But you are not legitimising it as a subjective impression that correctly represents reality…
only as an illusion: you can feel free in a deterministic world, but you can’t be free in one.
I say: “you are free when you do as you want, not matter how determined are your desires”. This is how I define freedom in “Freedom under naturalistic dualism”(and I think that this position is original, so if this is not the case, I would be glad of being corrected).
That’s just ordinary compatibilism—as I said, “it’s not libertarian free will.”
All the work is being done by using a definition of free will that doesn’t require indeterministic “elbow room”, so none of it is being done by all the physics and metaphysics. If it is valid, it would be just as valid under naturalistic monism, supernaturalistic determinism, etc.
And compatibilism isn’t universally accepted as the solution to free will because the quale of freedom is libertarian—one feels that one could have done otherwise. (At least , mine is like that).
An additional non physical layer of consciousness might buy you qualia, but delivers no guarantee that they will be accurate… a quale of libertarian free will is necessarily illusory under determinism.
An additional non physical layer of consciousness might have bought you downwards causation and libertarian free will.
Well, “one feel you can have done otherwise” is the part of the qualia of free will my definition do not legitimize.
When you chose among several options, the options are real (other person could have done otherwise) but once it is “you” who choses, mechanism imply “all degrees of freedom have been used”.
But you are not legitimising it as a subjective impression that correctly represents reality… only as an illusion: you can feel free in a deterministic world, but you can’t be free in one.
I say: “you are free when you do as you want, not matter how determined are your desires”. This is how I define freedom in “Freedom under naturalistic dualism”(and I think that this position is original, so if this is not the case, I would be glad of being corrected).
That’s just ordinary compatibilism—as I said, “it’s not libertarian free will.” All the work is being done by using a definition of free will that doesn’t require indeterministic “elbow room”, so none of it is being done by all the physics and metaphysics. If it is valid, it would be just as valid under naturalistic monism, supernaturalistic determinism, etc.
And compatibilism isn’t universally accepted as the solution to free will because the quale of freedom is libertarian—one feels that one could have done otherwise. (At least , mine is like that).
An additional non physical layer of consciousness might buy you qualia, but delivers no guarantee that they will be accurate… a quale of libertarian free will is necessarily illusory under determinism.
An additional non physical layer of consciousness might have bought you downwards causation and libertarian free will.
Well, “one feel you can have done otherwise” is the part of the qualia of free will my definition do not legitimize.
When you chose among several options, the options are real (other person could have done otherwise) but once it is “you” who choses, mechanism imply “all degrees of freedom have been used”.