust my initial impressions. I’d start looking for a hidden camera. And maybe get an MRI, just in case. Those probabilities apply to everyone, including myself. Would you not agree ?
Rather than continue to talk in hypotheticals, I think I’ll take a moment to describe the incident in question (and I think you’ll see why I say I expect you to be unconvinced by it).
I was waiting outside Church; I had been nearby for some other reason, and it would not be economical to go home before mass (as I would then have had to leave immediately again), but there was still some time to wait. Having planned for this eventuality, I had a book to read with me. (I should perhaps mention, at this point, that I am notorious among my close acquaintances for the difficulty of interrupting me in the middle of a good book).
A little way outside the church, there is a large crucifix set up. While I was reading, a man walked by and knelt at the crucifix in prayer. And, for a brief while, I felt this very strong sense of Presence… strong enough that I found myself unable to continue reading my book until it had gone.
And that’s it. After a while, the man got up and walked away; the sense of Presence receded.
So, what makes me trust the evidence? I remember it; and I do not believe there was any way that any human could have faked that experience.
The obvious explanation is a brain malfunction, not fakery by another human.
(I also suspect confirmation bias. If you had had the same experience without a man praying nearby, you wouldn’t have decided that it proves that such experiences have nothing to do with prayer.)
But even ignoring that, plenty of Muslims and people of other religions have had similar experiences. Yet I doubt you believe that they were real. Since you believe that similar experiences by Muslims are not real, you obviously do believe that there are explanations other than the experience being real. Why not now, too?
The obvious explanation is a brain malfunction, not fakery by another human.
Possible; but I consider it an extremely low-probability possibility, for much the same reason as I consider the possibility that a given cloud I see in the sky is a hallucination has very low probability.
(I also suspect confirmation bias. If you had had the same experience without a man praying nearby, you wouldn’t have decided that it proves that such experiences have nothing to do with prayer.)
No… but I do believe I would still have interpreted it as evidence for the existence of God.
But even ignoring that, plenty of Muslims and people of other religions have had similar experiences. Yet I doubt you believe that they were real.
Ah—be careful of assumptions. I see no reason why some of them might not have been real. I’m not sure that the details of what building one goes into for worship, or the wording of the sermons, are what’s really important.
Consider Matthew 25:31-46, in which the Final Judgement is directly referenced, and the criteria under which that judgement will take place are given:
35 I was hungry and you fed me, thirsty and you gave me a drink; I was a stranger and you received me in your homes, 36 naked and you clothed me; I was sick and you took care of me, in prison and you visited me.
There’s nothing in there about belonging to a specific religion; it’s all about going out there and going good things for people.
So, given that there are Muslims who are good people and do good things, I see no reason why God wouldn’t on occasion answer their prayers, on the same criteria (which are hard to find and may take as input information not available without omniscience) as He uses to respond to anyone else.
Hm. Backing up a little: what’s your confidence that an arbitrarily selected perception is the result of processing signals from a distal stimulus that conforms in all significant ways to the perception?
Very very high. Short of strong evidence that a given perception is false (and not merely might be false), I tend to assume that all of my perceptions are caused by a distal stimulus that conforms in all significant ways to the perception in question (possibly filtered by intervening effects, e.g. dimmed if I am wearing sunglasses).
Well, yes, of course very very high. And, sure, in practice we behave as though all our perceptions are like this, because treating any given one as though it isn’t is typically unjustified.
I meant the question somewhat more precisely.
For example, out of 100,000 distinct perceptions, would you estimate the chance that at least one of those perceptions lacks a conforming distal stimulus as ~1? ~.1? ~.01? ~.00001? Other?
I’m afraid I can’t really give you an answer at the level of precision you’re asking for; I’m really not well calibrated for extimating extremely low probabilities. The best I can give you is “small enough as to be near indistinguishable from zero”.
And I’m not entirely sure where I should put the upper bound of that category, either.
Well, let’s approach it from the other direction, then. Would you say that the chance that I’ve experienced at least one perception not caused by processing signals from a distal stimulus that conforms in all significant ways to the perception within the last 12 months is indistinguishable from zero? Indistinguishable from one? Somewhere in between?
There are substances that, when ingested or perhaps inhaled, will trigger hallucinations.
There are certain mental conditions which may trigger hallucinations.
Dreams might also count, given the wording you’ve used.
If I assume that you haven’t ingested any hallucinogens, knowingly or not; and that you are mentally healthy, and not counting dreams, then I’d say it falls into the “small enough as to be near indistinguishable from zero” category. (If you have ingested hallucinogens, the probability shoots up; potentially quite a lot).
Possible; but I consider it an extremely low-probability possibility, for much the same reason as I consider the possibility that a given cloud I see in the sky is a hallucination has very low probability.
The possibility that a random cloud is a hallucination is low because clouds are well-studied and there is plenty of evidence for the existence of clouds—evidence of such a nature that anyone can see it. Furthermore, we know something about hallucinations—hallucinations don’t cause random people to see random objects under random circumstances. A random cloud in the sky is not the type of thing that hallucinations typically make people see.
Your mystical experience was observable only by yourself, and was of a type which is known to be caused by brain malfunction.
So, given that there are Muslims who are good people and do good things, I see no reason why God wouldn’t on occasion answer their prayers
But the more that different religions can do this, the less the meaning of the mystical experience. If God gives those experiences to people of all religions, then those experiences are no longer evidence for any particular religion. For all you know, the Muslim idea of God is the true one, the Christian one is false, and the Muslim God gives experiences to Christians in the same way you think that the Christian one gives experiences to Muslims. Maybe Christianity is really false, the pagans are right that there is a god and a goddess, and they give mystical experiences to Christians. Maybe some form of devil-worship is correct; I assume you believe that the Devil can’t hand out mystical experiences, but if you are wrong about just that part, your experience could just as well come from the Devil.
If God gives those experiences to people of all religions, then those experiences are no longer evidence for any particular religion.
It simply suggests that the criteria that God uses, when deciding when to make His presence known, are not limited to the professed religion of the person in question. Exactly what those criteria are, is not fully clear; but any religion which helped to foster those criteria amongst its adherents would be at least partially correct, in its effects if not necessarily in its dogma.
I assume you believe that the Devil can’t hand out mystical experiences
Why not? We’re talking about the what may be second-most powerful entity in existence. (Mind you, there’s a big difference between can and will; the existence of the Devil strongly implies the existence of God, and if the Devil is trying to discourage religion, then it would be counterproductive unless some other effects of said experience outweigh that risk.)
It simply suggests that the criteria that God uses, when deciding when to make His presence known, are not limited to the professed religion of the person in question.
That sounds like you’re agreeing with me. If God gives people mystical experiences no matter what their religion, mystical experiences are no good in showing that the religion is true. Of course this is a matter of degree. The wider the range of people get the experiences, the worse the experiences are at showing anything.
If beings other than God (such as the Devil) can give out mystical experiences, it’s even worse. Mystical experiences not only don’t show that the religion is true, they don’t even show that “God exists” is true. At this point I don’t see why you care that it’s not just a brain malfunction, because even if it wasn’t, you have no way to tell between an experience sent by God, one sent by the Devil, and there being a sorcerer on every block who occasionally pulls pranks by giving random people mystical experiences.
(As for why the Devil would want to do that? Maybe he knows that people interpret mystical experiences as evidence for their religion being true and he can incite religious conflict by giving people of opposing religions mystical experiences.)
That sounds like you’re agreeing with me. If God gives people mystical experiences no matter what their religion, mystical experiences are no good in showing that the religion is true. Of course this is a matter of degree. The wider the range of people get the experiences, the worse the experiences are at showing anything.
It does not prevent said experiences from showing the existence of God, or from hinting at the criteria He finds important.
If beings other than God (such as the Devil) can give out mystical experiences, it’s even worse. Mystical experiences not only don’t show that the religion is true, they don’t even show that “God exists” is true. At this point I don’t see why you care that it’s not just a brain malfunction, because even if it wasn’t, you have no way to tell between an experience sent by God, one sent by the Devil, and there being a sorcerer on every block who occasionally pulls pranks by giving random people mystical experiences.
The devil is defined more-or-less by being in oppostion to God. If the devil exists, then so does God, pretty much.
And humans capable of pulling off a trick like that would almost certainly have been discovered by now if they were common.
It does not prevent said experiences from showing the existence of God
The more different kinds of God you think can give out mystical experiences, the vaguer the “God” that those experiences demonstrate the existence of. If the Muslim version of God can send them, maybe it shows there’s a God but he’s not necessarily Christian. If polytheistic pagan gods can send them, maybe it shows that there’s a God but he’s not necessarily Christian and there isn’t necessarily one of him either. You’ve ended up “proving” there’s a God who has few attributes other than his name.
The devil is defined more-or-less by being in oppostion to God. If the devil exists, then so does God, pretty much.
That’s just a matter of semantics. Maybe a devil-like being without a God can’t strictly speaking be called the Devil, but whatever you call him, surely you believe that if the normal Devil can give out mystical experiences, so can that one, right?
And humans capable of pulling off a trick like that would almost certainly have been discovered by now if they were common
“Every block” is just an example. Suppose there were few but not no sorcerers in the world. Couldn’t they produce mystical experiences that you could not tell from God-borne ones?
(And how do you explain the fact that people can take drugs that cause mystical experiences, get electrical shocks to their brain that trigger mystical experiences, and why some known mental illnesses are associated with mystical experiences? None of these things happen for seeing clouds except in passing.)
I find your comment very confusing. Might I suggest that we continue this discussion, after tabooing the words ‘God’ and ‘Devil’?
I’ll start out by rewriting my previous post under those same constraints:
That sounds like you’re agreeing with me. If God gives people mystical experiences no matter what their religion, mystical experiences are no good in showing that the religion is true. Of course this is a matter of degree. The wider the range of people get the experiences, the worse the experiences are at showing anything.
It does not prevent said experiences from showing the existence of [an omnipotent, omniscient being], or from hinting at the criteria He finds important.
If beings other than God (such as the Devil) can give out mystical experiences, it’s even worse. Mystical experiences not only don’t show that the religion is true, they don’t even show that “God exists” is true. At this point I don’t see why you care that it’s not just a brain malfunction, because even if it wasn’t, you have no way to tell between an experience sent by God, one sent by the Devil, and there being a sorcerer on every block who occasionally pulls pranks by giving random people mystical experiences.
The [being opposing an omnipotent, omniscient being] is defined more-or-less by being in oppostion to [an omnipotent, omniscient being]. If the [being opposing an omnipotent, omniscient being] exists, then so does [said omnipotent, omniscient being], pretty much.
And humans capable of pulling off a trick like that would almost certainly have been discovered by now if they were common.
I find your comment very confusing. Might I suggest that we continue this discussion, after tabooing the words ‘God’ and ‘Devil’?
No, not unless the claim that you’re making fits whatever words you use instead of “God” and “Devil”. In order for it to work, you would have to assert that mystical experiences can come only from omnipotent, omniscient beings or other beings who share a cosmology, and from nobody else. I find that a very peculiar thing to claim.
I would think that, if they exist, pagan gods should be able to provide mystical experiences. Pagan gods aren’t omnipotent and omniscient. A being that resembled the devil but didn’t oppose anyone powerful could provide mystical experiences, and he wouldn’t be omniscient, omnipotent, or in opposition to someone who is. Sorcerers aren’t omniscient or omnipotent, yet they could make such experiences. And we know that brain stimulation, drugs, starvation, and mental illness can produce mystical experiences and they have nothing to do with omnipotence or omniscience.
And as for sorcerers being common, the argument doesn’t depend on them being common, just on them existing. Rare sorcerers are equally a problem for the theory as common ones. There’s also the possibility that sorcerers exist in a society that is intentionally kept hidden from discovery by the muggles. (And even then, who’s to say that sorcerers haven’t been discovered? They haven’t been discovered in a reproducible way in a laboratory, but neither has God. They certainly have been discovered in the sense that an awful lot of people over a wide range of times and places were confident that they are real.)
In order for it to work, you would have to assert that mystical experiences can come only from omnipotent, omniscient beings or other beings who share a cosmology, and from nobody else. I find that a very peculiar thing to claim.
No, I simply need to assert that such experiences are more likely given the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent being than they are without the existence of such a being.
Consider, for example; if I find a drop of oil on my driveway one morning, I may conclude that my car has an oil leak. There are other ways that the oil may have got there; someone else may have parked in my driveway for a few hours overnight, and he may have an oil leak. Or a neighbour may have dripped some oil on my driveway as a prank.
The mere existence of alternate hypothesis is not, on its own, sufficient to show that a conclusion cannot be correct.
I would think that, if they exist, pagan gods should be able to provide mystical experiences.
Okay, since you’re not tabooing ‘god’, I’m going to take a guess that you mean a very powerful and knowledgeable but neither omnipotent nor omniscient being which is part of a community of similarly powerful and knowledgeable beings, whose unified actions underlie the basic physics of the universe. Is that approximately correct?
If that is what you meant, then yes, you are correct; however, the chances that such beings exist is very small, because if a number of nearly-equally-powerful yet different beings were trying to run the physics of the universe, then we would almost certainly by now have spotted some areas of blatant disagreement between different beings; it would, in short, almost certainly be clearly impossible that a theory of everything could ever be produced. (If they never disagreed about anything ever, then are they really separate beings?)
A being that resembled the devil but didn’t oppose anyone powerful could provide mystical experiences, and he wouldn’t be omniscient, omnipotent, or in opposition to someone who is.
I’m guessing here (because I’m really not sure what you mean) that you mean a single powerful and knowledgeable but neither omnipotent nor omniscient being?
If so, then again, you’re right. Such a being could provide such an experience.
And we know that brain stimulation, drugs, starvation, and mental illness can produce mystical experiences and they have nothing to do with omnipotence or omniscience.
Yes. And I know that I didn’t have electrodes in my brain, I hadn’t taken drugs, I wasn’t starved, and I’m mentally healthy.
And as for sorcerers being common, the argument doesn’t depend on them being common, just on them existing. Rare sorcerers are equally a problem for the theory as common ones.
True. The occasional rare sorceror who doesn’t even know he’s a sorceror would work. This would imply some circumstance, possibly some rare genetic mutation, which would permit some human brain to have a very direct effect on another human brain. If this could be controlled—even slightly—and if it worked on non-human brains as well, it could have a drastic positive effect on an organism’s survival. If this were the case, I’d expect to see at least one type of mildly telepathic animal, exploiting this.
...I might not, of course. It might be that the ‘sorcerors’ are the first organism to exhibit this rare mutation.
if a number of nearly-equally-powerful yet different beings were trying to run the physics of the universe, then we would almost certainly by now have spotted some areas of blatant disagreement between different beings
And if there was a God, and there was a Devil who opposed him, we’d almost certainly have spotted some areas of disagreement between them. (You could claim that yes, we have spotted such things, but of course the same claim could be made for pagan gods.)
Also, pagan gods needn’t necessarily run the physics of the universe in the sense of changing the cosmological constant.
I’d expect to see at least one type of mildly telepathic animal, exploiting this.
This would be true for certain types of psychic powers, but there are other things which can be done only by humans. Sorcerers with spellbooks have to be able to read, for instance, and even if you quibble about whether animals can read, they wouldn’t be able to read well enough to use a spellbook.
I know that I didn’t have electrodes in my brain, I hadn’t taken drugs, I wasn’t starved, and I’m mentally healthy.
The point is that mystical experiences are known to have physical causes other than the existence of a supernatural being. I would expect milder versions of those to occasionally produce mystical experiences too. Nobody may have put an electrode in your brain, but the brain is complex and can occasionally misfire by itself.
No, I simply need to assert that such experiences are more likely given the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent being than they are without the existence of such a being.
No, that’s not enough. Given that this is lesswrong, I hope you are aware of Bayseianism. The extent to which an experience is evidence of a God compared to evidence of other things that produce mystical experiences depends on your priors.It may be that a God is more likely to produce a mystical experience than anything else, but the prior for the existence of God is low enough that a mystical experience is still most likely to have been caused by something other than God.
And if there was a God, and there was a Devil who opposed him, we’d almost certainly have spotted some areas of disagreement between them.
Only if they were roughly equal in power and ability. If God is so comparatively powerful that the Devil doesn’t get to make changes to the laws of physics, then we wouldn’t see any such disagreements (because physics as a whole is still then under control of one being)
Also, pagan gods needn’t necessarily run the physics of the universe in the sense of changing the cosmological constant.
In that case, can you please explain to me what exactly you mean by the phrase ‘pagan gods’?
No, that’s not enough. Given that this is lesswrong, I hope you are aware of Bayseianism.
Yes, I am aware of Bayesianism.
The extent to which an experience is evidence of a God compared to evidence of other things that produce mystical experiences depends on your priors.It may be that a God is more likely to produce a mystical experience than anything else, but the prior for the existence of God is low enough that a mystical experience is still most likely to have been caused by something other than God.
My prior for the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient being was set pretty high; somewhere over 50%. Why do you claim that that prior has to be set “low enough that a mystical experience is still most likely to have been caused by something other than God”?
If God is so comparatively powerful that the Devil doesn’t get to make changes to the laws of physics, then we wouldn’t see any such disagreements
I was thinking more of the Devil causing small-scale events like, oh, killing someone’s child to tempt them into committing revenge, or sending people mystical experiences in order to increase religious strife. The Devil is commonly described as being able to do things like that and God doesn’t stop him, for whatever reason. I don’t care if the Devil can change the speed of light.
In that case, can you please explain to me what exactly you mean by the phrase ‘pagan gods’?
A being who has powers other than those currently recognized by science, has an area of concern and a level of power over its area of concern that is relatively high in the hierarchy if applicable, and either was worshipped or is in a class of beings that is generally worshipped.
As defining words is difficult even for well-known concepts like “chair” I reserve the right to update this definition. (If a chair is defined as being for sitting, does that mean that a chair designed as a museum art exhibit is not a chair? You try to define it and end up with locutions like “is either meant for sitting, or has features that would be considered to be designed for sitting if it was intended for sitting”.)
My prior for the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient being was set pretty high;
If you set your prior high enough, anything can become evidence for God, in which case your belief that given that prior a mystical experience is evidence for God is correct but uninteresting.
I was thinking more of the Devil causing small-scale events like, oh, killing someone’s child to tempt them into committing revenge, or sending people mystical experiences in order to increase religious strife.
But that would leave physics down to a single Being, with a single agenda; so there wouldn’t be signs of disagreement to be seen in the laws of physics themselves
In that case, can you please explain to me what exactly you mean by the phrase ‘pagan gods’?
A being who has powers other than those currently recognized by science, has an area of concern and a level of power over its area of concern that is relatively high in the hierarchy if applicable, and either was worshipped or is in a class of beings that is generally worshipped.
Ah, I see. So it’s a very powerful being, with that power limited (whether by force or by choice) to a single area of concern (or possibly to multiple areas of concern), capable of feats not explainable by current scientific theories, possibly but not necessarily with the power to alter physics directly?
Such a being could presumably create a mystical experience, yes. And if they are able to alter physics directly, then I would expect a messier physics; on the other hand, if they are [i]not[/i], then, though powerful, they are no less subject to the laws of physics than we are and would eventually be explained as science progresses towards a better understanding of the universe.
If you set your prior high enough, anything can become evidence for God, in which case your belief that given that prior a mystical experience is evidence for God is correct but uninteresting.
Not quite anything, no. And I have to be wary of anthropic reasoning.
No matter where my prior is set, though, I still consider such an experience evidence of the existence of God; in that it is more likely that I’d have the experience if God exists than if not. The only difference that the prior makes is in deciding whether or not the evidence is sufficient prove God’s existence.
I don’t understand why you insist on wondering whether some being has the power to change the laws of physics. Giving someone a mystical experience doesn’t change the laws of physics (at least not nontrivially—by some definitions anything a supernatural being does “changes the laws of physics”), and the fact that a devil-like being without an adversary, a pagan god, or a sorcerer could give you one doesn’t mean they can change the laws of physics.
if they are [i]not[/i], then, though powerful, they are no less subject to the laws of physics than we are and would eventually be explained as science progresses towards a better understanding of the universe.
“Eventually” isn’t now. You don’t believe the Devil can change the laws of physics, yet surely you acknowledge that science has no understanding of him or his powers.
Why can’t there be other types of beings like pagan gods or sorcerers, that science also doesn’t yet understand yet (regardless of whether science might understand them sometime in the future)?
No matter where my prior is set, though, I still consider such an experience evidence of the existence of God; in that it is more likely that I’d have the experience if God exists than if not.
You presumably believe God created typhoid fever and that it is more likely we would see that if God existed than if he didn’t. If all you mean is that mystical experiences are evidence for God in the same sense that typhoid fever is, then that falls under “true but uninteresting”. On the other hand, if you believe that mystical experiences are evidence for God in some stronger sense than typhoid fever, please elaborate.
I don’t understand why you insist on wondering whether some being has the power to change the laws of physics.
Because, from the start, I was presenting my experience as a piece of evidence in favour of the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent being; and ‘omnipotent’ involves, among other things, being able to alter physics.
Yes, it is possible to have a sense of presence without being able to change the laws of physics. But that’s not the point.
Right now, I honestly think that you and I are having completely different arguments. I am trying to discuss the probability of existence of an omnipotent, omniscient being; while you, as far as I can tell, are simply trying to list off alternate explanations for something I once saw. And yes, they are valid alternate explanations, but that’s not the point.
If, to take an analogy, I find a leaf on the ground (and assuming for the moment that I can’t identify a tree by its leaves) then this would be evidence in favour of the hypothesis that there is an apple tree nearby. Listing other types of tree that the leaf could have come from does not change that.
You presumably believe God created typhoid fever and that it is more likely we would see that if God existed than if he didn’t.
No; on the contrary, typhoid fever (along with virtually any other illness) is a side effect of the evolutionary process; as soon as a sufficiently large creature evolves, its body in turn forms a new environment in which other creatures (germs) can survive and grow. Illnesses, I’d think, would be almost certain to appear in any life-bearing world in the absence of God; and since I don’t understand why they exist, I can’t make the assumption that they must exist without engaging in circular reasoning. Which makes them weak evidence against the idea that God exists.
The experience I had in front of the church, on the other hand, is an experience that is very likely in a universe where an omnipotent, omniscient being exists; and seems very unlikely in a universe where that is false. Therefore, it is evidence in favour of the idea that such a being exists.
The experience I had in front of the church, on the other hand, is an experience that is very likely in a universe where an omnipotent, omniscient being exists; and seems very unlikely in a universe where that is false
This is phrased in a subtly different way from how you phrased it before, because “seems very unlikely in a universe where that is false” isn’t a conditional probability (even though you use it to find a conditional probability).
Given the way you phrased it this time, in order to say that mystical experiences are unlikely in a universe without God, you have to show that the list of other things that cause mystical experiences is unlikely in a universe without God.
I certainly don’t agree that brain malfunctions are unlikely in a universe without God. In fact, I’d say that they are very likely, especially since we know that mystical experiences can be caused by purely physical processes. And I can’t see any reason why according to your standards, pagan gods, devil-like beings, or sorcerers are unlikely.
This is phrased in a subtly different way from how you phrased it before, because “seems very unlikely in a universe where that is false” isn’t a conditional probability (even though you use it to find a conditional probability).
...that’s what my paragraph was trying to communicate.
Given the way you phrased it this time, in order to say that mystical experiences are unlikely in a universe without God, you have to show that the list of other things that cause mystical experiences is unlikely in a universe without God.
I merely need to show that the experience is more likely in a universe with God than in a universe without God.
I certainly don’t agree that brain malfunctions are unlikely in a universe without God. In fact, I’d say that they are very likely
Let us consider the set of all possible universes in which brains develop through evolutionary means, without the aid of any external beings, omnipotent or otherwise. Now, the resultant brains will, in general, merely be sufficient to result in a creature with a high chance of having grandchildren. Non-debilitating brain malfunctions are not merely likely; I’d think that they’re almost certain.
However, the effects of such malfunctions will be more-or-less random. One type of malfunction might cause the sufferer to temporarily perceive green as red and vice versa. Another might cause some form of synesthesia. Yet another might result in a sudden burst of emotion, such as rage or fear.
The odds that a malfunction will give someone the impression of an approaching Presence would be a lot lower than the odds of a random malfunction. And it is the odds of that specific malfunction that I expect to be fairly low; not the odds of brain malfunctions in general.
And I can’t see any reason why according to your standards, pagan gods, devil-like beings, or sorcerers are unlikely.
In two cases, those are immaterial beings; if one type of immaterial being exists, that’s weak evidence that another may also exist. So that implies that those two are marginally more likely in a universe that contains an omnipotent, omniscient being than in one that does not.
Aside from that very weak point, I see no reason to assume that any of those are more likely in either sort of universe. And if the probability of those are equal, and there is another potential source of mystical experiences in the universe with the omnipotent, omniscient being, then such an experience is weak evidence in favour of the existence of such a being.
No, because you phrased it differently. “The experience I had in front of the church, on the other hand, is an experience that is very likely in a universe where an omnipotent, omniscient being exists; and seems very unlikely in a universe where that is false” amounts to “P (experience | God) is high && P(experience | no God) is low”, not “P (experience | God) > P(experience | no God)”.
However, the effects of such malfunctions will be more-or-less random.
Brain malfunctions are more likely to produce some effects than others. And mystical experiences are the sort of thing brain malfunctions are likely to produce. That’s why people starve themselves and see mystical experiences, but they rarely starve themselves and start thinking they have 12 fingers. While you gave examples of other things brain malfunctions can produce, those are just other things which they are more likely than normal to produce; they don’t mean that the chance of everything is equal.
that implies that those two are marginally more likely in a universe that contains an omnipotent, omniscient being than in one that does not
Those things are only marginally more likely in a universe with a God if you believe all types of God are equally likely. It is my impression that you think a Biblical-type God is more likely.
Even if they are more likely, this falls under “true but uninteresting”. There are lots of things that are marginally more likely in a universe with God. Claiming that mystical experiences are evidence for God is only interesting if it’s better evidence than those other things. Nobody says “I saw the Loch Ness Monster, so God is marginally more likely” (seeing the Loch Ness Monster implies that science, which says there is no such thing, can fail, and if science can fail, God is marginally more likely).
No, because you phrased it differently. “The experience I had in front of the church, on the other hand, is an experience that is very likely in a universe where an omnipotent, omniscient being exists; and seems very unlikely in a universe where that is false” amounts to “P (experience | God) is high && P(experience | no God) is low”, not “P (experience | God) > P(experience | no God)”.
Well, I do think that “P (experience | God) is high && P(experience | no God) is low”. However, in order to take the experience as evidence for the existence of God, it is necessary only to show the weaker point that “P (experience | God) > P(experience | no God)”
Brain malfunctions are more likely to produce some effects than others.
True.
And mystical experiences are the sort of thing brain malfunctions are likely to produce.
For human brains as they exist in this universe, perhaps. But for every possible type of brain, as may exist in every possible type of universe?
I consider that unlikely. I could be wrong about that, of course. But remember, in order to consider the probability of brains being prone to that exact malfunction, one must consider the possibility of brains constructed very differently to the ones we have. And, quite honestly, that’s such a wide and unexplored field that there’s not much I can say about it at all...
Those things are only marginally more likely in a universe with a God if you believe all types of God are equally likely. It is my impression that you think a Biblical-type God is more likely.
No, not all types are equally likely. Yes, I do think that an omniscient, omnipotent being very probably exists.
“I saw the Loch Ness Monster, so God is marginally more likely” (seeing the Loch Ness Monster implies that science, which says there is no such thing, can fail, and if science can fail, God is marginally more likely).
...why on earth would the idea that ‘science can fail’ lead to ‘God is marginally more likely’?
If an omnipotent, omniscient being exists, then it is reasonable to postulate that said being created our universe (or, at the very least, knew about it and didn’t stop it from existing). If such a being created our universe, then it is reasonable to assume that it would have been created with some care; because most craftsmen take a lot of care in their work. A bit of observation shows that our universe runs on rules; and if those rules were created with care, then it is reasonable to assume that they will work, that there are not going to be any obvious seams visible in the rules.
In short, if God exists, then science (being a systematic attempt to discover those rules) should work.
But remember, in order to consider the probability of brains being prone to that exact malfunction, one must consider the possibility of brains constructed very differently to the ones we have.
To figure out the odds of the existence of God based on you having a certain type of experience, you can’t just ignore the knowledge about what kind of brain you have. If you do that, you’re throwing out evidence that affects your conclusion. The type of brain you actually have is one where malfunctions produce mystical experiences more readily than they produce arbitrary other effects.
why on earth would the idea that ‘science can fail’ lead to ‘God is marginally more likely’?… there are not going to be any obvious seams visible in the rules.
Yes, there would. If people normally disintegrate only when exposed to thousands of degrees of temperature, but God can disintegrate people whenever he wants, every time God stays hidden but disintegrates a person who is not hidden, that’s a seam in the rules and science will not be able to explain that event.
To figure out the odds of the existence of God based on you having a certain type of experience, you can’t just ignore the knowledge about what kind of brain you have.
The figures that I am using to find P(God | experience) include P(experience | no God) and P(experience | God). P(experience | no God) must surely integrate over every possible universe in which there is no God, or else it will be P(experience | a specific universe), which is the wrong figure. Similarly, P(experience | God) must integrate over every universe in which an omnipotent, omniscient being exists; or else, once again, it is P(experience | specific universe), and is the wrong figure.
I’m trying to simplify the equation, for purposes of debate, to an update on exactly one piece of evidence. If we start including the specifics of the brain, then that opens up the question of P(God | human brain), which is an entire, and much bigger, debate on its own. And one that I have no intention of entering into with you; the inferential distance between us is simply too large, and I’ve been having enough trouble trying to communicate with you as it is.
Yes, there would. If people normally disintegrate only when exposed to thousands of degrees of temperature, but God can disintegrate people whenever he wants, every time God stays hidden but disintegrates a person who is not hidden, that’s a seam in the rules and science will not be able to explain that event.
That’s a very good point.
It’s rather unlikely that it could be replicated under laboratory conditions, which would mean it’s not an obvious seam… but yes, I see your point, it could be a bit of a seam. (Or it could be as-yet undiscovered physics of some sort, of course).
I’m trying to simplify the equation, for purposes of debate, to an update on exactly one piece of evidence. If we start including the specifics of the brain, then that opens up the question of P(God | human brain), which is an entire, and much bigger, debate on its own.
You can’t simplify that equation. If you simplify the equation that way it’s only useful when figuring out if there is a god, given a creature of unknown type who has a mystical experience. You are not a creature of unknown type, and throwing out the information that you have a brain that is inordinately prone to malfunctions that produce mystical experiences will distort the answer.
It’s like concluding there is a high probability that someone is insane because he thinks he’s Napoleon, while discarding the information that he’s ruling France in the year 1805. P(insane|claim Napoleon) is high, but P(insane|claim Napoleon && rules France in 1805)” is not high. Discarding this information is wrong.
If you simplify the equation that way it’s only useful when figuring out if there is a god, given a creature of unknown type who has a mystical experience.
That is exactly the point I was trying to make; that the fact that such an experience happened is a piece of evidence in favour of the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient being.
You are not a creature of unknown type, and throwing out the information that you have a brain that is inordinately prone to malfunctions that produce mystical experiences will distort the answer.
The trouble with this, if you start insisting that certain information cannot be left out, is that you are cherry-picking what information that is, and specifically selecting information that you believe leads to the conclusion that you want. I could probably name a dozen other pieces of information which support the idea that an omniscient, omnipotent being exists and insist on including them too (for example; consider P(God | intelligent life exists)).
If we start down this path, then we could both simply throw new pieces of information into the discussion again and again; it will take months, and it would lead absolutely nowhere.
It’s like concluding there is a high probability that someone is insane because he thinks he’s Napoleon, while discarding the information that he’s ruling France in the year 1805. P(insane|claim Napoleon) is high, but P(insane|claim Napoleon && rules France in 1805)” is not high. Discarding this information is wrong.
I would like to refer you to a short story that discusses that point in greater detail.
In short, yes, P(insane | claims Napoleon) is high, and if I meet someone who tells me ‘One of my ancestors claimed he was Napoleon’ then I will consider it a high probability that that ancestor was insane.
That is exactly the point I was trying to make; that the fact that such an experience happened is a piece of evidence in favour of the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient being.
The fact that such an experience happened, given no other information, may be evidence for God. But you have other information and are ignoring it.
Furthermore, even as evidence for God, it’s only evidence in a very weak sense compared to typical cases where one speaks about something being evidence. It makes it more likely that there’s a God, but it also makes it more likely that there is a pagan god, or a sorcerer, or an extraterrestrial with a mind-control ray.
The trouble with this, if you start insisting that certain information cannot be left out, is that you are cherry-picking what information that is
It’s not cherry picking to refuse to discard information which affects the result by orders of magnitude more than the probability you’re hoping to get from it. A mystical experience in a human brain is much better evidence for a brain malfunction than it is for God.
In short, yes, P(insane | claims Napoleon) is high, and if I meet someone who tells me ‘One of my ancestors claimed he was Napoleon’
My scenario not only involves being in 1805, but also ruling France. If you use the information that someone is your ancestor (presumably from 1805), but you omit the information that he was ruling France then, you have still discarded relevant information and as a result will come up with a probability of insanity that is much too high.
The fact that such an experience happened, given no other information, may be evidence for God. But you have other information and are ignoring it.
sigh
Very well. If you insist that I not ignore information, then there is a lot more information that needs to be properly considered. Decades of experiences that need to be sorted and categorised. Hundreds of writings, ancient and modern; thousands of accounts, of one sort or another.
We’ll just have to go through it all, piece by piece. Only the bits that are relevant, of course, but there’s a lot that is relevant.
For a start, let me consider the probability of the existence of God, given the existence of brains (or any form of hardware capable of supporting intelligence in some or other form).
Where, just to be clear, I use the word ‘God’ to refer to any omniscient, omnipotent being.
For that, we need to consider the probability that a randomly chosen universe will contain brains, at some or other point in its history.
In order to do that, let us consider all possible universes.
Here, I start by considering the null universe; a universe that contains no matter. Since it contains no matter, it cannot contain brains.
Then, let us add a piece of matter; a single quark. this one-quark universe also cannot contain brains, as there is insufficient matter to form the brains.
I don’t think it’s sensible to consider different one-quark universes as different; no matter where the quark is, or how fast it is moving, it’s just a coordinate transform to make it identical to any other one-quark universe.
Then, let us add a second quark. Now, it is sensible to differentiate between different two-quark universes, because there is a measurement that can change from one universe to another; and that is the distance between the two quarks. There is also another measurement that can change from one universe to another, and that is their relative velocity. However, it is not always clear whether two diffferent snapshots of two-quark universes are different universes, or the same universe at different times. Still, no brains are possible.
There are even more three-quark than two-quark universes; at a rough estimate, I’d say that the number of three-quark universes is half of the square of the number of two-quark universes. Still no brains.
Four-quark universes; here, I expect the total number of universes to be roughly x^3/6 where x is the number of two-quark universes.
For an N-quark universe, in general, I expect that the total number of possible universes would be roughly x^(N-1)/(N-1)!. This is an interesting function; it grows exponentially for low N, the rate of increase slows as N approaches x, and finally, when N exceeds x, the number of possible N-particle universes actually begins to drop. Of course, x is either infinite or at least very very large, so we can expect that most universes will have quite a lot of matter; more than enough to form brains.
Now, what are the odds of a universe which contains enough matter containing brains? Note that the universes under consideration here contain a number of quarks, in what is essentially a random configuration. All possible configurations are under consideration here, so at least some of them will have brains (in some cases, Boltzman brains; in other cases, brains with bodies and whole civilisations around them). However, since every possible random configuration is permitted, it would seem to me that a highly ordered set of particles, like a brain, must be relatively rare.
So, P(Brain | no God) seems like it should be fairly low.
Now, let us consider P(Brain | God). This time, we do not have to consider every possible universe; only those universes that could exist in the presence of an omniscient, omnipotent being. It seems likely that such a being will adjust any universe to His liking, and possibly create one if one does not exist.
It also seems quite probable, to me, that if a single intelligent being exists, then that being is quite likely to realise that he (or she) would like a conversation with someone else. Being omnipotent, it seems likely that God would create someone to talk with, and thus create brains.
So, it seems likely that P(Brains | God) is high.
Putting a high value for P(Brains | God) and a low value for P(Brains | no God) into the equation from earlier:
...will produce the result that P(God | Brains) > P(God). This seems to be a fairly major effect.
A mystical experience in a human brain is much better evidence for a brain malfunction than it is for God.
Do you have any figures for the likelihood of such a brain malfunction? Or any form of data at all to back up this assertion?
My scenario not only involves being in 1805, but also ruling France.
Yes. That is quite a lot of bits of information; since it eliminates all but one of the people throughout all of history who thought they were Napoleon.
It’s a bit like the difference between asking “what are the odds of getting a six on a fair die roll?” and “what are the odds that I got a six on the fair die I rolled on Thursday 10 April 2014 at 21:10?”—though the difference is a bit more pronounced, as I’m sure there were more than six people throughout history who claimed to be Napoleon.
And there were news reports at the time (there’s a scan of at least one relevant newspaper page on the wikipedia page)
Right, but there were no records of the event itself, just records of people’s testimonies. This is somewhat… odd. When e.g. a volcano erupts there is usually tons of footage of the actual event. People can be mistaken, or they can lie; but it’s hard to argue with a giant flaming mountain.
...being told that they had caught a Great White is still evidence in favour of a Great White having been caught.
Yes, but it’s also evidence for any number of other, more likely events: that my friends are pulling a prank, that they are mistaken, that a prank has been pulled on them, etc. etc. We don’t need to enumerate them all; what’s important here is only the posterior probability. If it is minute, then the reasonable course of action is to say, “until I see that shark, I won’t believe that you guys caught it, sorry”. There’s a huge difference between saying that, and saying, “even though the chances that you caught that shark are even smaller than the chances of a meteorite hitting me in the head anytime soon, I can’t come up with a better explanation off the top of my head so I’ll believe you, good job !”.
You said,
When I say that empirical evidence is rare, I mean that many things can be adequately explained whether it is true that God exists or not.
But beliefs do not exist in a vacuum. Instead, they form a Bayesian network: pieces of evidence affect the posterior probabilities of some beliefs; those beliefs change the prior probabilities of other beliefs, and so on. And the problem with the proposition G, which means “a god of some kind exists”, is that it’s starting to look like for any piece of evidence E, P(G|E) is lower than P(x|E), where x is pretty much any other non-divine explanation; and there is a lot of other evidence that can raise P(x). This is what I was driving at earlier with my hypothetical Alpha-god.
So, is there any piece of evidence E for which P(G|E) is much higher than any alternatives ? Moses, presumably, got exactly such a piece of evidence in the form of a burning bush. We don’t have that, however; what we’ve got is an ancient story about a guy who saw a burning bush, and experience tells us that ancient stories mostly can’t be trusted—or else we’d be forced to believe in Zeus, Shivah, the Jade Emperor, etc., possibly at the same time.
Rather than continue to talk in hypotheticals, I think I’ll take a moment to describe the incident in question (and I think you’ll see why I say I expect you to be unconvinced by it).
As you have anticipated, I am unconvinced by your report, but the question is, why are you convinced ? You say:
So, what makes me trust the evidence? I remember it; and I do not believe there was any way that any human could have faked that experience.
But these aren’t the only possibilities. Even if you cannot come up with any others (such as a random brain malfunction, as Jiro points out), why is this experience sufficient to convince you that a miracle occurred—given that, as you agreed above, the probability of such an event is minute ? Don’t you want to see the actual shark, before making your conclusions ?
Right, but there were no records of the event itself, just records of people’s testimonies. This is somewhat… odd. When e.g. a volcano erupts there is usually tons of footage of the actual event.
There appear to have been quite a few pictures—somewhat to my surprise. Most of them appear to be pictures of the crowd, rather than of the Sun… and, as with any google search, some appear to be unrelated.
Yes, but it’s also evidence for any number of other, more likely events: that my friends are pulling a prank, that they are mistaken, that a prank has been pulled on them, etc. etc.
That is true.
We don’t need to enumerate them all; what’s important here is only the posterior probability. If it is minute, then the reasonable course of action is to say, “until I see that shark, I won’t believe that you guys caught it, sorry”. There’s a huge difference between saying that, and saying, “even though the chances that you caught that shark are even smaller than the chances of a meteorite hitting me in the head anytime soon, I can’t come up with a better explanation off the top of my head so I’ll believe you, good job !”
But the posterior probability doesn’t just depend on the evidence; it also depends on the prior probability. The prior probability assigned to the shark being caught is substantially lower than the prior probability I’d assigned to the existence of God. The analogy breaks down at the selection of priors.
And the problem with the proposition G, which means “a god of some kind exists”, is that it’s starting to look like for any piece of evidence E, P(G|E) is lower than P(x|E), where x is pretty much any other non-divine explanation; and there is a lot of other evidence that can raise P(x).
I suspect that this is a rather severe exaggeration. I can easily propose an infinite number of proposals for ‘x’ where ‘x’ is non-divine but where P(G|E)>P(x|E) for almost any E. My method for finding these proposals for ‘x’ would be to string together a number of randomly selected grammatically correct sentence starting with the word ‘because’; this would result in a number of entirely nonsensical proposals. Similarly, I can randomly select evidences E, placing them before the ‘because’.
I shall assume you meant, therefore, that “there exists at least one non-divine explanation ‘x’ for which P(x|E)>P(G|E) for any given evidence E”.
So, is there any piece of evidence E for which P(G|E) is much higher than any alternatives ? Moses, presumably, got exactly such a piece of evidence in the form of a burning bush.
You’ve at least partially answered your own question; Moses saw the evidence in the burning bush. One particular monk saw the evidence in the Miracle of Lanciano. Several thousand people saw the evidence in the Miracle of the Sun. Doubting Thomas saw the evidence in the resurrected Jesus.
Lots of people saw evidence in first-hand observation of miracles.
We don’t have that, however; what we’ve got is an ancient story about a guy who saw a burning bush, and experience tells us that ancient stories mostly can’t be trusted—or else we’d be forced to believe in Zeus, Shivah, the Jade Emperor, etc., possibly at the same time.
That’s the trouble; as soon as you get to second-hand observation, the evidence is a whole lot less convincing. If you’ve set the prior for God’s existence sufficiently low, then there isn’t going to be enough second-hand evidence to alter that.
As you have anticipated, I am unconvinced by your report, but the question is, why are you convinced ? You say:
So, what makes me trust the evidence? I remember it; and I do not believe there was any way that any human could have faked that experience.
But these aren’t the only possibilities. Even if you cannot come up with any others (such as a random brain malfunction, as Jiro points out), why is this experience sufficient to convince you that a miracle occurred—given that, as you agreed above, the probability of such an event is minute ? Don’t you want to see the actual shark, before making your conclusions ?
Because I did see the shark, to extend the metaphor. And then it swam away, on its own business.
There appear to have been quite a few pictures—somewhat to my surprise. Most of them appear to be pictures of the crowd, rather than of the Sun...
Are there any photos (or preferably videos) of the event itself ? I’m looking for something along the lines of this—although, admittedly, volcano eruptions are relatively mundane events by comparison.
The prior probability assigned to the shark being caught is substantially lower than the prior probability I’d assigned to the existence of God.
Ah, I see, that is interesting. What is the ballpark prior probability you place on the existence of God (or any other god, for that matter) ?
I shall assume you meant, therefore, that “there exists at least one non-divine explanation ‘x’ for which P(x|E)>P(G|E) for any given evidence E”.
Yes, good call.
Lots of people saw evidence in first-hand observation of miracles.
It would be more accurate to say something like, “we have a lot of historical texts that describe people who claim to have seen miracles”. The distinction is important, because we have a veritable deluge of such texts regarding all major religions, as well as more modern phenomena such as alien abductions, Bigfoot, etc. The problem with such second- and third-hand accounts are that they—as you have pointed out—are notoriously unreliable.
I do not believe that little gray aliens have ever visited Earth, despite the claims of many, many “abductees”. Do you ? If not, why not, and what would it take to convince you ? You say:
Because I did see the shark, to extend the metaphor. And then it swam away, on its own business.
So, to recap: if someone told you about this shark, you would not believe him. Similarly, you do not believe that your shark story is convincing enough to convert another rational person to your belief. I think we are in agreement on these two points.
One thing I don’t understand, though, is why are you convinced ? Do you believe yourself to be that much better—orders of magnitude better—at detecting the presence of sharks (or gods) than any other person ? If so, then for what reason ? But if not, then why are you privileging your own perceptions, given that they are no better than anyone else’s ?
Think of all the alternative explanations you’d come up with if I told you, “guess what, I was abducted by little gray men from space yesterday”. Do not these explanations also apply to yourself ?
Are there any photos (or preferably videos) of the event itself ? I’m looking for something along the lines of this—although, admittedly, volcano eruptions are relatively mundane events by comparison.
There won’t be videos; the event in question happened in 1917, and the earliest video cameras were apparently first used in the 1930s. And I’m not sure that anyone can get a halfway reasonable photo of a very bright light source using 1917 camera technology—which doesn’t mean that no-one did, of course.
But if it doesn’t turn up in a Google search, then I have no idea where else to look for such a picture; should one even exist.
The prior probability assigned to the shark being caught is substantially lower than the prior probability I’d assigned to the existence of God.
Ah, I see, that is interesting. What is the ballpark prior probability you place on the existence of God (or any other god, for that matter) ?
To the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent being, I’d assigned a prior probability of somewhere over 50%.
It would be more accurate to say something like, “we have a lot of historical texts that describe people who claim to have seen miracles”
An excellent point. Very well, then; lots of people claim to have seen evidence in first-hand observation of miracles.
I do not believe that little gray aliens have ever visited Earth, despite the claims of many, many “abductees”. Do you ? If not, why not, and what would it take to convince you ?
I consider the prior probability that little gray aliens have ever visited Earth to be very small. Despite this, they have become sufficiently mimetic in modern culture that I would consider them a prime choice for hoaxsters; this, in turn, results in me sharply discounting second-hand accounts.
To convince me that aliens have visited Earth will require some piece of physical evidence; perhaps either something made from a material that can be proven not to have come from this planet (and considering what we can make, that might be a tough order) or some piece of technology not merely unavailable to humanity but significantly distant from what is available. I would not necessarily need to hold the evidence in my own hands; I would merely need to be convinced that said evidence exists (e.g. through news reports from reliable sources - ‘Scientists Study Alien Technology’).
So, to recap: if someone told you about this shark, you would not believe him.
This depends on my prior. For the existence of God, my prior is high enough that I would consider it plausible that he is telling the truth. For finding an actual shark in a lake fed and drained by small streams, my prior is far, far lower.
Similarly, you do not believe that your shark story is convincing enough to convert another rational person to your belief.
Yes, this is correct.
One thing I don’t understand, though, is why are you convinced ?
Largely because I started with a very high prior. My very high prior was contingent on the word of my parents, and particularly of my father, a wise and intelligent man who is far better than me at telling true from false. He’s not infallible, but if he says something is certainly true, then I consider that a good reason to set a high prior for that datum (before updating on any other available evidence, of course).
Think of all the alternative explanations you’d come up with if I told you, “guess what, I was abducted by little gray men from space yesterday”. Do not these explanations also apply to yourself ?
Many of them do not. I know that I am not making up the story. I know that I am not lying. I know that I was not dreaming. I know that I had not received any major head injuries at around the same time. That covers the majority of the probability with regard to reasons why you might claim to have been abducted by little gray aliens.
As a first-hand observer, I can discount all of those explanations.
Also, my prior for the existence of little gray men from space is fairly low; which would lead to me assigning extra probability to the various ‘lying’ categories.
I cannot say for sure. I’d like to say ‘yes’… but too much of my history would need to change for that to be true. I can’t say anything for certain about that counterfactual me.
Yes, but some are mere coincidences, like your odometer; while others appear to subvert the natural order, like the Sun doing a dance.
Yes, that was more-or-less my point.
I’d say that any kind of natural law is exactly as miraculous as a permanently-repeatable miracle. I don’t really think that dilutes the work ‘miracle’ all that much; after all, some pretty amazing stuff happens on a continual basis. (It may inflate the phrase ‘stuff that happens’ somewhat; but when one considers all that goes into stuff happening, it can be pretty impressive in any case).
Hmmm.
For Job, I shall pick out Job chapters 4 and 5; a very long, wordy speech by one speaker. Note that this is framed as being one of Job’s friends, taking to Job after Job has lost everything and moaned about it a bit. Completely overblown. I can’t imagine anyone speaking like that in a conversation.
Compare this passage from the Gospel of John (specifically, John 18:28-19:16); wherein Jesus is taken before Pilate by a mob who want to have him killed; what people say here is a lot shorter and more to-the-point. It’s easier to see Pilate as a civil servant who just really doesn’t want anything to do with this mess that’s been thrown on his lap; his reactions seem far more plausible than Job’s friends’ speeches.
Jesus has a similar overblown speech spanning multiple chapters in John (14-18)
Just FYI, Pilate’s behavior in the Gospels is almost completely at odds with how he’s described in literature that’s actually contemporary with when Pilate lived. Pilate in the Gospels is depicted as a patient, if not a slightly annoyed, judge of character. Only succumbing to executing Jesus because he doesn’t want a riot to start. Pilate depicted by Philo (who was writing when Pilate was still alive) describes Pilate as stubborn, inflexible, greedy, impatient, executing multiple people without trials, and has no qualms about ignoring the will of Jewish mobs. Pilate is actually relieved of his duty because he was such a corrupt prefect.
Also, Barabbas, the character that the Jews want released in Jesus’ stead: His name “Barabbas” literally means “son of the father” which just so happens to be Jesus’ identity. Not only would Pilate not have acquiesced to releasing a (presumably) convicted criminal to appease a Jewish crowd, but there was no tradition of letting a prisoner go during Passover.
The whole trial scene with Pilate is exceedingly improbable if one knows the history of the time period, even if Pilate uses more to the point wording; that is easily fabricated.
It’s a long speech, yes, and spans multiple chapters; but it’s not the sort of overblown verbiage one finds in Job. The speeches in Job are long not because they have a lot to say, but because they insist on saying everything in the most drawn-out and overdone way possible; each entire speech could probably be replaced by two or three sentences easily. It would be a lot harder to replace Jesus’ speech in John 14-17 with a similarly few short phrases.
Okay, I’ve followed up your link, and I don’t think it backs up your claim as completely as you seem to assume it does. (That’s aside from the fact that people are complex beings, and often do unexpected things.) I hadn’t really looked into other sources on Pilate before reading your comment, so this is just sortof off the top of my head.
So, the picture I get of Pilate from your link is of someone who really doesn’t like the Jews, and is quite willing to set his soldiers on them—even to the point of enticing a Jewish crowd to form in a place where he can arrange disguised soldiers in its midst, so that his disguised troops can cut up the nearby protestors. He has no qualms about sentencing people to death and really, really doesn’t like to change his mind.
So. Imagine a person like that, and then imagine that this Jewish mob turns up on his doorstep, all unexpected, clamouring to have this man put to death. Pilate may not have qualms about sentencing a man to death; but a stubborn and inflexible man who doesn’t like the Jewish mob isn’t going to want to give them what they want. No, he’s going to want to deny them out of sheer contrariness; he’s going to look for a way to get this guy out of his hair, alive, so that he can go back and bother the Jews more.
And then, of course, there’s the data point that he often turns against the mob. But he’s human; one man against a mob tends to go really badly for the one man, and he knows that. He doesn’t turn against the mob on his own—he turns against the mob when he’s backed up by enough soldiers. As in the example where he had the soldiers disguise themselves to join the mob, this takes planning. This takes forethought. This takes knowing that the mob is going to be there. In advance. A mob that turns up entirely unannounced, while Pilate’s busy with other stuff and perhaps some of his soldiers are on leave, is another matter entirely; that calls for defusing them now, and punishing them later, when there’s been time to plan it out. And hey, this mob gets defused by simply having this one Jewish guy killed. Not optimal, but better than a riot that the troops aren’t quite ready to deal with...
Given the picture you’ve painted, as a corrupt prefect, he might well release some minor brigand who’d only preyed on the peasants and left anyone with soldiers alone.
Yeah, that’s probably what I’d say, too.
How do you know which is which; and how do you know when the natural order has truly been subverted ? For example, I personally don’t know much about that dancing sun event, but the fact that (according to Wikipedia, at least) it has not been recorded by any cameras or other instruments leads me to believe that human psychology, rather than divine intervention, was responsible.
That said, in your estimation, approximately how many miracles of that kind are occurring on Earth per year ?
Agreed. So, when we talk about miracles, let’s stick to unusual acts of divine intervention.
In addition to what JQuinton said, I’d like to add that, while the New Testament definitely contains more action than Job, it’s still pretty much full of parables, sermons, and long-winded speeches; for example, such as the one directly preceeding the passage you quoted—and that’s not even the longest one. I agree that the supporting characters are a bit more lifelike in the New Testament—but then, it’s also a much longer book, so there are more pages available to flesh them out.
Furthermore, there are many other works of literature with even better writing; for example, the Odyssey, Moby Dick, or, more recently, Harry Potter. Presumably, you don’t believe that these works describe real events; but if so, why not ?
Well, first you have to know what the natural order is. And that requires the help of the physicists and other scientists.
What a scientist cannot explain may or may not be a subversion of the natural order. (What a scientist can explain may or may not also be a subversion of the natural order—some scientists can be trapped into providing justifications for incorrect versions of events—but it’s still a useful filtering tool) Or it may be a thing that the physicist will have to update his model of physics to explain.
...it’s not an easy question.
That’s not impossible. (I don’t know much about it either; it was linked from the wikipedia article on ‘miracle’).
Ummm… if I had to guess… I’d guess less than one. I wouldn’t venture a guess as to how much less than one, though.
Defining whether a given event is or is not an unusual act of divine intervention may be tricky; but fair enough, let’s go with that definition for the moment.
You’re right; nothing that’s written in the Gospels can raise it to a status of higher than ‘plausible’. Many clear works of fiction also reach the status of ‘plausible’; in order to reach the higher status of ‘probably true’, one needs a certain amount of external verification.
I find a good deal of that external verification in the fact that a number of people, in whom I place a great deal of trust, and at least some of whom are known to be better at identifying truth than I am, have told me that it is true.
Ok, I admit that science is hard. But about you ? How do you, personally, know what’s a subversion of the natural order and what isn’t ?
Which possibility do you think is more likely in this case: genuine miracle, or mass confirmation bias ? That’s why I’d like you to clarify this:
Well, can you put a ballpark figure on it ? Do miracles happen (on average) once a year ? Once a century ? Once a millennium ? Once per the lifetime of our Universe ?
I think this is another difference between our methods; and I must confess that I find your approach quite weird. This doesn’t automatically mean that it’s wrong, of course; in fact, many theists (including C.S.Lewis) advocate it, so there might be something to it. I just don’t see what.
The big difference between your approach and mine is that you seem to be entirely discounting empirical evidence; or, if not discounting it, then trivializing it at the very least. So, for example, if a trusted friend told you that he was fishing in the pond behind his house and caught a Great White shark; and if all of your friends confirmed this; then you’d accept that as true. I, on the other hand, would ask to see the shark.
The reason for this is not that I’m some sort of a hateful, un-trusting person (or rather, that’s not the only reason, heh); but because we have mountains and mountains of data on sharks, and all of it tells us that they are incredibly unlikely to show up in ponds, and are also quite strong and thus nearly impossible to catch using an ordinary fishing line. Compared to this overwhelming pile of evidence, the testimony of a few people does not suffice to turn the tide of my belief.
So, is there a reason why you value empirical evidence as little as you do ? Alternatively, did I completely misunderstand your position ?
I have at least as much difficulty as the hypothetical scientist. Possibly slightly more difficulty, because the hypothetical scientist will know more science than I do.
Insufficient data for a firm conclusion.
Opposing the mass confirmation bias hypothesis, are the claims that the water on the ground and on people’s clothing was dried during the time; also apparently people ‘miles away’ (and thus unlikely to have been caught up in mass hysteria at the time) also reported having seen it.
Having said that, there is another explanation that occurs to me; the scene was described as the dancing sun appearing after a rainstorm, bursting through the clouds:
If the clouds were thick enough, it may be hard to see the Sun; the bright light could have been… something else sufficiently hot and bright. (I do not know what, but there’s room for a number of other hypotheses there).
I am very poorly calibrated on such low frequencies, so take what I say here is highly speculative. (Also, the rate seems very variable, with several a year in the time of the Gospels, for example).
At a rough guess, I’d say possibly somewhere between once a year and once a century. Might be more, might be less.
Let me explain further, then, by means of an analogy. Consider the example you provide, of a trustworthy friend claiming to have found a great white shark in a nearby pond. For the sake of argument, I shall assume a rather large pond, in which a Great White could plausibly survive a day or two, but fed and drained by rivers too small for a Great White to swim along.
I shall further assume that you are aware that all your friends were on the fishing trip together (which you were unable to join due to a prior appointment).
Now, catching a Great White is a noteworthy accomplishment. If your friend were to accomplish this, it is reasonable to assign a high probability that he would tell you. Therefore, I assign the following:
P (Being told | Great White caught) = 0.95
It is also possible that your friends are collaborating on a prank, giving you an implausible story to see if they can convince you. If this is the case, they could have decided to do so while on the fishing trip, and laid out the necessary plans then. Exactly what probability you assign to this depends a lot on your friends; however, for the sake of argument, I shall assume that there’s a 20% chance of this scenario.
P (Being told | No great white caught) = 0.2
Now, furthermore, there is no plausible way for a Great White to have ended up in the pond; and no plausible way to catch one with a simple fishing line. There are a variety of implausible but physically possible ways to accomplish both actions, though. So the prior probability of a Great White being caught is very low:
P (Great White caught) = 0.05
(possibly less than that, but let’s go with that for the moment).
Thus, P(Being told) = P (Being told | Great White caught) P(Great White caught) + P (Being told | No great white caught) P(No great white caught) = (0.95 0.05) + (0.2 0.95) = 0.2375
Plugging this into Bayes, P(Great White caught | Being told) = P (Being told | Great White caught) P(Great White caught)/P(Being told) = (0.95 0.05)/0.2375 = 0.2
So, given certain assumptions about how trustworthy your friends are, etc., I find that the probability that they have indeed captured a Great White is higher if they tell you that they have than if they do not. Mind you, the prior probability for capturing a Great White is very low to begin with; the end result is still that it is more probable that they are lying than that they have captured a Great White, and you would be perfectly sensible to request further proof, in the form of the shark in question, before believing their claims.
It’s not that I completely discard empirical evidence; it’s just that empirical evidence, one way or another, is somewhat rare in the case of this particular question, and thus I am forced to rely on what evidence I can find.
I have, on at least one occasion, observed some evidence; but it’s the sort of evidence that doesn’t communicate well and is rather unconvincing at one remove (I know it happened, because I remember it, but I have no proof other than my unsupported word).
You yourself have said that the prior probability of a miracle occurring on any given day is relatively small, “somewhere between once a year and once a century”. You also said that, if a miracle were to occur, you would likely be unable to recognize it as such: “I have at least as much difficulty as the hypothetical scientist. Possibly slightly more difficulty...”. You also offered a plausible-sounding natural explanation for the event, and, as you mentioned, many other perfectly natural explanations exist. In addition, we have zero recorded evidence for this miracle, other than people’s testimonies; whereas any other spectacular events (such as volcano eruptions or Justin Bieber sightings) are usually accompanied by plenty of recorded data (including news reports, cellphone footage, instrument telemetry, etc. etc.).
Given all of this, I’d argue that the probability of this particular event being a miracle is quite low—even if we grant that a miracle-causing god of some sort does exist.
Whoa, whoa, wait a minute, 0.05 is huge ! It’s about 460 times greater than your odds of dying in a car accident during any given year, assuming you live in the USA. And that’s car accidents, which are pretty common events. Given that no recorded evidence of a backyard shark catch exists, I’d estimate its prior to be even lower. After all, meteorite strikes that damage people or property are extremely rare, and yet we do have recorded evidence of them happening, so pond sharks have got to be even more rare than that.
If we estimate the prior at something fairly optimistic, like 1 / 7e6 (meaning that we’d expect this rare event to happen to at least one person on any given day, seeing as there are 7e6 people on Earth), we still get a probability of something like 5.7e-7, which is about the same odds as winning the lottery (though I could be wrong, I don’t know much about lotteries).
Wouldn’t this drive down the probability ? If I knew that people were catching great whites in ponds all the time, I’d be more likely to believe my friends when they told me they caught one, right ?
What makes you trust the evidence, then ?
If I went fishing in a pond one day, and caught what appears to be at first glance a great white shark, I wouldn’t trust my initial impressions. I’d start looking for a hidden camera. And maybe get an MRI, just in case. Those probabilities apply to everyone, including myself. Would you not agree ?
All true.
I would like to point out that, first of all, this occurred in 1917; there were no cellphones to take cellphone footage. And there were news reports at the time (there’s a scan of at least one relevant newspaper page on the wikipedia page)
I don’t think this detracts all that much from your point, but I felt I should point it out.
I expect that there are significantly more events claimed to be miracles than there are actual miracles. So, given as cursory a look over the available evidence as we’ve taken in this discussion, it would be sensible to assign a low probability to this incident having been a miracle, yes.
You’re right, it is really rather unreasonably large. (All of my assumed priors in my previous posts were multiples of 1⁄20, a level of granularity perhaps too coarse for this figure). However, I don’t believe that detracts from the point I was making at all.
Consider: P(Being told) = P (Being told | Great White caught) P(Great White caught) + P (Being told | No great white caught) P(No great white caught)
Taking the previously assumed values of P (Being told | Great White caught) = 0.95 and P (Being told | No great white caught) = 0.2, and taking P(Great White caught) as 1e(-10), that gives P(Being told) = (0.95 1e(-10)) + (0.2 (1 − 1e(-10))) = 0.200000000075
Now, substituting these values in Bayes: P(Great White caught | Being told) = P (Being told | Great White caught) P(Great White caught)/P(Being told) = (0.95 1e(-10))/0.200000000075 = 0.00000000047499999982; or approximately 4.75e-10. While this is minute, it is still over four times larger than the probability that they had caught a Great White had they not yet told you; being told that they had caught a Great White is still evidence in favour of a Great White having been caught. (Though not enough to make it probable that a Great White had actually been caught).
No, because the fact that great whites are not being caught in ponds all the time is evidence. It is very strong evidence for the hypothesis that great whites are not often found, or caught, in ponds.
When I say that empirical evidence is rare, I mean that many things can be adequately explained whether it is true that God exists or not. Therefore, those things do not act as evidence either for or against the hypothesis.
Rather than continue to talk in hypotheticals, I think I’ll take a moment to describe the incident in question (and I think you’ll see why I say I expect you to be unconvinced by it).
I was waiting outside Church; I had been nearby for some other reason, and it would not be economical to go home before mass (as I would then have had to leave immediately again), but there was still some time to wait. Having planned for this eventuality, I had a book to read with me. (I should perhaps mention, at this point, that I am notorious among my close acquaintances for the difficulty of interrupting me in the middle of a good book).
A little way outside the church, there is a large crucifix set up. While I was reading, a man walked by and knelt at the crucifix in prayer. And, for a brief while, I felt this very strong sense of Presence… strong enough that I found myself unable to continue reading my book until it had gone.
And that’s it. After a while, the man got up and walked away; the sense of Presence receded.
So, what makes me trust the evidence? I remember it; and I do not believe there was any way that any human could have faked that experience.
The obvious explanation is a brain malfunction, not fakery by another human.
(I also suspect confirmation bias. If you had had the same experience without a man praying nearby, you wouldn’t have decided that it proves that such experiences have nothing to do with prayer.)
But even ignoring that, plenty of Muslims and people of other religions have had similar experiences. Yet I doubt you believe that they were real. Since you believe that similar experiences by Muslims are not real, you obviously do believe that there are explanations other than the experience being real. Why not now, too?
Possible; but I consider it an extremely low-probability possibility, for much the same reason as I consider the possibility that a given cloud I see in the sky is a hallucination has very low probability.
No… but I do believe I would still have interpreted it as evidence for the existence of God.
Ah—be careful of assumptions. I see no reason why some of them might not have been real. I’m not sure that the details of what building one goes into for worship, or the wording of the sermons, are what’s really important.
Consider Matthew 25:31-46, in which the Final Judgement is directly referenced, and the criteria under which that judgement will take place are given:
There’s nothing in there about belonging to a specific religion; it’s all about going out there and going good things for people.
So, given that there are Muslims who are good people and do good things, I see no reason why God wouldn’t on occasion answer their prayers, on the same criteria (which are hard to find and may take as input information not available without omniscience) as He uses to respond to anyone else.
Hm.
Backing up a little: what’s your confidence that an arbitrarily selected perception is the result of processing signals from a distal stimulus that conforms in all significant ways to the perception?
Very very high. Short of strong evidence that a given perception is false (and not merely might be false), I tend to assume that all of my perceptions are caused by a distal stimulus that conforms in all significant ways to the perception in question (possibly filtered by intervening effects, e.g. dimmed if I am wearing sunglasses).
Well, yes, of course very very high.
And, sure, in practice we behave as though all our perceptions are like this, because treating any given one as though it isn’t is typically unjustified.
I meant the question somewhat more precisely.
For example, out of 100,000 distinct perceptions, would you estimate the chance that at least one of those perceptions lacks a conforming distal stimulus as ~1? ~.1? ~.01? ~.00001? Other?
Ah. I see.
I’m afraid I can’t really give you an answer at the level of precision you’re asking for; I’m really not well calibrated for extimating extremely low probabilities. The best I can give you is “small enough as to be near indistinguishable from zero”.
And I’m not entirely sure where I should put the upper bound of that category, either.
Well, let’s approach it from the other direction, then. Would you say that the chance that I’ve experienced at least one perception not caused by processing signals from a distal stimulus that conforms in all significant ways to the perception within the last 12 months is indistinguishable from zero? Indistinguishable from one? Somewhere in between?
Hmmm. Tricky.
There are substances that, when ingested or perhaps inhaled, will trigger hallucinations.
There are certain mental conditions which may trigger hallucinations.
Dreams might also count, given the wording you’ve used.
If I assume that you haven’t ingested any hallucinogens, knowingly or not; and that you are mentally healthy, and not counting dreams, then I’d say it falls into the “small enough as to be near indistinguishable from zero” category. (If you have ingested hallucinogens, the probability shoots up; potentially quite a lot).
OK, cool… that answers the question I was trying to get answered. Thank you.
The possibility that a random cloud is a hallucination is low because clouds are well-studied and there is plenty of evidence for the existence of clouds—evidence of such a nature that anyone can see it. Furthermore, we know something about hallucinations—hallucinations don’t cause random people to see random objects under random circumstances. A random cloud in the sky is not the type of thing that hallucinations typically make people see.
Your mystical experience was observable only by yourself, and was of a type which is known to be caused by brain malfunction.
But the more that different religions can do this, the less the meaning of the mystical experience. If God gives those experiences to people of all religions, then those experiences are no longer evidence for any particular religion. For all you know, the Muslim idea of God is the true one, the Christian one is false, and the Muslim God gives experiences to Christians in the same way you think that the Christian one gives experiences to Muslims. Maybe Christianity is really false, the pagans are right that there is a god and a goddess, and they give mystical experiences to Christians. Maybe some form of devil-worship is correct; I assume you believe that the Devil can’t hand out mystical experiences, but if you are wrong about just that part, your experience could just as well come from the Devil.
It simply suggests that the criteria that God uses, when deciding when to make His presence known, are not limited to the professed religion of the person in question. Exactly what those criteria are, is not fully clear; but any religion which helped to foster those criteria amongst its adherents would be at least partially correct, in its effects if not necessarily in its dogma.
Why not? We’re talking about the what may be second-most powerful entity in existence. (Mind you, there’s a big difference between can and will; the existence of the Devil strongly implies the existence of God, and if the Devil is trying to discourage religion, then it would be counterproductive unless some other effects of said experience outweigh that risk.)
That sounds like you’re agreeing with me. If God gives people mystical experiences no matter what their religion, mystical experiences are no good in showing that the religion is true. Of course this is a matter of degree. The wider the range of people get the experiences, the worse the experiences are at showing anything.
If beings other than God (such as the Devil) can give out mystical experiences, it’s even worse. Mystical experiences not only don’t show that the religion is true, they don’t even show that “God exists” is true. At this point I don’t see why you care that it’s not just a brain malfunction, because even if it wasn’t, you have no way to tell between an experience sent by God, one sent by the Devil, and there being a sorcerer on every block who occasionally pulls pranks by giving random people mystical experiences.
(As for why the Devil would want to do that? Maybe he knows that people interpret mystical experiences as evidence for their religion being true and he can incite religious conflict by giving people of opposing religions mystical experiences.)
It does not prevent said experiences from showing the existence of God, or from hinting at the criteria He finds important.
The devil is defined more-or-less by being in oppostion to God. If the devil exists, then so does God, pretty much.
And humans capable of pulling off a trick like that would almost certainly have been discovered by now if they were common.
The more different kinds of God you think can give out mystical experiences, the vaguer the “God” that those experiences demonstrate the existence of. If the Muslim version of God can send them, maybe it shows there’s a God but he’s not necessarily Christian. If polytheistic pagan gods can send them, maybe it shows that there’s a God but he’s not necessarily Christian and there isn’t necessarily one of him either. You’ve ended up “proving” there’s a God who has few attributes other than his name.
That’s just a matter of semantics. Maybe a devil-like being without a God can’t strictly speaking be called the Devil, but whatever you call him, surely you believe that if the normal Devil can give out mystical experiences, so can that one, right?
“Every block” is just an example. Suppose there were few but not no sorcerers in the world. Couldn’t they produce mystical experiences that you could not tell from God-borne ones?
(And how do you explain the fact that people can take drugs that cause mystical experiences, get electrical shocks to their brain that trigger mystical experiences, and why some known mental illnesses are associated with mystical experiences? None of these things happen for seeing clouds except in passing.)
I find your comment very confusing. Might I suggest that we continue this discussion, after tabooing the words ‘God’ and ‘Devil’?
I’ll start out by rewriting my previous post under those same constraints:
It does not prevent said experiences from showing the existence of [an omnipotent, omniscient being], or from hinting at the criteria He finds important.
The [being opposing an omnipotent, omniscient being] is defined more-or-less by being in oppostion to [an omnipotent, omniscient being]. If the [being opposing an omnipotent, omniscient being] exists, then so does [said omnipotent, omniscient being], pretty much.
And humans capable of pulling off a trick like that would almost certainly have been discovered by now if they were common.
No, not unless the claim that you’re making fits whatever words you use instead of “God” and “Devil”. In order for it to work, you would have to assert that mystical experiences can come only from omnipotent, omniscient beings or other beings who share a cosmology, and from nobody else. I find that a very peculiar thing to claim.
I would think that, if they exist, pagan gods should be able to provide mystical experiences. Pagan gods aren’t omnipotent and omniscient. A being that resembled the devil but didn’t oppose anyone powerful could provide mystical experiences, and he wouldn’t be omniscient, omnipotent, or in opposition to someone who is. Sorcerers aren’t omniscient or omnipotent, yet they could make such experiences. And we know that brain stimulation, drugs, starvation, and mental illness can produce mystical experiences and they have nothing to do with omnipotence or omniscience.
And as for sorcerers being common, the argument doesn’t depend on them being common, just on them existing. Rare sorcerers are equally a problem for the theory as common ones. There’s also the possibility that sorcerers exist in a society that is intentionally kept hidden from discovery by the muggles. (And even then, who’s to say that sorcerers haven’t been discovered? They haven’t been discovered in a reproducible way in a laboratory, but neither has God. They certainly have been discovered in the sense that an awful lot of people over a wide range of times and places were confident that they are real.)
No, I simply need to assert that such experiences are more likely given the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent being than they are without the existence of such a being.
Consider, for example; if I find a drop of oil on my driveway one morning, I may conclude that my car has an oil leak. There are other ways that the oil may have got there; someone else may have parked in my driveway for a few hours overnight, and he may have an oil leak. Or a neighbour may have dripped some oil on my driveway as a prank.
The mere existence of alternate hypothesis is not, on its own, sufficient to show that a conclusion cannot be correct.
Okay, since you’re not tabooing ‘god’, I’m going to take a guess that you mean a very powerful and knowledgeable but neither omnipotent nor omniscient being which is part of a community of similarly powerful and knowledgeable beings, whose unified actions underlie the basic physics of the universe. Is that approximately correct?
If that is what you meant, then yes, you are correct; however, the chances that such beings exist is very small, because if a number of nearly-equally-powerful yet different beings were trying to run the physics of the universe, then we would almost certainly by now have spotted some areas of blatant disagreement between different beings; it would, in short, almost certainly be clearly impossible that a theory of everything could ever be produced. (If they never disagreed about anything ever, then are they really separate beings?)
I’m guessing here (because I’m really not sure what you mean) that you mean a single powerful and knowledgeable but neither omnipotent nor omniscient being?
If so, then again, you’re right. Such a being could provide such an experience.
Yes. And I know that I didn’t have electrodes in my brain, I hadn’t taken drugs, I wasn’t starved, and I’m mentally healthy.
True. The occasional rare sorceror who doesn’t even know he’s a sorceror would work. This would imply some circumstance, possibly some rare genetic mutation, which would permit some human brain to have a very direct effect on another human brain. If this could be controlled—even slightly—and if it worked on non-human brains as well, it could have a drastic positive effect on an organism’s survival. If this were the case, I’d expect to see at least one type of mildly telepathic animal, exploiting this.
...I might not, of course. It might be that the ‘sorcerors’ are the first organism to exhibit this rare mutation.
And if there was a God, and there was a Devil who opposed him, we’d almost certainly have spotted some areas of disagreement between them. (You could claim that yes, we have spotted such things, but of course the same claim could be made for pagan gods.)
Also, pagan gods needn’t necessarily run the physics of the universe in the sense of changing the cosmological constant.
This would be true for certain types of psychic powers, but there are other things which can be done only by humans. Sorcerers with spellbooks have to be able to read, for instance, and even if you quibble about whether animals can read, they wouldn’t be able to read well enough to use a spellbook.
The point is that mystical experiences are known to have physical causes other than the existence of a supernatural being. I would expect milder versions of those to occasionally produce mystical experiences too. Nobody may have put an electrode in your brain, but the brain is complex and can occasionally misfire by itself.
No, that’s not enough. Given that this is lesswrong, I hope you are aware of Bayseianism. The extent to which an experience is evidence of a God compared to evidence of other things that produce mystical experiences depends on your priors.It may be that a God is more likely to produce a mystical experience than anything else, but the prior for the existence of God is low enough that a mystical experience is still most likely to have been caused by something other than God.
Only if they were roughly equal in power and ability. If God is so comparatively powerful that the Devil doesn’t get to make changes to the laws of physics, then we wouldn’t see any such disagreements (because physics as a whole is still then under control of one being)
In that case, can you please explain to me what exactly you mean by the phrase ‘pagan gods’?
Yes, I am aware of Bayesianism.
My prior for the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient being was set pretty high; somewhere over 50%. Why do you claim that that prior has to be set “low enough that a mystical experience is still most likely to have been caused by something other than God”?
I was thinking more of the Devil causing small-scale events like, oh, killing someone’s child to tempt them into committing revenge, or sending people mystical experiences in order to increase religious strife. The Devil is commonly described as being able to do things like that and God doesn’t stop him, for whatever reason. I don’t care if the Devil can change the speed of light.
A being who has powers other than those currently recognized by science, has an area of concern and a level of power over its area of concern that is relatively high in the hierarchy if applicable, and either was worshipped or is in a class of beings that is generally worshipped.
As defining words is difficult even for well-known concepts like “chair” I reserve the right to update this definition. (If a chair is defined as being for sitting, does that mean that a chair designed as a museum art exhibit is not a chair? You try to define it and end up with locutions like “is either meant for sitting, or has features that would be considered to be designed for sitting if it was intended for sitting”.)
If you set your prior high enough, anything can become evidence for God, in which case your belief that given that prior a mystical experience is evidence for God is correct but uninteresting.
But that would leave physics down to a single Being, with a single agenda; so there wouldn’t be signs of disagreement to be seen in the laws of physics themselves
Ah, I see. So it’s a very powerful being, with that power limited (whether by force or by choice) to a single area of concern (or possibly to multiple areas of concern), capable of feats not explainable by current scientific theories, possibly but not necessarily with the power to alter physics directly?
Such a being could presumably create a mystical experience, yes. And if they are able to alter physics directly, then I would expect a messier physics; on the other hand, if they are [i]not[/i], then, though powerful, they are no less subject to the laws of physics than we are and would eventually be explained as science progresses towards a better understanding of the universe.
Not quite anything, no. And I have to be wary of anthropic reasoning.
No matter where my prior is set, though, I still consider such an experience evidence of the existence of God; in that it is more likely that I’d have the experience if God exists than if not. The only difference that the prior makes is in deciding whether or not the evidence is sufficient prove God’s existence.
I don’t understand why you insist on wondering whether some being has the power to change the laws of physics. Giving someone a mystical experience doesn’t change the laws of physics (at least not nontrivially—by some definitions anything a supernatural being does “changes the laws of physics”), and the fact that a devil-like being without an adversary, a pagan god, or a sorcerer could give you one doesn’t mean they can change the laws of physics.
“Eventually” isn’t now. You don’t believe the Devil can change the laws of physics, yet surely you acknowledge that science has no understanding of him or his powers.
Why can’t there be other types of beings like pagan gods or sorcerers, that science also doesn’t yet understand yet (regardless of whether science might understand them sometime in the future)?
You presumably believe God created typhoid fever and that it is more likely we would see that if God existed than if he didn’t. If all you mean is that mystical experiences are evidence for God in the same sense that typhoid fever is, then that falls under “true but uninteresting”. On the other hand, if you believe that mystical experiences are evidence for God in some stronger sense than typhoid fever, please elaborate.
Because, from the start, I was presenting my experience as a piece of evidence in favour of the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent being; and ‘omnipotent’ involves, among other things, being able to alter physics.
Yes, it is possible to have a sense of presence without being able to change the laws of physics. But that’s not the point.
Right now, I honestly think that you and I are having completely different arguments. I am trying to discuss the probability of existence of an omnipotent, omniscient being; while you, as far as I can tell, are simply trying to list off alternate explanations for something I once saw. And yes, they are valid alternate explanations, but that’s not the point.
If, to take an analogy, I find a leaf on the ground (and assuming for the moment that I can’t identify a tree by its leaves) then this would be evidence in favour of the hypothesis that there is an apple tree nearby. Listing other types of tree that the leaf could have come from does not change that.
No; on the contrary, typhoid fever (along with virtually any other illness) is a side effect of the evolutionary process; as soon as a sufficiently large creature evolves, its body in turn forms a new environment in which other creatures (germs) can survive and grow. Illnesses, I’d think, would be almost certain to appear in any life-bearing world in the absence of God; and since I don’t understand why they exist, I can’t make the assumption that they must exist without engaging in circular reasoning. Which makes them weak evidence against the idea that God exists.
The experience I had in front of the church, on the other hand, is an experience that is very likely in a universe where an omnipotent, omniscient being exists; and seems very unlikely in a universe where that is false. Therefore, it is evidence in favour of the idea that such a being exists.
This is phrased in a subtly different way from how you phrased it before, because “seems very unlikely in a universe where that is false” isn’t a conditional probability (even though you use it to find a conditional probability).
Given the way you phrased it this time, in order to say that mystical experiences are unlikely in a universe without God, you have to show that the list of other things that cause mystical experiences is unlikely in a universe without God.
I certainly don’t agree that brain malfunctions are unlikely in a universe without God. In fact, I’d say that they are very likely, especially since we know that mystical experiences can be caused by purely physical processes. And I can’t see any reason why according to your standards, pagan gods, devil-like beings, or sorcerers are unlikely.
P(experience | no omnipotent, omniscient being) < P(experience | omnipotent, omniscient being)
...that’s what my paragraph was trying to communicate.
I merely need to show that the experience is more likely in a universe with God than in a universe without God.
Let us consider the set of all possible universes in which brains develop through evolutionary means, without the aid of any external beings, omnipotent or otherwise. Now, the resultant brains will, in general, merely be sufficient to result in a creature with a high chance of having grandchildren. Non-debilitating brain malfunctions are not merely likely; I’d think that they’re almost certain.
However, the effects of such malfunctions will be more-or-less random. One type of malfunction might cause the sufferer to temporarily perceive green as red and vice versa. Another might cause some form of synesthesia. Yet another might result in a sudden burst of emotion, such as rage or fear.
The odds that a malfunction will give someone the impression of an approaching Presence would be a lot lower than the odds of a random malfunction. And it is the odds of that specific malfunction that I expect to be fairly low; not the odds of brain malfunctions in general.
In two cases, those are immaterial beings; if one type of immaterial being exists, that’s weak evidence that another may also exist. So that implies that those two are marginally more likely in a universe that contains an omnipotent, omniscient being than in one that does not.
Aside from that very weak point, I see no reason to assume that any of those are more likely in either sort of universe. And if the probability of those are equal, and there is another potential source of mystical experiences in the universe with the omnipotent, omniscient being, then such an experience is weak evidence in favour of the existence of such a being.
No, because you phrased it differently. “The experience I had in front of the church, on the other hand, is an experience that is very likely in a universe where an omnipotent, omniscient being exists; and seems very unlikely in a universe where that is false” amounts to “P (experience | God) is high && P(experience | no God) is low”, not “P (experience | God) > P(experience | no God)”.
Brain malfunctions are more likely to produce some effects than others. And mystical experiences are the sort of thing brain malfunctions are likely to produce. That’s why people starve themselves and see mystical experiences, but they rarely starve themselves and start thinking they have 12 fingers. While you gave examples of other things brain malfunctions can produce, those are just other things which they are more likely than normal to produce; they don’t mean that the chance of everything is equal.
Those things are only marginally more likely in a universe with a God if you believe all types of God are equally likely. It is my impression that you think a Biblical-type God is more likely.
Even if they are more likely, this falls under “true but uninteresting”. There are lots of things that are marginally more likely in a universe with God. Claiming that mystical experiences are evidence for God is only interesting if it’s better evidence than those other things. Nobody says “I saw the Loch Ness Monster, so God is marginally more likely” (seeing the Loch Ness Monster implies that science, which says there is no such thing, can fail, and if science can fail, God is marginally more likely).
Well, I do think that “P (experience | God) is high && P(experience | no God) is low”. However, in order to take the experience as evidence for the existence of God, it is necessary only to show the weaker point that “P (experience | God) > P(experience | no God)”
True.
For human brains as they exist in this universe, perhaps. But for every possible type of brain, as may exist in every possible type of universe?
I consider that unlikely. I could be wrong about that, of course. But remember, in order to consider the probability of brains being prone to that exact malfunction, one must consider the possibility of brains constructed very differently to the ones we have. And, quite honestly, that’s such a wide and unexplored field that there’s not much I can say about it at all...
No, not all types are equally likely. Yes, I do think that an omniscient, omnipotent being very probably exists.
...why on earth would the idea that ‘science can fail’ lead to ‘God is marginally more likely’?
If an omnipotent, omniscient being exists, then it is reasonable to postulate that said being created our universe (or, at the very least, knew about it and didn’t stop it from existing). If such a being created our universe, then it is reasonable to assume that it would have been created with some care; because most craftsmen take a lot of care in their work. A bit of observation shows that our universe runs on rules; and if those rules were created with care, then it is reasonable to assume that they will work, that there are not going to be any obvious seams visible in the rules.
In short, if God exists, then science (being a systematic attempt to discover those rules) should work.
To figure out the odds of the existence of God based on you having a certain type of experience, you can’t just ignore the knowledge about what kind of brain you have. If you do that, you’re throwing out evidence that affects your conclusion. The type of brain you actually have is one where malfunctions produce mystical experiences more readily than they produce arbitrary other effects.
Yes, there would. If people normally disintegrate only when exposed to thousands of degrees of temperature, but God can disintegrate people whenever he wants, every time God stays hidden but disintegrates a person who is not hidden, that’s a seam in the rules and science will not be able to explain that event.
The figures that I am using to find P(God | experience) include P(experience | no God) and P(experience | God). P(experience | no God) must surely integrate over every possible universe in which there is no God, or else it will be P(experience | a specific universe), which is the wrong figure. Similarly, P(experience | God) must integrate over every universe in which an omnipotent, omniscient being exists; or else, once again, it is P(experience | specific universe), and is the wrong figure.
I’m trying to simplify the equation, for purposes of debate, to an update on exactly one piece of evidence. If we start including the specifics of the brain, then that opens up the question of P(God | human brain), which is an entire, and much bigger, debate on its own. And one that I have no intention of entering into with you; the inferential distance between us is simply too large, and I’ve been having enough trouble trying to communicate with you as it is.
That’s a very good point.
It’s rather unlikely that it could be replicated under laboratory conditions, which would mean it’s not an obvious seam… but yes, I see your point, it could be a bit of a seam. (Or it could be as-yet undiscovered physics of some sort, of course).
You can’t simplify that equation. If you simplify the equation that way it’s only useful when figuring out if there is a god, given a creature of unknown type who has a mystical experience. You are not a creature of unknown type, and throwing out the information that you have a brain that is inordinately prone to malfunctions that produce mystical experiences will distort the answer.
It’s like concluding there is a high probability that someone is insane because he thinks he’s Napoleon, while discarding the information that he’s ruling France in the year 1805. P(insane|claim Napoleon) is high, but P(insane|claim Napoleon && rules France in 1805)” is not high. Discarding this information is wrong.
That is exactly the point I was trying to make; that the fact that such an experience happened is a piece of evidence in favour of the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient being.
The trouble with this, if you start insisting that certain information cannot be left out, is that you are cherry-picking what information that is, and specifically selecting information that you believe leads to the conclusion that you want. I could probably name a dozen other pieces of information which support the idea that an omniscient, omnipotent being exists and insist on including them too (for example; consider P(God | intelligent life exists)).
If we start down this path, then we could both simply throw new pieces of information into the discussion again and again; it will take months, and it would lead absolutely nowhere.
I would like to refer you to a short story that discusses that point in greater detail.
In short, yes, P(insane | claims Napoleon) is high, and if I meet someone who tells me ‘One of my ancestors claimed he was Napoleon’ then I will consider it a high probability that that ancestor was insane.
The fact that such an experience happened, given no other information, may be evidence for God. But you have other information and are ignoring it.
Furthermore, even as evidence for God, it’s only evidence in a very weak sense compared to typical cases where one speaks about something being evidence. It makes it more likely that there’s a God, but it also makes it more likely that there is a pagan god, or a sorcerer, or an extraterrestrial with a mind-control ray.
It’s not cherry picking to refuse to discard information which affects the result by orders of magnitude more than the probability you’re hoping to get from it. A mystical experience in a human brain is much better evidence for a brain malfunction than it is for God.
My scenario not only involves being in 1805, but also ruling France. If you use the information that someone is your ancestor (presumably from 1805), but you omit the information that he was ruling France then, you have still discarded relevant information and as a result will come up with a probability of insanity that is much too high.
sigh
Very well. If you insist that I not ignore information, then there is a lot more information that needs to be properly considered. Decades of experiences that need to be sorted and categorised. Hundreds of writings, ancient and modern; thousands of accounts, of one sort or another.
We’ll just have to go through it all, piece by piece. Only the bits that are relevant, of course, but there’s a lot that is relevant.
For a start, let me consider the probability of the existence of God, given the existence of brains (or any form of hardware capable of supporting intelligence in some or other form).
Where, just to be clear, I use the word ‘God’ to refer to any omniscient, omnipotent being.
So, what is P(God | Brains)?
According to Bayes’ Theorem:
P(God | Brains) = P(Brains | God)*P(God)/P(Brains)
Of course, P(Brains) = P(Brains | God)P(God)+P(Brains | no God)P(no God).
Thus, a simple substitution gives:
P(God | Brains) = P(Brains | God)P(God)/[P(Brains | God)P(God)+P(Brains | no God)*P(no God)]
So. What is P(Brains | no God)?
For that, we need to consider the probability that a randomly chosen universe will contain brains, at some or other point in its history.
In order to do that, let us consider all possible universes.
Here, I start by considering the null universe; a universe that contains no matter. Since it contains no matter, it cannot contain brains.
Then, let us add a piece of matter; a single quark. this one-quark universe also cannot contain brains, as there is insufficient matter to form the brains.
I don’t think it’s sensible to consider different one-quark universes as different; no matter where the quark is, or how fast it is moving, it’s just a coordinate transform to make it identical to any other one-quark universe.
Then, let us add a second quark. Now, it is sensible to differentiate between different two-quark universes, because there is a measurement that can change from one universe to another; and that is the distance between the two quarks. There is also another measurement that can change from one universe to another, and that is their relative velocity. However, it is not always clear whether two diffferent snapshots of two-quark universes are different universes, or the same universe at different times. Still, no brains are possible.
There are even more three-quark than two-quark universes; at a rough estimate, I’d say that the number of three-quark universes is half of the square of the number of two-quark universes. Still no brains.
Four-quark universes; here, I expect the total number of universes to be roughly x^3/6 where x is the number of two-quark universes.
For an N-quark universe, in general, I expect that the total number of possible universes would be roughly x^(N-1)/(N-1)!. This is an interesting function; it grows exponentially for low N, the rate of increase slows as N approaches x, and finally, when N exceeds x, the number of possible N-particle universes actually begins to drop. Of course, x is either infinite or at least very very large, so we can expect that most universes will have quite a lot of matter; more than enough to form brains.
Now, what are the odds of a universe which contains enough matter containing brains? Note that the universes under consideration here contain a number of quarks, in what is essentially a random configuration. All possible configurations are under consideration here, so at least some of them will have brains (in some cases, Boltzman brains; in other cases, brains with bodies and whole civilisations around them). However, since every possible random configuration is permitted, it would seem to me that a highly ordered set of particles, like a brain, must be relatively rare.
So, P(Brain | no God) seems like it should be fairly low.
Now, let us consider P(Brain | God). This time, we do not have to consider every possible universe; only those universes that could exist in the presence of an omniscient, omnipotent being. It seems likely that such a being will adjust any universe to His liking, and possibly create one if one does not exist.
It also seems quite probable, to me, that if a single intelligent being exists, then that being is quite likely to realise that he (or she) would like a conversation with someone else. Being omnipotent, it seems likely that God would create someone to talk with, and thus create brains.
So, it seems likely that P(Brains | God) is high.
Putting a high value for P(Brains | God) and a low value for P(Brains | no God) into the equation from earlier:
P(God | Brains) = P(Brains | God)P(God)/[P(Brains | God)P(God)+P(Brains | no God)*P(no God)]
...will produce the result that P(God | Brains) > P(God). This seems to be a fairly major effect.
Do you have any figures for the likelihood of such a brain malfunction? Or any form of data at all to back up this assertion?
Yes. That is quite a lot of bits of information; since it eliminates all but one of the people throughout all of history who thought they were Napoleon.
It’s a bit like the difference between asking “what are the odds of getting a six on a fair die roll?” and “what are the odds that I got a six on the fair die I rolled on Thursday 10 April 2014 at 21:10?”—though the difference is a bit more pronounced, as I’m sure there were more than six people throughout history who claimed to be Napoleon.
Right, but there were no records of the event itself, just records of people’s testimonies. This is somewhat… odd. When e.g. a volcano erupts there is usually tons of footage of the actual event. People can be mistaken, or they can lie; but it’s hard to argue with a giant flaming mountain.
Yes, but it’s also evidence for any number of other, more likely events: that my friends are pulling a prank, that they are mistaken, that a prank has been pulled on them, etc. etc. We don’t need to enumerate them all; what’s important here is only the posterior probability. If it is minute, then the reasonable course of action is to say, “until I see that shark, I won’t believe that you guys caught it, sorry”. There’s a huge difference between saying that, and saying, “even though the chances that you caught that shark are even smaller than the chances of a meteorite hitting me in the head anytime soon, I can’t come up with a better explanation off the top of my head so I’ll believe you, good job !”.
You said,
But beliefs do not exist in a vacuum. Instead, they form a Bayesian network: pieces of evidence affect the posterior probabilities of some beliefs; those beliefs change the prior probabilities of other beliefs, and so on. And the problem with the proposition G, which means “a god of some kind exists”, is that it’s starting to look like for any piece of evidence E, P(G|E) is lower than P(x|E), where x is pretty much any other non-divine explanation; and there is a lot of other evidence that can raise P(x). This is what I was driving at earlier with my hypothetical Alpha-god.
So, is there any piece of evidence E for which P(G|E) is much higher than any alternatives ? Moses, presumably, got exactly such a piece of evidence in the form of a burning bush. We don’t have that, however; what we’ve got is an ancient story about a guy who saw a burning bush, and experience tells us that ancient stories mostly can’t be trusted—or else we’d be forced to believe in Zeus, Shivah, the Jade Emperor, etc., possibly at the same time.
As you have anticipated, I am unconvinced by your report, but the question is, why are you convinced ? You say:
But these aren’t the only possibilities. Even if you cannot come up with any others (such as a random brain malfunction, as Jiro points out), why is this experience sufficient to convince you that a miracle occurred—given that, as you agreed above, the probability of such an event is minute ? Don’t you want to see the actual shark, before making your conclusions ?
There appear to have been quite a few pictures—somewhat to my surprise. Most of them appear to be pictures of the crowd, rather than of the Sun… and, as with any google search, some appear to be unrelated.
That is true.
But the posterior probability doesn’t just depend on the evidence; it also depends on the prior probability. The prior probability assigned to the shark being caught is substantially lower than the prior probability I’d assigned to the existence of God. The analogy breaks down at the selection of priors.
I suspect that this is a rather severe exaggeration. I can easily propose an infinite number of proposals for ‘x’ where ‘x’ is non-divine but where P(G|E)>P(x|E) for almost any E. My method for finding these proposals for ‘x’ would be to string together a number of randomly selected grammatically correct sentence starting with the word ‘because’; this would result in a number of entirely nonsensical proposals. Similarly, I can randomly select evidences E, placing them before the ‘because’.
I shall assume you meant, therefore, that “there exists at least one non-divine explanation ‘x’ for which P(x|E)>P(G|E) for any given evidence E”.
You’ve at least partially answered your own question; Moses saw the evidence in the burning bush. One particular monk saw the evidence in the Miracle of Lanciano. Several thousand people saw the evidence in the Miracle of the Sun. Doubting Thomas saw the evidence in the resurrected Jesus.
Lots of people saw evidence in first-hand observation of miracles.
That’s the trouble; as soon as you get to second-hand observation, the evidence is a whole lot less convincing. If you’ve set the prior for God’s existence sufficiently low, then there isn’t going to be enough second-hand evidence to alter that.
Because I did see the shark, to extend the metaphor. And then it swam away, on its own business.
Are there any photos (or preferably videos) of the event itself ? I’m looking for something along the lines of this—although, admittedly, volcano eruptions are relatively mundane events by comparison.
Ah, I see, that is interesting. What is the ballpark prior probability you place on the existence of God (or any other god, for that matter) ?
Yes, good call.
It would be more accurate to say something like, “we have a lot of historical texts that describe people who claim to have seen miracles”. The distinction is important, because we have a veritable deluge of such texts regarding all major religions, as well as more modern phenomena such as alien abductions, Bigfoot, etc. The problem with such second- and third-hand accounts are that they—as you have pointed out—are notoriously unreliable.
I do not believe that little gray aliens have ever visited Earth, despite the claims of many, many “abductees”. Do you ? If not, why not, and what would it take to convince you ? You say:
So, to recap: if someone told you about this shark, you would not believe him. Similarly, you do not believe that your shark story is convincing enough to convert another rational person to your belief. I think we are in agreement on these two points.
One thing I don’t understand, though, is why are you convinced ? Do you believe yourself to be that much better—orders of magnitude better—at detecting the presence of sharks (or gods) than any other person ? If so, then for what reason ? But if not, then why are you privileging your own perceptions, given that they are no better than anyone else’s ?
Think of all the alternative explanations you’d come up with if I told you, “guess what, I was abducted by little gray men from space yesterday”. Do not these explanations also apply to yourself ?
There won’t be videos; the event in question happened in 1917, and the earliest video cameras were apparently first used in the 1930s. And I’m not sure that anyone can get a halfway reasonable photo of a very bright light source using 1917 camera technology—which doesn’t mean that no-one did, of course.
But if it doesn’t turn up in a Google search, then I have no idea where else to look for such a picture; should one even exist.
To the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent being, I’d assigned a prior probability of somewhere over 50%.
An excellent point. Very well, then; lots of people claim to have seen evidence in first-hand observation of miracles.
I consider the prior probability that little gray aliens have ever visited Earth to be very small. Despite this, they have become sufficiently mimetic in modern culture that I would consider them a prime choice for hoaxsters; this, in turn, results in me sharply discounting second-hand accounts.
To convince me that aliens have visited Earth will require some piece of physical evidence; perhaps either something made from a material that can be proven not to have come from this planet (and considering what we can make, that might be a tough order) or some piece of technology not merely unavailable to humanity but significantly distant from what is available. I would not necessarily need to hold the evidence in my own hands; I would merely need to be convinced that said evidence exists (e.g. through news reports from reliable sources - ‘Scientists Study Alien Technology’).
This depends on my prior. For the existence of God, my prior is high enough that I would consider it plausible that he is telling the truth. For finding an actual shark in a lake fed and drained by small streams, my prior is far, far lower.
Yes, this is correct.
Largely because I started with a very high prior. My very high prior was contingent on the word of my parents, and particularly of my father, a wise and intelligent man who is far better than me at telling true from false. He’s not infallible, but if he says something is certainly true, then I consider that a good reason to set a high prior for that datum (before updating on any other available evidence, of course).
Many of them do not. I know that I am not making up the story. I know that I am not lying. I know that I was not dreaming. I know that I had not received any major head injuries at around the same time. That covers the majority of the probability with regard to reasons why you might claim to have been abducted by little gray aliens.
As a first-hand observer, I can discount all of those explanations.
Also, my prior for the existence of little gray men from space is fairly low; which would lead to me assigning extra probability to the various ‘lying’ categories.