Amanojack

Karma: 406

Amanojack 2 Feb 2018 18:06 UTC
2 points
on: “The Conditional Fallacy in Contemporary Philosophy”
This is just a manifestation of the general fact that it is impossible to specify a hypothetical fully without telling the entire story of how things got that way from the dawn of time. Speaking of hypotheticals is thus inherently loose. There is no way to avoid fallacies in most such exercises. Feigning rigor by calling specific cases “fallacies” is pretention.

It isn’t just difficult to avoid these errors; it’s impossible, and relegates the exercise to the merely cautiously suggestive, not a central method of philosophy.

Amanojack 19 May 2013 13:13 UTC
−13 points
on: [Paper] On the ‘Simulation Argument’ and Selective Scepticism
The Simulation Argument is incoherent in the first place, and no complicated refutation is required to illustrate this. It is simply nonsensical to speak of entities in “another” universe simulating “our” universe, as the word universe already means “everything that exists.” (Note that more liberal definitions, like “universe = everything we can even conceive of existing,” only serve to show the incoherence more directly: the speaker talks of everything she can conceive of existing “plus more” that she is also conceiving as existing—immediately contradictory.)

By the way, this is the same reason an AI in a box cannot ever know it’s in a box. No matter how intelligent it may be, it remains an incoherent notion for an AI in a box to conceive of something “outside the box.” Not even a superintelligence gets a free pass on self-contradiction.

Amanojack 3 Mar 2013 5:21 UTC
1 point
in reply to: incogn’s comment on: Decision Theory FAQ
I agree; wherever there is paradox and endless debate, I have always found ambiguity in the initial posing of the question. An unorthodox mathematician named Norman Wildberger just released a new solution by unambiguously specifying what we know about Omega’s predictive powers.

Amanojack 11 Oct 2012 8:42 UTC
−2 points
in reply to: ArisKatsaris’s comment on: Rationality: Appreciating Cognitive Algorithms

truth=opinion

I’d phrase it as “truth is subjective,” but I agree in principle. Truth is a word for everyday talk, not for precise discourse. This may sound pretty off-the-wall, but stepping back for a second it should be no surprise that holding to everyday English phrasing would interfere with our efforts to speak precisely. I’ll put this more specifically below.

But if e.g. you get in an accident and you lose your leg, nobody will have offered you an opinion, but nonetheless it’ll be true that you’ll be missing a leg.

This is actually begging the question in that you tacitly assume objective truth by using the standard English phrasing. That there is such a thing as an objective truth is precisely the conclusion you hope to establish. Unfortunately English all but forces you to start by assuming it. Again, carrying over the habits of everyday talk into a precise discussion is a recipe for confusion. We’ll have to be a little more careful with phrasing to get at what’s going on.

I’d first point out that when you say, “you lose your leg,” you are speaking as if there is some omniscient narrator who knows “the objective facts of reality.” Parent’s point is exactly that there is no such omniscience. There are only individuals, including you and I, who have [subjective] experiences.

To get specific, we would have to identify who it is that witnesses the loss of Parent’s leg. If you had said, “e.g. you find that you get in an accident and that you lose your leg,” it would not be convincing to follow up with, “but nonetheless it’ll be true that you’ll be missing a leg.”

We could all have witnessed (what we experience as) Parent losing a leg. It will be “true” for us (everyday talk), but none among us is an omniscient narrator qualified to state any more than what we experienced. Nowhere is any objective truth to be found. If we were to call it an “objective truth,” we would simply be referencing the fact that all three of our experiences seem to match up. It would be at best an inter-subjective “truth,” but this “truth” is a lie to someone else who thinks they see Parent with both legs still attached. To avoid confusion, we had best call it a subjective report or something. Hence, while perhaps not ideal, “truth=opinion” is not too bad a way to put it after all.

Amanojack 10 May 2012 18:49 UTC
4 points
in reply to: Shmi’s comment on: If epistemic and instrumental rationality strongly conflict
Any time you have a bias you cannot fully compensate for, there is a potential benefit to putting instrumental rationality above epistemic.

One fear I was unable to overcome for many years was that of approaching groups of people. I tried all sorts of things, but the best piece advice turned out to be: “Think they’ll like you.” Simply believing that eliminates the fear and aids in my social goals, even though it sometimes proves to have been a false belief, especially with regard to my initial reception. Believing that only 3 out of 4 groups will like or welcome me initially and 1 will rebuff me, even though this may be the case, has not been as useful as believing that they’ll all like me.

Amanojack 8 May 2012 20:37 UTC
6 points
in reply to: Vladimir_Nesov’s comment on: Configurations and Amplitude
He’s making some interesting points, and he gets extra credit in my view for taking so radical a view while usually remaining reasonable. I find his railing against prediction to be puzzling, but his semantic points and discussion of Ptolemaic explanations have given me a lot to think about.

I also noticed that even some of his friendly, reasoned posts were being downvoted to the same extreme negative levels, which seems unwarranted. He has posted too much without familiarizing himself with the norms here, but he shows sincerity and willingness to learn and adapt. He got a little testy a few times, but he also apologized a lot.

All in all, with a few notable exceptions, it looks like he is getting downvoted mainly for unfamiliarity with LW posting style and for disagreeing with “settled science” (I myself am not too partial to that term). Perhaps also for some unconventional spellings and other idiosyncrasies.

I’m open to being corrected on this, but I think I have read this entire thread and I am pretty sure Monkeymind is not deliberately trolling. High inferential distance feels like trolling so often that it’s almost a forum trope. I myself am enjoying some of his posts and the responses.

I’ll change my mind if he continues with the present posting style, though.

Amanojack 8 May 2012 20:08 UTC
1 point
in reply to: Monkeymind’s comment on: Configurations and Amplitude
You’re making a ton of interesting points, but please succinctify (a lot!). I mean, let people reply and stuff. I feel sorry for you writing all that knowing almost no one will see it. It’s obvious you’re reading LW classic posts and making discoveries, and then immediately turning around and applying them, which is great. I just think you’d do well to steep yourself in the posting norms of this forum so you can participate in a more fruitful way. Again, I for one would like to hear well-reasoned radical views.

Amanojack 8 May 2012 19:58 UTC
−3 points
in reply to: Monkeymind’s comment on: Configurations and Amplitude
To be honest, you sound bitter or something, although given the difference of opinion being as radical as it is, that is pretty understandable (so are the downvotes, for the same reason). Maybe let it cool off for a bit. I have an interest in hearing what you think after you have spent more time here.

You remind me of Silas Barta, and I think we could use more people who radically disagree with major pieces of LW, because it is good practice if nothing else.

Amanojack 8 May 2012 19:46 UTC
−1 points
in reply to: Monkeymind’s comment on: Configurations and Amplitude
I think your position is just too radical here.

Ultimately all science has to eventually be used for prediction or it is useless except for aesthetic purposes. However, I do sympathize with what (I think) your main point was before, that prediction is no measure of a theory if the “theory” is just curve-fitting (it is, of course, a measure of the utility of the curve or equation that the data was fit to). That is really just common sense, though, so you may have meant something else.

Amanojack 8 May 2012 19:40 UTC
−4 points
in reply to: Monkeymind’s comment on: Configurations and Amplitude
This is a LessWrong idea two: play the why game, keep asking “why” all the way down. Can’t find the post on this though :/

Amanojack 8 May 2012 19:38 UTC
−4 points
in reply to: Monkeymind’s comment on: Configurations and Amplitude
Whoah, thanks for this. I get what you’re saying now: you oppose Ptolemaic explanations. I think these are good points—why’s this sensible post being downvoted? Even if there is something wrong with the reasoning, these seem like good, interesting questions to me.

Amanojack 8 May 2012 19:32 UTC
0 points
in reply to: Vaniver’s comment on: Configurations and Amplitude

Theories don’t explain- they predict. Consider gravity- Newton’s law tells you the attraction between two masses, and it’s mostly consistent with the mostly elliptical orbits that we observe the planets moving in.

The gravitational equation is effectively just* a summary of the observed data, so it is no surprise that it predicts. I believe Monkeymind finds this unsatsifactory, but I’m still not sure exactly how. Perhaps he defines theory differently. I’m a little curious what actually causes the Earth to pull on me, rather than, say, push me away. At the time Newton said he had no hypothesis for that, but now the same equation constitutes a theory or explanation? I feel like these terms are used a little too loosely.

*Not to imply that finding the equation that fit the data wasn’t an important achievement

Amanojack 8 May 2012 19:26 UTC
−2 points
in reply to: Swimmer963 (Miranda Dixon-Luinenburg) ’s comment on: Configurations and Amplitude
I would say the theory was poorly communicated, at best.

Amanojack 8 May 2012 19:23 UTC
−6 points
in reply to: Monkeymind’s comment on: Configurations and Amplitude
I think you two may be talking past each other here. You clearly would do some observation before hypothesizing or theorizing, just perhaps not as much. I think the real difference between your positions lies in how you’re defining a theory or an explanation (as opposed to a description of appearances). The explanation that QM raised to a level of attention was not an explanation in the way you probably mean, but more like what you may call a description, like a summary of observations.

Amanojack 8 May 2012 19:01 UTC
−2 points
in reply to: thomblake’s comment on: Configurations and Amplitude

Luckily, you can choose to use a mechanism other than human intuition to understand the universe. Like mathematics, which seems to do a much better job, even in a way observable to humans. We have lots of devices (observable at human scales!) that do exactly what the mathematics said they would, like GPS.

I think there is a common miscommunication on this point. If something cannot be understood in the conventional human sense, can it be understood via math? It depends on what we mean by “understand.” We can certainly catalog what we observe and summarize those data in the form of mathematical formulae and models.

However, if those are merely very succinct summaries, it is no surprise that they make accurate predictions, as they would effectively just be extrapolating from the observed data. It also seems unsatisfying to call that a theory in the traditional sense, if it is really more like curve-fitting.

Amanojack 8 May 2012 18:48 UTC
−1 points
in reply to: Mitchell_Porter’s comment on: Configurations and Amplitude

Learning QM has been compared to learning to ride a bicycle. You don’t do that by first defining your terms, you just get out there and do it, and it’s hard to reduce the knowledge of how to ride a bike to definitions.

This may indeed be the case, but taking the outside view—if I didn’t know you were talking about QM, but knew it was about some purported scientific theory—giving a free pass to the usual strict rationalist requirement to “define your terms clearly” would seem pretty dubious. There are a lot of ways to build whole systems out of equivocations and other such semantic fudging, a lot of religious argument operates that way, and so on.

Amanojack 8 May 2012 18:37 UTC
1 point
in reply to: Monkeymind’s comment on: Configurations and Amplitude
Your method of argumentation is a little unusual and perhaps a bit off-putting, but I don’t know why all your posts are being systematically downvoted this low. It’s clear from posts like this one that you’re not merely trolling, but I think you’re taking on too much at once. Also, your style is not very LessWrong friendly and you’re posting a lot. Maybe slow it down a bit, get familiar with the lay of the land a bit more.

I, for one, would like to hear a bit more about your misgivings. You’ve said some interesting things so far that have got me thinking.

Amanojack 8 May 2012 18:27 UTC
−4 points
in reply to: Monkeymind’s comment on: Configurations and Amplitude
One can’t really “explain” a particle. I would say, however, that if you cannot show the shape of the particle (how it occupies space), it is somewhat questionable to call it a “particle” in any classical sense that I’m familiar with.

Amanojack 8 May 2012 18:18 UTC
−1 points
in reply to: Monkeymind’s comment on: Configurations and Amplitude
Why shouldn’t physics talk about concepts? Or first, what is your definition of “object” and “concept”—even just by examples.

Amanojack 8 May 2012 18:14 UTC
−1 points
in reply to: Monkeymind’s comment on: Configurations and Amplitude

Yes, it does take far more than just defining ones terms, but we must start there b4 we can go anywhere else! I don’t mean a infinite number of now define that, now define that....just the KEY TERMS of one’s hypothesis b4 moving on to the theory. Whatever the defs are they must be used CONSISTENTLY.

I agree that key terms need a definition. They have apparently all been defined before, but no one here has yet shown an interest in giving those (or any) precise definitions right now. I’m not sure why, especially given that this is LessWrong. I’d help you out on that, but I honestly don’t know the precise definition that QM theorists use for wave. Surely someone must know?