It also stipulates the predictor predicts almost perfectly. So it’s very relevant.
Yes, almost perfectly (well, it has to be “almost”, because it’s also stipulated that the predictor got it wrong this time).
No, it’s the wrong decision. Right-boxing is just the necessary consequence of the predictor predicting I Right-box. But insofar this is a decision problem, Left-boxing is correct, and then the predictor predicted I would Left-box.
None of this matters, because the scenario stipulates that there’s a bomb in the Left box.
No, it means the model Left-boxed and thus the predictor didn’t put a bomb in Left.
But it’s stipulated that the predictor did put a bomb in Left. That’s part of the scenario.
Do you understand how subjunctive dependence works?
Why does it matter? We know that there’s a bomb in Left, because the scenario tells us so.
Yes, almost perfectly (well, it has to be “almost”, because it’s also stipulated that the predictor got it wrong this time).
Well, not with your answer, because you Right-box. But anyway.
Why does it matter? We know that there’s a bomb in Left, because the scenario tells us so.
It matters a lot, because in a way the problem description is contradicting itself (which happens more often in Newcomblike problems).
It says there’s a bomb in Left.
It also says that if I Left-box, then the predictor predicted this, and will not have put a Bomb in Left. (Unless you assume the predictor predicts so well by looking at, I don’t know, the color of your shoes or something. But it strongly seems like the predictor has some model of your decision procedure.)
You keep repeating (1), ignoring (2), even though (2) is stipulated just as much as (1).
So, yes, my question whether you understand subjunctive dependence is justified, because you keep ignoring that crucial part of the problem.
Well, first of all, if there is actually a contradiction in the scenario, then we’ve been wasting our time. What’s to talk about? In such a case the answer to “what happens in this scenario” is “nothing, it’s logically impossible in the first place”, and we’re done.
But of course there isn’t actually a contradiction. (Which you know, otherwise you wouldn’t have needed to hedge by saying “in a way”.)
It’s simply that the problem says that if you Left-box, then the predictor predicted this, and will not have put a bomb in Left… usually. Almost always! But not quite always. It very rarely makes mistakes! And this time, it would seem, is one of those times.
So there’s no contradiction, there’s just a (barely) fallible predictor.
So the scenario tells us that there’s a bomb in Left, we go “welp, guess the predictor screwed up”, and then… well, apparently FDT tells us to choose Left anyway? For some reason…? (Or does it? You tell me…) But regardless, obviously the correct choice is Right, because Left’s got a bomb in it.
I really don’t know what else there is to say about this.
But of course there isn’t actually a contradiction. (Which you know, otherwise you wouldn’t have needed to hedge by saying “in a way”.)
There is, as I explained. There’s 2 ways of resolving it, but yours isn’t one of them. You can’t have it both ways.
It’s simply that the problem says that if you Left-box, then the predictor predicted this, and will not have put a bomb in Left… usually. Almost always! But not quite always. It very rarely makes mistakes! And this time, it would seem, is one of those times.
Just… no. “The predictor predicted this”, yes, so there are a trillion trillion − 1 follow-up worlds where I don’t burn to death! And yes, 1 - just 1 - world where I do. Why choose to focus on that 1 out of a trillion trillion worlds?
Because the problem talks about a bomb in Left?
No. The problem says more than that. It clearly predicts a trillion trillion − 1 worlds where I don’t burn to death. That 1 world where I do sucks, but paying $100 to avoid it seems odd. Unless, of course, you value your life infinitely (which you do I believe?). That’s fine, it does all depend on the specific valuations.
The problem stipulates that you actually, in fact, find yourself in a world where there’s a bomb in Left. These “other worlds” are—in the scenario we’re given—entirely hypothetical (or “counterfactual”, if you like). Do they even exist? If so, in what sense? Not clear. But in the world you find yourself in (we are told), there’s a bomb in the Left box. You can either take that box, and burn to death, or… not do that.
So, “why choose to focus on” that world? Because that’s the world we find ourselves in, where we have to make the choice.
Paying $100 to avoid burning to death isn’t something that “seems odd”, it’s totally normal and the obviously correct choice.
My point is that those “other worlds” are just as much stipulated by the problem statement as that one world you focus on. So, you pay $100 and don’t burn to death. I don’t pay $100, burn to death in 1 world, and live for free in a trillion trillion − 1 worlds. Even if I value my life at $10,000,000,000,000, my choice gives more utility.
My point is that those “other worlds” are just as much stipulated by the problem statement as that one world you focus on.
Sorry, but no, they’re not. You may choose to infer their “existence” from what’s stated in the problem—but that’s an inference that depends on various additional assumptions (e.g. about the nature of counterfactuals, and all sorts of other things). All that’s actually stipulated is the one world you find yourself in.
You infer the existence of me burning to death from what’s stated in the problem as well. There’s no difference.
I do have the assumption of subjunctive dependence. But without that one—if, say, the predictor predicts by looking at the color of my shoes—then I don’t Left-box anyway.
You infer the existence of me burning to death from what’s stated in the problem as well. There’s no difference.
Of course there’s a difference: inferring burning to death just depends on the perfectly ordinary assumption of cause and effect, plus what is very explicitly stated in the problem. Inferring the existence of other worlds depends on much more esoteric assumptions that that. There’s really no comparison at all.
I do have the assumption of subjunctive dependence.
Not only is that not the only assumption required, it’s not even clear what it means to “assume” subjunctive dependence. Sure, it’s stipulated that the predictor is usually (but not quite always!) right about what you’ll do. What else is there to this “assumption” than that?
But how that leads to “other worlds exist” and “it’s meaningful to aggregate utility across them” and so on… I have no idea.
If they’re just possible worlds, then why do they matter? They’re not actual worlds, after all (by the time the described scenario is happening, it’s too late for any of them to be actual!). So… what’s the relevance?
The UDT convention is that other possible worlds remain relevant, even when you find yourself in a possible world that isn’t compatible with their actuality. It’s confusing to discuss this general point as if it’s specific to this contentious thought experiment.
The setting has a sample space, as in expected utility theory, with situations that take place in some event (let’s call it a situation event) and offer a choice between smaller events resulting from taking alternative actions. The misleading UDT convention is to call the situation event “actual”. It’s misleading because the goal is to optimize expected utility over the whole sample space, not just over the situation event, so the places on the sample space outside the situation event are effectively still in play, still remain relevant, not ruled out by the particular situation event being “actual”.
Alright. But by the time the situation described in the OP happens, it no longer matters whether you optimize expected utility over the whole sample space; that goal is now moot. One event out of the sample space has occurred, and the others have failed to occur. Why would you continue to attempt to achieve that goal, toward which you are no longer capable of taking any action?
by the time the situation described in the OP happens, it no longer matters whether you optimize expected utility over the whole sample space; that goal is now moot
That goal may be moot for some ways of doing decisions. For UDT it’s not moot, it’s the only thing that we care about instead. And calling some situation or another “actual” has no effect at all on the goal, and on the process of decision making in any situation, actual or otherwise, that’s what makes the goal and the decision process reflectively stable.
“But by the time the situation described in the OP happens, it no longer matters whether you optimize expected utility over the whole sample space; that goal is now moot.”
This is what we agree on. If you’re in the situation with a bomb, all that matters is the bomb.
My stance is that Left-boxers virtually never get into the situation to begin with, because of the prediction Omega makes. So with probability close to 1, they never see a bomb.
Your stance (if I understand correctly) is that the problem statement says there is a bomb, so, that’s what’s true with probability 1 (or almost 1).
And so I believe that’s where our disagreement lies. I think Newcomblike problems are often “trick questions” that can be resolved in two ways, one leaning more towards your interpretation.
In spirit of Vladimir’s points, if I annoyed you, I do apologize. I can get quite intense in such discussions.
This is what we agree on. If you’re in the situation with a bomb, all that matters is the bomb.
But that’s false for a UDT agent, it still matters to that agent-instance-in-the-situation what happens in other situations, those without a bomb, it’s not the case that all that matters is the bomb (or even a bomb).
Hmm, interesting. I don’t know much about UDT. From and FDT perspective, I’d say that if you’re in the situation with the bomb, your decision procedure already Right-boxed and therefore you’re Right-boxing again, as logical necessity. (Making the problem very interesting.)
To explain my view more, the question I try to answer in these problems is more or less: if I were to choose a decision theory now to strictly adhere to, knowing I might run into the Bomb problem, which decision theory would I choose?
If I ever find myself in the Bomb scenario, I Right-box. Because in that scenario, the predictor’s model of me already Right-boxed, and therefore I do, too—not as a decision, per se, but as a logical consequence.
The correct decision is another question—that’s Left-boxing, because the decision is being made in two places. If I find myself in the Bomb scenario, that just means the decision to Right-box was already made.
The Bomb problem asks what the correct decision is, and makes clear (at least under my assumption) that the decision is made at 2 points in time. At that first point (in the predictor’s head), Left-boxing leads to the most utility: it avoids burning to death for free. Note that at that point, there is not yet a bomb in Left!
If I ever find myself in the Bomb scenario, I Right-box.
If we agree on that, then I don’t understand what it is that you think we disagree on! (Although the “not as a decision, per se” bit seems… contentless.)
The Bomb problem asks what the correct decision is,
No, it asks what decision you should make. And we apparently agree that the answer is “Right”.
What does it mean to say that Left-boxing is “the correct decision” if you then say that the decision you’d actually make would be to Right-box? This seems to be straightforwardly contradictory, in a way that renders the claim nonsensical.
I read all your comments in this thread. But you seem to be saying things that, in a very straightforward way, simply don’t make any sense…
Alright. The correct decision is Left-boxing, because that means the predictor’s model Left-boxed (and so do I), letting me live for free. Because, at the point where the predictor models me, the Bomb isn’t placed yet (and never will be).
However, IF I’m in the Bomb scenario, then the predictor’s model already Right-boxed. Then, because of subjunctive dependence, it’s apparently not possible for me to Left-box, just as it is impossible for two calculators to give a different result to 2 + 2.
Well, the Bomb scenario is what we’re given. So the first paragraph you just wrote there is… irrelevant? Inapplicable? What’s the point of it? It’s answering a question that’s not being asked.
As for the last sentence of your comment, I don’t understand what you mean by it. Certainly it’s possible for you to Left-box; you just go ahead and Left-box. This would be a bad idea, of course! Because you’d burn to death. But you could do it! You just shouldn’t—a point on which we, apparently, agree.
The bottom line is: to the actual single question the scenario asks—which box do you choose, finding yourself in the given situation?—we give the same answer. Yes?
The bottom line is: to the actual single question the scenario asks—which box do you choose, finding yourself in the given situation?—we give the same answer. Yes?
The bottom line is that Bomb is a decision problem. If I am still free to make a decision (which I suppose I am, otherwise it isn’t much of a problem), then the decision I make is made at 2 points in time. And then, Left-boxing is the better decision.
Yes, the Bomb is what we’re given. But with the very reasonable assumption of subjunctive dependence, it specifies what I am saying...
We agree that if I would be there, I would Right-box, but also everybody would then Right-box, as a logical necessity (well, 1 in a trillion trillion error rate, sure). It has nothing to do with correct or incorrect decisions, viewed like that: the decision is already hard coded into the problem statement, because of the subjunctive dependence.
“But you can just Left-box” doesn’t work: that’s like expecting one calculator to answer to 2 + 2 differently than another calculator.
I think it’s better to explain to such people the problem where the predictor is perfect, and then generalize to an imperfect predictor. They don’t understand the general principle of your present choices pseudo-overwriting the entire timeline and can’t think in the seemingly-noncausal way that optimal decision-making requires. By jumping right to an imperfect predictor, the principle becomes, I think, too complicated to explain.
(Btw, you can call your answer “obvious” and my side “crazy” all you want, but it won’t change a thing until you actually demonstrate why and how FDT is wrong, which you haven’t done.)
I’ve done that: FDT is wrong because it (according to you) recommends that you choose to burn to death, when you could easily choose not to burn to death. Pretty simple.
It seems to me that your argument proves too much.
Let’s set aside this specific example and consider something more everyday: making promises. It is valuable to be able to make promises that others will believe, even when they are promises to do something that (once the relevant situation arises) you will strongly prefer not to do.
Suppose I want a $1000 loan, with $1100 to be repaid one year from now. My counterparty Bob has no trust in the legal system, police, etc., and expects that next year I will be somewhere where he can’t easily find me and force me to pay up. But I really need the money. Fortunately, Bob knows some mad scientists and we agree to the following: I will have implanted in my body a device that will kill me if 366 days from now I haven’t paid up. I get the money. I pay up. Nobody dies. Yay.
I hope we are agreed that (granted the rather absurd premises involved) I should be glad to have this option, even though in the case where I don’t pay up it kills me.
Revised scenario: Bob knows some mad psychologists who by some combination of questioning, brain scanning, etc., are able to determine very reliably what future choices I will make in any given situation. He also knows that in a year’s time I might (but with extremely low probability) be in a situation where I can only save my life at the cost of the $1100 that I owe him. He has no risk tolerance to speak of and will not lend me the money if in that situation I would choose to save my life and not give him the money.
Granted these (again absurd) premises, do you agree with me that it is to my advantage to have the sort of personality that can promise to pay Bob back even if it literally kills me?
It seems to me that: 1. Your argument in this thread would tell me, a year down the line and in the surprising situation that I do in fact need to choose between Bob’s money and my life, “save your life, obviously”. 2. If my personality were such that I would do as you advise in that situation, then Bob will not lend me the money. (Which may in fact mean that in that unlikely future situation I die anyway.) 3. Your reasons for saying “FDT recommends knowingly choosing to burn to death! So much the worse for FDT!”, are equally reasons to say “Being someone who can make and keep this sort of promise means knowingly choosing to pay up and die! So much the worse for being that sort of person!”. 4. Being that sort of person is not in fact worse even though there are situations in which it leads to a worse outcome. 5. There is no version of “being that sort of person” that lets you just decide to live, in that unlikely situation, because paying up at the cost of your own life is what “being that sort of person” means. 6. To whatever extent I get to choose whether to be that sort of person, I have to make the decision before I know whether I’m going to be in that unlikely situation. And, to whatever extent I get to choose, it is reasonable to choose to be that sort of person, because the net benefit is greater. 7. Once again, “be that sort of person and then change your mind” is not one of the available options; if I will change my mind about it, then I was never that sort of person after all.
What (if anything) do you disagree with in that paragraph? What (if anything) do you find relevantly disanalogous between the situation I describe here and the one with the bomb?
Granted these (again absurd) premises, do you agree with me that it is to my advantage to have the sort of personality that can promise to pay Bob back even if it literally kills me?
I do not.
What (if anything) do you disagree with in that paragraph? What (if anything) do you find relevantly disanalogous between the situation I describe here and the one with the bomb?
Your scenario omits the crucial element of the scenario in the OP, where you (the subject) find yourself in a situation where the predictor turns out to have erred in its prediction.
Hmm. I am genuinely quite baffled by this; there seems to be some very fundamental difference in how we are looking at the world. Let me just check that this is a real disagreement and not a misunderstanding (even if it is there would also be a real disagreement, but a different one): I am asking not “do you agree with me that at the point where I have to choose between dying and failing to repay Bob it is to my advantage …” but “do you agree with me that at an earlier point, say when I am negotiating with Bob it is to my advantage …”.
If I am understanding you right and you are understanding me right, then I think the following is true. Suppose that when Bob has explained his position (he is willing to lend me the money if, and only if, his mad scientists determine that I will definitely repay him even if the alternative is death), some supernatural being magically informs me that while it cannot lend me the money it can make me the sort of person who can make the kind of commitment Bob wants and actually follow through. I think you would recommend that I either not accept this offer, or at any rate not make that commitment having been empowered to do so.
Do you feel the same way about the first scenario, where instead of choosing to be a person who will pay up even at the price of death I choose to be a person who will be compelled by brute force to pay up or die? If not, why?
Your scenario omits the crucial element of the scenario in the OP, where you (the subject) find yourself in a situation where the predictor turns out to have erred in its prediction.
Why does that matter? (Maybe it doesn’t; your opinion about my scenario is AIUI the same as your opinion about the one in the OP.)
I am asking not “do you agree with me that at the point where I have to choose between dying and failing to repay Bob it is to my advantage …” but “do you agree with me that at an earlier point, say when I am negotiating with Bob it is to my advantage …”.
Yes, I understood you correctly. My answer stands. (But I appreciate the verification.)
I think you would recommend that I either not accept this offer, or at any rate not make that commitment having been empowered to do so.
Right.
Do you feel the same way about the first scenario, where instead of choosing to be a person who will pay up even at the price of death I choose to be a person who will be compelled by brute force to pay up or die? If not, why?
No, because there’s a difference between “pay up or die” and “pay up and die”.
Your scenario omits the crucial element of the scenario in the OP, where you (the subject) find yourself in a situation where the predictor turns out to have erred in its prediction.
Why does that matter? (Maybe it doesn’t; your opinion about my scenario is AIUI the same as your opinion about the one in the OP.)
The scenario in the OP seems to hinge on it. As described, the situation is that the agent has picked FDT as their decision theory, is absolutely the sort of agent who will choose the Left box and die if so predicted, who is thereby supposed to not actually encounter situations where the Left box has a bomb… but oops! The predictor messed up and there is a bomb there anyhow. And now the agent is left with a choice on which nothing depends except whether he pointlessly dies.
I agree (of course!) that there is a difference between “pay up and die” and “pay up or die”. But I don’t understand how this difference can be responsible for the difference in your opinions about the two scenarios.
Scenario 1: I choose for things to be so arranged that in unlikely situation S (where if I pay Bob back I die), if I don’t pay Bob back then I also die. You agree with me (I think—you haven’t actually said so explicitly) that it can be to my benefit for things to be this way, if this is the precondition for getting the loan from Bob.
Scenario 2: I choose for things to be so arranged that in unlikely scenario S (where, again, if I pay Bob back I die), I will definitely pay. You think this state of affairs can’t be to my advantage.
How is scenario 2 actually worse for me than scenario 1? Outside situation S, they are no different (I will not be faced with such strong incentive not to pay Bob back, and I will in fact pay him back, and I will not die). In situation S, scenario 1 means I die either way, so I might as well pay my debts; scenario 2 means I will pay up and die. I’m equally dead in each case. I choose to pay up in each case.
In scenario 1, I do have the option of saying a mental “fuck you” to Bob, not repaying my debt, and dying at the hand of his infernal machinery rather than whatever other thing I could save myself from with the money. But I’m equally dead either way, and I can’t see why I’d prefer this, and in any case it’s beyond my understanding why having this not-very-appealing extra option would be enough for scenario 1 to be good and scenario 2 to be bad.
What am I missing?
I think we are at cross purposes somehow about the “predictor turns out to have erred” thing. I do understand that this feature is present in the OP’s thought experiment and absent in mine. My thought experiment isn’t meant to be equivalent to the one in the OP, though it is meant to be similar in some ways (and I think we are agreed that it is similar in the ways I intended it to be similar). It’s meant to give me another view of something in your thinking that I don’t understand, in the hope that I might understand it better (hopefully with the eventual effect of improving either my thinking or yours, if it turns out that one of us is making a mistake rather than just starting from axioms that seem alien to one another).
Anyway, it probably doesn’t matter, because so far as I can tell you do in fact have “the same” opinion about the OP’s thought experiment and mine; I was asking about disanalogies between the two in case it turned out that you agreed with all the numbered points in the paragraph before that question. I think you don’t agree with them all, but I’m not sure exactly where the disagreements are; I might understand better if you could tell me which of those numbered points you disagree with.
But it’s stipulated that the predictor did put a bomb in Left. That’s part of the scenario.
This is instead part of the misleading framing. Putting bomb in Left is actually one of the situations being considered, not all that actually happens, even if it says that it’s what actually happens. It’s one of the possible worlds, and there is a misleading convention of saying that when you find yourself in a possible world, what you see is what actually happens. It’s because that’s how it subjectively looks like, even if other worlds are supposed to still matter by UDT convention.
Yes, almost perfectly (well, it has to be “almost”, because it’s also stipulated that the predictor got it wrong this time).
None of this matters, because the scenario stipulates that there’s a bomb in the Left box.
But it’s stipulated that the predictor did put a bomb in Left. That’s part of the scenario.
Why does it matter? We know that there’s a bomb in Left, because the scenario tells us so.
Well, not with your answer, because you Right-box. But anyway.
It matters a lot, because in a way the problem description is contradicting itself (which happens more often in Newcomblike problems).
It says there’s a bomb in Left.
It also says that if I Left-box, then the predictor predicted this, and will not have put a Bomb in Left. (Unless you assume the predictor predicts so well by looking at, I don’t know, the color of your shoes or something. But it strongly seems like the predictor has some model of your decision procedure.)
You keep repeating (1), ignoring (2), even though (2) is stipulated just as much as (1).
So, yes, my question whether you understand subjunctive dependence is justified, because you keep ignoring that crucial part of the problem.
Well, first of all, if there is actually a contradiction in the scenario, then we’ve been wasting our time. What’s to talk about? In such a case the answer to “what happens in this scenario” is “nothing, it’s logically impossible in the first place”, and we’re done.
But of course there isn’t actually a contradiction. (Which you know, otherwise you wouldn’t have needed to hedge by saying “in a way”.)
It’s simply that the problem says that if you Left-box, then the predictor predicted this, and will not have put a bomb in Left… usually. Almost always! But not quite always. It very rarely makes mistakes! And this time, it would seem, is one of those times.
So there’s no contradiction, there’s just a (barely) fallible predictor.
So the scenario tells us that there’s a bomb in Left, we go “welp, guess the predictor screwed up”, and then… well, apparently FDT tells us to choose Left anyway? For some reason…? (Or does it? You tell me…) But regardless, obviously the correct choice is Right, because Left’s got a bomb in it.
I really don’t know what else there is to say about this.
There is, as I explained. There’s 2 ways of resolving it, but yours isn’t one of them. You can’t have it both ways.
Just… no. “The predictor predicted this”, yes, so there are a trillion trillion − 1 follow-up worlds where I don’t burn to death! And yes, 1 - just 1 - world where I do. Why choose to focus on that 1 out of a trillion trillion worlds?
Because the problem talks about a bomb in Left?
No. The problem says more than that. It clearly predicts a trillion trillion − 1 worlds where I don’t burn to death. That 1 world where I do sucks, but paying $100 to avoid it seems odd. Unless, of course, you value your life infinitely (which you do I believe?). That’s fine, it does all depend on the specific valuations.
The problem stipulates that you actually, in fact, find yourself in a world where there’s a bomb in Left. These “other worlds” are—in the scenario we’re given—entirely hypothetical (or “counterfactual”, if you like). Do they even exist? If so, in what sense? Not clear. But in the world you find yourself in (we are told), there’s a bomb in the Left box. You can either take that box, and burn to death, or… not do that.
So, “why choose to focus on” that world? Because that’s the world we find ourselves in, where we have to make the choice.
Paying $100 to avoid burning to death isn’t something that “seems odd”, it’s totally normal and the obviously correct choice.
My point is that those “other worlds” are just as much stipulated by the problem statement as that one world you focus on. So, you pay $100 and don’t burn to death. I don’t pay $100, burn to death in 1 world, and live for free in a trillion trillion − 1 worlds. Even if I value my life at $10,000,000,000,000, my choice gives more utility.
Sorry, but no, they’re not. You may choose to infer their “existence” from what’s stated in the problem—but that’s an inference that depends on various additional assumptions (e.g. about the nature of counterfactuals, and all sorts of other things). All that’s actually stipulated is the one world you find yourself in.
You infer the existence of me burning to death from what’s stated in the problem as well. There’s no difference.
I do have the assumption of subjunctive dependence. But without that one—if, say, the predictor predicts by looking at the color of my shoes—then I don’t Left-box anyway.
Of course there’s a difference: inferring burning to death just depends on the perfectly ordinary assumption of cause and effect, plus what is very explicitly stated in the problem. Inferring the existence of other worlds depends on much more esoteric assumptions that that. There’s really no comparison at all.
Not only is that not the only assumption required, it’s not even clear what it means to “assume” subjunctive dependence. Sure, it’s stipulated that the predictor is usually (but not quite always!) right about what you’ll do. What else is there to this “assumption” than that?
But how that leads to “other worlds exist” and “it’s meaningful to aggregate utility across them” and so on… I have no idea.
Inferring that I don’t burn to death depends on
Omega modelling my decision procedure
Cause and effect from there.
That’s it. No esoteric assumptions. I’m not talking about a multiverse with worlds existing next to each other or whatever, just possible worlds.
If they’re just possible worlds, then why do they matter? They’re not actual worlds, after all (by the time the described scenario is happening, it’s too late for any of them to be actual!). So… what’s the relevance?
The world you’re describing is just as much a possible world as the ones I describe. That’s my point.
Huh? It’s the world that’s stipulated to be the actual world, in the scenario.
No, it isn’t. In the world that’s stipulated, you still have to make your decision.
That decision is made in my head and in the predictor’s head. That’s the key.
But if you choose Left, you will burn to death. I’ve already quoted that. Says so right in the OP.
That’s one possible world. There are many more where I don’t burn to death.
But… there aren’t, though. They’ve already failed to be possible, at that point.
The UDT convention is that other possible worlds remain relevant, even when you find yourself in a possible world that isn’t compatible with their actuality. It’s confusing to discuss this general point as if it’s specific to this contentious thought experiment.
Well, we’re discussing it in the context of this thought experiment. If the point applies more generally, then so be it.
Can you explain (or link to an explanation of) what is meant by “convention” and “remain relevant” here?
The setting has a sample space, as in expected utility theory, with situations that take place in some event (let’s call it a situation event) and offer a choice between smaller events resulting from taking alternative actions. The misleading UDT convention is to call the situation event “actual”. It’s misleading because the goal is to optimize expected utility over the whole sample space, not just over the situation event, so the places on the sample space outside the situation event are effectively still in play, still remain relevant, not ruled out by the particular situation event being “actual”.
Alright. But by the time the situation described in the OP happens, it no longer matters whether you optimize expected utility over the whole sample space; that goal is now moot. One event out of the sample space has occurred, and the others have failed to occur. Why would you continue to attempt to achieve that goal, toward which you are no longer capable of taking any action?
That goal may be moot for some ways of doing decisions. For UDT it’s not moot, it’s the only thing that we care about instead. And calling some situation or another “actual” has no effect at all on the goal, and on the process of decision making in any situation, actual or otherwise, that’s what makes the goal and the decision process reflectively stable.
“But by the time the situation described in the OP happens, it no longer matters whether you optimize expected utility over the whole sample space; that goal is now moot.”
This is what we agree on. If you’re in the situation with a bomb, all that matters is the bomb.
My stance is that Left-boxers virtually never get into the situation to begin with, because of the prediction Omega makes. So with probability close to 1, they never see a bomb.
Your stance (if I understand correctly) is that the problem statement says there is a bomb, so, that’s what’s true with probability 1 (or almost 1).
And so I believe that’s where our disagreement lies. I think Newcomblike problems are often “trick questions” that can be resolved in two ways, one leaning more towards your interpretation.
In spirit of Vladimir’s points, if I annoyed you, I do apologize. I can get quite intense in such discussions.
But that’s false for a UDT agent, it still matters to that agent-instance-in-the-situation what happens in other situations, those without a bomb, it’s not the case that all that matters is the bomb (or even a bomb).
Hmm, interesting. I don’t know much about UDT. From and FDT perspective, I’d say that if you’re in the situation with the bomb, your decision procedure already Right-boxed and therefore you’re Right-boxing again, as logical necessity. (Making the problem very interesting.)
To explain my view more, the question I try to answer in these problems is more or less: if I were to choose a decision theory now to strictly adhere to, knowing I might run into the Bomb problem, which decision theory would I choose?
Not at the point in time where Omega models my decision procedure.
One thing we do agree on:
If I ever find myself in the Bomb scenario, I Right-box. Because in that scenario, the predictor’s model of me already Right-boxed, and therefore I do, too—not as a decision, per se, but as a logical consequence.
The correct decision is another question—that’s Left-boxing, because the decision is being made in two places. If I find myself in the Bomb scenario, that just means the decision to Right-box was already made.
The Bomb problem asks what the correct decision is, and makes clear (at least under my assumption) that the decision is made at 2 points in time. At that first point (in the predictor’s head), Left-boxing leads to the most utility: it avoids burning to death for free. Note that at that point, there is not yet a bomb in Left!
If we agree on that, then I don’t understand what it is that you think we disagree on! (Although the “not as a decision, per se” bit seems… contentless.)
No, it asks what decision you should make. And we apparently agree that the answer is “Right”.
Hmmm, I thought that comment might clear things up, but apparently it doesn’t. And I’m left wondering if you even read it.
Anyway, Left-boxing is the correct decision. But since you didn’t really engage with my points, I’ll be leaving now.
What does it mean to say that Left-boxing is “the correct decision” if you then say that the decision you’d actually make would be to Right-box? This seems to be straightforwardly contradictory, in a way that renders the claim nonsensical.
I read all your comments in this thread. But you seem to be saying things that, in a very straightforward way, simply don’t make any sense…
Alright. The correct decision is Left-boxing, because that means the predictor’s model Left-boxed (and so do I), letting me live for free. Because, at the point where the predictor models me, the Bomb isn’t placed yet (and never will be).
However, IF I’m in the Bomb scenario, then the predictor’s model already Right-boxed. Then, because of subjunctive dependence, it’s apparently not possible for me to Left-box, just as it is impossible for two calculators to give a different result to 2 + 2.
Well, the Bomb scenario is what we’re given. So the first paragraph you just wrote there is… irrelevant? Inapplicable? What’s the point of it? It’s answering a question that’s not being asked.
As for the last sentence of your comment, I don’t understand what you mean by it. Certainly it’s possible for you to Left-box; you just go ahead and Left-box. This would be a bad idea, of course! Because you’d burn to death. But you could do it! You just shouldn’t—a point on which we, apparently, agree.
The bottom line is: to the actual single question the scenario asks—which box do you choose, finding yourself in the given situation?—we give the same answer. Yes?
The bottom line is that Bomb is a decision problem. If I am still free to make a decision (which I suppose I am, otherwise it isn’t much of a problem), then the decision I make is made at 2 points in time. And then, Left-boxing is the better decision.
Yes, the Bomb is what we’re given. But with the very reasonable assumption of subjunctive dependence, it specifies what I am saying...
We agree that if I would be there, I would Right-box, but also everybody would then Right-box, as a logical necessity (well, 1 in a trillion trillion error rate, sure). It has nothing to do with correct or incorrect decisions, viewed like that: the decision is already hard coded into the problem statement, because of the subjunctive dependence.
“But you can just Left-box” doesn’t work: that’s like expecting one calculator to answer to 2 + 2 differently than another calculator.
Unless I’m missing something, it’s possible you’re in the predictor’s simulation, in which case it’s possible you will Left-box.
Excellent point!
I think it’s better to explain to such people the problem where the predictor is perfect, and then generalize to an imperfect predictor. They don’t understand the general principle of your present choices pseudo-overwriting the entire timeline and can’t think in the seemingly-noncausal way that optimal decision-making requires. By jumping right to an imperfect predictor, the principle becomes, I think, too complicated to explain.
(Btw, you can call your answer “obvious” and my side “crazy” all you want, but it won’t change a thing until you actually demonstrate why and how FDT is wrong, which you haven’t done.)
I’ve done that: FDT is wrong because it (according to you) recommends that you choose to burn to death, when you could easily choose not to burn to death. Pretty simple.
It seems to me that your argument proves too much.
Let’s set aside this specific example and consider something more everyday: making promises. It is valuable to be able to make promises that others will believe, even when they are promises to do something that (once the relevant situation arises) you will strongly prefer not to do.
Suppose I want a $1000 loan, with $1100 to be repaid one year from now. My counterparty Bob has no trust in the legal system, police, etc., and expects that next year I will be somewhere where he can’t easily find me and force me to pay up. But I really need the money. Fortunately, Bob knows some mad scientists and we agree to the following: I will have implanted in my body a device that will kill me if 366 days from now I haven’t paid up. I get the money. I pay up. Nobody dies. Yay.
I hope we are agreed that (granted the rather absurd premises involved) I should be glad to have this option, even though in the case where I don’t pay up it kills me.
Revised scenario: Bob knows some mad psychologists who by some combination of questioning, brain scanning, etc., are able to determine very reliably what future choices I will make in any given situation. He also knows that in a year’s time I might (but with extremely low probability) be in a situation where I can only save my life at the cost of the $1100 that I owe him. He has no risk tolerance to speak of and will not lend me the money if in that situation I would choose to save my life and not give him the money.
Granted these (again absurd) premises, do you agree with me that it is to my advantage to have the sort of personality that can promise to pay Bob back even if it literally kills me?
It seems to me that: 1. Your argument in this thread would tell me, a year down the line and in the surprising situation that I do in fact need to choose between Bob’s money and my life, “save your life, obviously”. 2. If my personality were such that I would do as you advise in that situation, then Bob will not lend me the money. (Which may in fact mean that in that unlikely future situation I die anyway.) 3. Your reasons for saying “FDT recommends knowingly choosing to burn to death! So much the worse for FDT!”, are equally reasons to say “Being someone who can make and keep this sort of promise means knowingly choosing to pay up and die! So much the worse for being that sort of person!”. 4. Being that sort of person is not in fact worse even though there are situations in which it leads to a worse outcome. 5. There is no version of “being that sort of person” that lets you just decide to live, in that unlikely situation, because paying up at the cost of your own life is what “being that sort of person” means. 6. To whatever extent I get to choose whether to be that sort of person, I have to make the decision before I know whether I’m going to be in that unlikely situation. And, to whatever extent I get to choose, it is reasonable to choose to be that sort of person, because the net benefit is greater. 7. Once again, “be that sort of person and then change your mind” is not one of the available options; if I will change my mind about it, then I was never that sort of person after all.
What (if anything) do you disagree with in that paragraph? What (if anything) do you find relevantly disanalogous between the situation I describe here and the one with the bomb?
I do not.
Your scenario omits the crucial element of the scenario in the OP, where you (the subject) find yourself in a situation where the predictor turns out to have erred in its prediction.
Hmm. I am genuinely quite baffled by this; there seems to be some very fundamental difference in how we are looking at the world. Let me just check that this is a real disagreement and not a misunderstanding (even if it is there would also be a real disagreement, but a different one): I am asking not “do you agree with me that at the point where I have to choose between dying and failing to repay Bob it is to my advantage …” but “do you agree with me that at an earlier point, say when I am negotiating with Bob it is to my advantage …”.
If I am understanding you right and you are understanding me right, then I think the following is true. Suppose that when Bob has explained his position (he is willing to lend me the money if, and only if, his mad scientists determine that I will definitely repay him even if the alternative is death), some supernatural being magically informs me that while it cannot lend me the money it can make me the sort of person who can make the kind of commitment Bob wants and actually follow through. I think you would recommend that I either not accept this offer, or at any rate not make that commitment having been empowered to do so.
Do you feel the same way about the first scenario, where instead of choosing to be a person who will pay up even at the price of death I choose to be a person who will be compelled by brute force to pay up or die? If not, why?
Why does that matter? (Maybe it doesn’t; your opinion about my scenario is AIUI the same as your opinion about the one in the OP.)
Yes, I understood you correctly. My answer stands. (But I appreciate the verification.)
Right.
No, because there’s a difference between “pay up or die” and “pay up and die”.
The scenario in the OP seems to hinge on it. As described, the situation is that the agent has picked FDT as their decision theory, is absolutely the sort of agent who will choose the Left box and die if so predicted, who is thereby supposed to not actually encounter situations where the Left box has a bomb… but oops! The predictor messed up and there is a bomb there anyhow. And now the agent is left with a choice on which nothing depends except whether he pointlessly dies.
I see no analogous feature of your scenarios…
I agree (of course!) that there is a difference between “pay up and die” and “pay up or die”. But I don’t understand how this difference can be responsible for the difference in your opinions about the two scenarios.
Scenario 1: I choose for things to be so arranged that in unlikely situation S (where if I pay Bob back I die), if I don’t pay Bob back then I also die. You agree with me (I think—you haven’t actually said so explicitly) that it can be to my benefit for things to be this way, if this is the precondition for getting the loan from Bob.
Scenario 2: I choose for things to be so arranged that in unlikely scenario S (where, again, if I pay Bob back I die), I will definitely pay. You think this state of affairs can’t be to my advantage.
How is scenario 2 actually worse for me than scenario 1? Outside situation S, they are no different (I will not be faced with such strong incentive not to pay Bob back, and I will in fact pay him back, and I will not die). In situation S, scenario 1 means I die either way, so I might as well pay my debts; scenario 2 means I will pay up and die. I’m equally dead in each case. I choose to pay up in each case.
In scenario 1, I do have the option of saying a mental “fuck you” to Bob, not repaying my debt, and dying at the hand of his infernal machinery rather than whatever other thing I could save myself from with the money. But I’m equally dead either way, and I can’t see why I’d prefer this, and in any case it’s beyond my understanding why having this not-very-appealing extra option would be enough for scenario 1 to be good and scenario 2 to be bad.
What am I missing?
I think we are at cross purposes somehow about the “predictor turns out to have erred” thing. I do understand that this feature is present in the OP’s thought experiment and absent in mine. My thought experiment isn’t meant to be equivalent to the one in the OP, though it is meant to be similar in some ways (and I think we are agreed that it is similar in the ways I intended it to be similar). It’s meant to give me another view of something in your thinking that I don’t understand, in the hope that I might understand it better (hopefully with the eventual effect of improving either my thinking or yours, if it turns out that one of us is making a mistake rather than just starting from axioms that seem alien to one another).
Anyway, it probably doesn’t matter, because so far as I can tell you do in fact have “the same” opinion about the OP’s thought experiment and mine; I was asking about disanalogies between the two in case it turned out that you agreed with all the numbered points in the paragraph before that question. I think you don’t agree with them all, but I’m not sure exactly where the disagreements are; I might understand better if you could tell me which of those numbered points you disagree with.
Yeah you keep repeating that. Stating it. Saying it’s simple, obvious, whatever. Saying I’m being crazy. But it’s just wrong. So there’s that.
Which part of what I said you deny…?
That I’m being crazy
That Left-boxing means burning to death
That your answer is obviously correct
Take your pick.
The scenario stipulates this:
This is instead part of the misleading framing. Putting bomb in Left is actually one of the situations being considered, not all that actually happens, even if it says that it’s what actually happens. It’s one of the possible worlds, and there is a misleading convention of saying that when you find yourself in a possible world, what you see is what actually happens. It’s because that’s how it subjectively looks like, even if other worlds are supposed to still matter by UDT convention.