This theory simply does not resonate with me. I do not feel that I am at all like that and neither has anyone I have known been like that. It is as off the mark as Freudian theories are, in my view.
“So you wall off a little area of your mind..” Do you have any evidence for this idea that the consciousness is a walled off area?
Is your objection that you don’t believe in an unconscious at all, or that you think the unconscious works in a different when than I do?
I think links in this post are sufficient to show something’s going on with mental decisions that aren’t consciously available; if you haven’t already, see posts like “Belief in Belief”, “Cached Selves”, “Simultaneously Right and Wrong”, “The Apologist and the Revolutionary”, et cetera. Given that unconscious processing takes place, this is an attempt to explain why and where it might work. I guess another model might be better, but I haven’t really seen* any other model (except Wei’s and Phil’s, to which this is basically a friendly amendment).
So yes, I admit it’s obviously crazy, but I don’t think it’s crazier than necessary to explain the crazy data.
My objection is not about unconsciousness, nor is it about consciousness—it is about the division of the mind/brain into two systems.
I have a mind (product or function of my brain) and that mind does the things like perception, problem solving, motivation, action, memory, emotion and so on, all the mind-type things. Some of that activity I am aware of and some not. This is not a difference primarily in the activity but in which parts of it rise to consciousness. Nothing much happens in consciousness other than conscious awareness. It is one system. Consciousness seems to be necessary for some functions of memory and focus of attention, to predict the use of skeletal muscles, to facilitate some complex thought that requires a working memory (language and the like). I do not associate my ‘I’ with my consciousness alone but with my whole, single, undivided mind. That is how it feels and a division does not resonate with me.
I know that we were all brought up to accept a Freudian or some other such division inside our heads, but I was not able to believe that in the ’50s when I was a teenager and I have never been able to do it since. I do not feel divided and never have.
My objection is not about unconsciousness, nor is it about consciousness—it is about the division of the mind/brain into two systems.
I’d like to expand on this point by merging it with pjeby’s comment:
Remember: it isn’t conscious (not an agent), and it’s not singular (not an agent).
There’s nothing wrong, per se, with dividing the mind into conscious and unconscious, any more than any division into a category and its complement. The problem comes when the unconscious is made out to be highly parallel to the (usual picture of the) conscious mind, including a high degree of internal coherence, capacity for sophisticated goal-seeking, etc.
Additional problems may come from viewing the conscious mind as having a single coherent focus (“it’s the PR department”). The conscious mind comes across as too homunculized. Tim Tyler’s view makes more sense to me: PR is one function among many.
Can you clarify? Are you saying that this posting’s ideas are not similar to Freudian ideas? Or are you saying that Freudian type ideas are not generally discredited in neuroscience? Or both? Or something else?
I’m saying that Freudian type ideas are really, really bad. I’m emphasising that saying a model is as bad as Freud’s eponymous theories is a significant claim indeed, (although it is something that could reasonably be used to emphasise a lesser criticism with hyperbole.)
My comment here is orthogonal to the issue of to what extent the ideas in this post are accurate and useful but relevant to scale of evaluation.
Fair enough. If you are saying that the ideas in the post are not as bad as Freud’s and I have exaggerated, then you may be right. They seem very similar to me but I was focusing on the business of dividing up the mind into component minds and the notion of opposition between the resulting minds. I would agree that the post is not like Freud in other ways.
If you are saying that the ideas in the post are not as bad as Freud’s and I have exaggerated,
Well, that and I’m just taking the chance to disrespect Freud (and express contempt with the remnants of Freudian thinking that are still floating about in popular psychology.)
One thing that I would say, and you may well agree on this, is that this post could reasonably be labelled a ‘just so’ story, as could Freud’s ramblings. Fortunately the sanity watermark is somewhat higher here and contemporary understanding of human behavior at least ensures that even the most arbitrary of just so stories must explain a better set of observations.
This theory simply does not resonate with me. I do not feel that I am at all like that and neither has anyone I have known been like that. It is as off the mark as Freudian theories are, in my view. “So you wall off a little area of your mind..” Do you have any evidence for this idea that the consciousness is a walled off area?
Is your objection that you don’t believe in an unconscious at all, or that you think the unconscious works in a different when than I do?
I think links in this post are sufficient to show something’s going on with mental decisions that aren’t consciously available; if you haven’t already, see posts like “Belief in Belief”, “Cached Selves”, “Simultaneously Right and Wrong”, “The Apologist and the Revolutionary”, et cetera. Given that unconscious processing takes place, this is an attempt to explain why and where it might work. I guess another model might be better, but I haven’t really seen* any other model (except Wei’s and Phil’s, to which this is basically a friendly amendment).
So yes, I admit it’s obviously crazy, but I don’t think it’s crazier than necessary to explain the crazy data.
My objection is not about unconsciousness, nor is it about consciousness—it is about the division of the mind/brain into two systems.
I have a mind (product or function of my brain) and that mind does the things like perception, problem solving, motivation, action, memory, emotion and so on, all the mind-type things. Some of that activity I am aware of and some not. This is not a difference primarily in the activity but in which parts of it rise to consciousness. Nothing much happens in consciousness other than conscious awareness. It is one system. Consciousness seems to be necessary for some functions of memory and focus of attention, to predict the use of skeletal muscles, to facilitate some complex thought that requires a working memory (language and the like). I do not associate my ‘I’ with my consciousness alone but with my whole, single, undivided mind. That is how it feels and a division does not resonate with me.
I know that we were all brought up to accept a Freudian or some other such division inside our heads, but I was not able to believe that in the ’50s when I was a teenager and I have never been able to do it since. I do not feel divided and never have.
I’d like to expand on this point by merging it with pjeby’s comment:
There’s nothing wrong, per se, with dividing the mind into conscious and unconscious, any more than any division into a category and its complement. The problem comes when the unconscious is made out to be highly parallel to the (usual picture of the) conscious mind, including a high degree of internal coherence, capacity for sophisticated goal-seeking, etc.
Additional problems may come from viewing the conscious mind as having a single coherent focus (“it’s the PR department”). The conscious mind comes across as too homunculized. Tim Tyler’s view makes more sense to me: PR is one function among many.
You never experience akrasia?
Yes, I have experienced akrasia. What does that say about whether I have one or two minds? All it says is that sometimes I’m conflicted.
That is an incredibly strong claim if meant literally rather than as hyperbole.
Can you clarify? Are you saying that this posting’s ideas are not similar to Freudian ideas? Or are you saying that Freudian type ideas are not generally discredited in neuroscience? Or both? Or something else?
I’m saying that Freudian type ideas are really, really bad. I’m emphasising that saying a model is as bad as Freud’s eponymous theories is a significant claim indeed, (although it is something that could reasonably be used to emphasise a lesser criticism with hyperbole.)
My comment here is orthogonal to the issue of to what extent the ideas in this post are accurate and useful but relevant to scale of evaluation.
Fair enough. If you are saying that the ideas in the post are not as bad as Freud’s and I have exaggerated, then you may be right. They seem very similar to me but I was focusing on the business of dividing up the mind into component minds and the notion of opposition between the resulting minds. I would agree that the post is not like Freud in other ways.
Well, that and I’m just taking the chance to disrespect Freud (and express contempt with the remnants of Freudian thinking that are still floating about in popular psychology.)
One thing that I would say, and you may well agree on this, is that this post could reasonably be labelled a ‘just so’ story, as could Freud’s ramblings. Fortunately the sanity watermark is somewhat higher here and contemporary understanding of human behavior at least ensures that even the most arbitrary of just so stories must explain a better set of observations.
Agreed—thanks for the correction
Re: “Do you have any evidence for this idea that the consciousness is a walled off area?”
If consciousness is a walled garden, the walls would appear to be quite mobile.