If you keep the project open source, I might be able help with the programming (although I don’t know much about Rails, I could help with the client side). The math is a mystery to me, too, but can’t you charge ahead with a simple geometric mean for the combination of estimates while you figure it out?
Gust
We’re translating to Brazilian Protuguese only, since that’s our native language.
Hi, and thanks for the awesome job! Will you keep a public record of changes you make to the book? I’m coordinating a translation effort, and that would be important to keep it in sync if you change the actual text, not just fix spelling and hyperlinking errors.
Edit: Our translation effort is for Portuguese only, and can be found at http://racionalidade.com.br/wiki .
Interesting idea. Brazilian law explicitly admits lottery as a form of settling, but I’m not sure if that example with a penalty for not winning a lawsuit would be admissible.
I guess I misunderstood what you meant by “There are many ways to tackle this question, but I mean this in a homo economicus, not biased perspective.” then. See my reply to ShardPhoenix.
He specifically said he’s talking about “homo economicus”-”rational”-like decision. An agent like that should have no need to punish itself—by having a negative emotion—since the potential loss of utility itself is a compelling reason to take action beforehand. So self-punishing is out. How do you think sadness would serve as a signalling device, in this case?
Not sure what you mean by “you SHOULD be sad when you miss an opportunity1”? What’s the advantage of being sad instead of just shrugging and replanning?
I’ve read Kolak’s Cognitive Science, which you recomended in that textbook list post. I’ve enjoyed it a lot and it didn’t feel like I needed some previous introductory reading. Any reason why you left it out now?
Awesome project. I really liked the facebook discussion, and this post explains clearly and concretely a part that some people found confusing. Very well written. Congratulation, Robb.
This just feels really promising, although I can’t say I’ve really followed it all (you’ve lost me a couple posts ago on the math, but that’s my fault). I’m waiting eagerly for the re-post.
All the content in the post just fell in place after I read Giles summary. Still a great post, though.
Necessary entities, Moses ben Maimonides Anselm’s ontological, Summa Theologica I think these are switched.
Although I think your point here is plausible, I don’t think it fits in a post where you are talking about the logicalness of morality. This qualia problem is physical; whether your feeling changes when the structure of some part of your decision system changes depends on your implementation.
Maybe your background understanding of neurology is enough for you to be somewhat confident stating this feeling/logical-function relation for humans. But mine is not and, although I could separate your metaethical explanations from your physical claims when reading the post, I think it would be better off without the latter.
I guess you could still build a causal graph if the universe is defined by initial and end states—you’d just have two disconnected nodes at the top. But you’d have to give up the link between causality and what we call “time”.
Seconded.
Great post as usual.
It brings to mind and fits in with some thoughts I have on simulations. Why isn’t this two-layered system you described analogous to the relation between a simulated universe and its simulator? I mean: the simulator sees and, therefore, is affected by whatever happens in the simulation. But the simulation, if it is just the computation of a mathematical structure, cannot be affected by the simulator: indeed, if I, simulator, were to change the value of some bits during the simulation, the results I would see wouldn’t be the results of the original mathematical structure I was computing. I would be observing a new object, instead of changin the object I was observing, I think. The simulator, then, is in an epiphenomenal lower level in relation to the simulation
The main problem is that is seems weird to give the simulated stuff (the mathemathical sub-pattern that behaves analogously to a kid kicking a ball and having fun) the same status as the simulator stuff (the electrons implementing the computer). This relates, I think, to the problem of the existence or truth of mathematical facts or statements, and of reality of interpretations of patterns.
Of course, if you think the existence of some universe depends on the fact that its mathematical structure is being computed somewhere (and that that universe has some spark of base-lavel existence), then this “epiphenomenalism” goes away.
Also, related to gwern’s comment here.
Well, you really wouldn’t be able to remember qualia, but you’d be able to recall brain states that evoke the same qualia as the original events they recorded. In that sense, “to remember” means your brain enters states that are in some way similar to those of the moments of experience (and, in a world where qualia exist, these remembering-brain-states evoke qualia accordingly). So, although I still agree with other arguments agains epiphenomenalism, I don’t think this one refutes it.
I don’t know if this insight is originally yours or not, but thank you for it. It’s like you just gave me a piece of the puzzle I was missing (even if I still don’t know where it fits).
I think you’ve taken EY’s question too literally. The real question is about the status of statements and facts of formal systems (“systems of rules for symbol manipulation”) in general, not arithmetic, specifically. If you define “mathematics” to include all formal systems, then you can say EY’s meditation is about mathematics.
You’re a Brazilian studying Law who’s been around LW since 2013 and I’d never heard of you? Wow. Please show up!