Could we have predicted Russia’s intention to invade Ukraine earlier? Back in August 2021 the energy prices in Europe doubled and stayed at this level until the start of hostilites:
This, of course, did not go unnoticed. Many, many articles were written about it. Shockingly, a wide range of unsubstantiated theories for the rise were presented in these, often with a suggestion that carbon taxes or decarbonisation was the root cause.
Actually, the root cause was an increase in natural gas prices. This was obvious at the time to anyone who knows how the energy market price is determined:
Energy is consumed in merit order, left to right, until demand is met. The last source determines the market spot price for all providers (image source)
The cause of the gas price increase was that Russia suddenly restricted its supplies to Europe, which was also noticed and reported on as in this CNBC article titled “Russia is pumping a lot less natural gas to Europe all of a sudden — and it is not clear why”.
The effect was to dramatically lower European gas reserves, which was also noticed:
Why would Russia deliberately reduce European gas reserves? To increase their leverage, ideally timed at some point in the future when Europe needs that gas the most. This has to be relatively short-term, as if supply remains low and prices high over the long term Europe will choose to fill its reserves anyway, giving us three main sweet spots:
Late 2021: reserves insufficient to cover the winter and demand high.
Early 2022: reserves at their lowest point, but demand decreasing for 9 months.
Late 2022: demand increasing but risks that reserves have had time to refill.
What conclusions could we draw from information in August 2021 about this? Well, by April of 2021 Russia had amassed significant and unusual forces on the border with Ukraine, which was also well-reported:
Russia claimed the forces were on training exercises. Western spectators mostly seem to have assumed sabre-rattling.
That interpretation is inconsistent with reducing gas supply to Europe over a period of months to ensure gas supplies will be depleted after the winter of 2021. The logical conclusion from Russia’s military buildup (which intensified in October 2021) must have been that Putin plans to invade, ideally in late 2021 but at the latest in early 2022.
With 20⁄20 hindsight it’s easy to cherry-pick evidence. So I have a few questions:
Who drew this connection in August / October 2021? I haven’t found anything but would love to update on these people’s current analysis of events.
What’s was the steel-man case in August / October 2021 that Putin is not preparing for war—which other concrete information out there was strong enough to overlook these clear signs of economic and military preparation for war?
Is there evidence that the invasion was delayed by 1-2 months? The economic timing suggests Putin would have had more leverage if he had invaded at the start of winter. Indeed, much was made of the spring thawing making the invasion harder (soft ground channels heavy vehicles along roads, making them more vulnerable) and the actual timing meant Europe was able to refill its gas reserves ahead of the 2022 winter.
This is a rare opportunity to look back and update on world-model predictions. The information was there. Who saw it and made the case?
Signals of war in August 2021
Could we have predicted Russia’s intention to invade Ukraine earlier? Back in August 2021 the energy prices in Europe doubled and stayed at this level until the start of hostilites:
This, of course, did not go unnoticed. Many, many articles were written about it. Shockingly, a wide range of unsubstantiated theories for the rise were presented in these, often with a suggestion that carbon taxes or decarbonisation was the root cause.
Actually, the root cause was an increase in natural gas prices. This was obvious at the time to anyone who knows how the energy market price is determined:
The cause of the gas price increase was that Russia suddenly restricted its supplies to Europe, which was also noticed and reported on as in this CNBC article titled “Russia is pumping a lot less natural gas to Europe all of a sudden — and it is not clear why”.
The effect was to dramatically lower European gas reserves, which was also noticed:
Why would Russia deliberately reduce European gas reserves? To increase their leverage, ideally timed at some point in the future when Europe needs that gas the most. This has to be relatively short-term, as if supply remains low and prices high over the long term Europe will choose to fill its reserves anyway, giving us three main sweet spots:
Late 2021: reserves insufficient to cover the winter and demand high.
Early 2022: reserves at their lowest point, but demand decreasing for 9 months.
Late 2022: demand increasing but risks that reserves have had time to refill.
What conclusions could we draw from information in August 2021 about this? Well, by April of 2021 Russia had amassed significant and unusual forces on the border with Ukraine, which was also well-reported:
Russia claimed the forces were on training exercises. Western spectators mostly seem to have assumed sabre-rattling.
That interpretation is inconsistent with reducing gas supply to Europe over a period of months to ensure gas supplies will be depleted after the winter of 2021. The logical conclusion from Russia’s military buildup (which intensified in October 2021) must have been that Putin plans to invade, ideally in late 2021 but at the latest in early 2022.
With 20⁄20 hindsight it’s easy to cherry-pick evidence. So I have a few questions:
Who drew this connection in August / October 2021? I haven’t found anything but would love to update on these people’s current analysis of events.
What’s was the steel-man case in August / October 2021 that Putin is not preparing for war—which other concrete information out there was strong enough to overlook these clear signs of economic and military preparation for war?
Is there evidence that the invasion was delayed by 1-2 months? The economic timing suggests Putin would have had more leverage if he had invaded at the start of winter. Indeed, much was made of the spring thawing making the invasion harder (soft ground channels heavy vehicles along roads, making them more vulnerable) and the actual timing meant Europe was able to refill its gas reserves ahead of the 2022 winter.
This is a rare opportunity to look back and update on world-model predictions. The information was there. Who saw it and made the case?