The lack of belief in a time-continuos self would give the same moral value to yourself as to other people, but wouldn’t eliminate caring about yourself altogether.
Example of what? You didn’t give your argument, only conclusion. I only guessed that this argument, whatever it is, will more visibly crumble in the case I suggested.
Eh. If you don’t know the argument it’s irrational to call it wrong. I didn’t really argue anything, I just made an observation for those people who possibly believe that time-continuos self is required for morality.
And you don’t provide any arguments for your claim either..
Okay, here’s one: Even with time-continuos self, humans value other people, even though they personally experience anything other peope do. There’s some (moral) value in other persons. Maybe people value themselves more, but that’s not even relevant to the argument. So, if time-continuos self doesn’t exist, people will value their future selfs as much as any other persons, which is atleast more than nothing.
Of course, this assumes that such a person does value other people. May not apply to every single person.
The lack of belief in a time-continuos self would give the same moral value to yourself as to other people, but wouldn’t eliminate caring about yourself altogether.
Wrong. To see the error, try applying the argument to structures other than people.
Care to give an example then?
Example of what? You didn’t give your argument, only conclusion. I only guessed that this argument, whatever it is, will more visibly crumble in the case I suggested.
Eh. If you don’t know the argument it’s irrational to call it wrong. I didn’t really argue anything, I just made an observation for those people who possibly believe that time-continuos self is required for morality.
Your conclusion is wrong, therefore the argument must be wrong as well.
And you don’t provide any arguments for your claim either..
Okay, here’s one: Even with time-continuos self, humans value other people, even though they personally experience anything other peope do. There’s some (moral) value in other persons. Maybe people value themselves more, but that’s not even relevant to the argument. So, if time-continuos self doesn’t exist, people will value their future selfs as much as any other persons, which is atleast more than nothing.
Of course, this assumes that such a person does value other people. May not apply to every single person.