Amanojack

• AmanojackMay 8, 2012, 6:06 PM

  2 points

  in reply to: Desrtopa’s comment on: Con­figu­ra­tions and Amplitude

  If quantum mechanical models accurately describe what’s happening, the fact that we can’t picture it in our heads is not a problem.

  I think there’s a danger of equivocating here on the words “what’s happening.” In other words, which “what’s happening” do the QM models describe?

  I’ll elaborate. If we observe X, do the QM models describe X, or do they describe the (so far unobserved) phenomena that may underly X?

  • If the mathematical QM model merely describes X, it’s hard to see how it is anything other than a very succinct cataloging of the observations, put in a very useful form. That’s quite an achievement, but I can understand the hesitation with calling it an explanation or a theory.

  • If the QM model actually describes some as-yet unobserved phenomena that is proposed to underly X, then it seems like it avoids Monkeymind’s criticisms because there is actually something additional being posited to be happening, behind the scenes as it were.

  If it is the latter, I’d be interested in seeing an example (anything in QM).

  What links here?

  • Amanojack's comment on Con­figu­ra­tions and Amplitude by Eliezer Yudkowsky (May 8, 2012, 7:01 PM; -2 points)

• AmanojackMay 8, 2012, 5:48 PM

  0 points

  in reply to: Desrtopa’s comment on: Con­figu­ra­tions and Amplitude

  “I can’t get a picture of this in my head” is not a rebuttal of a physical theory, because there’s no reason that our heads must actually be equipped to create pictures of how the fundamental level of reality works.

  Agreed, the basic structure of reality may be unvisualizable and otherwise incomprehensible to us. However, a theory is ostensibly a physical explanation, not merely a mathematical summary of the observed data. Reading over Monkeymind’s posts, it seems the point he is making is that these theories sort of seem to “feel like” physical explanations, but in the end are “just math.”

  The question naturally arises, to the newbie at least, of what the difference really is between a mathematical summary of the data we’ve collected and a mathematical theory of how (by what mechanism) a physical phenomenon occurs.

• AmanojackMay 8, 2012, 5:29 PM

  0 points

  in reply to: Desrtopa’s comment on: Con­figu­ra­tions and Amplitude

  Taking the outside view—that is, forgetting this is a conversation about QM—this sounds a little hand-wavy. It seems natural to ask for precise definitions of basic terms in an article about QM, and for consistency in their usage.

• AmanojackMay 4, 2012, 10:23 AM

  4 points

  in reply to: Jack’s comment on: Open Thread, May 1-15, 2012

  I didn’t say he was in the Bayesian camp, I said he had the Bayesian insight that probability is in the mind.

  In the final quote he is simply saying that mathematical statements of probability merely summarize our state of knowledge; they do not add anything to it other than putting it in a more useful form. I don’t see how this would be interpreted as going against subjectivism, especially when he clearly refers to probabilities being expressions of our ignorance.

• AmanojackMay 4, 2012, 8:34 AM

  2 points

  in reply to: Bart119’s comment on: Seek­ing links for the best ar­gu­ments for eco­nomic libertarianism

  I think you’ll find the extreme cases (totalitarian economic controls vs. complete laissez faire) to be helpful to look at so as to challenge the way you’re framing the spectrum.

  Also, politics and economics go hand in hand, economics being—in terms of what it is usually actually used for—the study of how political actions affect the economy. For example, David Friedman argues that courts would produce better rulings if they were not run as a monopoly, and that the same is true with laws and regulations themselves. So at the limit it is not easy to separate them.

  Another example is the libertarian argument that pollution is largely enable by weakened property rights due to laws passed in the 19th century (in the US case) preventing torts against polluters, and from the basic fact that the government essentially owns the waters and airways. These types of arguments tend to undercut the whole divide between economics and politics.

• AmanojackMay 4, 2012, 8:06 AM

  6 points

  on: Seek­ing links for the best ar­gu­ments for eco­nomic libertarianism

  Short: I, Pencil by Leonard E. Reed

  Long: Economics in One Lesson by Henry Hazlitt

  Very long: Socialism by Ludwig von Mises, or any of F.A. Hayek’s work on spontaneous order

  (All available in pdf form by googling, though some may be copyrighted)

  For specific questions, the Mises forums will happily supply you with arguments and tailored links for any economic questions. Just be sure to ask for arguments on consequentialist grounds since the forum is idealogically extremely libertarian (but friendly).

  If you’re looking for something more mild of the John Stossel or Milton Friedman variety, try anything by Friedman himself, or Thomas Sowell’s Basic Economics: A Common Sense Guide to the Economy—though these may not align with libertarian arguments on monetary policy.

• AmanojackMay 4, 2012, 6:31 AM

  1 point

  in reply to: Mitchell_Porter’s comment on: Open Thread, May 1-15, 2012

  I have also found claims that one or a few simple ideas can solve huge swaths of the world’s problems to be a sign of naivity, but another exception is when there is mass delusion or confusion due to systematic errors. Provided such pervasive and damaging errors do exist, merely clearing up those errors would be a major service to humanity. In this sense, Less Wrong and Misesian epistemology share a goal: to eliminate flawed reasoning. I am not sure why Mises chose to put forth this LW-style message as a positive theory (praxeology), but the content seems to me entirely negative in that it formalizes and systematizes many of the corrections economists (even mainstream ones) must have been tired of making. Perhaps he found that people were more receptive to hearing a “competing theory” than to having their own theories covered in red ink.

• AmanojackMay 3, 2012, 2:31 AM

  10 points

  in reply to: [deleted]’s comment on: Open Thread, May 1-15, 2012

  Sure. He wrote about it a lot. Here is a concise quote:

  The concepts of chance and contingency, if properly analyzed, do not refer ultimately to the course of events in the universe. They refer to human knowledge, prevision, and action. They have a praxeological [relating to human knowledge and action], not an ontological connotation.

  Also:

  Calling an event contingent is not to deny that it is the necessary outcome of the preceding state of affairs. It means that we mortal men do not know whether or not it will happen. The present epistemological situation in the field of quantum mechanics would be correctly described by the statement: We know the various patterns according to which atoms behave and we know the proportion in which each of these patterns becomes actual. This would describe the state of our knowledge as an instance of class probability: We know all about the behavior of the whole class; about the behavior of the individual members of the class we know only that they are members. A statement is probable if our knowledge concerning its content is deficient. We do not know everything which would be required for a definite decision between true and not true. But, on the other hand, we do know something about it; we are in a position to say more than simply non liquet or ignoramus. For this defective knowledge the calculus of probability provides a presentation in symbols of the mathematical terminology. It neither expands nor deepens nor complements our knowledge. It translates it into mathematical language. Its calculations repeat in algebraic formulas what we knew beforehand. They do not lead to results that would tell us anything about the actual singular events. And, of course, they do not add anything to our knowledge concerning the behavior of the whole class, as this knowledge was already perfect—or was considered perfect—at the very outset of our consideration of the matter.

• AmanojackMay 3, 2012, 2:16 AM

  1 point

  in reply to: praxis’s comment on: Open Thread, May 1-15, 2012

  My point was to indicate that not all people who put stock in the “Austrian school” accept post-Misesians as competent intepreters. I meant, essentially: Mises had it right, but read his original work (not later Austrians) and you’ll be able to tell whether I’m right.

• AmanojackMay 3, 2012, 2:09 AM

  1 point

  in reply to: Multiheaded’s comment on: Open Thread, May 1-15, 2012

  I would have prefaced that with “in my opinion,” but I thought that was obvious. (What else would it be?)

• AmanojackMay 2, 2012, 3:12 AM

  −1 points

  in reply to: [deleted]’s comment on: Open Thread, May 1-15, 2012

  Block and Rothbard do not understand Austrian economics and are incapable of defending it against serious rationalist criticism. Ludwig von Mises is the only rigorous rationalist in the “school”. His works make mincemeat of Caplan’s arguments decades before Caplan even makes them. But don’t take my word for it—go back and reread Mises directly.

  You will see that the “rationalist” objections Caplan raises are not new. They are simply born out of a misunderstanding of a complex topic. Rothbard, Block, and most of the other “Austrian” economists that followed merely added another layer of confusion because they weren’t careful enough thinkers to understand Mises.

  ETA: Speaking of Bayesianism, it was also rejected for centuries as being unscientific, for many of the same reasons that Mises’s observations have been. In fact, Mises explains exactly why probability is in the mind in his works almost a century ago, and he’s not even a mathematician. It is a straightforward application of his Austrian epistemology. I hope that doesn’t cause anyone’s head to explode.

• AmanojackMay 2, 2012, 2:54 AM

  −4 points

  in reply to: Matt_Simpson’s comment on: Open Thread, May 1-15, 2012

  Debating with Block would turn any rationalist off of Austrian econ. No one got it comletely right except Mises himself. Actually not even him, but he was usually extremely rational and rigorous in his approach—more than any other economist I know of—albeit often poorly communicated.

  In any case, any non-ideologically motivated rationalist worth their salt ought to be able to piece together a decent understanding of the epistemological issues by reading the first 200 pages of Human Action.

• AmanojackApr 13, 2012, 6:51 PM

  0 points

  in reply to: Jack2’s comment on: Words as Men­tal Paint­brush Handles

  I’ve had the same experience. To me this suggests that although not all conscious thoughts are visual, they may all be sensual. That is, of the five senses.

  Actually, this is tautological if “conscious thought” means a thought we are completely aware of, unless we can be ‘aware’ of something other than five-sense experience.

• AmanojackApr 13, 2012, 5:09 PM

  −1 points

  in reply to: Monkeymind’s comment on: Con­figu­ra­tions and Amplitude

  Eliezer can tell us how to visualize triangular lightbulbs, but not zero-dimensional objects. Which is more mysterious?

• AmanojackApr 13, 2012, 5:07 PM

  0 points

  in reply to: Insert_Idionym_Here’s comment on: Con­figu­ra­tions and Amplitude

  For that matter, amplitude of a wave...but what is waving? Where’s the realism?

• AmanojackFeb 4, 2012, 9:12 AM

  2 points

  on: Does func­tion­al­ism im­ply du­al­ism?

  The question of “dualism” isn’t even a real question. Science tells us that a certain wavelength of light will appear to us as green. But what really is the point of knowing that? Well, it gives us a set of instructions for how to make us experience green. But the instructions for how to produce the subjective experience are not themselves the experience. The notion that if we could just figure out how to make people experience green through some manipulation we will have learned something amazing is silly. We can already do that by showing a green flag or telling someone not to think of a green rabbit.

• AmanojackAug 10, 2011, 3:05 AM

  1 point

  in reply to: CuSithBell’s comment on: Not for the Sake of Plea­sure Alone

  Plus we have a hard time conceiving of what it would be like to always be in a state of maximal, beyond-orgasmic pleasure.

  When I imagine it I cannot help but let a little bit of revulsion, fear, and emptiness creep into the feeling—which of course would not be actually be there. This invalidates the whole thought experiment to me, because it’s clear I’m unable to perform it correctly, and I doubt I’m uncommon in that regard.

• AmanojackMay 26, 2011, 1:15 AM

  0 points

  in reply to: Peterdjones’s comment on: Con­cep­tual Anal­y­sis and Mo­ral Theory

  Dictionaries tend to define the moral as the good.It is hard to believe that anyone can grow up not hearing the word “good” used a lot, unless they were raised by wolves

  The problem isn’t that I don’t know what it means. The problem is that it means many different things and I don’t know which of those you mean by it.

  an amoral hedonist

  I have moral sentiments (empathy, sense of justice, indignation, etc.), so I’m not amoral. And I am not particularly high time-preference, so I’m not a hedonist.

  preferences can also be defined to include universalisable values alongside personal whims

  If you mean preferences that everyone else shares, sure, but there’s no stipulation in my definitions that other people can’t share the preferences. In fact, I said, “(though they may be universal or semi-universal).”

  You may be making the classic of error of taking “subjective” to mean “believed by a subject”

  It’d be a “classic error” to assume you meant one definition of subjective rather than another, when you haven’t supplied one yourself? This is about the eight time in this discussion that I’ve thought that I can’t imagine what you think language even is.

  I doubt we have any disagreement, to be honest. I think we only view language very, radically differently. (You could say we have a disagreement about language.)

Tor­ture Si­mu­lated with Flipbooks

• AmanojackMay 26, 2011, 12:42 AM

  0 points

  in reply to: Peterdjones’s comment on: Con­cep­tual Anal­y­sis and Mo­ral Theory

  This is the whole demonstrated preference thing. I don’t buy it myself, but that’s a debate for another time. What I mean by subjectively is that I will value one person’s life more than another person’s life, or I could think that I want that $1,000,000 more than a rich person wants it, but that’s just all in my head. To compare utility functions and work from demonstrated preference usually—not always—is a precursor to some kind of authoritarian scheme. I can’t say there is anything like that coming, but it does set off some alarm bells. Anyway, this is not something I can substantiate right now.