“You have argued that some things that seem real are real because they seem real. The problem is that because the (degrees of) freedom don’t really exist”
There are things I can do (because they are under my conscient control, like move my finger) and others that I cannot do (like altering Earth orbit). I am “free” to move or nor a finger, and I am not “free” to alter Earth orbit. Is there anything irrational in this? Anything illusory?
Of course, the way I use my freedom is determined. “Brain” has degrees of freedom, they are real (Laplace demon can compute them, by considering all futures conditional on possible Brain configurations), but, at the end, “Brain” is also a physical system, and can be predicted too.
The set of all possible futures conditional on brain configurations is the “degrees of freedom” of Brain, while, when you predict what “Brain” does with those degrees of freedom, you predict Brain use of its freedom.
How important is that dinstiction? From the perspective of Brain, hugue, for Laplace’s demon irrelevant.
There are things I can do (because they are under my conscient control, like move my finger) and others that I cannot do (like altering Earth orbit). I am “free” to move or nor a finger, and I am not “free” to alter Earth orbit. Is there anything irrational in this? Anything illusory?
You have been assuming determinism, and if determinism is true you are not free to move your finger or not as you choose. Determinism means that the movement of your finger was pre ordained before you were born.
So determinism seems to mean that you can never do anything except the one thing you do. That’s the deterministic argument against libertarian free will. But it’s pretty counterintuitive that both “cannots” are the same.
Compatibilists like Dennett argue that you can move your finger or not in the sense that a very similar version of you, it the same you under slightly different circumstances, would move his finger...but no such slightly different or nearby version of you can change the Earths Orbit.
That leaves everything unchanged … You still lack libertarian free will, you still have compatibilist free will, and having consciousness or qualia still doesn’t make a difference.
How important is that dinstiction? From the perspective of Brain, hugue, for Laplace’s demon irrelevant.
“You have been assuming determinism, and if determinism is true you are not free to move your finger or not as you choose”
I freely chose to move my finger, but my (free) choice is pre-ordained. I can do as a I please (in the set of my “degrees of physical freedom”), so I am free within those bounds; on the other hand, what I want is pre-ordained.
“So it’s compatibilist free will, and having a quale of libertarian free will doesn’t change that”
Well, in fact the whole point was to legitimize the quale of libertarian free will (as a Hamiltonian, not as a unicorn), so I think at this point all our differences are reconciled :-)
But you are not legitimising it as a subjective impression that correctly represents reality…
only as an illusion: you can feel free in a deterministic world, but you can’t be free in one.
I say: “you are free when you do as you want, not matter how determined are your desires”. This is how I define freedom in “Freedom under naturalistic dualism”(and I think that this position is original, so if this is not the case, I would be glad of being corrected).
That’s just ordinary compatibilism—as I said, “it’s not libertarian free will.”
All the work is being done by using a definition of free will that doesn’t require indeterministic “elbow room”, so none of it is being done by all the physics and metaphysics. If it is valid, it would be just as valid under naturalistic monism, supernaturalistic determinism, etc.
And compatibilism isn’t universally accepted as the solution to free will because the quale of freedom is libertarian—one feels that one could have done otherwise. (At least , mine is like that).
An additional non physical layer of consciousness might buy you qualia, but delivers no guarantee that they will be accurate… a quale of libertarian free will is necessarily illusory under determinism.
An additional non physical layer of consciousness might have bought you downwards causation and libertarian free will.
Well, “one feel you can have done otherwise” is the part of the qualia of free will my definition do not legitimize.
When you chose among several options, the options are real (other person could have done otherwise) but once it is “you” who choses, mechanism imply “all degrees of freedom have been used”.
“You have argued that some things that seem real are real because they seem real. The problem is that because the (degrees of) freedom don’t really exist”
There are things I can do (because they are under my conscient control, like move my finger) and others that I cannot do (like altering Earth orbit). I am “free” to move or nor a finger, and I am not “free” to alter Earth orbit. Is there anything irrational in this? Anything illusory?
Of course, the way I use my freedom is determined. “Brain” has degrees of freedom, they are real (Laplace demon can compute them, by considering all futures conditional on possible Brain configurations), but, at the end, “Brain” is also a physical system, and can be predicted too.
The set of all possible futures conditional on brain configurations is the “degrees of freedom” of Brain, while, when you predict what “Brain” does with those degrees of freedom, you predict Brain use of its freedom.
How important is that dinstiction? From the perspective of Brain, hugue, for Laplace’s demon irrelevant.
Both are rigth.
You have been assuming determinism, and if determinism is true you are not free to move your finger or not as you choose. Determinism means that the movement of your finger was pre ordained before you were born.
So determinism seems to mean that you can never do anything except the one thing you do. That’s the deterministic argument against libertarian free will. But it’s pretty counterintuitive that both “cannots” are the same.
Compatibilists like Dennett argue that you can move your finger or not in the sense that a very similar version of you, it the same you under slightly different circumstances, would move his finger...but no such slightly different or nearby version of you can change the Earths Orbit.
That leaves everything unchanged … You still lack libertarian free will, you still have compatibilist free will, and having consciousness or qualia still doesn’t make a difference.
Surely Laplace’s demon wins?
“You have been assuming determinism, and if determinism is true you are not free to move your finger or not as you choose”
I freely chose to move my finger, but my (free) choice is pre-ordained. I can do as a I please (in the set of my “degrees of physical freedom”), so I am free within those bounds; on the other hand, what I want is pre-ordained.
So it’s not free from determinism. So it’s not libertarian free will.
You can do only one thing in any particular situation, the thing that is predetermined.
So it’s compatibilist free will, and having a quale of libertarian free will doesn’t change that.
“So it’s compatibilist free will, and having a quale of libertarian free will doesn’t change that”
Well, in fact the whole point was to legitimize the quale of libertarian free will (as a Hamiltonian, not as a unicorn), so I think at this point all our differences are reconciled :-)
But you are not legitimising it as a subjective impression that correctly represents reality… only as an illusion: you can feel free in a deterministic world, but you can’t be free in one.
I say: “you are free when you do as you want, not matter how determined are your desires”. This is how I define freedom in “Freedom under naturalistic dualism”(and I think that this position is original, so if this is not the case, I would be glad of being corrected).
That’s just ordinary compatibilism—as I said, “it’s not libertarian free will.” All the work is being done by using a definition of free will that doesn’t require indeterministic “elbow room”, so none of it is being done by all the physics and metaphysics. If it is valid, it would be just as valid under naturalistic monism, supernaturalistic determinism, etc.
And compatibilism isn’t universally accepted as the solution to free will because the quale of freedom is libertarian—one feels that one could have done otherwise. (At least , mine is like that).
An additional non physical layer of consciousness might buy you qualia, but delivers no guarantee that they will be accurate… a quale of libertarian free will is necessarily illusory under determinism.
An additional non physical layer of consciousness might have bought you downwards causation and libertarian free will.
Well, “one feel you can have done otherwise” is the part of the qualia of free will my definition do not legitimize.
When you chose among several options, the options are real (other person could have done otherwise) but once it is “you” who choses, mechanism imply “all degrees of freedom have been used”.