I think my confusion is less about understanding the view (assuming the Richard’s rigid designator interpretation is accurate) and more everyone’s insistence on calling it a moral realist view. It feels like everyone is playing word games to avoid being moral subjectivists. I don’t know if it was all the arguing with theists or being annoyed with moral relativist social-justice types but somewhere along the way much of the Less Wrong crowd developed strong negative associations with the words used to describe varieties of moral anti-realism.
As far as I can tell most everyone here has the same descriptive picture of what is going on with ethics. There is this animal on planet Earth that has semi-ordered preferences about how the world should be and how things similar to that animal should act. Those of this species which speak the language called “English” write inscriptions like “morality” and “right and wrong” to describe these preferences. These preferences are the result of evolved instincts and cultural norms. Many members of this species have very similar preferences.
This seems like a straightforward description of ethical subjectivism—the position that moral sentences are about the attitudes of people (notice that isn’t the same as saying they are relative). But people don’t seem to like calling themselves ethical subjectivists—or maybe they don’t like that the theory doesn’t tell them what to do? I don’t understand this. I’d love for someone to explain it. In any case, then we start doing philosophy to try to shoehorn this description into something we can call moral realism.
And it definitely is true that much of our moral language function like rigid designators, which hides the causal history of our moral beliefs. This explains why people don’t feel like morality changes under counterfactuals—i.e. if you imagine a world in which you have a preference for innocent children being murdered you don’t believe that murdering children is therefore moral in that world. I outlined this in more detail here. I didn’t use the term ‘rigid designator’ in that post, but the point is that what we think is moral is invariant in counterfacturals.
I don’t see how this isn’t a straightforward example of moral subjectivism. And that is reflected in the fact that there are no universally compelling arguments. I can see how you can sort of structure the arguments and questions and get it to output “moral realism” if you really had to. You say that the word “right” designates particular facts about worlds such that worlds can be objectively evaluated according to that concept. But to me, it is weird and confusing to ignore the fact that the rule uniting those facts about the world is determined by our attitudes—especially since we can’t right now enumerate the rigid contents of our moral language and have to apply the rule in most circumstances.
Whether you call it moral subjectivism or not, it seems like the next step is examining our preferences to see how much they can overlap, and what constitutes an ethical and effective way of reconciling them so that they are consistent with each other. In other words, we need to know how we ought to resolve moral disagreements, ‘reflective equilibrium’, that kind of stuff. This is how we determine how universal our morality is. And that’s what actually matters, not whether or not it exists independently of human attitudes.
1- There are inevitable conflicts between practically any two creatures on this planet as to what preferences they would have as to the world. If you narrow these down to the area classified by humans as “moral” the picture can be greatly simplified, but there will still be a large amount of difference.
2- I dispute that moral sentences ARE about the attitudes of people. Most people throughout history have had a concept of “Right” and “Wrong” as being objective. This naive conception is philosophically indefensible, but the best descriptor of what people throughout history, and even nowadays, have believed. It is hard to defend the idea that a person thinks they are referring to X and are in fact referring to Y when X and Y are drastically different things and the person is not thinking of Y on any level of their brain- the likely case for, say, a typical Stone Age man arguing a moral point.
1- There are inevitable conflicts between practically any two creatures on this planet as to what preferences they would have as to the world. If you narrow these down to the area classified by humans as “moral” the picture can be greatly simplified, but there will still be a large amount of difference.
Sure, as I said at the end, the “universality” of the whole thing is an open problem.
I dispute that moral sentences ARE about the attitudes of people. Most people throughout history have had a concept of “Right” and “Wrong” as being objective. This naive conception is philosophically indefensible, but the best descriptor of what people throughout history, and even nowadays, have believed. It is hard to defend the idea that a person thinks they are referring to X and are in fact referring to Y when X and Y are drastically different things and the person is not thinking of Y on any level of their brain- the likely case for, say, a typical Stone Age man arguing a moral point.
That’s fine. But in that case, all moral sentences are false (or nonsense, depending on how you feel about references to non-entities). I agree that there is a sense in which that is true which you outlined here. In this case we can start from scratch and just make the entire enterprise about figuring out what we we really truly want to do with the world—and then do that. Personally I find that interpretation of moral language a bit uncharitable. And it turns out people are pretty stuck on the whole morality idea and don’t like it when you tell them their moral beliefs are false.
Subjectivism seems both more charitable and friendlier—but ultimately these are two different ways of saying the same thing. The debates between varieties of anti-realism seem entirely semantic to me.
2- There are some rare exceptions- some people define morality differently and can thus be said to mean different things. Almost all moral sentences, if every claim to something be right or wrong throughout history count as moral sentences, are false/nonsense, however.
The principle of charity, however, does not apply here- the evidence clearly shows that human beings throughout history have truely believed that some things are morally wrong and some morally right on a level more than preferences, even if this is not in fact true.
The principle of charity, however, does not apply here- the evidence clearly shows that human beings throughout history have truely believed that some things are morally wrong and some morally right on a level more than preferences, even if this is not in fact true.
Philosophy typically involves taking folk notions that are important but untrue in a strict sense and constructing something tenable out of that material. And I think the situation is more ambiguous than you make it sound.
But it is essentially irrelevant. I mean, you could just go back to bed after concluding all moral statements are false. But that seems like it is ignoring everything that made us interested in this question in the first place. Regardless of what people think they are referring to when they make moral statements it seems pretty clear what they’re actually doing. And the latter is accurately described by something like subjectivism or quasi-realism. People might be wrong about moral claims, but what we want to know is why and what they’re doing when they make them.
A typical person would be insulted if you claimed that their moral statements referred only to feelings. Most philosophical definitions work on a principle which isn’t quite like how ordinary people see them but would seem close enough to an ordinary person.
There are a lot of uses of the concepts of right and wrong, not just people arguing with each other. Ethical dilemnas, people wondering whether to do the “right” thing or the “wrong” thing, philosophical schools (think of the Confucians, for example, who don’t define ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ but talk about it a lot). Your conception only covers one use.
This seems like a straightforward description of ethical subjectivism—the position that moral sentences are about the attitudes of people (notice that isn’t the same as saying they are relative).
Except that’s not Eliezer’s view. The mistake you’re making here is the equivalent of thinking that, because the meaning of the word “water” is determined by how English speakers use it, therefore sentences about water are sentences about the behavior of English speakers.
I understand, this is what I’m dealing with in the second to last paragraph.
I can see how you can sort of structure the arguments and questions and get it to output “moral realism” if you really had to. You say that the word “right” designates particular facts about worlds such that worlds can be objectively evaluated according to that concept. But to me, it is weird and confusing to ignore the fact that the rule uniting those facts about the world is determined by our attitudes—especially since we can’t right now enumerate the rigid contents of our moral language and have to apply the rule in most circumstances.
There is a sense in which all concepts both exist subjectively and objectively. There is some mathematical function that describes all the things that ChrisHallquist thinks are funny just like there is a mathematical function that describes the behavior of atoms. We can get into the nitty-gritty about what makes a concept subjective and what makes a concept objective. But I don’t see what the case for morality counting as “objective” is unless we’re just going to count all concepts as objective.
Can you be clearer about the way you are using “describes” here?
I’m not clear if you are thinking about a) a giant lookup table of all the things Chris Hallquist finds funny, or b) a program that is more compact than that list—so compact, indeed, that a cut-down bug-filled beta of it can be implemented inside his skull! - but yet can generate the list.
I am a moral subjectivist and a moral realist. The only point of contention I’d have with EY is if he is a non psycho human moral universalist. I felt that his language was ambiguous on that point, and at times he seemed to be making arguments in that direction. I just couldn’t tell.
In other words, we need to know how we ought to resolve moral disagreements,
But if\ we’re going to be moral subjectivists, we should realize that “we ought” too easily glosses over the fact that ought_you is not identical to ought_me.
And I don’t think you get a compelling answer from some smuggled self recursion, but from your best estimate of what people actually are.
Traditional usage defines those terms to exclude the possibility of being both. The standard definition of a moral realist is someone who believes that moral judgments express mind-independent facts; while the standard definition of a moral subjectivist is someone who believes moral judgments express mind-dependent facts.
So I don’t know quite what you mean.
a non psycho human moral universalist.
You mean someone who doesn’t believe that there are moral universals among humans? One too many adjectives for me.
And I don’t think you get a compelling answer from some smuggled self recursion, but from your best estimate of what people actually are.
If I understand this right: you’re contrasting trying to come up with some self-justifying method for resolving disagreement (recursively finding consensus on how to find consensus) with… descriptive moral psychology? I’m not sure I follow.
The standard definition of a moral realist is someone who believes that moral judgments express mind-independent facts; while the standard definition of a moral subjectivist is someone who believes moral judgments express mind-dependent facts.
My point being that the categories themselves are not used consistently, so that I can be called either one or the other depending on usage.
Definitions tend to be theory bound themselves, so that mind dependent and mind independent are not clear cut. If I think that eating cows is fine, but I wouldn’t if I knew more and thought longer, which represents my mind—both, neither, the first, the second?
For example, if you go to the article in La Wik on Ethical Subjectvism, they talk about “opinions” and not minds. In this case, my opinion would be that eating cows is fine, but it would not be my extrapolated values.
Some would call my position realism, and some would call it subjectivism. Me, I don’t care what you call it. I recognize that my position could be called either within the bounds of normal usage.
non psycho human moral universalist.
Someone who believes that what is moral is universal across humans who are not psychos.
But if\ we’re going to be moral subjectivists, we should realize that “we ought” too easily glosses over the fact that ought_you is not identical to ought_me.
Does the fact that people have different opinions about non moral claims, means there are no objective, scientific facts?
But it does mean that I ought not behave as though objective, scientific facts exist until I have some grounds for doing so, and that “some people think their intuitions reflect objective, scientific facts” doesn’t qualify as a ground for doing so.
At this point, one could ask “well, OK, what qualifies as a ground for behaving as though objective, scientific facts exist?” and the conversation can progress in a vaguely sensible direction.
I would similarly ask (popping your metaphorical stack) “what qualifies as a ground for behaving as though objective moral facts exist?” and refrain from behaving as though they do until some such ground is demonstrated.
I don’t think you’re in a position to do that unless you can actually solve the problem of grounding scientific objectivity without incurring Munchausen’s trilemma. That is essentially an unsolved problem. Analytical philosophy, LW, and various other groups sidestep it by getting together with people who share the same intuitions. But that is not exactly the epistemic high ground.
I’m content to ground behaving as though objective, scientific facts exist in the observation that such behavior reliably correlates with (and predicts) my experience of the world improving. I haven’t observed anything analogous about behaving as though objective moral facts exist.
This, too, is not the epistemic high ground. I’m OK with that.
But, sure, if you insist on pulling yourself out of the Munchausen’s swamp before you can make any further progress, then you’re quite correct that progress is equally impossible on both scientific and ethical fronts.
I’m content to ground behaving as though objective, scientific facts exist in the observation that such behavior reliably correlates with (and predicts) my experience of the world improving. I haven’t observed anything analogous about behaving as though objective moral facts exist.
Indeed you haven’t, because they are not analogous. Morality is about guiding action in the world, not passively registering the state of the world. It doesn’t tell you what the melting point of aluminum is, it tells you whether what you are about to do is the right thing.
But, sure, if you insist on pulling yourself out of the Munchausen’s swamp before you can make any further progress, then you’re quite correct that progress is equally impossible on both scientific and ethical fronts.
And if you think it is such levitation is unnecessary, then progress is equally possible on both fronts.
Alice: “Science has a set of norms or guides-to-action called the scientific method. These have truth-values which are objective in the sense of not being a matter of individual whim”
Bob: “I don’t believe you! What experiments do you perform to measure these truth-values, what equipment do you use?”
Charlie: “I don;’t believe you! You sound like you believe in some immaterial ScientificMethod object for these statements to correspond to!”.
Dave: Behaving as though objective scientific facts exist has made it possible for me to talk to people all over the world, for the people I care about to be warm in the winter, cool in the summer, have potable water to drink and plenty of food to eat, and routinely survive incidents that would have killed us in pre-scientific cultures, and more generally has alleviated an enormous amount of potential suffering and enabled an enormous amount of value-satisfaction.
I am therefore content to continue behaving as though objective scientific facts exist.
If, hypothetically, it turned out that objective scientific facts didn’t exist, but that behaving as though they do nevertheless reliably provided these benefits, I’d continue to endorse behaving as though they do. In that hypothetical scenario you and Alice and Bob and Charlie are free to go on talking about truth-values but I don’t see why I should join you. Why should anyone care about truth in that hypothetical scenario?
Similarly, if behaving as though objective moral facts exist has some benefit, then I might be convinced to behave as though objective moral facts exist. But if it’s just more talking about truth-values divorced from even theoretical benefits… well, you’re free to do that if you wish, but I don’t see why I should join you.
Dave: Behaving as though objective scientific facts exist has made it possible for me to … I am therefore content to continue behaving as though objective scientific facts exist.
I can construct a very similar argument for Christianity (or for most any religion, actually).
Usefulness of beliefs and verity of beliefs are not orthogonal but are not 100% correlated either.
I can construct a very similar argument for Christianity
That’s surprising, but if you can, please do. If behaving as though the beliefs of Christianity are objective facts reliably and differentially provides benefits on a par with the kinds of scientific beliefs we’re discussing here, I am equally willing to endorse behaving as though the beliefs of Christianity are objective facts.
Usefulness of beliefs and verity of beliefs are not orthogonal but are not 100% correlated either.
The argument wouldn’t involve running hot water in your house, but would involve things like social cohesion, shared values, psychological satisfaction, etc.
Think about meme evolution and selection criteria. Religion is a very powerful meme that was strongly selected for. It certainly provided benefits for societies and individuals.
Dave: Behaving as though objective scientific facts exist has made it possible for me to talk to people all over the world, for the people I care about to be warm in the winter, cool in the summer, have potable water to drink and plenty of food to eat, and routinely survive incidents that would have killed us in pre-scientific cultures, and more generally has alleviated an enormous amount of potential suffering and enabled an enormous amount of value-satisfaction.
Edith: A lot of good stuff, then?
Fred: Those facts didn’t fall off a tree, they were arrived at by following a true..right..effective..call it what you will...set of methods.
Dave:Why should anyone care about truth in that hypothetical scenario?
Edith: You care about science because it leads to things that are good. Morality does too.
Dave: Similarly, if behaving as though objective moral facts exist has some benefit, then I might be convinced to behave as though objective moral facts exist
Edith: you don’t already? How do you stay out of jail?
Dave: But if it’s just more talking about truth-values divorced from even theoretical benefits..
Edith: If there are no moral facts, then the good things you like are not really good at all.
I’m not sure what you mean to express by that word. A lot of stuff I value, certainly.
Fred: Those facts didn’t fall off a tree, they were arrived at by following a true..right..effective..call it what you will...set of methods.
Yes, that’s true. And?
Edith: You care about science because it leads to things that are good. Morality does too.
Great! Wonderful! I’ll happily endorse morality on the grounds of its reliable observable benefits, then, and we can drop all this irrelevant talk about “objective moral facts”.
Edith: you don’t already? How do you stay out of jail?
Same as everyone else… by following laws when I might be arrested for violating them. I would do all of that even if there were no objective moral facts. Indeed, I’ve been known to avoid getting arrested under laws that, if they did reflect objective moral facts, would seem to imply mutually exclusive sets of objective moral facts.
Edith: If there are no moral facts, then the good things you like are not really good at all.
Perhaps. So what? Why should I care? What difference does it make, in that scenario?
For example, I prefer people not suffering to people suffering… that’s a value of mine. If it turns out that there really are objective moral facts that are independent of my values, and that people suffering actually is objectively preferable to people not-suffering, and my values are simply objectively wrong… why should I care?
And there is a way of guides-to-action to be objectively right (etc) that has nothing to with reflecting facts or predicting experience. Thus removing the “morality doesn’t help me predict experience” objection.
I’ll happily endorse morality on the grounds of its reliable observable benefits,
You have presupposed that there are Good Things (benefits) in that comment, and in your previous comment about science. You are already attaching truth values to propositions about what is good or not, I don’t have to argue you into that.
Same as everyone else… by following laws when I might be arrested for violating them.
“Jail is bad” has the truth-value True?
I would do all of that even if there were no objective moral facts.
Why are you avoiding jail if its badness is not a fact?
Perhaps. So what? Why should I care?
Because you care about good things, benefits and so on. You are already caring about them, so I don’t have to argue you into it.
If it turns out that there really are objective moral facts that are independent of my values, and that people suffering actually is objectively preferable to people not-suffering, and my values are simply objectively wrong… why should I care?
Do you update your other opinions if they turn out to be false?
You have presupposed that there are Good Things (benefits) in that comment, and in your previous comment about science. You are already attaching truth values to propositions about what is good or not, I don’t have to argue you into that.
You are treating my statements about what I value as assertions about Good Things.
If you consider those equivalent, then great… you are already treating Good as a fact about what we value, and I don’t have to argue you into that.
If you don’t consider them equivalent (which I suspect) then interpreting the former as a statement about the latter is at best confused, and more likely dishonest.
“Jail is bad” has the truth-value True?
I value staying out of jail. Is there anything in your question I haven’t agreed to by saying that?
If not, great. I will go on talking about what I value, and if you insist on talking about the truth-values of moral claims I will understand you as referring to what you value.
If so, what?
Why are you avoiding jail if its badness is not a fact?
Because I value staying out of jail. (Which in turn derives from other values of mine.)
Because you care about good things, benefits and so on. You are already caring about them, so I don’t have to argue you into it.
As above; if this is an honest and coherent response, then great, we agree that “good things” simply refers to what we value.
Do you update your other opinions if they turn out to be false?
Sure, there are areas in which I endorse doing this.
So, you ask, shouldn’t I endorse updating false moral beliefs as well?
Sure, if I anticipate observable benefits to having true moral beliefs, as I do to having true beliefs in those other areas in which I have opinions. But I don’t anticipate such benefits.
Another area where I don’t anticipate such benefits, and where I am similarly skeptical that the label “true beliefs” refers to anything or is worth talking about, is aesthetics. For example, sure, maybe my preference for blue over red is false, and a true aesthetic belief is that “red is more aesthetic than blue” is true. But… so what? Should I start preferring red over blue on that basis? Why on Earth would I do that?
(But Dave, you value having accurate beliefs in other areas! Why not aesthetics?)
If you consider those equivalent, then great… you are already treating Good as a fact about what we value, and I don’t have to argue you into that.
I am not sure what that means. Is the “we” individual-by-individual or collective?
And where did you get the idea that Objective metaethics means giving up on values?
I value staying out of jail.
How does that differ from “jail is bad-for-me”?
If not, great. I will go on talking about what I value, and if you insist on talking about the truth-values of moral claims I will understand you as referring to what you value.
If I thought that he truth-values of moral claims refers only to what I value, I wouldn’t be making much of a pitch for objectivism, would I?
As above; if this is an honest and coherent response, then great, we agree that “good things” simply refers to what we value.
Whatever that means?
Do you update your other opinions if they turn out to be false?
Sure, there are areas in which I endorse doing this.
What explains the difference?
So, you ask, shouldn’t I endorse updating false moral beliefs as well?
Sure, if I anticipate observable benefits to having true moral beliefs,
But that isn’t the function of moral beliefs: their function is to guide action. You have admitted
that your behaviour is guided by jail-avoidance.
Another area where I don’t anticipate such benefits, and where I am similarly skeptical that the label “true beliefs” refers to anything or is worth talking about, is aesthetics. For example, sure, maybe my preference for blue over red is false, and a true aesthetic belief is that “red is more aesthetic than blue” is true. But… so what? Should I start preferring red over blue on that basis? Why on Earth would I do that?
You seem to be interested in the meta-level question of objective aesthetics. Why is that?
Is the “we” individual-by-individual or collective?
I think that’s a separate discussion, and I don’t think spinning it off will be productive. Feel free to replace “we” with “I” if that’s clearer. If it’s still not clear what I mean, I’m content to let it drop there.
And where did you get the idea that Objective metaethics means giving up on values?
I’m not sure what “giving up on values” means.
How does [I value staying out of jail] differ from “jail is bad-for-me”?
Beats me. Perhaps it doesn’t.
If I thought that he truth-values of moral claims refers only to what I value, I wouldn’t be making much of a pitch for objectivism, would I?
No, you wouldn’t.
Whatever [what-we-value] means?
Yes.
What explains the difference [between areas where I endorse updating false opinions and those where I don’t] ?
Whether concerning myself with the truth-values of the propositions expressed by opinions reliably provides observable and differential benefits.
But [observable benefits] isn’t the function of moral beliefs: their function is to guide action.
I agree that beliefs guide action (this is not just true of moral beliefs).
If the sole function of moral beliefs is to guide action without reference to expected observable benefits, I don’t see why I should prefer “true” moral beliefs (whatever that means) to “false” ones (whatever that means).
You have admitted that your behaviour is guided by jail-avoidance.
Yes. Which sure sounds like a benefit to me.
You seem to be interested in the meta-level question of objective aesthetics. Why is that?
I don’t seem that way to myself, actually. I bring it up as another example of an area where some people assert there are objective truths and falsehoods, but where I see no reason to posit any such thing...positing the existence of individual aesthetic values seems quite adequate to explain my observations.
I think that’s a separate discussion, and I don’t think spinning it off will be productive. Feel free to replace “we” with “I” if that’s clearer. If it’s still not clear what I mean, I’m content to let it drop there.
I think it is a key issue. This is about ethical objectivism. If Good is a fact about what we value collectively, in your view, then your theory is along the lines of utilitariansim, which is near enough to objectivism AFAIC. Yet you seem to disagree with me about something.
What explains the difference [between areas where I endorse updating false opinions and those where I don’t] ?
Whether concerning myself with the truth-values of the propositions expressed by opinions reliably provides observable and differential benefits.
If you concern yourself with the truth values of your own beliefs about what you believe to be good and bad, and revise your beliefs accordingly and act on them, you will end up doing the right thing.
What’s more beneficial than doing the right thing?
If the things you think are beneficial are in fact not beneficial, then you are not getting benefits; you just mistakenly think you are.
To actually get benefits, you have to know what is actually beneficial.
If the sole function of moral beliefs is to guide action without reference to expected observable benefits, I don’t see why I should prefer “true” moral beliefs (whatever that means) to “false” ones (whatever that means).
Morality is all about what is truly beneficial. Those truths aren’t observable: neither are the truths of mathematics.
I bring it up as another example of an area where some people assert there are objective truths and falsehoods, but where I see no reason to posit any such thing...positing the existence of individual aesthetic values seems quite adequate to explain my observations.
It is not clear to me what we disagree about, precisely, if anything.
What’s more beneficial than doing the right thing?
I don’t know. It is not clear to me what the referent of “the right thing” is when you say it, or indeed if it even has a referent, so it’s hard to be sure one way or another. (Yes, I do understand that you meant that as a rhetorical question whose correct answer was “Nothing.”)
If the things you think are beneficial are in fact not beneficial, then you are not getting benefits; you just mistakenly think you are.
Yes, that’s true.
To actually get benefits, you have to know what is actually beneficial.
No, that’s false. But my expectation of actually getting benefits increases sharply if I know what is actually beneficial.
Morality is all about what is truly beneficial. Those truths aren’t observable
I disagree.
neither are the truths of mathematics.
Supposing this is true, I don’t see why it’s relevant.
It is not clear to me what we disagree about, precisely, if anything.
Is ethical objectivism true, IYO?
It is not clear to me what the referent of “the right thing”
Doing thins such that it is an objective fact that they are beneficial, and not just a possibly false belief.
Morality is all about what is truly beneficial. Those truths aren’t observable
I disagree.
Explain how you observe the truth-value of a claim about what is beneficial.
neither are the truths of mathematics.
Supposing this is true, I don’t see why it’s relevant.
it is relevant you attitude that only the observable maters in epistemology.
I bring it up as another example of an area where some people assert there are objective truths and falsehoods, but where I see no reason to posit any such thing...positing the existence of individual aesthetic values seems quite adequate to explain my observations.
Are you a passive observer who never acts?
No.
Then explaining your observations is not the only game in town.
If you point me at a definition of ethical objectivism you consider adequate, I’ll try to answer that question.
What’s more beneficial than doing the right thing?
what the referent of “the right thing”
Doing thins such that it is an objective fact that they are beneficial, and not just a possibly false belief.
So, you’re asking what’s more beneficial than doing things such that it’s an objective fact that they are beneficial? Presumably doing other things such that it’s an objective fact that they are more beneficial is more beneficial than merely doing things such that it’s an objective fact that they are beneficial.
Explain how you observe the truth-value of a claim about what is beneficial.
When I experience X having consequences I value in situations where I didn’t expect it to, I increase my confidence in the claim that X is beneficial. When I experience X failing to have such consequences in situations where I did expect it to, I decrease my confidence in the claim.
it is relevant you attitude that only the observable maters in epistemology.
How do unobservable mathematical truths matter in epistemology?
explaining your observations is not the only game in town.
If you point me at a definition of ethical objectivism you consider adequate, I’ll try to answer that question.
“moral claims have subject-independent truth values”.
Presumably doing other things such that it’s an objective fact that they are more beneficial is more beneficial than merely doing things such that it’s an objective fact that they are beneficial.
And doing things that aren’t really beneficial at all isn’t really beneficial at all.
When I experience X having consequences I value in situations where I didn’t expect it to, I increase my confidence in the claim that X is beneficial.
Explain how you justified the truth of the claim “what Dave values is beneficial”
How do unobservable mathematical truths matter in epistemology?
Epistemology is about truth.
explaining your observations is not the only game in town.
That’s true.
So you no longer reject metaethics on the basis that it doesn’t explain your observations?
Is ethical objectivism (“moral claims have subject-independent truth values”) true, IYO?
No.
And doing things that aren’t really beneficial at all isn’t really beneficial at all.
Yes, that’s true.
Explain how you justified the truth of the claim “what Dave values is beneficial”
Increasing it has consequences I value.
Epistemology is about truth.
No, epistemology is about knowledge. For example, unknowable truths are not within the province of epistemology.
So you no longer reject metaethics on the basis that it doesn’t explain your observations?
If you point me to where in this discussion I rejected metaethics on the basis that it doesn’t explain my observations, I will tell you if I still stand by that rejection. As it stands I don’t know how to answer this question.
And doing things that aren’t really beneficial at all isn’t really beneficial at all.
Yes, that’s true.
So you have beliefs that you have done beneficial things, but you don’t know if you have, because you don’t know what is beneficial, because you have never tried to find out, because you have assumed there is no answer to the question?
Explain how you justified the truth of the claim “what Dave values is beneficial”
Increasing it has consequences I value.
That boils down to “what Dave values, Dave values”.
Epistemology is about truth.
No, epistemology is about knowledge. For example, unknowable truths are not within the province of epistemology
“Epistemic Logic: A Survey of the Logic of Knowledge” by Nicholas Rescher has a chapter on unknowable truth.
But that is not the point. The point was unobservable truth. You seem to have decided, in line with your previous comments, that what is unobservable is unknowable. But logical and mathematical truths are well-known examples of unobservable (non empirical truths).
So you have beliefs that you have done beneficial things, but you don’t know if you have, because you don’t know what is beneficial, because you have never tried to find out, because you have assumed there is no answer to the question?
That doesn’t seem to follow from what we’ve said thus far.
That boils down to “what Dave values, Dave values”.
Absolutely. Which, IIRC, is what I said in the first place that inspired this whole conversation, so it certainly ought not surprise you that I’m saying it now.
The point was unobservable truth. You seem to have decided, in line with your previous comments, that what is unobservable is unknowable. But logical and mathematical truths are well-known examples of unobservable (non empirical truths).
(shrug) All right. Let’s assume for the sake of comity that you’re right, that we can come to know moral truths about our existence through a process divorced from observation, just like, on your account, we come to know logical and mathematical truths about our existence through a process divorced from observation.
So what are the correct grounds for deciding what is in the set of knowable unobserved objective moral truths?
For example, consider the claim “angles between 85 and 95 degrees, other than 90 degrees, are bad.”
There are no observations (actual or anticipated) that would lead me to that conclusion, so I’m inclined to reject the claim on those grounds. But for the sake of comity I will set that standard aside, as you suggest. So… is that claim a knowable unobserved objective moral truth? A knowable unobserved objective moral falsehood? A moral claim whose unobserved objective truth-value is unknowable? A moral claim without an unobserved objective truth-value? Not a moral claim at all? Something else?
How do you approach that question so as to avoid mistaking one of those other things for knowable unobserved objective moral truths?
So you have beliefs that you have done beneficial things, but you don’t know if you have, because you don’t know what is beneficial, because you have never tried to find out, because you have assumed there is no answer to the question?
That doesn’t seem to follow from what we’ve said thus far.
Have you a) seen outcomes which are beneficial, and which you know to be beneficial? or b) seen outcomes which you believe to be beneficial?
That boils down to “what Dave values, Dave values”.
Absolutely. Which, IIRC, is what I said in the first place that inspired this whole conversation, so it certainly ought not surprise you that I’m saying it now.
AFAIC, this conversation is about your claim that ethical objectivism is false. That claim cannot be justified by a
tautology like ” “what Dave values, Dave values”.
The point was unobservable truth. You seem to have decided, in line with your previous comments, that what is unobservable is unknowable. But logical and mathematical truths are well-known examples of unobservable (non empirical truths).
(shrug) All right. Let’s assume for the sake of comity that you’re right, that we can come to know moral truths about our existence through a process divorced from observation, just like, on your account, we come to know logical and mathematical truths about our existence through a process divorced from observation.
So what are the correct grounds for deciding what is in the set of knowable unobserved objective moral truths?
It’s being a special case of an overaching principle such as “”Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law.”, or “increase aggregate utility”.
For example, consider the claim “angles between 85 and 95 degrees, other than 90 degrees, are bad.”
There are no observations (actual or anticipated) that would lead me to that conclusion, so I’m inclined to reject the claim on those grounds. But for the sake of comity I will set that standard aside, as you suggest. So… is that claim a knowable unobserved objective moral truth?
AFAIC, this conversation is about your claim that ethical objectivism is false.
I started all of this by saying:
I ought not behave as though objective, scientific facts exist until I have some grounds for doing so, and that “some people think their intuitions reflect objective, scientific facts” doesn’t qualify as a ground for doing so. At this point, one could ask “well, OK, what qualifies as a ground for behaving as though objective, scientific facts exist?” and the conversation can progress in a vaguely sensible direction. I would similarly ask (popping your metaphorical stack) “what qualifies as a ground for behaving as though objective moral facts exist?” and refrain from behaving as though they do until some such ground is demonstrated.
As far as I can tell, no such ground has been demonstrated throughout our whole discussion. So I continue to endorse not behaving as though objective moral facts exist.
But as far as you’re concerned, what we’re discussing instead is whether I’m justified in claiming that ethical objectivism is false. (shrug) OK. I retract that claim. If that ends this discussion, I’m OK with that.
Have you a) seen outcomes which are beneficial, and which you know to be beneficial? or b) seen outcomes which you believe to be beneficial?
I have seen outcomes that I’m confident are beneficial. I don’t think the relationship of such confidence to knowledge or belief is a question you and I can profitably discuss.
So what are the correct grounds for deciding what is in the set of knowable unobserved objective moral truths? It’s being a special case of an overaching principle such as “”Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law.”, or “increase aggregate utility”.
This just triggers regress. That is, OK, I’m evaluating moral claim X, for which I have no observed evidence, to see whether it’s a knowable unobserved objective moral truth. To determine this, I first evaluate whether I can will that X should become a universal law. OK, fine… what are the correct grounds for deciding whether I can will that X be a universal law?
But you additionally suggest that “increase aggregate utility” is the determiner here… which suggests that if X increases the aggregate utility of everything everywhere, I can will that X should become a universal law, and therefore can know that X is an objective moral truth.
Yes? Have I understood your view correctly?
How does it even relate to action?
Well, if angles between 85 and 95 degrees, other than 90 degrees, are bad, then it seems to follow that given a choice of angle between 85 and 95 degrees, I should choose 90 degrees. That sure sounds like a relationship to an action to me. So, to repeat my question, is “angles between 85 and 95 degrees, other than 90 degrees, are bad” a knowable unobserved objective moral truth, or not?
By the standard you describe above, I should ask whether choosing 90 degrees rather than other angles between 85 and 95 degrees increases aggregate utility. If it does, then “angles between 85 and 95 degrees, other than 90 degrees, are bad” is an objective moral truth, otherwise it isn’t. Yes?
I have seen outcomes that I’m confident are beneficial.
Confidence isn;t knowledge. So: b). You have only seen outcomes which you believe to be beneficial.
I don’t think the relationship of such confidence to knowledge or belief is a question you and I can profitably discuss.
Why not?
OK, fine… what are the correct grounds for deciding whether I can will that X be a universal law?
If considering murder, you ask yourself whether you would want everyone to be able ot murder you, willy-nilly. Far from regressing, the answer to that grounds out in one of those kneejerk obvioulsy-not-valuable-to-Dave intuitions you have been appealing to throughout this discussion.,
increase aggregate utility”
Does your murdering someone increase aggregate utility?
, I should choose 90 degrees.
How does that affect other people? Choices that effect only yourself are aesthetics, not ethics.
Actually, on further thought… by “moral claims have subject-independent truth values” do you mean “there exists at least one moral claim with a subject-independent truth value”? Or “All moral claims have subject-independent truth values”?
I’m less confident regarding the falsehood of the former than the latter
I think my confusion is less about understanding the view (assuming the Richard’s rigid designator interpretation is accurate) and more everyone’s insistence on calling it a moral realist view. It feels like everyone is playing word games to avoid being moral subjectivists. I don’t know if it was all the arguing with theists or being annoyed with moral relativist social-justice types but somewhere along the way much of the Less Wrong crowd developed strong negative associations with the words used to describe varieties of moral anti-realism.
As far as I can tell most everyone here has the same descriptive picture of what is going on with ethics. There is this animal on planet Earth that has semi-ordered preferences about how the world should be and how things similar to that animal should act. Those of this species which speak the language called “English” write inscriptions like “morality” and “right and wrong” to describe these preferences. These preferences are the result of evolved instincts and cultural norms. Many members of this species have very similar preferences.
This seems like a straightforward description of ethical subjectivism—the position that moral sentences are about the attitudes of people (notice that isn’t the same as saying they are relative). But people don’t seem to like calling themselves ethical subjectivists—or maybe they don’t like that the theory doesn’t tell them what to do? I don’t understand this. I’d love for someone to explain it. In any case, then we start doing philosophy to try to shoehorn this description into something we can call moral realism.
And it definitely is true that much of our moral language function like rigid designators, which hides the causal history of our moral beliefs. This explains why people don’t feel like morality changes under counterfactuals—i.e. if you imagine a world in which you have a preference for innocent children being murdered you don’t believe that murdering children is therefore moral in that world. I outlined this in more detail here. I didn’t use the term ‘rigid designator’ in that post, but the point is that what we think is moral is invariant in counterfacturals.
I don’t see how this isn’t a straightforward example of moral subjectivism. And that is reflected in the fact that there are no universally compelling arguments. I can see how you can sort of structure the arguments and questions and get it to output “moral realism” if you really had to. You say that the word “right” designates particular facts about worlds such that worlds can be objectively evaluated according to that concept. But to me, it is weird and confusing to ignore the fact that the rule uniting those facts about the world is determined by our attitudes—especially since we can’t right now enumerate the rigid contents of our moral language and have to apply the rule in most circumstances.
Whether you call it moral subjectivism or not, it seems like the next step is examining our preferences to see how much they can overlap, and what constitutes an ethical and effective way of reconciling them so that they are consistent with each other. In other words, we need to know how we ought to resolve moral disagreements, ‘reflective equilibrium’, that kind of stuff. This is how we determine how universal our morality is. And that’s what actually matters, not whether or not it exists independently of human attitudes.
A few nitpicks of your descriptive picture.
1- There are inevitable conflicts between practically any two creatures on this planet as to what preferences they would have as to the world. If you narrow these down to the area classified by humans as “moral” the picture can be greatly simplified, but there will still be a large amount of difference. 2- I dispute that moral sentences ARE about the attitudes of people. Most people throughout history have had a concept of “Right” and “Wrong” as being objective. This naive conception is philosophically indefensible, but the best descriptor of what people throughout history, and even nowadays, have believed. It is hard to defend the idea that a person thinks they are referring to X and are in fact referring to Y when X and Y are drastically different things and the person is not thinking of Y on any level of their brain- the likely case for, say, a typical Stone Age man arguing a moral point.
Sure, as I said at the end, the “universality” of the whole thing is an open problem.
That’s fine. But in that case, all moral sentences are false (or nonsense, depending on how you feel about references to non-entities). I agree that there is a sense in which that is true which you outlined here. In this case we can start from scratch and just make the entire enterprise about figuring out what we we really truly want to do with the world—and then do that. Personally I find that interpretation of moral language a bit uncharitable. And it turns out people are pretty stuck on the whole morality idea and don’t like it when you tell them their moral beliefs are false.
Subjectivism seems both more charitable and friendlier—but ultimately these are two different ways of saying the same thing. The debates between varieties of anti-realism seem entirely semantic to me.
1- Alright. Misunderstood.
2- There are some rare exceptions- some people define morality differently and can thus be said to mean different things. Almost all moral sentences, if every claim to something be right or wrong throughout history count as moral sentences, are false/nonsense, however.
The principle of charity, however, does not apply here- the evidence clearly shows that human beings throughout history have truely believed that some things are morally wrong and some morally right on a level more than preferences, even if this is not in fact true.
Philosophy typically involves taking folk notions that are important but untrue in a strict sense and constructing something tenable out of that material. And I think the situation is more ambiguous than you make it sound.
But it is essentially irrelevant. I mean, you could just go back to bed after concluding all moral statements are false. But that seems like it is ignoring everything that made us interested in this question in the first place. Regardless of what people think they are referring to when they make moral statements it seems pretty clear what they’re actually doing. And the latter is accurately described by something like subjectivism or quasi-realism. People might be wrong about moral claims, but what we want to know is why and what they’re doing when they make them.
A typical person would be insulted if you claimed that their moral statements referred only to feelings. Most philosophical definitions work on a principle which isn’t quite like how ordinary people see them but would seem close enough to an ordinary person.
There are a lot of uses of the concepts of right and wrong, not just people arguing with each other. Ethical dilemnas, people wondering whether to do the “right” thing or the “wrong” thing, philosophical schools (think of the Confucians, for example, who don’t define ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ but talk about it a lot). Your conception only covers one use.
Except that’s not Eliezer’s view. The mistake you’re making here is the equivalent of thinking that, because the meaning of the word “water” is determined by how English speakers use it, therefore sentences about water are sentences about the behavior of English speakers.
I understand, this is what I’m dealing with in the second to last paragraph.
There is a sense in which all concepts both exist subjectively and objectively. There is some mathematical function that describes all the things that ChrisHallquist thinks are funny just like there is a mathematical function that describes the behavior of atoms. We can get into the nitty-gritty about what makes a concept subjective and what makes a concept objective. But I don’t see what the case for morality counting as “objective” is unless we’re just going to count all concepts as objective.
Can you be clearer about the way you are using “describes” here?
I’m not clear if you are thinking about a) a giant lookup table of all the things Chris Hallquist finds funny, or b) a program that is more compact than that list—so compact, indeed, that a cut-down bug-filled beta of it can be implemented inside his skull! - but yet can generate the list.
My point works with either, I think. Which is more charitable to Eliezer’s position?
I am a moral subjectivist and a moral realist. The only point of contention I’d have with EY is if he is a non psycho human moral universalist. I felt that his language was ambiguous on that point, and at times he seemed to be making arguments in that direction. I just couldn’t tell.
But if\ we’re going to be moral subjectivists, we should realize that “we ought” too easily glosses over the fact that ought_you is not identical to ought_me.
And I don’t think you get a compelling answer from some smuggled self recursion, but from your best estimate of what people actually are.
Traditional usage defines those terms to exclude the possibility of being both. The standard definition of a moral realist is someone who believes that moral judgments express mind-independent facts; while the standard definition of a moral subjectivist is someone who believes moral judgments express mind-dependent facts.
So I don’t know quite what you mean.
You mean someone who doesn’t believe that there are moral universals among humans? One too many adjectives for me.
If I understand this right: you’re contrasting trying to come up with some self-justifying method for resolving disagreement (recursively finding consensus on how to find consensus) with… descriptive moral psychology? I’m not sure I follow.
My point being that the categories themselves are not used consistently, so that I can be called either one or the other depending on usage.
Definitions tend to be theory bound themselves, so that mind dependent and mind independent are not clear cut. If I think that eating cows is fine, but I wouldn’t if I knew more and thought longer, which represents my mind—both, neither, the first, the second?
For example, if you go to the article in La Wik on Ethical Subjectvism, they talk about “opinions” and not minds. In this case, my opinion would be that eating cows is fine, but it would not be my extrapolated values.
Some would call my position realism, and some would call it subjectivism. Me, I don’t care what you call it. I recognize that my position could be called either within the bounds of normal usage.
Someone who believes that what is moral is universal across humans who are not psychos.
I think you’re getting the point there.
Does the fact that people have different opinions about non moral claims, means there are no objective, scientific facts?
It doesn’t mean that, no.
But it does mean that I ought not behave as though objective, scientific facts exist until I have some grounds for doing so, and that “some people think their intuitions reflect objective, scientific facts” doesn’t qualify as a ground for doing so.
At this point, one could ask “well, OK, what qualifies as a ground for behaving as though objective, scientific facts exist?” and the conversation can progress in a vaguely sensible direction.
I would similarly ask (popping your metaphorical stack) “what qualifies as a ground for behaving as though objective moral facts exist?” and refrain from behaving as though they do until some such ground is demonstrated.
I don’t think you’re in a position to do that unless you can actually solve the problem of grounding scientific objectivity without incurring Munchausen’s trilemma. That is essentially an unsolved problem. Analytical philosophy, LW, and various other groups sidestep it by getting together with people who share the same intuitions. But that is not exactly the epistemic high ground.
I’m content to ground behaving as though objective, scientific facts exist in the observation that such behavior reliably correlates with (and predicts) my experience of the world improving. I haven’t observed anything analogous about behaving as though objective moral facts exist.
This, too, is not the epistemic high ground. I’m OK with that.
But, sure, if you insist on pulling yourself out of the Munchausen’s swamp before you can make any further progress, then you’re quite correct that progress is equally impossible on both scientific and ethical fronts.
Indeed you haven’t, because they are not analogous. Morality is about guiding action in the world, not passively registering the state of the world. It doesn’t tell you what the melting point of aluminum is, it tells you whether what you are about to do is the right thing.
And if you think it is such levitation is unnecessary, then progress is equally possible on both fronts.
Science isn’t just about passively registering the state of the world, either.
Alice: “Science has a set of norms or guides-to-action called the scientific method. These have truth-values which are objective in the sense of not being a matter of individual whim”
Bob: “I don’t believe you! What experiments do you perform to measure these truth-values, what equipment do you use?”
Charlie: “I don;’t believe you! You sound like you believe in some immaterial ScientificMethod object for these statements to correspond to!”.
....welcome to my world.
Dave: Behaving as though objective scientific facts exist has made it possible for me to talk to people all over the world, for the people I care about to be warm in the winter, cool in the summer, have potable water to drink and plenty of food to eat, and routinely survive incidents that would have killed us in pre-scientific cultures, and more generally has alleviated an enormous amount of potential suffering and enabled an enormous amount of value-satisfaction.
I am therefore content to continue behaving as though objective scientific facts exist.
If, hypothetically, it turned out that objective scientific facts didn’t exist, but that behaving as though they do nevertheless reliably provided these benefits, I’d continue to endorse behaving as though they do. In that hypothetical scenario you and Alice and Bob and Charlie are free to go on talking about truth-values but I don’t see why I should join you. Why should anyone care about truth in that hypothetical scenario?
Similarly, if behaving as though objective moral facts exist has some benefit, then I might be convinced to behave as though objective moral facts exist. But if it’s just more talking about truth-values divorced from even theoretical benefits… well, you’re free to do that if you wish, but I don’t see why I should join you.
I can construct a very similar argument for Christianity (or for most any religion, actually).
Usefulness of beliefs and verity of beliefs are not orthogonal but are not 100% correlated either.
That’s surprising, but if you can, please do. If behaving as though the beliefs of Christianity are objective facts reliably and differentially provides benefits on a par with the kinds of scientific beliefs we’re discussing here, I am equally willing to endorse behaving as though the beliefs of Christianity are objective facts.
Sure, I agree.
The argument wouldn’t involve running hot water in your house, but would involve things like social cohesion, shared values, psychological satisfaction, etc.
Think about meme evolution and selection criteria. Religion is a very powerful meme that was strongly selected for. It certainly provided benefits for societies and individuals.
Edith: A lot of good stuff, then?
Fred: Those facts didn’t fall off a tree, they were arrived at by following a true..right..effective..call it what you will...set of methods.
Edith: You care about science because it leads to things that are good. Morality does too.
Edith: you don’t already? How do you stay out of jail?
Edith: If there are no moral facts, then the good things you like are not really good at all.
I’m not sure what you mean to express by that word.
A lot of stuff I value, certainly.
Yes, that’s true. And?
Great! Wonderful! I’ll happily endorse morality on the grounds of its reliable observable benefits, then, and we can drop all this irrelevant talk about “objective moral facts”.
Same as everyone else… by following laws when I might be arrested for violating them. I would do all of that even if there were no objective moral facts. Indeed, I’ve been known to avoid getting arrested under laws that, if they did reflect objective moral facts, would seem to imply mutually exclusive sets of objective moral facts.
Perhaps. So what? Why should I care? What difference does it make, in that scenario?
For example, I prefer people not suffering to people suffering… that’s a value of mine. If it turns out that there really are objective moral facts that are independent of my values, and that people suffering actually is objectively preferable to people not-suffering, and my values are simply objectively wrong… why should I care?
And there is a way of guides-to-action to be objectively right (etc) that has nothing to with reflecting facts or predicting experience. Thus removing the “morality doesn’t help me predict experience” objection.
You have presupposed that there are Good Things (benefits) in that comment, and in your previous comment about science. You are already attaching truth values to propositions about what is good or not, I don’t have to argue you into that.
“Jail is bad” has the truth-value True?
Why are you avoiding jail if its badness is not a fact?
Because you care about good things, benefits and so on. You are already caring about them, so I don’t have to argue you into it.
Do you update your other opinions if they turn out to be false?
You are treating my statements about what I value as assertions about Good Things.
If you consider those equivalent, then great… you are already treating Good as a fact about what we value, and I don’t have to argue you into that.
If you don’t consider them equivalent (which I suspect) then interpreting the former as a statement about the latter is at best confused, and more likely dishonest.
I value staying out of jail.
Is there anything in your question I haven’t agreed to by saying that?
If not, great. I will go on talking about what I value, and if you insist on talking about the truth-values of moral claims I will understand you as referring to what you value.
If so, what?
Because I value staying out of jail. (Which in turn derives from other values of mine.)
As above; if this is an honest and coherent response, then great, we agree that “good things” simply refers to what we value.
Sure, there are areas in which I endorse doing this.
So, you ask, shouldn’t I endorse updating false moral beliefs as well?
Sure, if I anticipate observable benefits to having true moral beliefs, as I do to having true beliefs in those other areas in which I have opinions. But I don’t anticipate such benefits.
Another area where I don’t anticipate such benefits, and where I am similarly skeptical that the label “true beliefs” refers to anything or is worth talking about, is aesthetics. For example, sure, maybe my preference for blue over red is false, and a true aesthetic belief is that “red is more aesthetic than blue” is true. But… so what? Should I start preferring red over blue on that basis? Why on Earth would I do that?
(But Dave, you value having accurate beliefs in other areas! Why not aesthetics?)
I am not sure what that means. Is the “we” individual-by-individual or collective?
And where did you get the idea that Objective metaethics means giving up on values?
How does that differ from “jail is bad-for-me”?
If I thought that he truth-values of moral claims refers only to what I value, I wouldn’t be making much of a pitch for objectivism, would I?
Whatever that means?
What explains the difference?
But that isn’t the function of moral beliefs: their function is to guide action. You have admitted that your behaviour is guided by jail-avoidance.
You seem to be interested in the meta-level question of objective aesthetics. Why is that?
I think that’s a separate discussion, and I don’t think spinning it off will be productive. Feel free to replace “we” with “I” if that’s clearer. If it’s still not clear what I mean, I’m content to let it drop there.
I’m not sure what “giving up on values” means.
Beats me. Perhaps it doesn’t.
No, you wouldn’t.
Yes.
Whether concerning myself with the truth-values of the propositions expressed by opinions reliably provides observable and differential benefits.
I agree that beliefs guide action (this is not just true of moral beliefs).
If the sole function of moral beliefs is to guide action without reference to expected observable benefits, I don’t see why I should prefer “true” moral beliefs (whatever that means) to “false” ones (whatever that means).
Yes. Which sure sounds like a benefit to me.
I don’t seem that way to myself, actually. I bring it up as another example of an area where some people assert there are objective truths and falsehoods, but where I see no reason to posit any such thing...positing the existence of individual aesthetic values seems quite adequate to explain my observations.
I think it is a key issue. This is about ethical objectivism. If Good is a fact about what we value collectively, in your view, then your theory is along the lines of utilitariansim, which is near enough to objectivism AFAIC. Yet you seem to disagree with me about something.
If you concern yourself with the truth values of your own beliefs about what you believe to be good and bad, and revise your beliefs accordingly and act on them, you will end up doing the right thing.
What’s more beneficial than doing the right thing?
If the things you think are beneficial are in fact not beneficial, then you are not getting benefits; you just mistakenly think you are.
To actually get benefits, you have to know what is actually beneficial.
Morality is all about what is truly beneficial. Those truths aren’t observable: neither are the truths of mathematics.
Are you a passive observer who never acts?
It is not clear to me what we disagree about, precisely, if anything.
I don’t know. It is not clear to me what the referent of “the right thing” is when you say it, or indeed if it even has a referent, so it’s hard to be sure one way or another. (Yes, I do understand that you meant that as a rhetorical question whose correct answer was “Nothing.”)
Yes, that’s true.
No, that’s false. But my expectation of actually getting benefits increases sharply if I know what is actually beneficial.
I disagree.
Supposing this is true, I don’t see why it’s relevant.
No.
Is ethical objectivism true, IYO?
Doing thins such that it is an objective fact that they are beneficial, and not just a possibly false belief.
Explain how you observe the truth-value of a claim about what is beneficial.
it is relevant you attitude that only the observable maters in epistemology.
Then explaining your observations is not the only game in town.
If you point me at a definition of ethical objectivism you consider adequate, I’ll try to answer that question.
So, you’re asking what’s more beneficial than doing things such that it’s an objective fact that they are beneficial?
Presumably doing other things such that it’s an objective fact that they are more beneficial is more beneficial than merely doing things such that it’s an objective fact that they are beneficial.
When I experience X having consequences I value in situations where I didn’t expect it to, I increase my confidence in the claim that X is beneficial. When I experience X failing to have such consequences in situations where I did expect it to, I decrease my confidence in the claim.
How do unobservable mathematical truths matter in epistemology?
That’s true.
“moral claims have subject-independent truth values”.
And doing things that aren’t really beneficial at all isn’t really beneficial at all.
Explain how you justified the truth of the claim “what Dave values is beneficial”
Epistemology is about truth.
So you no longer reject metaethics on the basis that it doesn’t explain your observations?
No.
Yes, that’s true.
Increasing it has consequences I value.
No, epistemology is about knowledge. For example, unknowable truths are not within the province of epistemology.
If you point me to where in this discussion I rejected metaethics on the basis that it doesn’t explain my observations, I will tell you if I still stand by that rejection. As it stands I don’t know how to answer this question.
So you have beliefs that you have done beneficial things, but you don’t know if you have, because you don’t know what is beneficial, because you have never tried to find out, because you have assumed there is no answer to the question?
That boils down to “what Dave values, Dave values”.
“Epistemic Logic: A Survey of the Logic of Knowledge” by Nicholas Rescher has a chapter on unknowable truth.
But that is not the point. The point was unobservable truth. You seem to have decided, in line with your previous comments, that what is unobservable is unknowable. But logical and mathematical truths are well-known examples of unobservable (non empirical truths).
That doesn’t seem to follow from what we’ve said thus far.
Absolutely. Which, IIRC, is what I said in the first place that inspired this whole conversation, so it certainly ought not surprise you that I’m saying it now.
(shrug) All right. Let’s assume for the sake of comity that you’re right, that we can come to know moral truths about our existence through a process divorced from observation, just like, on your account, we come to know logical and mathematical truths about our existence through a process divorced from observation.
So what are the correct grounds for deciding what is in the set of knowable unobserved objective moral truths?
For example, consider the claim “angles between 85 and 95 degrees, other than 90 degrees, are bad.”
There are no observations (actual or anticipated) that would lead me to that conclusion, so I’m inclined to reject the claim on those grounds. But for the sake of comity I will set that standard aside, as you suggest. So… is that claim a knowable unobserved objective moral truth? A knowable unobserved objective moral falsehood? A moral claim whose unobserved objective truth-value is unknowable? A moral claim without an unobserved objective truth-value? Not a moral claim at all? Something else?
How do you approach that question so as to avoid mistaking one of those other things for knowable unobserved objective moral truths?
Have you
a) seen outcomes which are beneficial, and which you know to be beneficial?
or
b) seen outcomes which you believe to be beneficial?
AFAIC, this conversation is about your claim that ethical objectivism is false. That claim cannot be justified by a tautology like ” “what Dave values, Dave values”.
It’s being a special case of an overaching principle such as “”Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law.”, or “increase aggregate utility”.
How does it even relate to action?
How does it even relate to action?
I started all of this by saying:
As far as I can tell, no such ground has been demonstrated throughout our whole discussion.
So I continue to endorse not behaving as though objective moral facts exist.
But as far as you’re concerned, what we’re discussing instead is whether I’m justified in claiming that ethical objectivism is false. (shrug) OK. I retract that claim. If that ends this discussion, I’m OK with that.
I have seen outcomes that I’m confident are beneficial. I don’t think the relationship of such confidence to knowledge or belief is a question you and I can profitably discuss.
This just triggers regress. That is, OK, I’m evaluating moral claim X, for which I have no observed evidence, to see whether it’s a knowable unobserved objective moral truth. To determine this, I first evaluate whether I can will that X should become a universal law. OK, fine… what are the correct grounds for deciding whether I can will that X be a universal law?
But you additionally suggest that “increase aggregate utility” is the determiner here… which suggests that if X increases the aggregate utility of everything everywhere, I can will that X should become a universal law, and therefore can know that X is an objective moral truth.
Yes? Have I understood your view correctly?
Well, if angles between 85 and 95 degrees, other than 90 degrees, are bad, then it seems to follow that given a choice of angle between 85 and 95 degrees, I should choose 90 degrees. That sure sounds like a relationship to an action to me. So, to repeat my question, is “angles between 85 and 95 degrees, other than 90 degrees, are bad” a knowable unobserved objective moral truth, or not?
By the standard you describe above, I should ask whether choosing 90 degrees rather than other angles between 85 and 95 degrees increases aggregate utility. If it does, then “angles between 85 and 95 degrees, other than 90 degrees, are bad” is an objective moral truth, otherwise it isn’t. Yes?
So, OK. How do I determine that?
Confidence isn;t knowledge. So: b). You have only seen outcomes which you believe to be beneficial.
Why not?
If considering murder, you ask yourself whether you would want everyone to be able ot murder you, willy-nilly. Far from regressing, the answer to that grounds out in one of those kneejerk obvioulsy-not-valuable-to-Dave intuitions you have been appealing to throughout this discussion.,
Does your murdering someone increase aggregate utility?
How does that affect other people? Choices that effect only yourself are aesthetics, not ethics.
Tapping out here.
I’ll address your example after you address mine.
Actually, on further thought… by “moral claims have subject-independent truth values” do you mean “there exists at least one moral claim with a subject-independent truth value”? Or “All moral claims have subject-independent truth values”?
I’m less confident regarding the falsehood of the former than the latter
The former.
Fair enough. So, which moral claims have subject-independent truth values, on your account?
Mot of them. But there may be some claims that are self-reflexive, eg “to be the best person I can be, I should get a PhD”.