Of course, but in relative terms he’s still right, it’s just easier to see when you are thinking from the point of the hungry hobo (or peasant in the developing world).
Standing from the point of view of a middle class person in a rich country looking at hypothetical bets where the potential loss is usually tiny relative to our large net worth+human capital value of >4-500k, then of course we don’t feel like we can mostly dismiss utility over a few hundred thousand k, because we’re already there.
Consider a bet with the following characteristics: You are a programmer making 60k ish a year a couple years out of school. You have a 90% probability of winning. If you win, you will win 10 million dollars in our existing world. If you lose (10%) you will swapped into parallel universe where your skills are completely worthless, you know no-one, and you would essentially be in the position of the hungry hobo. You don’t actually lose your brain, so you could potentially figure out how to make ends meet and even become wealthy in this new society, but you start with zero human capital—you don’t know how to get along in it, any better than someone who was raised in a mumbai slum to typical poor parents does in this world.
So do you take that bet? I certainly wouldn’t.
Is there any amount of money we could put in the win column that would mean you take the bet?
When you start considering bets where a loss actually puts you in the Hungry hobo position, it becomes clearer that utility of money over a few hundred thousand dollars is pretty small beer, compared to what’s going on at the lower tiers of Maslow’s hierarchy.
Which is another way of saying that pretty much everyone who can hold down a good job in the rich world has it really freaking good. The difference between $500k and $50 million (enough to live like an entertainer or big-time CEO without working) from the point of view of someone with very low human capital looks a lot like the famed academics having bitter arguments over who gets the slightly nicer office.
This also means that even log utility or log(log) utility isn’t risk averse enough for most people when it comes to bets with a large probability mass of way over normal middle class net worth + human capital values, and any significant probability of dropping below rich-country above-poverty net worth+ human capital levels.
Fortunately, for most of the bets we are actually offered in real life, linear is a good enough approximation for small ones, and log or log-log utility is a plenty good enough approximation for even the largest swings (like starting a startup vs. a salaried position), as long as we attach some value to directing wealth we would not consume, and there is a negligible added probability of the kind of losses that would take us completely out of our privileged status.
In most real life cases any problems with the model are overwhelmed by our uncertainties in mapping the probability distribution.
So one of the major issues I’ve identified with why our gut feelings don’t always match with good expected utility models is that we don’t live in a hypothetical universe. I typically use log utility of end state wealth to judge bets where I am fairly confident of my probability distributions as per Vaniver in another comment.
But there are reasons that even this doesn’t really match with our gut.
Our “gut” has evolved to like truly sure things, and we have sayings like “a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush” partly because we are not very good at mapping probability distributions, and because we can’t always trust everything we are told by outside parties.
When presented with a real life monty haul bet like this, except in very strange and arbitrary circumstances, we usually have reason to be more confident of our probability map on the sure bet than on the unsure one.
If someone has the $240 in cash in their hand, and is saying that if you take option B, they will hand it you right now and you can see it, you can usually be pretty sure that if you take option B you will get the money—there is no way they can deny you the money without it being obvious that they have plain and simply lied to you and are completely untrustworthy.
OTOH, if you take the uncertain option—how sure can you really be that the game is fair? How will the chance be determined? The person setting up the game understands this better than you, and may know tricks they are not telling you. If the real chance is much lower than promised, how will you be able to tell? If they have no intention of paying you for a “win”, how could you tell?
The more uncertainty is promised, the more uncertainty we will and should have in our trust and other unknown considerations. That’s a general rule of real life bets that’s summed up more perfectly than I ever could have in this famous quote from Guys and Dolls:
“One of these days in your travels, a guy is going to show you a brand new deck of cards on which the seal is not yet broken. Then this guy is going to offer to bet you that he can make the jack of spades jump out of this brand new deck of cards and squirt cider in your ear. But, son, do not accept this bet, because as sure as you stand there, you’re going to wind up with an ear full of cider.”
So for these reasons, this gamble, where the difference in expected value is fairly small compared to the value of the sure win—even though a log expected utility curve says to take the risk at almost any reasonable level of rich country wealth, unless you have a short term liquidity crunch—I’d probably take the 240. The only situations under which I would even consider taking the best are ones where I was very confident in my estimate of the probability distribution (we’re at a casino poker table and I have calculated the odds myself for example), and either already have nearly complete trust or don’t require significant trust in the other bettor/game master to make the numbers work.
In the hypothetical where we can assume complete trust and knowledge of the probability distribution, then yes I take the gamble. The reason my gut doesn’t like this, is because we almost never have that level of trust and knowledge in real life except in artificial circumstances.