Is your objection that you don’t believe in an unconscious at all, or that you think the unconscious works in a different when than I do?
I think links in this post are sufficient to show something’s going on with mental decisions that aren’t consciously available; if you haven’t already, see posts like “Belief in Belief”, “Cached Selves”, “Simultaneously Right and Wrong”, “The Apologist and the Revolutionary”, et cetera. Given that unconscious processing takes place, this is an attempt to explain why and where it might work. I guess another model might be better, but I haven’t really seen* any other model (except Wei’s and Phil’s, to which this is basically a friendly amendment).
So yes, I admit it’s obviously crazy, but I don’t think it’s crazier than necessary to explain the crazy data.
My objection is not about unconsciousness, nor is it about consciousness—it is about the division of the mind/brain into two systems.
I have a mind (product or function of my brain) and that mind does the things like perception, problem solving, motivation, action, memory, emotion and so on, all the mind-type things. Some of that activity I am aware of and some not. This is not a difference primarily in the activity but in which parts of it rise to consciousness. Nothing much happens in consciousness other than conscious awareness. It is one system. Consciousness seems to be necessary for some functions of memory and focus of attention, to predict the use of skeletal muscles, to facilitate some complex thought that requires a working memory (language and the like). I do not associate my ‘I’ with my consciousness alone but with my whole, single, undivided mind. That is how it feels and a division does not resonate with me.
I know that we were all brought up to accept a Freudian or some other such division inside our heads, but I was not able to believe that in the ’50s when I was a teenager and I have never been able to do it since. I do not feel divided and never have.
My objection is not about unconsciousness, nor is it about consciousness—it is about the division of the mind/brain into two systems.
I’d like to expand on this point by merging it with pjeby’s comment:
Remember: it isn’t conscious (not an agent), and it’s not singular (not an agent).
There’s nothing wrong, per se, with dividing the mind into conscious and unconscious, any more than any division into a category and its complement. The problem comes when the unconscious is made out to be highly parallel to the (usual picture of the) conscious mind, including a high degree of internal coherence, capacity for sophisticated goal-seeking, etc.
Additional problems may come from viewing the conscious mind as having a single coherent focus (“it’s the PR department”). The conscious mind comes across as too homunculized. Tim Tyler’s view makes more sense to me: PR is one function among many.
Is your objection that you don’t believe in an unconscious at all, or that you think the unconscious works in a different when than I do?
I think links in this post are sufficient to show something’s going on with mental decisions that aren’t consciously available; if you haven’t already, see posts like “Belief in Belief”, “Cached Selves”, “Simultaneously Right and Wrong”, “The Apologist and the Revolutionary”, et cetera. Given that unconscious processing takes place, this is an attempt to explain why and where it might work. I guess another model might be better, but I haven’t really seen* any other model (except Wei’s and Phil’s, to which this is basically a friendly amendment).
So yes, I admit it’s obviously crazy, but I don’t think it’s crazier than necessary to explain the crazy data.
My objection is not about unconsciousness, nor is it about consciousness—it is about the division of the mind/brain into two systems.
I have a mind (product or function of my brain) and that mind does the things like perception, problem solving, motivation, action, memory, emotion and so on, all the mind-type things. Some of that activity I am aware of and some not. This is not a difference primarily in the activity but in which parts of it rise to consciousness. Nothing much happens in consciousness other than conscious awareness. It is one system. Consciousness seems to be necessary for some functions of memory and focus of attention, to predict the use of skeletal muscles, to facilitate some complex thought that requires a working memory (language and the like). I do not associate my ‘I’ with my consciousness alone but with my whole, single, undivided mind. That is how it feels and a division does not resonate with me.
I know that we were all brought up to accept a Freudian or some other such division inside our heads, but I was not able to believe that in the ’50s when I was a teenager and I have never been able to do it since. I do not feel divided and never have.
I’d like to expand on this point by merging it with pjeby’s comment:
There’s nothing wrong, per se, with dividing the mind into conscious and unconscious, any more than any division into a category and its complement. The problem comes when the unconscious is made out to be highly parallel to the (usual picture of the) conscious mind, including a high degree of internal coherence, capacity for sophisticated goal-seeking, etc.
Additional problems may come from viewing the conscious mind as having a single coherent focus (“it’s the PR department”). The conscious mind comes across as too homunculized. Tim Tyler’s view makes more sense to me: PR is one function among many.
You never experience akrasia?
Yes, I have experienced akrasia. What does that say about whether I have one or two minds? All it says is that sometimes I’m conflicted.