I can’t state exactly what I mean by “free will”, any more than I can state exactly what I mean by “consciousness”. No one has come up with a reductionist account of either. But since I actually do believe in consciousness, I can’t dismiss free will as nonsense.
A clarification added in response to the instantaneous orgy of downvotes: I realize that Eliezer has provided a reductionist explanation for how he thinks “free will” should be interpreted, and for why people believe in it. That is not what I mean. I mean that no one has come up with a reductionist account for how what people actually mean by “free will” could work in the physical world. Just as no one has come up with a reductionist account for how what people mean by “consciousness” could work in the physical world.
If you find a reason to disagree with this, it means that you have a tremendously important insight, and should probably write a little comment to share your revelation with us on a reductionist implementation of naive free will, or consciousness.
I can’t state exactly what I mean by “free will”, any more than I can state exactly what I mean by “consciousness”. No one has come up with a reductionist account of either.
This is not only incorrect, but is in dismissive denial of statements to the opposite made by people in response to your questions. One thing is to consider an argument incorrect or to be unwilling to accept it, another is to fail to understand the argument to the point of denying its very existence.
You should be more specific: Point out which part of my statement is incorrect, and what statements I am dismissively denying.
A reductionist account of causality does not count as a reductionist account of free will. Saying, “The world is deterministic, therefore ‘free will’ actually means the uninteresting concept X that is not what anybody means by ‘free will’” does not count as a deterministic account of free will.
What I mean is that no one has provided a reductionist account of how the naive notion of free will could work. Not that no one has provided a reductionist account of how the world actually works and what “free will” maps onto in that world.
I’m also curious why it’s bad for me to dismissively deny statements made to me, but okay for you to dismissively deny my statements as incorrect.
What I mean is that no one has provided a reductionist account of how the naive notion of free will could work.
Because that would be as silly as seeking a reductionist account of how souls or gods could “work”—the only way you’re going to get one is by explaining how the brain tends to believe these (purely mental) phenomena actually exist.
Free will is just the feeling that more than one choice is possible, just like a soul or a god is just the feeling of agency, detached from an actual agent.
All three are descriptions of mental phenomena, rather than having anything to do with a physical reality outside the brain.
Again—yes, I agree that what you say is almost certainly true. The reason I said that no one has provided a reductionist account of how the naive notion of free will could work, was to point out its similarity to the question of consciousness, which seems as nonsensical as free will, and yet exists; and thereby show that there is a possibility that there is something to the naive notion. And as long as there is some probability epsilon > 0 of that, then we have the situation I described above when performing expectation maximization.
BTW, your response is an assertion, or at best an explaining-away; not a proof.
I can’t state exactly what I mean by “free will”, any more than I can state exactly what I mean by “consciousness”. No one has come up with a reductionist account of either. But since I actually do believe in consciousness, I can’t dismiss free will as nonsense.
A clarification added in response to the instantaneous orgy of downvotes: I realize that Eliezer has provided a reductionist explanation for how he thinks “free will” should be interpreted, and for why people believe in it. That is not what I mean. I mean that no one has come up with a reductionist account for how what people actually mean by “free will” could work in the physical world. Just as no one has come up with a reductionist account for how what people mean by “consciousness” could work in the physical world.
If you find a reason to disagree with this, it means that you have a tremendously important insight, and should probably write a little comment to share your revelation with us on a reductionist implementation of naive free will, or consciousness.
This is not only incorrect, but is in dismissive denial of statements to the opposite made by people in response to your questions. One thing is to consider an argument incorrect or to be unwilling to accept it, another is to fail to understand the argument to the point of denying its very existence.
You should be more specific: Point out which part of my statement is incorrect, and what statements I am dismissively denying.
A reductionist account of causality does not count as a reductionist account of free will. Saying, “The world is deterministic, therefore ‘free will’ actually means the uninteresting concept X that is not what anybody means by ‘free will’” does not count as a deterministic account of free will.
What I mean is that no one has provided a reductionist account of how the naive notion of free will could work. Not that no one has provided a reductionist account of how the world actually works and what “free will” maps onto in that world.
I’m also curious why it’s bad for me to dismissively deny statements made to me, but okay for you to dismissively deny my statements as incorrect.
Because that would be as silly as seeking a reductionist account of how souls or gods could “work”—the only way you’re going to get one is by explaining how the brain tends to believe these (purely mental) phenomena actually exist.
Free will is just the feeling that more than one choice is possible, just like a soul or a god is just the feeling of agency, detached from an actual agent.
All three are descriptions of mental phenomena, rather than having anything to do with a physical reality outside the brain.
Again—yes, I agree that what you say is almost certainly true. The reason I said that no one has provided a reductionist account of how the naive notion of free will could work, was to point out its similarity to the question of consciousness, which seems as nonsensical as free will, and yet exists; and thereby show that there is a possibility that there is something to the naive notion. And as long as there is some probability epsilon > 0 of that, then we have the situation I described above when performing expectation maximization.
BTW, your response is an assertion, or at best an explaining-away; not a proof.