Physics has already given us better ideas that we could replace a belief in a time-continuous self with. If we choose not to use these ideas that better reflect what we know of reality, I wouldn’t call it a heuristic, but instead choosing faith over what pure reason would tell us.
Physics has already given us better ideas that we could replace a belief in a time-continuous self with. If we choose not to use these ideas that better reflect what we know of reality, I wouldn’t call it a heuristic, but instead choosing faith over what pure reason would tell us.
But physics has also confirmed that a time-continuous self is a good enough approximation under most circumstances. You wouldn’t call choosing Newtonian physics over relativity “faith”, and in most cases you wouldn’t call it wrong either. It is only when we try to use the approximation in corner cases, like cloning and death, that it becomes a problem.
The analogy would be that relativity says something that demoralizes us.
Using Newtonian physics as a heuristic when solving problems doesn’t allow us to avoid that demoralizing effect. If we’d still believe that relativity is the model that is actually true, the demoralizing effect would remain.
Calling a model “true” is a category error. Models predict their relevant details of reality to the accuracy and precision necessary for the tasks to which they are appropriately applied, as best they can.
It’s well-defined enough when we talk about models of reality, so far as what “reality” is, assumed understood. It’s clearly false that speed of light is 10km/s, it’s clearly true that speed of light is not 10 km/s.
Yes, the proposition “the speed of light is 10km/s” is false. However, it is entirely possible to have a model which sets the speed of light to 10km/s (to make the math simpler, possibly), that nonetheless churns out accurate predictions.
LCPW (least convenient possible world). I obviously meant that you use a standard physical framework. Accurate predictions = true model, completely wrong predictions = false model. Simple enough.
Eh. If you want to use words that way, I suppose I can’t stop you. You could also use the word “true” to mean “valid” with respect to arguments, and I think your intention would be obvious, but I will also call that a category error.
I’m gonna pull a Nesov on this one and say that belief in a time-continuous self can be thought of as a value/preference rather than belief. You care about your individual organism because evolution made you care about it, not because it is physically real (whatever that means).
Of course, similar reasoning can be used to show that observed particle physics is a Darwinian construct :-) Last I talked with Nesov about it, this was a big puzzle. Any news?
The lack of belief in a time-continuos self would give the same moral value to yourself as to other people, but wouldn’t eliminate caring about yourself altogether.
Example of what? You didn’t give your argument, only conclusion. I only guessed that this argument, whatever it is, will more visibly crumble in the case I suggested.
Eh. If you don’t know the argument it’s irrational to call it wrong. I didn’t really argue anything, I just made an observation for those people who possibly believe that time-continuos self is required for morality.
And you don’t provide any arguments for your claim either..
Okay, here’s one: Even with time-continuos self, humans value other people, even though they personally experience anything other peope do. There’s some (moral) value in other persons. Maybe people value themselves more, but that’s not even relevant to the argument. So, if time-continuos self doesn’t exist, people will value their future selfs as much as any other persons, which is atleast more than nothing.
Of course, this assumes that such a person does value other people. May not apply to every single person.
Don’t confuse heuristics with faith.
Physics has already given us better ideas that we could replace a belief in a time-continuous self with. If we choose not to use these ideas that better reflect what we know of reality, I wouldn’t call it a heuristic, but instead choosing faith over what pure reason would tell us.
But physics has also confirmed that a time-continuous self is a good enough approximation under most circumstances. You wouldn’t call choosing Newtonian physics over relativity “faith”, and in most cases you wouldn’t call it wrong either. It is only when we try to use the approximation in corner cases, like cloning and death, that it becomes a problem.
The analogy would be that relativity says something that demoralizes us.
Using Newtonian physics as a heuristic when solving problems doesn’t allow us to avoid that demoralizing effect. If we’d still believe that relativity is the model that is actually true, the demoralizing effect would remain.
Calling a model “true” is a category error. Models predict their relevant details of reality to the accuracy and precision necessary for the tasks to which they are appropriately applied, as best they can.
It’s well-defined enough when we talk about models of reality, so far as what “reality” is, assumed understood. It’s clearly false that speed of light is 10km/s, it’s clearly true that speed of light is not 10 km/s.
Yes, the proposition “the speed of light is 10km/s” is false. However, it is entirely possible to have a model which sets the speed of light to 10km/s (to make the math simpler, possibly), that nonetheless churns out accurate predictions.
LCPW (least convenient possible world). I obviously meant that you use a standard physical framework. Accurate predictions = true model, completely wrong predictions = false model. Simple enough.
Eh. If you want to use words that way, I suppose I can’t stop you. You could also use the word “true” to mean “valid” with respect to arguments, and I think your intention would be obvious, but I will also call that a category error.
I’m gonna pull a Nesov on this one and say that belief in a time-continuous self can be thought of as a value/preference rather than belief. You care about your individual organism because evolution made you care about it, not because it is physically real (whatever that means).
Of course, similar reasoning can be used to show that observed particle physics is a Darwinian construct :-) Last I talked with Nesov about it, this was a big puzzle. Any news?
The lack of belief in a time-continuos self would give the same moral value to yourself as to other people, but wouldn’t eliminate caring about yourself altogether.
Wrong. To see the error, try applying the argument to structures other than people.
Care to give an example then?
Example of what? You didn’t give your argument, only conclusion. I only guessed that this argument, whatever it is, will more visibly crumble in the case I suggested.
Eh. If you don’t know the argument it’s irrational to call it wrong. I didn’t really argue anything, I just made an observation for those people who possibly believe that time-continuos self is required for morality.
Your conclusion is wrong, therefore the argument must be wrong as well.
And you don’t provide any arguments for your claim either..
Okay, here’s one: Even with time-continuos self, humans value other people, even though they personally experience anything other peope do. There’s some (moral) value in other persons. Maybe people value themselves more, but that’s not even relevant to the argument. So, if time-continuos self doesn’t exist, people will value their future selfs as much as any other persons, which is atleast more than nothing.
Of course, this assumes that such a person does value other people. May not apply to every single person.