“Are you using a different definition of “fundamental”? What I mean by it is an element that is not produced by any other elements”
Epistemologically, your subjective experience is more fundamental than physical reality. The entire world could be a simulation, and then Physics would be false; on the other hand, subjective experience and Mathematics is true in absolute and aprioristic grounds. Color red, an orgasm, and natural numbers and the Fermat theorem are true, even if you are trapped in Matrix, under the power of a “malign genius”.
Cartesian subjectivism and Newtonian mechanism were almost contemporaneous, and they created a massive Schism in philosophy and the Western mind. From the perspective of the mathematician and the philosopher, subjective experience is immediate and “fundamental”, while sensorial experience imply “faith”. You cannot prove anything about physical reality because you cannot prove there is a physical reality at all. But in Mathematics, you can prove many things, because they refer to mental objects, and your mind and its objects are (unproblematically) real. That is why mathematical theorems are more certain than physical laws. When you accept that, it implies that conscience is more epistemologically fundamental than physical reality. You are trapped in your self, and the “world” is not more than an act of faith or a useful hypothesis that coordinates your experience.
Of course, I have faith in sensory experience (unlike Tensor White, see comment below, that has more faith in God and less in brutal matter). But I am aware of the abyss that separates me from wherever Physical reality is, and the fact that that abyss can only be crossed by faith (unlike you accept St Anselm ontological proof of God existence, as Descartes did).
“Instead of trying to understand the mystery of how consciousness is produced by matter interactions it just postulates that it’s a separate entity”
I begin my exposition describing what means “explanation” in Physicalism. Life is explained by pointing out that its apparent special characteristics (reproduction, autopoiesis, etc) are simply results of the laws of Physics. Reductionist biology takes a life form, makes inverse engeneering and show the “plans” of the being, and you can understand how it works from physical and chemical laws (that means finally only Physics).
But what about chat GTP? How helpful are the “plans” of the machine to assess conscience? What additional scientific knowledge do you need? You have the generative model, the most complete set of plans and physical relations you can dream of. Regarding chat GTP you are almost like the Laplace demon. Still, you don’t know how sentient is it.
For me that is “Naturalistic dualism”: the physicalist-reductionist explanation (no matter how perfect) is simply not enough for the assessment of sentience. Either there is some other type of scientific explanation beyond reductionism-physicalism, or simply conscience is beyond our scientific assessment (not understanding! The typical naturalistic dualist thinks that “there is nothing to explain” nor understand, probably because we accept what explanation is since Newtonian “hypothsys non fingo”). Sentience is real, and it is simply “there” for some physical systems, there is no way to assess which ones.
“What if there was an entity that could consider possible futures conditional on its actions and choose one of them—suiting its goals the best, - and yet this entity completely lacked conscious experience?”
If it “considers”, “chose” and “has goals”, it is conscious.
Tensor White
Thank you for your comment. I cannot answer you with the kind of detail that I did to “Ape in the coat”, because I am a materialist (as materialist as possible, in a Universe where conscience exists). I agree that it takes a lot of intellectual machinery and some leaps of faith, but reality is as it is: atoms and emptiness, as Democritus discovered more than 2500 years ago.
TAG
“Doesnt that amount to saying that free will isn’t really real,but seems real?”
It is as “real” as the set of natural numbers or as real as “true love”. For me that is more real than a neutron star that nobody has ever seen. The stream of my conscience is more real than anything else and well defined mental objects there are very real.
“Libertarian free will allows the future to depend on decisions which are not themselves determined.”
Everything is physically determined. But when a conscious being has N options, and choses one, he chooses what he wants (=he is free), no matter how determined is what he wants.
The discussion on moral responsibility comes from that: when you accidentally kill your wife you can say you didn’t chose. On the other hand, if there is intent, the determination by material causes of your act does not change that the act was conscious and then your conscience [=you] is evil.
As Jan Blomqvist said, we are “ghosted machines”. The fact that the ghost comes from the machine doesn’t mean that the product of the machine cannot be an evil ghost.
Thank you very much for this marvelous discussion. At least, even if does not end as an academic paper, I am very happy with this exchange.
Sorry for the delay, but there are posting (one per hour, 3 per day) limitations for low karma participants even in their own posts.
“Doesnt that amount to saying that free will isn’t really real,but seems real?”
It is as “real” as the set of natural numbers
That isn’t helpful, because there is no agreement about how real numbers are. I’m an anti realist myself.
or as real as “true love”. For me that is more real than a neutron star that nobody has ever seen. The stream of my conscience is more real than anything else and well defined mental objects there are very real.
What you are not doing is arguing against the counter-claims …that there is a much more robust sense of “real” than “seems real to me”, that “seemingly real” is more “seeming” than “real”.
Epistemologically, your subjective experience is more fundamental than physical reality.
But what about ontologically? Surely that is the gold standard.
Indeed the requirement for free choice is not knowing what you will choose.
That doesn’t make a choice free of anything at all. At best, it’s an illusion of indeterminism.
Everything is physically determined. But when a conscious being has N options, and choses one, he chooses what he wants (=he is free), no matter how determined is what he wants.
That’s the standard argument for compatibilist free will. Compatibilist free will only needs preferences and the ability to act on them. Adding a dualistic layer to physical reality doesn’t give you any more compatibilist free will, and it doesn’t get you libertarian free will, as you admit. So what is doing?
My position is that freedom is a property related to conscious experience, so as long as there is no conscience, my definition of freedom cannot be applied. Conscious choice is the basis of freedom.
So being able to do what you want isn’t the basis of freedom?
The discussion on moral responsibility comes from that: when you accidentally kill your wife you can say you didn’t chose. On the other hand, if there is intent, the determination by material causes of your act does not change that the act was conscious and then your conscience [=you] is evil.
There are reasons for being concerned with libertarian free will other than moral responsibility.
“Libertarian free will allows the future to depend on decisions which are not themselves determined.”
We belive this, because Laplace demon has an explanation of all material facts (that is physicalism, isn’t it?). What else can you “know”, what else can you explain?
It’s obvious to you that “all physical facts” doesn’t include consciousness, it’s obvious to Ape that it does. It’s pretty circular either way.
That’s the standard argument for compatibilist free will. Compatibilist free will only needs preferences and the ability to act on them. Adding a dualistic layer to physical reality doesn’t give you any more compatibilist free will, and it doesn’t get you libertarian free will, as you admit. So what is doing?
Let’s work over the case of a deterministic physicalist universe, to simplify. You can divide reality in two disjoint arbitrary sets covering the whole universe, called “Brain” and “Rest”. Laplace demon has all information about “Rest” while no information about “Brain”. Now, he can compute all possible futures of the universe for each possible configuration of “Brain”. This set of possible futures tells us the “degrees of freedom of Brain”, that is, how this subset of the reality can influence the Universe. This is a cumbersome but legitimate exercise, and a totally materialistic one.
Now, we go to the other side of reality: suppose that “Brain” is not an arbitrary part of the universe, but one that has an attached stream of unified conscientious experience (those systems exist: I am one of them, hopefully you too). “Brain” is volitive and has a feeling of free will and choice. What I say, is that the scope of possible futures among which a conscious being chose is an approximation to the “degrees of freedom of Brain” that I defined in the previous paragraph (with the help of a Laplace demon). What I claim from this is that the feeling and the scope of freedom are rigorous mental objects. That they illusory as a Hamiltonian, not as a unicorn!
So I guess my position is “compatibilist”, but my experience reading compatibilist texts is that they are not as clear as my exposition before.
Of course, everything depends on conscience, because it is the mental experience of free will what is under analysis here. What I am trying to do is to assess the rationality of that experience. The unpredictability of the disintegration of an atomic nucleus is not an instance of free will, and in fact, I have developed all my argumentation for a purely deterministic universe (but one where the future can be affected by the present, but no the other way around. How is that possible if the laws of Physics are time symmetric?… That is for me the real open question; the philosophical part [=relation between physical reality and epiphenomenal conscience] is straightforward).
Now, he can compute all possible futures of the universe for each possible configuration of “Brain”. This set of possible futures tells us the “degrees of freedom of Brain”, that is, how this subset of the reality can influence the Universe.
From L’s D’s point of view , everything that your brain does is predictable given Brain+Rest, and in fact, everything your brain does is predictable from the global state of the universe before it existed. So Brain has no degree of freedom.
What I say, is that the scope of possible futures among which a conscious being chose is an approximation to the “degrees of freedom of Brain”
If you consider Brain separately from everything else, then you introduce Knightian Uncertainty: it appears to have degrees of of freedom, because you have neglected a bunch of causal factors. The freedom only seems to exist because of absence of complete information.
how this subset of the reality can influence the Universe.
But it can’t, really, because it’s mutually causally dependent on everything else. You could make the same argument about anything that isn’t a brain+rest.
Of course, everything depends on conscience, because it is the mental experience of free will what is under analysis here. What I am trying to do is to assess the rationality of that experience
You have argued that some things that seem real are real because they seem real. The problem is that because the (degrees of) freedom don’t really exist, the feeling of freedom doesn’t imply actual freedom, so the feeling of freedom is one of the illusory feelings.
The unpredictability of the disintegration of an atomic nucleus is not an instance of free will,
It has the property thats lacking from compatibilist free will (but not libertarian free will) the ability to have happened otherwise, but doesn’t have the purposiveness. You’re not rescuing compatibilist or feeling-based free will.
, I have not better arguments than Bishop Berkeley
“You have argued that some things that seem real are real because they seem real. The problem is that because the (degrees of) freedom don’t really exist”
There are things I can do (because they are under my conscient control, like move my finger) and others that I cannot do (like altering Earth orbit). I am “free” to move or nor a finger, and I am not “free” to alter Earth orbit. Is there anything irrational in this? Anything illusory?
Of course, the way I use my freedom is determined. “Brain” has degrees of freedom, they are real (Laplace demon can compute them, by considering all futures conditional on possible Brain configurations), but, at the end, “Brain” is also a physical system, and can be predicted too.
The set of all possible futures conditional on brain configurations is the “degrees of freedom” of Brain, while, when you predict what “Brain” does with those degrees of freedom, you predict Brain use of its freedom.
How important is that dinstiction? From the perspective of Brain, hugue, for Laplace’s demon irrelevant.
There are things I can do (because they are under my conscient control, like move my finger) and others that I cannot do (like altering Earth orbit). I am “free” to move or nor a finger, and I am not “free” to alter Earth orbit. Is there anything irrational in this? Anything illusory?
You have been assuming determinism, and if determinism is true you are not free to move your finger or not as you choose. Determinism means that the movement of your finger was pre ordained before you were born.
So determinism seems to mean that you can never do anything except the one thing you do. That’s the deterministic argument against libertarian free will. But it’s pretty counterintuitive that both “cannots” are the same.
Compatibilists like Dennett argue that you can move your finger or not in the sense that a very similar version of you, it the same you under slightly different circumstances, would move his finger...but no such slightly different or nearby version of you can change the Earths Orbit.
That leaves everything unchanged … You still lack libertarian free will, you still have compatibilist free will, and having consciousness or qualia still doesn’t make a difference.
How important is that dinstiction? From the perspective of Brain, hugue, for Laplace’s demon irrelevant.
“You have been assuming determinism, and if determinism is true you are not free to move your finger or not as you choose”
I freely chose to move my finger, but my (free) choice is pre-ordained. I can do as a I please (in the set of my “degrees of physical freedom”), so I am free within those bounds; on the other hand, what I want is pre-ordained.
“So it’s compatibilist free will, and having a quale of libertarian free will doesn’t change that”
Well, in fact the whole point was to legitimize the quale of libertarian free will (as a Hamiltonian, not as a unicorn), so I think at this point all our differences are reconciled :-)
But you are not legitimising it as a subjective impression that correctly represents reality…
only as an illusion: you can feel free in a deterministic world, but you can’t be free in one.
I say: “you are free when you do as you want, not matter how determined are your desires”. This is how I define freedom in “Freedom under naturalistic dualism”(and I think that this position is original, so if this is not the case, I would be glad of being corrected).
That’s just ordinary compatibilism—as I said, “it’s not libertarian free will.”
All the work is being done by using a definition of free will that doesn’t require indeterministic “elbow room”, so none of it is being done by all the physics and metaphysics. If it is valid, it would be just as valid under naturalistic monism, supernaturalistic determinism, etc.
And compatibilism isn’t universally accepted as the solution to free will because the quale of freedom is libertarian—one feels that one could have done otherwise. (At least , mine is like that).
An additional non physical layer of consciousness might buy you qualia, but delivers no guarantee that they will be accurate… a quale of libertarian free will is necessarily illusory under determinism.
An additional non physical layer of consciousness might have bought you downwards causation and libertarian free will.
Well, “one feel you can have done otherwise” is the part of the qualia of free will my definition do not legitimize.
When you chose among several options, the options are real (other person could have done otherwise) but once it is “you” who choses, mechanism imply “all degrees of freedom have been used”.
“It’s obvious to you that “all physical facts” doesn’t include consciousness”
If Laplace demon needs conscience attribution to compute future positions and velocities, I rest my case. That could be possible, if “quantum collapse” is both ontologically real and triggered by a conscient observer. This is obviously over my payroll...
But what about ontologically? Surely that is the gold standard.
Regarding this, I have not better arguments than Bishop Berkeley, who turned the Cartesian epistemological subjectivism into ontological subjectivism. That is the real birth of anglo-continental divide, while perhaps Occam laid grounds to the tradition in the Middle Age.
I understand the subjective idealist perspective very well as I used to be one myself. I’d recommend you to understand my usage of the word “fundamental” because currently when, you just interchangably use it with “real” you are missing the point I’m trying to make.
Again, try reasoning in terms of map and territory, I suspect it can be enlightning for you as it was for me. Mental things are part of a map. Initially when you see a map you are more certain of its existence than the territory that this map describes. And yet the map itself can still be just a part of territory. Drawn on the wall of a building or on a piece of paper that was produced on a factory that is shown on this exact map.
I begin my exposition describing what means “explanation” in Physicalism.
To explain something is to show how it reduces to something you already understand, making mysterious things not mysterious anymore.
But what about chat GTP? How helpful are the “plans” of the machine to assess conscience? What additional scientific knowledge do you need? You have the generative model, the most complete set of plans and physical relations you can dream of. Regarding chat GTP you are almost like the Laplace demon. Still, you don’t know how sentient is it.
We have good understanding how to make one. We still lack in understanding how exactly it works. Interpretability research are ongoing and we are slowly learning more and more about it, filling the blancks in our understanding. I’m not sure why you call an opaque box “the most complete set of plans and physical relations you can dream of”—it’s clearly not the case.
the physicalist-reductionist explanation (no matter how perfect) is simply not enough for the assessment of sentience.
It’s not that you had the pleasure to experience the most perfect physicalist-reductionist explanation. So how can you know that you are not giving up too early? Epiphenomenalism doesn’t try to solve the mystery so it won’t be able to do it. Had we just assumed a priori that we would never learn anything more about GPT we wouldn’t be doing all the interpretability research and as a result it would be a self fulfilling prophecy leaving us less knowledgeble then we are now.
If it “considers”, “chose” and “has goals”, it is conscious.
I notice a contradiction here. Previously you’ve said that we can’t know whether somthing other than us is conscious. Now you say that we can, if this something considers, chooses and has goals. Or are you claiming that we can’t possibly know whether something possess such abilities via materialistic science? If so, would you agree that epiphenomenalism is wrong if I showed you the way to do it?
“Mental things are part of a map. Initially when you see a map you are more certain of its existence than the territory that this map describes. And yet the map itself can still be just a part of territory”
Well, this quite metaphorical for a hard materialist … :-)
Additionally, I cannot compare “map” and territory, because I (subject) can only deal with different maps (I cannot access reality, wherever it means, directly), at most different internal representations of something I believe is “out there”.
“Now you say that we can, if this something considers, chooses and has goals”
I am only sure of the fact that I “consider”, “choose” and “have goals”. For the rest, it is only a hypothesis (quite persuasive for very similar organisms that also speak, and the more different from me the harder is to use analogy to assess sentience).
“We have good understanding how to make one. We still lack in understanding how exactly it works. Interpretability research are ongoing and we are slowly learning more and more about it, filling the blanks in our understanding “
I agree with this. In this particular case of “biology”, we have perfect knowledge of biochemistry [=the generative model], but as humans we want also the intermediate layers (like cytology). Still, in my view it does not matter if you go top-down [classical biology] or bottom-up [AI interpretability], what you have is phenomenal knowledge.
The “neural correlates of conscience” people are working in axiomatic formulations (Information Integration Theory), because they can only trust human experience (where analogy and language are available). For the rest of beings we have no Rosetta Stone that allow sentience comparison. Even in the case of humans, everything depends on “trust” on others’ experience, because the only conscience I can measure is the mine one.
“It’s not that you had the pleasure to experience the most perfect physicalist-reductionist explanation. So how can you know that you are not giving up too early? Epiphenomenalism doesn’t try to solve the mystery so it won’t be able to do it.”
Epiphenomenalism suggest that there is no mystery to solve. Of course, epiphenomenalists are as interested in “understanding” phenomenologically either AI and biological systems as anybody else. But after explaining everything, either by having the generative model of the systems or the intermediate layers of reduction, sentience can only be assessed by the the conscious entity itself.
Every conscious being in the universe is epistemologically alone, owning the knowledge of their sentience as a metaphysical absolute certainty that cannot be transferred to any other subject. Splendid loneliness...
Well, this quite metaphorical for a hard materialist … :-)
Were you under a misconception that materialists can’t use metaphors because they are not “sciency” enough?)
Additionally, I cannot compare “map” and territory, because I (subject) can only deal with different maps (I cannot access reality, wherever it means, directly), at most different internal representations of something I believe is “out there”.
True, the initial model is imperfect. But it’s a start. You can improve on it when you understand the initial framework. A model where you are writing your own map based on the other maps or even where you are locked in the infinite recursion of maps referencing other maps, without being able to access the territory in any other way than through a map. And still despite that, the maps can be made from the trees that grow on the territory.
I am only sure of the fact that I “consider”, “choose” and “have goals”. For the rest, it is only a hypothesis (quite persuasive for very similar organisms that also speak, and the more different from me the harder is to use analogy to assess sentience).
I think I understand your reasoning very well. And it seems obvious to me that if I managed to show you a counter example that I’m talking about, an entity about which I can be quite certain that it can “consider”, “choose” and “have goals” despite all the reasons that you brought up, you would have to accept that you made a mistake somewhere. But I want you to explicitly acknowledge this. Sorry for the annoyance, I promise that I’m not doing it just for my own amusement, that I expect it to be more helpful for your this way. So, please, say: “Yes, if you show me such an example it will falsify my theory”.
“ What if there was an entity that could consider possible futures conditional on its actions and choose one of them—suiting its goals the best, - and yet this entity completely lacked conscious experience? What properties of free will would such entity lack? Or do you believe that such entity is impossible in our universe (or even in any universe?) thus leaving the possibility for the falsification of your theory?”
I don’t think I am making a “theory”, but more an “interpretation”.
My position is that freedom is a property related to conscious experience, so as long as there is no conscience, my definition of freedom cannot be applied. Conscious choice is the basis of freedom. In fact, this is specially obvious, because my definition of freedom opens the door to moral responsibility, that obviously cannot exist with no conscience! What am I missing here?
Ape in the coat
“Are you using a different definition of “fundamental”? What I mean by it is an element that is not produced by any other elements”
Epistemologically, your subjective experience is more fundamental than physical reality. The entire world could be a simulation, and then Physics would be false; on the other hand, subjective experience and Mathematics is true in absolute and aprioristic grounds. Color red, an orgasm, and natural numbers and the Fermat theorem are true, even if you are trapped in Matrix, under the power of a “malign genius”.
Cartesian subjectivism and Newtonian mechanism were almost contemporaneous, and they created a massive Schism in philosophy and the Western mind. From the perspective of the mathematician and the philosopher, subjective experience is immediate and “fundamental”, while sensorial experience imply “faith”. You cannot prove anything about physical reality because you cannot prove there is a physical reality at all. But in Mathematics, you can prove many things, because they refer to mental objects, and your mind and its objects are (unproblematically) real. That is why mathematical theorems are more certain than physical laws. When you accept that, it implies that conscience is more epistemologically fundamental than physical reality. You are trapped in your self, and the “world” is not more than an act of faith or a useful hypothesis that coordinates your experience.
Of course, I have faith in sensory experience (unlike Tensor White, see comment below, that has more faith in God and less in brutal matter). But I am aware of the abyss that separates me from wherever Physical reality is, and the fact that that abyss can only be crossed by faith (unlike you accept St Anselm ontological proof of God existence, as Descartes did).
“Instead of trying to understand the mystery of how consciousness is produced by matter interactions it just postulates that it’s a separate entity”
I begin my exposition describing what means “explanation” in Physicalism. Life is explained by pointing out that its apparent special characteristics (reproduction, autopoiesis, etc) are simply results of the laws of Physics. Reductionist biology takes a life form, makes inverse engeneering and show the “plans” of the being, and you can understand how it works from physical and chemical laws (that means finally only Physics).
But what about chat GTP? How helpful are the “plans” of the machine to assess conscience? What additional scientific knowledge do you need? You have the generative model, the most complete set of plans and physical relations you can dream of. Regarding chat GTP you are almost like the Laplace demon. Still, you don’t know how sentient is it.
For me that is “Naturalistic dualism”: the physicalist-reductionist explanation (no matter how perfect) is simply not enough for the assessment of sentience. Either there is some other type of scientific explanation beyond reductionism-physicalism, or simply conscience is beyond our scientific assessment (not understanding! The typical naturalistic dualist thinks that “there is nothing to explain” nor understand, probably because we accept what explanation is since Newtonian “hypothsys non fingo”). Sentience is real, and it is simply “there” for some physical systems, there is no way to assess which ones.
“What if there was an entity that could consider possible futures conditional on its actions and choose one of them—suiting its goals the best, - and yet this entity completely lacked conscious experience?”
If it “considers”, “chose” and “has goals”, it is conscious.
Tensor White
Thank you for your comment. I cannot answer you with the kind of detail that I did to “Ape in the coat”, because I am a materialist (as materialist as possible, in a Universe where conscience exists). I agree that it takes a lot of intellectual machinery and some leaps of faith, but reality is as it is: atoms and emptiness, as Democritus discovered more than 2500 years ago.
TAG
“Doesnt that amount to saying that free will isn’t really real,but seems real?”
It is as “real” as the set of natural numbers or as real as “true love”. For me that is more real than a neutron star that nobody has ever seen. The stream of my conscience is more real than anything else and well defined mental objects there are very real.
“Libertarian free will allows the future to depend on decisions which are not themselves determined.”
Everything is physically determined. But when a conscious being has N options, and choses one, he chooses what he wants (=he is free), no matter how determined is what he wants.
The discussion on moral responsibility comes from that: when you accidentally kill your wife you can say you didn’t chose. On the other hand, if there is intent, the determination by material causes of your act does not change that the act was conscious and then your conscience [=you] is evil.
As Jan Blomqvist said, we are “ghosted machines”. The fact that the ghost comes from the machine doesn’t mean that the product of the machine cannot be an evil ghost.
Thank you very much for this marvelous discussion. At least, even if does not end as an academic paper, I am very happy with this exchange.
Sorry for the delay, but there are posting (one per hour, 3 per day) limitations for low karma participants even in their own posts.
That isn’t helpful, because there is no agreement about how real numbers are. I’m an anti realist myself.
What you are not doing is arguing against the counter-claims …that there is a much more robust sense of “real” than “seems real to me”, that “seemingly real” is more “seeming” than “real”.
But what about ontologically? Surely that is the gold standard.
That doesn’t make a choice free of anything at all. At best, it’s an illusion of indeterminism.
That’s the standard argument for compatibilist free will. Compatibilist free will only needs preferences and the ability to act on them. Adding a dualistic layer to physical reality doesn’t give you any more compatibilist free will, and it doesn’t get you libertarian free will, as you admit. So what is doing?
So being able to do what you want isn’t the basis of freedom?
There are reasons for being concerned with libertarian free will other than moral responsibility.
It’s obvious to you that “all physical facts” doesn’t include consciousness, it’s obvious to Ape that it does. It’s pretty circular either way.
That’s the standard argument for compatibilist free will. Compatibilist free will only needs preferences and the ability to act on them. Adding a dualistic layer to physical reality doesn’t give you any more compatibilist free will, and it doesn’t get you libertarian free will, as you admit. So what is doing?
Let’s work over the case of a deterministic physicalist universe, to simplify. You can divide reality in two disjoint arbitrary sets covering the whole universe, called “Brain” and “Rest”. Laplace demon has all information about “Rest” while no information about “Brain”. Now, he can compute all possible futures of the universe for each possible configuration of “Brain”. This set of possible futures tells us the “degrees of freedom of Brain”, that is, how this subset of the reality can influence the Universe. This is a cumbersome but legitimate exercise, and a totally materialistic one.
Now, we go to the other side of reality: suppose that “Brain” is not an arbitrary part of the universe, but one that has an attached stream of unified conscientious experience (those systems exist: I am one of them, hopefully you too). “Brain” is volitive and has a feeling of free will and choice. What I say, is that the scope of possible futures among which a conscious being chose is an approximation to the “degrees of freedom of Brain” that I defined in the previous paragraph (with the help of a Laplace demon). What I claim from this is that the feeling and the scope of freedom are rigorous mental objects. That they illusory as a Hamiltonian, not as a unicorn!
So I guess my position is “compatibilist”, but my experience reading compatibilist texts is that they are not as clear as my exposition before.
Of course, everything depends on conscience, because it is the mental experience of free will what is under analysis here. What I am trying to do is to assess the rationality of that experience. The unpredictability of the disintegration of an atomic nucleus is not an instance of free will, and in fact, I have developed all my argumentation for a purely deterministic universe (but one where the future can be affected by the present, but no the other way around. How is that possible if the laws of Physics are time symmetric?… That is for me the real open question; the philosophical part [=relation between physical reality and epiphenomenal conscience] is straightforward).
From L’s D’s point of view , everything that your brain does is predictable given Brain+Rest, and in fact, everything your brain does is predictable from the global state of the universe before it existed. So Brain has no degree of freedom.
If you consider Brain separately from everything else, then you introduce Knightian Uncertainty: it appears to have degrees of of freedom, because you have neglected a bunch of causal factors. The freedom only seems to exist because of absence of complete information.
But it can’t, really, because it’s mutually causally dependent on everything else. You could make the same argument about anything that isn’t a brain+rest.
You have argued that some things that seem real are real because they seem real. The problem is that because the (degrees of) freedom don’t really exist, the feeling of freedom doesn’t imply actual freedom, so the feeling of freedom is one of the illusory feelings.
It has the property thats lacking from compatibilist free will (but not libertarian free will) the ability to have happened otherwise, but doesn’t have the purposiveness. You’re not rescuing compatibilist or feeling-based free will.
Oh, dear!
“You have argued that some things that seem real are real because they seem real. The problem is that because the (degrees of) freedom don’t really exist”
There are things I can do (because they are under my conscient control, like move my finger) and others that I cannot do (like altering Earth orbit). I am “free” to move or nor a finger, and I am not “free” to alter Earth orbit. Is there anything irrational in this? Anything illusory?
Of course, the way I use my freedom is determined. “Brain” has degrees of freedom, they are real (Laplace demon can compute them, by considering all futures conditional on possible Brain configurations), but, at the end, “Brain” is also a physical system, and can be predicted too.
The set of all possible futures conditional on brain configurations is the “degrees of freedom” of Brain, while, when you predict what “Brain” does with those degrees of freedom, you predict Brain use of its freedom.
How important is that dinstiction? From the perspective of Brain, hugue, for Laplace’s demon irrelevant.
Both are rigth.
You have been assuming determinism, and if determinism is true you are not free to move your finger or not as you choose. Determinism means that the movement of your finger was pre ordained before you were born.
So determinism seems to mean that you can never do anything except the one thing you do. That’s the deterministic argument against libertarian free will. But it’s pretty counterintuitive that both “cannots” are the same.
Compatibilists like Dennett argue that you can move your finger or not in the sense that a very similar version of you, it the same you under slightly different circumstances, would move his finger...but no such slightly different or nearby version of you can change the Earths Orbit.
That leaves everything unchanged … You still lack libertarian free will, you still have compatibilist free will, and having consciousness or qualia still doesn’t make a difference.
Surely Laplace’s demon wins?
“You have been assuming determinism, and if determinism is true you are not free to move your finger or not as you choose”
I freely chose to move my finger, but my (free) choice is pre-ordained. I can do as a I please (in the set of my “degrees of physical freedom”), so I am free within those bounds; on the other hand, what I want is pre-ordained.
So it’s not free from determinism. So it’s not libertarian free will.
You can do only one thing in any particular situation, the thing that is predetermined.
So it’s compatibilist free will, and having a quale of libertarian free will doesn’t change that.
“So it’s compatibilist free will, and having a quale of libertarian free will doesn’t change that”
Well, in fact the whole point was to legitimize the quale of libertarian free will (as a Hamiltonian, not as a unicorn), so I think at this point all our differences are reconciled :-)
But you are not legitimising it as a subjective impression that correctly represents reality… only as an illusion: you can feel free in a deterministic world, but you can’t be free in one.
I say: “you are free when you do as you want, not matter how determined are your desires”. This is how I define freedom in “Freedom under naturalistic dualism”(and I think that this position is original, so if this is not the case, I would be glad of being corrected).
That’s just ordinary compatibilism—as I said, “it’s not libertarian free will.” All the work is being done by using a definition of free will that doesn’t require indeterministic “elbow room”, so none of it is being done by all the physics and metaphysics. If it is valid, it would be just as valid under naturalistic monism, supernaturalistic determinism, etc.
And compatibilism isn’t universally accepted as the solution to free will because the quale of freedom is libertarian—one feels that one could have done otherwise. (At least , mine is like that).
An additional non physical layer of consciousness might buy you qualia, but delivers no guarantee that they will be accurate… a quale of libertarian free will is necessarily illusory under determinism.
An additional non physical layer of consciousness might have bought you downwards causation and libertarian free will.
Well, “one feel you can have done otherwise” is the part of the qualia of free will my definition do not legitimize.
When you chose among several options, the options are real (other person could have done otherwise) but once it is “you” who choses, mechanism imply “all degrees of freedom have been used”.
Now two smaller points:
“It’s obvious to you that “all physical facts” doesn’t include consciousness”
If Laplace demon needs conscience attribution to compute future positions and velocities, I rest my case. That could be possible, if “quantum collapse” is both ontologically real and triggered by a conscient observer. This is obviously over my payroll...
But what about ontologically? Surely that is the gold standard.
Regarding this, I have not better arguments than Bishop Berkeley, who turned the Cartesian epistemological subjectivism into ontological subjectivism. That is the real birth of anglo-continental divide, while perhaps Occam laid grounds to the tradition in the Middle Age.
I understand the subjective idealist perspective very well as I used to be one myself. I’d recommend you to understand my usage of the word “fundamental” because currently when, you just interchangably use it with “real” you are missing the point I’m trying to make.
Again, try reasoning in terms of map and territory, I suspect it can be enlightning for you as it was for me. Mental things are part of a map. Initially when you see a map you are more certain of its existence than the territory that this map describes. And yet the map itself can still be just a part of territory. Drawn on the wall of a building or on a piece of paper that was produced on a factory that is shown on this exact map.
To explain something is to show how it reduces to something you already understand, making mysterious things not mysterious anymore.
We have good understanding how to make one. We still lack in understanding how exactly it works. Interpretability research are ongoing and we are slowly learning more and more about it, filling the blancks in our understanding. I’m not sure why you call an opaque box “the most complete set of plans and physical relations you can dream of”—it’s clearly not the case.
It’s not that you had the pleasure to experience the most perfect physicalist-reductionist explanation. So how can you know that you are not giving up too early? Epiphenomenalism doesn’t try to solve the mystery so it won’t be able to do it. Had we just assumed a priori that we would never learn anything more about GPT we wouldn’t be doing all the interpretability research and as a result it would be a self fulfilling prophecy leaving us less knowledgeble then we are now.
I notice a contradiction here. Previously you’ve said that we can’t know whether somthing other than us is conscious. Now you say that we can, if this something considers, chooses and has goals. Or are you claiming that we can’t possibly know whether something possess such abilities via materialistic science? If so, would you agree that epiphenomenalism is wrong if I showed you the way to do it?
“Mental things are part of a map. Initially when you see a map you are more certain of its existence than the territory that this map describes. And yet the map itself can still be just a part of territory”
Well, this quite metaphorical for a hard materialist … :-)
Additionally, I cannot compare “map” and territory, because I (subject) can only deal with different maps (I cannot access reality, wherever it means, directly), at most different internal representations of something I believe is “out there”.
“Now you say that we can, if this something considers, chooses and has goals”
I am only sure of the fact that I “consider”, “choose” and “have goals”. For the rest, it is only a hypothesis (quite persuasive for very similar organisms that also speak, and the more different from me the harder is to use analogy to assess sentience).
“We have good understanding how to make one. We still lack in understanding how exactly it works. Interpretability research are ongoing and we are slowly learning more and more about it, filling the blanks in our understanding “
I agree with this. In this particular case of “biology”, we have perfect knowledge of biochemistry [=the generative model], but as humans we want also the intermediate layers (like cytology). Still, in my view it does not matter if you go top-down [classical biology] or bottom-up [AI interpretability], what you have is phenomenal knowledge.
The “neural correlates of conscience” people are working in axiomatic formulations (Information Integration Theory), because they can only trust human experience (where analogy and language are available). For the rest of beings we have no Rosetta Stone that allow sentience comparison. Even in the case of humans, everything depends on “trust” on others’ experience, because the only conscience I can measure is the mine one.
“It’s not that you had the pleasure to experience the most perfect physicalist-reductionist explanation. So how can you know that you are not giving up too early? Epiphenomenalism doesn’t try to solve the mystery so it won’t be able to do it.”
Epiphenomenalism suggest that there is no mystery to solve. Of course, epiphenomenalists are as interested in “understanding” phenomenologically either AI and biological systems as anybody else. But after explaining everything, either by having the generative model of the systems or the intermediate layers of reduction, sentience can only be assessed by the the conscious entity itself.
Every conscious being in the universe is epistemologically alone, owning the knowledge of their sentience as a metaphysical absolute certainty that cannot be transferred to any other subject. Splendid loneliness...
Were you under a misconception that materialists can’t use metaphors because they are not “sciency” enough?)
True, the initial model is imperfect. But it’s a start. You can improve on it when you understand the initial framework. A model where you are writing your own map based on the other maps or even where you are locked in the infinite recursion of maps referencing other maps, without being able to access the territory in any other way than through a map. And still despite that, the maps can be made from the trees that grow on the territory.
I think I understand your reasoning very well. And it seems obvious to me that if I managed to show you a counter example that I’m talking about, an entity about which I can be quite certain that it can “consider”, “choose” and “have goals” despite all the reasons that you brought up, you would have to accept that you made a mistake somewhere. But I want you to explicitly acknowledge this. Sorry for the annoyance, I promise that I’m not doing it just for my own amusement, that I expect it to be more helpful for your this way. So, please, say: “Yes, if you show me such an example it will falsify my theory”.
“ What if there was an entity that could consider possible futures conditional on its actions and choose one of them—suiting its goals the best, - and yet this entity completely lacked conscious experience? What properties of free will would such entity lack? Or do you believe that such entity is impossible in our universe (or even in any universe?) thus leaving the possibility for the falsification of your theory?”
I don’t think I am making a “theory”, but more an “interpretation”.
My position is that freedom is a property related to conscious experience, so as long as there is no conscience, my definition of freedom cannot be applied. Conscious choice is the basis of freedom. In fact, this is specially obvious, because my definition of freedom opens the door to moral responsibility, that obviously cannot exist with no conscience! What am I missing here?