I should rephrase: I would like to accurately believe that the figure isn’t very high.
I’m actually really uncertain about whether there’s a meaningful distinction between “I want to sincerely and rationally believe x” and “I want x to be true” for a perfect Bayesian. For humans, of course, the distinction is enormous.
You’d like to be true, not you’d like to believe (I do so hope).
“I would like to believe it, and I would like the reason for that belief to be that it is true.”
I would like to believe that the true figure isn’t very high. But I like having beliefs that correspond with reality much more.
Do you like liking to believe things for reasons other than their truth?
I should rephrase: I would like to accurately believe that the figure isn’t very high.
I’m actually really uncertain about whether there’s a meaningful distinction between “I want to sincerely and rationally believe x” and “I want x to be true” for a perfect Bayesian. For humans, of course, the distinction is enormous.