My instinctive response to that chart was “YOU LIE!” I suspect the data is either based on a skewed sample, an incredibly broad definition of ESP, or simply wrong.
I expect the true number to be far higher than I’d like to believe, but 55% just doesn’t make sense.
I should rephrase: I would like to accurately believe that the figure isn’t very high.
I’m actually really uncertain about whether there’s a meaningful distinction between “I want to sincerely and rationally believe x” and “I want x to be true” for a perfect Bayesian. For humans, of course, the distinction is enormous.
My instinctive response to that chart was “YOU LIE!” I suspect the data is either based on a skewed sample, an incredibly broad definition of ESP, or simply wrong.
I expect the true number to be far higher than I’d like to believe, but 55% just doesn’t make sense.
You’d like to be true, not you’d like to believe (I do so hope).
“I would like to believe it, and I would like the reason for that belief to be that it is true.”
I would like to believe that the true figure isn’t very high. But I like having beliefs that correspond with reality much more.
Do you like liking to believe things for reasons other than their truth?
I should rephrase: I would like to accurately believe that the figure isn’t very high.
I’m actually really uncertain about whether there’s a meaningful distinction between “I want to sincerely and rationally believe x” and “I want x to be true” for a perfect Bayesian. For humans, of course, the distinction is enormous.