Denote F as a world in which free will exists, f as one in which it doesn’t.
I am unable to attach a truth condition to these sentences—I can’t imagine two different ways that reality could be which would make the statements true or alternatively false.
You shouldn’t consider worlds of type f in your decision, because if you’re in one of those worlds, your decision is pre-ordained.
If I want to, I can assign a meaning to “free will” in which it is tautologically true of causal universes as such, and applied to agents, is true of some agents but not others. But you used the term, you tell me what it means to you.
You used the term first. You called it a “dead horse” and “about as easy as a problem can get and still be Confusing”. I would think this meant that you have a clear concept of what it means. And it can’t be a tautology, because tautologies are not dead horses.
I can at least say that, to me, “Free will exists” implies “No Omega can predict with certainty whether I will one-box or two-box.” (This is not an “if and only if” because I don’t want to say that a random process has free will; nor that an undecidable algorithm has free will.)
I thought about saying: “Free will does not exist” if and only if “Consciousness is epiphenomenal”. That sounds dangerously tautological, but closer to what I mean.
I can’t think how to say anything more descriptive than what I wrote in my first comment above. I understand that saying there is free will seems to imply that I am not an algorithm; and that that seems to require some weird spiritualism or vitalism. But that is vague and fuzzy to me; whereas it is clear that it doesn’t make sense to worry about what I should do in the worlds where I can’t actually choose what I will do. I choose to live with the vague paradox rather than the clear-cut one.
ADDED: I should clarify that I don’t believe in free will. I believe there is no such thing. But, when choosing how to act, I don’t consider that possibility, because of the reasons I gave previously.
All right, I read all of the non-italicized links, except for the “All posts on Less Wrong tagged Free Will”, trusting that one of them would say something relevant to what I’ve said here. But alas, no.
All of those links are attempts to argue about the truth value of “there is free will”, or about whether the concept of free will is coherent, or about what sort of mental models might cause someone to believe in free will.
None of those things are at issue here. What I am talking about is what happens when you are trying to compute something over different possible worlds, where what your computation actually does is different in these different worlds. When you must compare expected value in possible worlds in which there is no free will, to expected value in possible worlds in which there is free will, and then make a choice; what that choice actually does is not independent of what possible world you end up in. This means that you can’t apply expectation-maximization in the usual way. The counterintuitive result, I think, is that you should act in the way that maximizes expected value given that there is free will, regardless of the computed expected value given that there is not free will.
As I mentioned, I don’t believe in free will. But I think, based on a history of other concepts or frameworks that seemed paradoxical but were eventually worked out satisfactorily, that it’s possible there’s something to the naive notion of “free will”.
We have a naive notion of “free will” which, so far, no one has been able to connect up with our understanding of physics in a coherent way. This is powerful evidence that it doesn’t exist, or isn’t even a meaningful concept. It isn’t proof, however; I could say the same thing about “consciousness”, which as far as I can see really shouldn’t exist.
All attempts that I’ve seen so far to parse out what free will means, including Eliezer’s careful and well-written essays linked to above, fail to noticeably reduce the probability I assign to there being naive “free will”, because the probability that there is some error in the description or mapping or analogies made is always much higher than the very-low prior probability that I assign to there being “free will”.
I’m not arguing in favor of free will. I’m arguing that, when considering an action to take that is conditioned on the existence of free will, you should not do the usual expected-utility calculations, because the answer to the free will question determines what it is you’re actually doing when you choose an action to take, in a way that has an asymmetry such that, if there is any possibility epsilon > 0 that free will exists, you should assume it exists.
(BTW, I think a philosopher who wished to defend free will could rightfully make the blanket assertion against all of Eliezer’s posts that they assume what they are trying to prove. It’s pointless to start from the position that you are an algorithm in a Blocks World, and argue from there against free will. There’s some good stuff in there, but it’s not going to convince someone who isn’t already reductionist or determinist.)
When you must compare expected value in possible worlds in which there is no free will, to expected value in possible worlds in which there is free will
I have stated exactly what I mean by the term “free will” and it makes this sentence nonsense; there is no world in which you do not have free will. And I see no way that your will could possibly be any freer than it already is. There is no possible amendment to reality which you can consistently describe, that would make your free will any freer than it is in our own timeless and deterministic (though branching) universe.
What do you mean by “free will” that makes your sentence non-nonsense? Don’t say “if we did actually have free will”, tell me how reality could be different.
in our own timeless and deterministic (though branching) universe.
That’s the part I don’t buy. I’m not saying it’s false, but I don’t see any good reason to think it’s true. (I think I read the posts where you explained why you believe it, but I might have missed some.)
I can’t state exactly what I mean by “free will”, any more than I can state exactly what I mean by “consciousness”. No one has come up with a reductionist account of either. But since I actually do believe in consciousness, I can’t dismiss free will as nonsense.
A clarification added in response to the instantaneous orgy of downvotes: I realize that Eliezer has provided a reductionist explanation for how he thinks “free will” should be interpreted, and for why people believe in it. That is not what I mean. I mean that no one has come up with a reductionist account for how what people actually mean by “free will” could work in the physical world. Just as no one has come up with a reductionist account for how what people mean by “consciousness” could work in the physical world.
If you find a reason to disagree with this, it means that you have a tremendously important insight, and should probably write a little comment to share your revelation with us on a reductionist implementation of naive free will, or consciousness.
I can’t state exactly what I mean by “free will”, any more than I can state exactly what I mean by “consciousness”. No one has come up with a reductionist account of either.
This is not only incorrect, but is in dismissive denial of statements to the opposite made by people in response to your questions. One thing is to consider an argument incorrect or to be unwilling to accept it, another is to fail to understand the argument to the point of denying its very existence.
You should be more specific: Point out which part of my statement is incorrect, and what statements I am dismissively denying.
A reductionist account of causality does not count as a reductionist account of free will. Saying, “The world is deterministic, therefore ‘free will’ actually means the uninteresting concept X that is not what anybody means by ‘free will’” does not count as a deterministic account of free will.
What I mean is that no one has provided a reductionist account of how the naive notion of free will could work. Not that no one has provided a reductionist account of how the world actually works and what “free will” maps onto in that world.
I’m also curious why it’s bad for me to dismissively deny statements made to me, but okay for you to dismissively deny my statements as incorrect.
What I mean is that no one has provided a reductionist account of how the naive notion of free will could work.
Because that would be as silly as seeking a reductionist account of how souls or gods could “work”—the only way you’re going to get one is by explaining how the brain tends to believe these (purely mental) phenomena actually exist.
Free will is just the feeling that more than one choice is possible, just like a soul or a god is just the feeling of agency, detached from an actual agent.
All three are descriptions of mental phenomena, rather than having anything to do with a physical reality outside the brain.
Again—yes, I agree that what you say is almost certainly true. The reason I said that no one has provided a reductionist account of how the naive notion of free will could work, was to point out its similarity to the question of consciousness, which seems as nonsensical as free will, and yet exists; and thereby show that there is a possibility that there is something to the naive notion. And as long as there is some probability epsilon > 0 of that, then we have the situation I described above when performing expectation maximization.
BTW, your response is an assertion, or at best an explaining-away; not a proof.
I am unable to attach a truth condition to these sentences—I can’t imagine two different ways that reality could be which would make the statements true or alternatively false.
http://wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/Free_will_(solution)
Do you mean that the phrases “free will exists” and “free will does not exist” are both incoherent?
If I want to, I can assign a meaning to “free will” in which it is tautologically true of causal universes as such, and applied to agents, is true of some agents but not others. But you used the term, you tell me what it means to you.
You used the term first. You called it a “dead horse” and “about as easy as a problem can get and still be Confusing”. I would think this meant that you have a clear concept of what it means. And it can’t be a tautology, because tautologies are not dead horses.
I can at least say that, to me, “Free will exists” implies “No Omega can predict with certainty whether I will one-box or two-box.” (This is not an “if and only if” because I don’t want to say that a random process has free will; nor that an undecidable algorithm has free will.)
I thought about saying: “Free will does not exist” if and only if “Consciousness is epiphenomenal”. That sounds dangerously tautological, but closer to what I mean.
I can’t think how to say anything more descriptive than what I wrote in my first comment above. I understand that saying there is free will seems to imply that I am not an algorithm; and that that seems to require some weird spiritualism or vitalism. But that is vague and fuzzy to me; whereas it is clear that it doesn’t make sense to worry about what I should do in the worlds where I can’t actually choose what I will do. I choose to live with the vague paradox rather than the clear-cut one.
ADDED: I should clarify that I don’t believe in free will. I believe there is no such thing. But, when choosing how to act, I don’t consider that possibility, because of the reasons I gave previously.
Then you’ve got the naive incoherent version of “free will” stuck in your head. Read the links.
http://wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/Free_will
http://wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/Freewill(solution)
All right, I read all of the non-italicized links, except for the “All posts on Less Wrong tagged Free Will”, trusting that one of them would say something relevant to what I’ve said here. But alas, no.
All of those links are attempts to argue about the truth value of “there is free will”, or about whether the concept of free will is coherent, or about what sort of mental models might cause someone to believe in free will.
None of those things are at issue here. What I am talking about is what happens when you are trying to compute something over different possible worlds, where what your computation actually does is different in these different worlds. When you must compare expected value in possible worlds in which there is no free will, to expected value in possible worlds in which there is free will, and then make a choice; what that choice actually does is not independent of what possible world you end up in. This means that you can’t apply expectation-maximization in the usual way. The counterintuitive result, I think, is that you should act in the way that maximizes expected value given that there is free will, regardless of the computed expected value given that there is not free will.
As I mentioned, I don’t believe in free will. But I think, based on a history of other concepts or frameworks that seemed paradoxical but were eventually worked out satisfactorily, that it’s possible there’s something to the naive notion of “free will”.
We have a naive notion of “free will” which, so far, no one has been able to connect up with our understanding of physics in a coherent way. This is powerful evidence that it doesn’t exist, or isn’t even a meaningful concept. It isn’t proof, however; I could say the same thing about “consciousness”, which as far as I can see really shouldn’t exist.
All attempts that I’ve seen so far to parse out what free will means, including Eliezer’s careful and well-written essays linked to above, fail to noticeably reduce the probability I assign to there being naive “free will”, because the probability that there is some error in the description or mapping or analogies made is always much higher than the very-low prior probability that I assign to there being “free will”.
I’m not arguing in favor of free will. I’m arguing that, when considering an action to take that is conditioned on the existence of free will, you should not do the usual expected-utility calculations, because the answer to the free will question determines what it is you’re actually doing when you choose an action to take, in a way that has an asymmetry such that, if there is any possibility epsilon > 0 that free will exists, you should assume it exists.
(BTW, I think a philosopher who wished to defend free will could rightfully make the blanket assertion against all of Eliezer’s posts that they assume what they are trying to prove. It’s pointless to start from the position that you are an algorithm in a Blocks World, and argue from there against free will. There’s some good stuff in there, but it’s not going to convince someone who isn’t already reductionist or determinist.)
I have stated exactly what I mean by the term “free will” and it makes this sentence nonsense; there is no world in which you do not have free will. And I see no way that your will could possibly be any freer than it already is. There is no possible amendment to reality which you can consistently describe, that would make your free will any freer than it is in our own timeless and deterministic (though branching) universe.
What do you mean by “free will” that makes your sentence non-nonsense? Don’t say “if we did actually have free will”, tell me how reality could be different.
That’s the part I don’t buy. I’m not saying it’s false, but I don’t see any good reason to think it’s true. (I think I read the posts where you explained why you believe it, but I might have missed some.)
I can’t state exactly what I mean by “free will”, any more than I can state exactly what I mean by “consciousness”. No one has come up with a reductionist account of either. But since I actually do believe in consciousness, I can’t dismiss free will as nonsense.
A clarification added in response to the instantaneous orgy of downvotes: I realize that Eliezer has provided a reductionist explanation for how he thinks “free will” should be interpreted, and for why people believe in it. That is not what I mean. I mean that no one has come up with a reductionist account for how what people actually mean by “free will” could work in the physical world. Just as no one has come up with a reductionist account for how what people mean by “consciousness” could work in the physical world.
If you find a reason to disagree with this, it means that you have a tremendously important insight, and should probably write a little comment to share your revelation with us on a reductionist implementation of naive free will, or consciousness.
This is not only incorrect, but is in dismissive denial of statements to the opposite made by people in response to your questions. One thing is to consider an argument incorrect or to be unwilling to accept it, another is to fail to understand the argument to the point of denying its very existence.
You should be more specific: Point out which part of my statement is incorrect, and what statements I am dismissively denying.
A reductionist account of causality does not count as a reductionist account of free will. Saying, “The world is deterministic, therefore ‘free will’ actually means the uninteresting concept X that is not what anybody means by ‘free will’” does not count as a deterministic account of free will.
What I mean is that no one has provided a reductionist account of how the naive notion of free will could work. Not that no one has provided a reductionist account of how the world actually works and what “free will” maps onto in that world.
I’m also curious why it’s bad for me to dismissively deny statements made to me, but okay for you to dismissively deny my statements as incorrect.
Because that would be as silly as seeking a reductionist account of how souls or gods could “work”—the only way you’re going to get one is by explaining how the brain tends to believe these (purely mental) phenomena actually exist.
Free will is just the feeling that more than one choice is possible, just like a soul or a god is just the feeling of agency, detached from an actual agent.
All three are descriptions of mental phenomena, rather than having anything to do with a physical reality outside the brain.
Again—yes, I agree that what you say is almost certainly true. The reason I said that no one has provided a reductionist account of how the naive notion of free will could work, was to point out its similarity to the question of consciousness, which seems as nonsensical as free will, and yet exists; and thereby show that there is a possibility that there is something to the naive notion. And as long as there is some probability epsilon > 0 of that, then we have the situation I described above when performing expectation maximization.
BTW, your response is an assertion, or at best an explaining-away; not a proof.