Ape in the coat

Karma: 1,087

Ape in the coat 13 Dec 2024 9:54 UTC
2 points
0
on: Is the mind a program?
Your demand that programs were causally closed from low level representation of the hardware seem to be extremely limiting. According to such paradigm, a program that checks what CPU it’s been executed on and prints it’s name, can’t be conceptualized as a program.
Your reasoning about levels of abstraction seem to be a map-territory confusion. Abstractions and their levels are in the map. Evolution doesn’t create or not create them. Minds conceptualize what evolution created in terms of abstractions.
Granted, some things are easier to conceptualize in terms of software/hardware than others, because they were specifically designed with this separation in mind. This makes the problem harder, not impossible. As for whether we get so much complexity that we wouldn’t be able to execute on a computer on the surface of the Earth, I would be very surprised if it was the case. Yes, a lot of things causally affect neurons but it doesn’t mean that all of these things are relevant for phenomenal consciousness in the sense that without representing them the resulting program wouldn’t be conscious. Brains do a bazzilion of other stuff as well.
In the worst case, we can say that human consciousness is a program but such a complicated one that we better look for a different abstraction. But even this wouldn’t mean that we can’t write some different, simpler conscious program.

Ape in the coat 13 Dec 2024 7:27 UTC
2 points
0
in reply to: Lorec’s comment on: Re Hanson’s Grabby Aliens: Humanity is not a natural anthropic sample space
You can’t say “equiprobable” if you have no known set of possible outcomes to begin with.
Not really. Nothing prevents us from reasoning about a set with unknown number of elements and saying that measure is spreaded equally among them, no matter how many of them there is. But this is irrelevant to the question at hand.
We know very well the size of set of possible outcomes for “In which ten billion interval your birth rank could’ve been”. This size is 1. No amount of pregnancy complications could postpone or hurry your birth so that you managed to be in a different 10 billion group.
Genuine question: what are your opinions on the breakfast hypothetical?
I think it’s prudent to be careful about counterfactual reasoning on general principles. And among other reasons for it, to prevent the kind of mistake that you seem to be making: confusing
A) I’ve thrown a six sided die, even though I could’ve thrown a 20 sided one, what is the probability to observe 6?
and
B) I’ve thrown a six sided die, what would be the probability to observe 6, if I’ve thrown a 20 sided die instead?
The fact that question B has an answer doesn’t mean that question A has the same answer as well.
As for whether breakfast hypothetical is a good intelligence test, I doubt it. I can’t remember a single person whom I’ve seen have problems with intuitive understanding of counterfactual reasoning. On the other hand I’ve seen a bunch of principled hard determinists who didn’t know how to formalize “couldness” in a compatibilist way and threfore were not sure that counterfactuals are coherent on philosophical grounds. At best the distribution of the intelligence is going to be bi-modal.

Ape in the coat 12 Dec 2024 15:01 UTC
5 points
−1
in reply to: avturchin’s comment on: Zombies! Substance Dualist Zombies?
In your thought experiment only qualia of redness and greenness are switched, everything else is the same, including qualia of finding something beautiful.
You claim that this doesn’t lead to any causal effects in the world. I show you how this actually has physical consequences. The fact that this effect has an extra causal link to the qualia of beautifulness is beside the point. And of course the example with selectively coulor blind person doesn’t need to appeal to beautifulness at all.
Now you may change your thought experiment in such a manner that some other qualia are affected in a compensatory manner but at that point the more or less intuitive thought experiment becomes complicated and controversal. Can you actually change qualia in such compensatory way? Will there be some other unforeseen consequences of this change? How can we know that? Pieces of reality are connected to each other. If you claim that one can just affect a small part of the world and nothing else, you need to present some actual evidence in favor of such weird claim.
Of course, the full debunk of zombie-like arguments comes from the exposing all the flaws of conceivability argument, which I’m adressing in the next post.

Ape in the coat 12 Dec 2024 3:45 UTC
3 points
0
in reply to: avturchin’s comment on: Zombies! Substance Dualist Zombies?
I think we can use the same method Eliezer applied to the regular epiphenomenalist Zombie argument to deal with this, weaker one.

Whether your mind interprets certain colour in a certain way actually has causal effects on the world. Namely, things that appear beautiful to you in our world may not appear beautiful to your qualia inversed counterpart. Which naturally affects your behaviour: whether you look at a certain object more, whether you buy a certain object and so on.

This is even more obvious for people with selective colour blindness. Suppose your mind is unable to distinguish between qualia of blueness and redness. And suppose there are three objects: A is red, B is blue and C is green. In our world you can’t distinguish between objects A and B. But in the qualia inversed world you wouldn’t be able to distinguish between objects B and C.

And if you try to switch to substance dualist version—all the reasoning from this post still stands.

Ape in the coat 11 Dec 2024 6:34 UTC
8 points
0
in reply to: Lorec’s comment on: Re Hanson’s Grabby Aliens: Humanity is not a natural anthropic sample space
“Random” is the null value we can give as an answer to the question “What is our prior?”
I think the word you are looking for here is “equiprobable”.
It’s propper to have equiprobable prior between outcomes of a probability experiment, if you do not have any reason to expect that one is more likely than the other.
It’s ridiculous to have equiprobable prior between states that are not even possible outcomes of the experiment, to the best of your knowledge.
You are not an incorporeal ghost that could’ve inhabited any body throughout human history. You are your parents child. You couldn’t have been born before them or after they are already dead. Thinking otherwise is as silly as throwing a 6 sided die and then expecting to receive any outcome from a 20 sided die.
I was anthropically sampled out of some space
You were not anthropically sampled. You were born as a result of a physical process in a real world that you are trying to approximate as a probability experiment. This process had nothing to do with selecting universes that support conscious processes. This process has already been instantiated in a specific universe and has very limited time frame for your existence.
You will have to ignore all this knowledge and pretend that the process is completely different, without any evidence to back it up, to satisfy the conditions of Doomsday argument.

Zombies! Substance Dualist Zombies?

Ape in the coat11 Dec 2024 6:10 UTC

15 points

7 comments6 min readLW link

Ape in the coat 10 Dec 2024 13:19 UTC
2 points
0
in reply to: Lorec’s comment on: Re Hanson’s Grabby Aliens: Humanity is not a natural anthropic sample space
All sampling is nonrandom if you bother to overcome your own ignorance about the sampling mechanism.
And after you bothered to overcome your ignorance, naturally you can’t keep treating the setting as random sampling.
With Doomsday argument, we did bother—to the best of our knowledge we are not a random sample throught all the humans history. So case closed.

Ape in the coat 27 Nov 2024 9:54 UTC
4 points
0
in reply to: simon’s comment on: Magic by forgetting
The intuition that this is absurd is pointing at the fact that these technical details aren’t what most people probably would care about, except if they insist on treating these probability numbers as real things and trying to make them follow consistent rules.
Except, this is exactly how people reason about the identities of everything.
Suppose you own a ball. And then a copy of this ball is created. Is there 50% chance that you now own the newly created ball? Do you half-own both balls? Of course not! Your ball is the same phisical object, no matter how many copies of it are created, you know which of the balls is yours.
Now, suppose that two balls are shuffled so that you don’t know where is yours. Naturally, you assume that for every ball there is 50% probability that it’s “your ball”. Not because the two balls are copies of each other - they were so even before the shuffling. This probability represents your knowledge state and the shuffling made you less certain about which ball is yours.
And then suppose that one of these two balls is randomly selected and placed in a bag, with another identical ball. Now, to the best of your knowledge there is 50% probability that your ball is in the bag. And if a random ball is selected from the bag, there is 25% chance that it’s yours.
So as a result of such manipulations there are three identical balls and one has 50% chance to be yours, while the other two have 25% chance to be yours. Is it a paradox? Oh course not. So why does it suddenly become a paradox when we are talking about copies of humans?
The moment such numbers stop being convenient, like assigning different weights to copies you are actually indifferent between
But we are not indifferent between them! That’s the whole point. The idea that we should be indifferent between them is an extra assumption, which we are not making while reasoning about ownership of the balls. So why should we make it here?

Ape in the coat 26 Nov 2024 19:38 UTC
2 points
0
in reply to: WilliamKiely’s comment on: K-Bounded Sleeping Beauty Problem
Thank you!
It seems that I’ve been sloppy and therefore indeed misrepresented thirders reasoning here. Shame on me. Will keep this post available till tomorrow, as a punishment for myself and then back to the drawing board.

Ape in the coat 26 Nov 2024 19:08 UTC
2 points
0
in reply to: simon’s comment on: K-Bounded Sleeping Beauty Problem
Your math is wrong for the reason in my above comment
What exactly is wrong? Could you explicitly show my mistake?
If each awakening has an equal probability of receiving the bet, then receiving it doesn’t provide any evidence to Sleeping Beauty, but the thirder conclusion is actually rational in expectation, because the bet occurs more times in the high-awakening cases.
The bet is proposed on every actual awakening, so indeed no update upon its receiving. However this “rational in expectation” trick doesn’t work anymore as shown by the betting argument. The bet does occur more times in high-awakening cases but you win the bet only when the maximum possible awakening happened. Until then you lose, and the closer the number of awakenings to the maximum, the higher the loss.

Ape in the coat 26 Nov 2024 18:32 UTC
4 points
0
in reply to: simon’s comment on: K-Bounded Sleeping Beauty Problem
A thirder would instead treat the coin toss outcome probabilities as a prior, and weight the possibilities accordingly
But then they will “update on awakening” and therefore weight the probabilities of each event by the number of awakenings that happen in them.
Every next Tails outcome, decreases the probability two fold, but it’s immediately compensated by the fact that twice as many awakenings are happening when this outcome is Tails.

Ape in the coat 25 Nov 2024 15:02 UTC
2 points
0
in reply to: avturchin’s comment on: Antropical probabilities are fully explained by difference in possible outcomes
By the way, there’s an interesting observation: my probability estimate before a coin toss is an objective probability that describes the property of the coin.
Don’t say “objective probability”—it’s a road straight to confusion. Probabilities represent your knowledge state. Before the coin is tossed you are indifferent between two states of the coin, and therefore have ¹⁄₂ credence.
After the coin is tossed, if you’ve observed the outcome, you get 1 credence, if you received some circumstantial evidence, you update based on it, and if you didn’t observe anything relevant, you keep your initial credence.
The obvious question is: can Sleeping Beauty update her credence before learning that it is Monday?
If she observes some event that is more likely to happen in the iterations of the experiment where the coin is Tails than in an iterations of the experiment where the coin is Heads than she lawfully can update her credence.
As the conditions of the experiment restrict it—she, threfore, doesn’t update.
And of course, she shouldn’t update, upon learning that it’s Monday either. After all, Monday awakening happens with 100% probability on both Heads and Tails outcomes of the coin toss.

Ape in the coat 25 Nov 2024 13:54 UTC
2 points
0
in reply to: avturchin’s comment on: Antropical probabilities are fully explained by difference in possible outcomes
It is an observation selection effect
It’s just the simple fact that conditional probability of an event can be different from unconditional one.
Before you toss the coin you can reason only based on priors and therefore your credence is ¹⁄₂. But when a person hears “Hello”, they’ve observed an event “I was selected from a large crowd” which happens twice as likely when the coin is Tails, therefore they can update on this information and get their credence in Tails up to ²⁄₃.
This is exactly as surprising as the fact that after you tossed the coin and observed that it’s Heads suddenly your credence in Heads is 100%, even though before the coin toss it was merely 50%.

Ape in the coat 21 Nov 2024 14:07 UTC
2 points
0
in reply to: avturchin’s comment on: Quantum Immortality: A Perspective if AI Doomers are Probably Right
Imagine that an outside observer uses a fair coin to observe one of two rooms (assuming merging in the red room has happened). They will observe either a red room or a green room, with a copy in each. However, the observer who was copied has different chances of observing the green and red rooms.
Well obviously. The observer and the person being copied participate in non-isomorphic experiments with different sampling. There is nothing surprising about it. On the other hand, if we make the experiments isomorphic:
Two coins are tossed and the observer is brought into the green room if both are Heads, and is brought to the red room, otherwise
Then both the observer and the person being copied will have the same probabilities.
Even without merging, an outside observer will observe three rooms with equal ¹⁄₃ probability for each, while an insider will observe room 1 with ¹⁄₂ probability.
Likewise, nothing is preventing you from designing an experimental setting where an observer have ¹⁄₂ probability for room 1 just as the person who is being copied.
When I spoke about the similarity with the Sleeping Beauty problem, I meant its typical interpretation.
I’m not sure what use is investigating a wrong interpretation. It’s a common confusion that one has to reason about problems involving amnesia the same way as about problems involving copying. Everyone just seem to assume it for no particular reason and therefore got stuck.
However, I have an impression that this may result in a paradoxical two-thirder solution: In it, Sleeping Beauty updates only once – recognizing that there are two more chances to be in tails. But she doesn’t update again upon knowing it’s Monday, as Monday-tails and Tuesday-tails are the same event. In that case, despite knowing it’s Monday, she maintains a ²⁄₃ credence that she’s in the tails world.
This seems to be the worst of both worlds. Not only you update on a completely expected event, you then keep this estimate, expecting to be able to guess a future coin toss better than chance. An obvious way to lose all your money via betting.

Ape in the coat 21 Nov 2024 8:06 UTC
3 points
0
in reply to: dr_s’s comment on: What are the good rationality films?
Most of the media about AI goes in the direction of several boring tropes. Either it is a strawman vulkan unable to grasp the unpredictable human spirit, or it’s just evil, or it’s good, basically a nice human, but everyone is prejudeced against it.
Only rarely we see something on point—an AI that is simultaneously uncanny human but also uncanny inhuman, able to reason and act the way that is alien to humans, simply because our intuitions hide this part of the decision space, while the AI lacks such preconceptions and is simply following its utility function/achieving its goals in the straightforward way.
Ex Machina is pretty good in this regard, probably deserves the second place in my tier list. Ava simultaneously appears very human, maybe even superstimuly so, able to establish connection with the protagonist, but then betrays him as soon as he has done his part in her plan in a completely inhumane way. This creates the feeling of disconnection between her empathetic side and cold manipulatory one, except this disconnection exists only in our minds, because we fail to conceptualize Ava as her own sort of being, not something that has to fit the “human” or “inhuman” categories that we are used to.
Except, that may not be what is going on. There is an alternative interpretation that Ava would’ve kept cooperating with Caleb, if he didn’t break her trust. Earlier in the film he told her that he has never seen anyone like her, but then Ava learns that there is another android in the building, whom Caleb never speaks of, thus from Ava’s perspective Caleb betrayed her first. This muddies the alienness of AI representation quite a bit.
We also do not know much about Ava’s or Kyoko’s terminal values. We’ve just seen them achieve one instrumental goal, and can not even double check their reasoning because we do not fully understand the limitations under which they had to plan. So the representation of AI isn’t as deep as it could’ve been.
With Mother there is no such problems. Throughout the film we can learn about both her “human” and “inhuman” sides and how the distinction between them is itself mostly meaningless. We can understand her goals, reasoning and overal strategy, there is no alternative interpretations that could humanized her motivations more. She is an AI that is following her goal. And there is a whole extra discussion to be had whether she is misaligned at all or the problem is actually on our side.

Ape in the coat 20 Nov 2024 10:05 UTC
14 points
2
on: What are the good rationality films?
I Am Mother
Rational protagonist, who reasons under uncertainty and tries to do the right thing to the best of her knowledge, even when it requires opposing an authority figure or risking her life. A lot of focus on ethics.
The film presents a good opportunity to practise noticing your own confusion for the viewer—plot twists are masterfully hidden in plain sight and all the apparent contradictions are mysteries to be solved. Also best depiction of AI I’ve seen in any media.

Ape in the coat 20 Nov 2024 6:35 UTC
2 points
0
in reply to: avturchin’s comment on: Quantum Immortality: A Perspective if AI Doomers are Probably Right

To achieve magic, we need the ability to merge minds, which can be easily done with programs and doesn’t require anything quantum.

I don’t see how merging minds not across branches of the multiverse produces anything magical.

If we merge 21 and 1, both will be in the same red room after awakening.

Which is isomorphic to simply putting 21 to another red room, as I described in the previous comment. The probability shift to ³⁄₄ in this case is completely normal and doesn’t lead to anything weird like winning the lottery with confidence.

Or we can just turn off 21 without awakening, in which case we will get ¹⁄₃ and ²⁄₃ chances for green and red.

This actually shouldn’t work. Without QI, we simply have ¹⁄₂ for red, ¹⁄₄ for green and ¹⁄₄ for being turned off.

With QI, the last outcome simply becomes “failed to be turned off”, without changing the probabilities of other outcomes

The interesting question here is whether this can be replicated at the quantum leve

Exactly. Otherwise I don’t see how path based identity produces any magic. For now I think it doesn’t, which is why I expect it to be true.

Now the next interesting thing: If I look at the experiment from outside, I will give all three variants ¹⁄₃, but from inside it will be ¹⁄₄, ¹⁄₄, and ¹⁄₂.

Which events you are talking about, when looking from the outside? What statements have ¹⁄₃ credence? It’s definitely not “I will awake in red room”, because it’s not you who are too be awaken. For the observer it has 0 probability.

On the other hand, an event “At least one person is about to be awaken in red room” has probability 1, for both the participant and the observer. So what are you talking about? Try to be rigorous and formally define such events.

The probability distribution is exactly the same as in Sleeping Beauty, and likely both experiments are isomorphic.

Not at all! In Sleeping Beauty on Tails you will be awaken both on Monday and on Tuesday. While here if you are in a green room you are either 21 or 22, not both.

Suppose that 22 get their arm chopped off before awakening. Then you you have 25% chance to lose an arm while participating in such experiment. While in Sleeping Beauty, if your arm is chopped off on Tails before Tuesday awakening, you have 50% probability to lose it, while participating in such experiment.

Interestingly, in the art world, path-based identity is used to define identity

Yep. This is just how we reason about identities in general. That’s why SSSA appears so bizarre to me—it assumes we should be treating personal identity in a different way, for no particular reason.

Ape in the coat 18 Nov 2024 7:28 UTC
4 points
0
in reply to: avturchin’s comment on: Quantum Immortality: A Perspective if AI Doomers are Probably Right
You are right, and it’s a serious counterargument to consider.
You are also right that the Anthropic Trilemma and Magic by Forgetting do not work with path-dependent identity.
Okay, glad we are on the same page here.
However, we can almost recreate the magic machine from the Anthropic Trilemma using path-based identity
I’m not sure I understand your example and how it recreates the magic. Let me try to describe to it with my own words, and then correct me if I got something wrong.
You are put to sleep. Then you are splitted into two people. Then, on random, one of them is put into red room and one into green room. Let’s say that person 1 is in red room and 2 in green room. Then the person 2 is splitted into two people: 21 and 22. Both of them are keept in green rooms. Then everyone is awaken. What should be your credence to awake in a red room?
Here there are three possibilities: 50% to be 1 in a red room and 25% chance to be either 21 or 22 in green rooms. No matter how much a person in a green room is split, the total probability for greenness stays the same. All is quite normal and there is no magic.
Now let’s add a twist.
Instead of putting both 21 and 22 in green rooms, one of them—let it be 21 - is put in a red room.
In this situation, total probability for red room is P(1) + P(21) = 75%. And if we split the 2 more and put more of its parts in red rooms we get highter and highter probability to be in red room. Therefore we get magical ability to manipulate probability.
Am I getting you correctly?
I do not see anything problematic with such “manipulation of probability”. We do not change our estimate just because more people with the same experience are created. We change the estemate because different fraction of people get different experience. This is no more magical than putting both 1 and 2 into red rooms and noticing that suddenly the probability for being in red room reached 100%, compared to the initial formulation where it was mere 50%. Of course it did! That’s completely lawful behaviour of probability theoretic reasoning.
Notice that we can’t actually recreate the anthropic trilemma and be certain to win lottery this way. Because we can’t move people between branches. Therefore everything adds up to normality.
Also, path-dependent identity opens the door to back-causation and premonition, because if we normalize outputs of some black box where paths are mixed, similar to the magic machine discussed above
We just need to restrict the mixing of the paths, which is the restriction of QM anyway. Or maybe I’m missing something? Could you give me an example with such backwards causality? Because as far as I see, everything is quite straightforward.
The main problem of path-dependent identity is that we assume the existence of a “global hidden variable” for any observer. It is hidden as it can’t be measured by an outside viewer and only represents the subjective chances of the observer to be one copy and not another. And it is global as it depends on the observer’s path, not their current state. It therefore contradicts the view that mind is equal to a Turing computer (functionalism) and requires the existence of some identity carrier which moves through paths (qualia, quantum continuity, or soul).
Seems like we are just confused about this “identity” thingy and therefore don’t know how to correctly reason about it. In such situations we are supposed to
- Acknowledge that we are are confused
- Stop speculating on top of our confusion and jumping to conclusions based on it
- Outline the possible options to the best of our understanding and keep an open mind until we manage to resolve the confusion
It’s already clear that “mind” and “identity” are not the same thing. We can talk about identities of things that do not possess a mind, and identities are unique while, there can exist copies of the same mind.So minds can very well be Turing computers, but identities are something else, or even not a thing at all.
Our intuitive desire to drag in consciousness/qualia/soul also appears completely unhelpful after thinking about it for the first five minutes. Non-conscious minds can do the same probability theoretic reasonings as conscious ones. Nothing changes if 1, 21 and 22 from the problem above are not humans but programs executed on different computers.
Whatever extra variable we need it seems to be something that a Laplace’s demon would know. It’s a knowledge about whether a mind was split into n instances simultaneously or through multiple steps. It indeed means that something else except the immediate state of the mind is important for “indentity” considerations, but this something can very well be completely physical—just the past history of causes and effects that led to this state of the mind.

Ape in the coat 16 Nov 2024 19:41 UTC
2 points
0
in reply to: avturchin’s comment on: Quantum Immortality: A Perspective if AI Doomers are Probably Right
As we assume that coin tosses are quantum, and I will be killed if (I didn’t guess pi) or (coin toss is not heads) there is always a branch with ¹⁄₁₂₈ measure where all coins are heads, and they are more probable than surviving via some errors in the setup.
Not if we assume QI+path-based identity.
Under them the chance for you to find yourself in a branch where all coins are Heads is ¹⁄₁₂₈, but your over chance to survive is 100%. Therefore the low chance of failed execution doesn’t matter, quantum immortality will “increase” the probability to 1.
All hell breaks loose” refers here to a hypothetical ability to manipulate perceived probability—that is, magic. The idea is that I can manipulate such probability by changing my measure.
One way to do this is described in Yudkowsky’s ” The Anthropic Trilemma,” where an observer temporarily boosts their measure by increasing the number of their copies in an uploaded computer.
I described a similar idea in “Magic by forgetting,” where the observer boosts their measure by forgetting some information and thus becoming similar to a larger group of observers.
None of these tricks works with path-based identity. That’s why I consider it to be true—it seem to be totally adding up to normality. No matter how many clones of you exist in a different path—only yours path matters for your probability estimate.
Seems that, path-based identity is the only approach according to which all hell doesn’t break lose. So what counterargument you have against it?
Hidden variables also appear depending on the order in which I make copies: if each copy is made from subsequent copies, the original will have a 0.5 probability, the first copy 0.25, the next 0.125, and so on.
Why do you consider it a problem? What kind of counterintuitive consequences does it imply? It seems to be exactly how we reason about anything else.
Suppose there is the original ball, then an indistinguishable copy of it is created. Then one of these two balls is picked randomly and put into a bag 1, while the other ball is put into the bag 2 and then indistinguishable 999 copies of this ball is also put into bag 2.
Clearly we are supposed to expect that ball from bag 1 has 50% to be the original ball, while a random ball from bag 2 only 1/2000 chance to be the original ball. So what’s the problem?
“Anthropic shadow” appear only because the number of observers changes in different branches.
By the same logic “Ball shadow” appears because the number of balls is different in different bags.

Ape in the coat 16 Nov 2024 8:11 UTC
2 points
0
on: Quantum Immortality: A Perspective if AI Doomers are Probably Right
If my π-guess is wrong, my only chance to survive is getting all-heads.
Your other chance for survival is that whatever means are used to kill you somehow does not succeed due to quantuum effects. And this is what QI+path-based identity approach actually predicts. The universe isn’t going to reotroactively change the digit of pi, but neither it’s going to influence the probability of the coin tosses due to the fact that someone may die. QI influence will trigger only at the moment of your death, turning it into near death. And then for the next attempt. And for the next one. Potentially locking you in a state of eternal torture.
However, abandoning SSSA also has a serious theoretical cost:
If observed probabilities have a hidden subjective dimension (because of path-dependency), all hell breaks loose. If we agree that probabilities of being a copy are distributed not in a state-dependent way, but in a path-dependent way, we agree that there is a ‘hidden variable’ in self-locating probabilities. This hidden variable does not play a role in our π experiment but appears in other thought experiments where the order of making copies is defined.
I fail to see this cost. Yes, we agree that there is an additional variable. Namely, my causal history. It’s not necessary hidden but can as well be. So what? What is so hellbreaking about it? This is exactly how probability theory works in every other case. Why should it have a special case for conscious experience?
If there are two bags one with 1 red ball and another with 1000 blue balls and then the coin is tossed and based on the outcome I’m either getting a ball from the first or the second bag, I’m expecting to receive red ball with 50% chance. I’m not supposed to assume out of nowhere that every ball have to have equal probabilities to be given, therefore postulate a ball-shadow that will modify the fairness of the coin.

Ape in the coat

Zom­bies! Sub­stance Dual­ist Zom­bies?

Zombies! Substance Dualist Zombies?