If you consider those equivalent, then great… you are already treating Good as a fact about what we value, and I don’t have to argue you into that.
I am not sure what that means. Is the “we” individual-by-individual or collective?
And where did you get the idea that Objective metaethics means giving up on values?
I value staying out of jail.
How does that differ from “jail is bad-for-me”?
If not, great. I will go on talking about what I value, and if you insist on talking about the truth-values of moral claims I will understand you as referring to what you value.
If I thought that he truth-values of moral claims refers only to what I value, I wouldn’t be making much of a pitch for objectivism, would I?
As above; if this is an honest and coherent response, then great, we agree that “good things” simply refers to what we value.
Whatever that means?
Do you update your other opinions if they turn out to be false?
Sure, there are areas in which I endorse doing this.
What explains the difference?
So, you ask, shouldn’t I endorse updating false moral beliefs as well?
Sure, if I anticipate observable benefits to having true moral beliefs,
But that isn’t the function of moral beliefs: their function is to guide action. You have admitted
that your behaviour is guided by jail-avoidance.
Another area where I don’t anticipate such benefits, and where I am similarly skeptical that the label “true beliefs” refers to anything or is worth talking about, is aesthetics. For example, sure, maybe my preference for blue over red is false, and a true aesthetic belief is that “red is more aesthetic than blue” is true. But… so what? Should I start preferring red over blue on that basis? Why on Earth would I do that?
You seem to be interested in the meta-level question of objective aesthetics. Why is that?
Is the “we” individual-by-individual or collective?
I think that’s a separate discussion, and I don’t think spinning it off will be productive. Feel free to replace “we” with “I” if that’s clearer. If it’s still not clear what I mean, I’m content to let it drop there.
And where did you get the idea that Objective metaethics means giving up on values?
I’m not sure what “giving up on values” means.
How does [I value staying out of jail] differ from “jail is bad-for-me”?
Beats me. Perhaps it doesn’t.
If I thought that he truth-values of moral claims refers only to what I value, I wouldn’t be making much of a pitch for objectivism, would I?
No, you wouldn’t.
Whatever [what-we-value] means?
Yes.
What explains the difference [between areas where I endorse updating false opinions and those where I don’t] ?
Whether concerning myself with the truth-values of the propositions expressed by opinions reliably provides observable and differential benefits.
But [observable benefits] isn’t the function of moral beliefs: their function is to guide action.
I agree that beliefs guide action (this is not just true of moral beliefs).
If the sole function of moral beliefs is to guide action without reference to expected observable benefits, I don’t see why I should prefer “true” moral beliefs (whatever that means) to “false” ones (whatever that means).
You have admitted that your behaviour is guided by jail-avoidance.
Yes. Which sure sounds like a benefit to me.
You seem to be interested in the meta-level question of objective aesthetics. Why is that?
I don’t seem that way to myself, actually. I bring it up as another example of an area where some people assert there are objective truths and falsehoods, but where I see no reason to posit any such thing...positing the existence of individual aesthetic values seems quite adequate to explain my observations.
I think that’s a separate discussion, and I don’t think spinning it off will be productive. Feel free to replace “we” with “I” if that’s clearer. If it’s still not clear what I mean, I’m content to let it drop there.
I think it is a key issue. This is about ethical objectivism. If Good is a fact about what we value collectively, in your view, then your theory is along the lines of utilitariansim, which is near enough to objectivism AFAIC. Yet you seem to disagree with me about something.
What explains the difference [between areas where I endorse updating false opinions and those where I don’t] ?
Whether concerning myself with the truth-values of the propositions expressed by opinions reliably provides observable and differential benefits.
If you concern yourself with the truth values of your own beliefs about what you believe to be good and bad, and revise your beliefs accordingly and act on them, you will end up doing the right thing.
What’s more beneficial than doing the right thing?
If the things you think are beneficial are in fact not beneficial, then you are not getting benefits; you just mistakenly think you are.
To actually get benefits, you have to know what is actually beneficial.
If the sole function of moral beliefs is to guide action without reference to expected observable benefits, I don’t see why I should prefer “true” moral beliefs (whatever that means) to “false” ones (whatever that means).
Morality is all about what is truly beneficial. Those truths aren’t observable: neither are the truths of mathematics.
I bring it up as another example of an area where some people assert there are objective truths and falsehoods, but where I see no reason to posit any such thing...positing the existence of individual aesthetic values seems quite adequate to explain my observations.
It is not clear to me what we disagree about, precisely, if anything.
What’s more beneficial than doing the right thing?
I don’t know. It is not clear to me what the referent of “the right thing” is when you say it, or indeed if it even has a referent, so it’s hard to be sure one way or another. (Yes, I do understand that you meant that as a rhetorical question whose correct answer was “Nothing.”)
If the things you think are beneficial are in fact not beneficial, then you are not getting benefits; you just mistakenly think you are.
Yes, that’s true.
To actually get benefits, you have to know what is actually beneficial.
No, that’s false. But my expectation of actually getting benefits increases sharply if I know what is actually beneficial.
Morality is all about what is truly beneficial. Those truths aren’t observable
I disagree.
neither are the truths of mathematics.
Supposing this is true, I don’t see why it’s relevant.
It is not clear to me what we disagree about, precisely, if anything.
Is ethical objectivism true, IYO?
It is not clear to me what the referent of “the right thing”
Doing thins such that it is an objective fact that they are beneficial, and not just a possibly false belief.
Morality is all about what is truly beneficial. Those truths aren’t observable
I disagree.
Explain how you observe the truth-value of a claim about what is beneficial.
neither are the truths of mathematics.
Supposing this is true, I don’t see why it’s relevant.
it is relevant you attitude that only the observable maters in epistemology.
I bring it up as another example of an area where some people assert there are objective truths and falsehoods, but where I see no reason to posit any such thing...positing the existence of individual aesthetic values seems quite adequate to explain my observations.
Are you a passive observer who never acts?
No.
Then explaining your observations is not the only game in town.
If you point me at a definition of ethical objectivism you consider adequate, I’ll try to answer that question.
What’s more beneficial than doing the right thing?
what the referent of “the right thing”
Doing thins such that it is an objective fact that they are beneficial, and not just a possibly false belief.
So, you’re asking what’s more beneficial than doing things such that it’s an objective fact that they are beneficial? Presumably doing other things such that it’s an objective fact that they are more beneficial is more beneficial than merely doing things such that it’s an objective fact that they are beneficial.
Explain how you observe the truth-value of a claim about what is beneficial.
When I experience X having consequences I value in situations where I didn’t expect it to, I increase my confidence in the claim that X is beneficial. When I experience X failing to have such consequences in situations where I did expect it to, I decrease my confidence in the claim.
it is relevant you attitude that only the observable maters in epistemology.
How do unobservable mathematical truths matter in epistemology?
explaining your observations is not the only game in town.
If you point me at a definition of ethical objectivism you consider adequate, I’ll try to answer that question.
“moral claims have subject-independent truth values”.
Presumably doing other things such that it’s an objective fact that they are more beneficial is more beneficial than merely doing things such that it’s an objective fact that they are beneficial.
And doing things that aren’t really beneficial at all isn’t really beneficial at all.
When I experience X having consequences I value in situations where I didn’t expect it to, I increase my confidence in the claim that X is beneficial.
Explain how you justified the truth of the claim “what Dave values is beneficial”
How do unobservable mathematical truths matter in epistemology?
Epistemology is about truth.
explaining your observations is not the only game in town.
That’s true.
So you no longer reject metaethics on the basis that it doesn’t explain your observations?
Is ethical objectivism (“moral claims have subject-independent truth values”) true, IYO?
No.
And doing things that aren’t really beneficial at all isn’t really beneficial at all.
Yes, that’s true.
Explain how you justified the truth of the claim “what Dave values is beneficial”
Increasing it has consequences I value.
Epistemology is about truth.
No, epistemology is about knowledge. For example, unknowable truths are not within the province of epistemology.
So you no longer reject metaethics on the basis that it doesn’t explain your observations?
If you point me to where in this discussion I rejected metaethics on the basis that it doesn’t explain my observations, I will tell you if I still stand by that rejection. As it stands I don’t know how to answer this question.
And doing things that aren’t really beneficial at all isn’t really beneficial at all.
Yes, that’s true.
So you have beliefs that you have done beneficial things, but you don’t know if you have, because you don’t know what is beneficial, because you have never tried to find out, because you have assumed there is no answer to the question?
Explain how you justified the truth of the claim “what Dave values is beneficial”
Increasing it has consequences I value.
That boils down to “what Dave values, Dave values”.
Epistemology is about truth.
No, epistemology is about knowledge. For example, unknowable truths are not within the province of epistemology
“Epistemic Logic: A Survey of the Logic of Knowledge” by Nicholas Rescher has a chapter on unknowable truth.
But that is not the point. The point was unobservable truth. You seem to have decided, in line with your previous comments, that what is unobservable is unknowable. But logical and mathematical truths are well-known examples of unobservable (non empirical truths).
So you have beliefs that you have done beneficial things, but you don’t know if you have, because you don’t know what is beneficial, because you have never tried to find out, because you have assumed there is no answer to the question?
That doesn’t seem to follow from what we’ve said thus far.
That boils down to “what Dave values, Dave values”.
Absolutely. Which, IIRC, is what I said in the first place that inspired this whole conversation, so it certainly ought not surprise you that I’m saying it now.
The point was unobservable truth. You seem to have decided, in line with your previous comments, that what is unobservable is unknowable. But logical and mathematical truths are well-known examples of unobservable (non empirical truths).
(shrug) All right. Let’s assume for the sake of comity that you’re right, that we can come to know moral truths about our existence through a process divorced from observation, just like, on your account, we come to know logical and mathematical truths about our existence through a process divorced from observation.
So what are the correct grounds for deciding what is in the set of knowable unobserved objective moral truths?
For example, consider the claim “angles between 85 and 95 degrees, other than 90 degrees, are bad.”
There are no observations (actual or anticipated) that would lead me to that conclusion, so I’m inclined to reject the claim on those grounds. But for the sake of comity I will set that standard aside, as you suggest. So… is that claim a knowable unobserved objective moral truth? A knowable unobserved objective moral falsehood? A moral claim whose unobserved objective truth-value is unknowable? A moral claim without an unobserved objective truth-value? Not a moral claim at all? Something else?
How do you approach that question so as to avoid mistaking one of those other things for knowable unobserved objective moral truths?
So you have beliefs that you have done beneficial things, but you don’t know if you have, because you don’t know what is beneficial, because you have never tried to find out, because you have assumed there is no answer to the question?
That doesn’t seem to follow from what we’ve said thus far.
Have you a) seen outcomes which are beneficial, and which you know to be beneficial? or b) seen outcomes which you believe to be beneficial?
That boils down to “what Dave values, Dave values”.
Absolutely. Which, IIRC, is what I said in the first place that inspired this whole conversation, so it certainly ought not surprise you that I’m saying it now.
AFAIC, this conversation is about your claim that ethical objectivism is false. That claim cannot be justified by a
tautology like ” “what Dave values, Dave values”.
The point was unobservable truth. You seem to have decided, in line with your previous comments, that what is unobservable is unknowable. But logical and mathematical truths are well-known examples of unobservable (non empirical truths).
(shrug) All right. Let’s assume for the sake of comity that you’re right, that we can come to know moral truths about our existence through a process divorced from observation, just like, on your account, we come to know logical and mathematical truths about our existence through a process divorced from observation.
So what are the correct grounds for deciding what is in the set of knowable unobserved objective moral truths?
It’s being a special case of an overaching principle such as “”Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law.”, or “increase aggregate utility”.
For example, consider the claim “angles between 85 and 95 degrees, other than 90 degrees, are bad.”
There are no observations (actual or anticipated) that would lead me to that conclusion, so I’m inclined to reject the claim on those grounds. But for the sake of comity I will set that standard aside, as you suggest. So… is that claim a knowable unobserved objective moral truth?
AFAIC, this conversation is about your claim that ethical objectivism is false.
I started all of this by saying:
I ought not behave as though objective, scientific facts exist until I have some grounds for doing so, and that “some people think their intuitions reflect objective, scientific facts” doesn’t qualify as a ground for doing so. At this point, one could ask “well, OK, what qualifies as a ground for behaving as though objective, scientific facts exist?” and the conversation can progress in a vaguely sensible direction. I would similarly ask (popping your metaphorical stack) “what qualifies as a ground for behaving as though objective moral facts exist?” and refrain from behaving as though they do until some such ground is demonstrated.
As far as I can tell, no such ground has been demonstrated throughout our whole discussion. So I continue to endorse not behaving as though objective moral facts exist.
But as far as you’re concerned, what we’re discussing instead is whether I’m justified in claiming that ethical objectivism is false. (shrug) OK. I retract that claim. If that ends this discussion, I’m OK with that.
Have you a) seen outcomes which are beneficial, and which you know to be beneficial? or b) seen outcomes which you believe to be beneficial?
I have seen outcomes that I’m confident are beneficial. I don’t think the relationship of such confidence to knowledge or belief is a question you and I can profitably discuss.
So what are the correct grounds for deciding what is in the set of knowable unobserved objective moral truths? It’s being a special case of an overaching principle such as “”Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law.”, or “increase aggregate utility”.
This just triggers regress. That is, OK, I’m evaluating moral claim X, for which I have no observed evidence, to see whether it’s a knowable unobserved objective moral truth. To determine this, I first evaluate whether I can will that X should become a universal law. OK, fine… what are the correct grounds for deciding whether I can will that X be a universal law?
But you additionally suggest that “increase aggregate utility” is the determiner here… which suggests that if X increases the aggregate utility of everything everywhere, I can will that X should become a universal law, and therefore can know that X is an objective moral truth.
Yes? Have I understood your view correctly?
How does it even relate to action?
Well, if angles between 85 and 95 degrees, other than 90 degrees, are bad, then it seems to follow that given a choice of angle between 85 and 95 degrees, I should choose 90 degrees. That sure sounds like a relationship to an action to me. So, to repeat my question, is “angles between 85 and 95 degrees, other than 90 degrees, are bad” a knowable unobserved objective moral truth, or not?
By the standard you describe above, I should ask whether choosing 90 degrees rather than other angles between 85 and 95 degrees increases aggregate utility. If it does, then “angles between 85 and 95 degrees, other than 90 degrees, are bad” is an objective moral truth, otherwise it isn’t. Yes?
I have seen outcomes that I’m confident are beneficial.
Confidence isn;t knowledge. So: b). You have only seen outcomes which you believe to be beneficial.
I don’t think the relationship of such confidence to knowledge or belief is a question you and I can profitably discuss.
Why not?
OK, fine… what are the correct grounds for deciding whether I can will that X be a universal law?
If considering murder, you ask yourself whether you would want everyone to be able ot murder you, willy-nilly. Far from regressing, the answer to that grounds out in one of those kneejerk obvioulsy-not-valuable-to-Dave intuitions you have been appealing to throughout this discussion.,
increase aggregate utility”
Does your murdering someone increase aggregate utility?
, I should choose 90 degrees.
How does that affect other people? Choices that effect only yourself are aesthetics, not ethics.
Actually, on further thought… by “moral claims have subject-independent truth values” do you mean “there exists at least one moral claim with a subject-independent truth value”? Or “All moral claims have subject-independent truth values”?
I’m less confident regarding the falsehood of the former than the latter
I am not sure what that means. Is the “we” individual-by-individual or collective?
And where did you get the idea that Objective metaethics means giving up on values?
How does that differ from “jail is bad-for-me”?
If I thought that he truth-values of moral claims refers only to what I value, I wouldn’t be making much of a pitch for objectivism, would I?
Whatever that means?
What explains the difference?
But that isn’t the function of moral beliefs: their function is to guide action. You have admitted that your behaviour is guided by jail-avoidance.
You seem to be interested in the meta-level question of objective aesthetics. Why is that?
I think that’s a separate discussion, and I don’t think spinning it off will be productive. Feel free to replace “we” with “I” if that’s clearer. If it’s still not clear what I mean, I’m content to let it drop there.
I’m not sure what “giving up on values” means.
Beats me. Perhaps it doesn’t.
No, you wouldn’t.
Yes.
Whether concerning myself with the truth-values of the propositions expressed by opinions reliably provides observable and differential benefits.
I agree that beliefs guide action (this is not just true of moral beliefs).
If the sole function of moral beliefs is to guide action without reference to expected observable benefits, I don’t see why I should prefer “true” moral beliefs (whatever that means) to “false” ones (whatever that means).
Yes. Which sure sounds like a benefit to me.
I don’t seem that way to myself, actually. I bring it up as another example of an area where some people assert there are objective truths and falsehoods, but where I see no reason to posit any such thing...positing the existence of individual aesthetic values seems quite adequate to explain my observations.
I think it is a key issue. This is about ethical objectivism. If Good is a fact about what we value collectively, in your view, then your theory is along the lines of utilitariansim, which is near enough to objectivism AFAIC. Yet you seem to disagree with me about something.
If you concern yourself with the truth values of your own beliefs about what you believe to be good and bad, and revise your beliefs accordingly and act on them, you will end up doing the right thing.
What’s more beneficial than doing the right thing?
If the things you think are beneficial are in fact not beneficial, then you are not getting benefits; you just mistakenly think you are.
To actually get benefits, you have to know what is actually beneficial.
Morality is all about what is truly beneficial. Those truths aren’t observable: neither are the truths of mathematics.
Are you a passive observer who never acts?
It is not clear to me what we disagree about, precisely, if anything.
I don’t know. It is not clear to me what the referent of “the right thing” is when you say it, or indeed if it even has a referent, so it’s hard to be sure one way or another. (Yes, I do understand that you meant that as a rhetorical question whose correct answer was “Nothing.”)
Yes, that’s true.
No, that’s false. But my expectation of actually getting benefits increases sharply if I know what is actually beneficial.
I disagree.
Supposing this is true, I don’t see why it’s relevant.
No.
Is ethical objectivism true, IYO?
Doing thins such that it is an objective fact that they are beneficial, and not just a possibly false belief.
Explain how you observe the truth-value of a claim about what is beneficial.
it is relevant you attitude that only the observable maters in epistemology.
Then explaining your observations is not the only game in town.
If you point me at a definition of ethical objectivism you consider adequate, I’ll try to answer that question.
So, you’re asking what’s more beneficial than doing things such that it’s an objective fact that they are beneficial?
Presumably doing other things such that it’s an objective fact that they are more beneficial is more beneficial than merely doing things such that it’s an objective fact that they are beneficial.
When I experience X having consequences I value in situations where I didn’t expect it to, I increase my confidence in the claim that X is beneficial. When I experience X failing to have such consequences in situations where I did expect it to, I decrease my confidence in the claim.
How do unobservable mathematical truths matter in epistemology?
That’s true.
“moral claims have subject-independent truth values”.
And doing things that aren’t really beneficial at all isn’t really beneficial at all.
Explain how you justified the truth of the claim “what Dave values is beneficial”
Epistemology is about truth.
So you no longer reject metaethics on the basis that it doesn’t explain your observations?
No.
Yes, that’s true.
Increasing it has consequences I value.
No, epistemology is about knowledge. For example, unknowable truths are not within the province of epistemology.
If you point me to where in this discussion I rejected metaethics on the basis that it doesn’t explain my observations, I will tell you if I still stand by that rejection. As it stands I don’t know how to answer this question.
So you have beliefs that you have done beneficial things, but you don’t know if you have, because you don’t know what is beneficial, because you have never tried to find out, because you have assumed there is no answer to the question?
That boils down to “what Dave values, Dave values”.
“Epistemic Logic: A Survey of the Logic of Knowledge” by Nicholas Rescher has a chapter on unknowable truth.
But that is not the point. The point was unobservable truth. You seem to have decided, in line with your previous comments, that what is unobservable is unknowable. But logical and mathematical truths are well-known examples of unobservable (non empirical truths).
That doesn’t seem to follow from what we’ve said thus far.
Absolutely. Which, IIRC, is what I said in the first place that inspired this whole conversation, so it certainly ought not surprise you that I’m saying it now.
(shrug) All right. Let’s assume for the sake of comity that you’re right, that we can come to know moral truths about our existence through a process divorced from observation, just like, on your account, we come to know logical and mathematical truths about our existence through a process divorced from observation.
So what are the correct grounds for deciding what is in the set of knowable unobserved objective moral truths?
For example, consider the claim “angles between 85 and 95 degrees, other than 90 degrees, are bad.”
There are no observations (actual or anticipated) that would lead me to that conclusion, so I’m inclined to reject the claim on those grounds. But for the sake of comity I will set that standard aside, as you suggest. So… is that claim a knowable unobserved objective moral truth? A knowable unobserved objective moral falsehood? A moral claim whose unobserved objective truth-value is unknowable? A moral claim without an unobserved objective truth-value? Not a moral claim at all? Something else?
How do you approach that question so as to avoid mistaking one of those other things for knowable unobserved objective moral truths?
Have you
a) seen outcomes which are beneficial, and which you know to be beneficial?
or
b) seen outcomes which you believe to be beneficial?
AFAIC, this conversation is about your claim that ethical objectivism is false. That claim cannot be justified by a tautology like ” “what Dave values, Dave values”.
It’s being a special case of an overaching principle such as “”Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law.”, or “increase aggregate utility”.
How does it even relate to action?
How does it even relate to action?
I started all of this by saying:
As far as I can tell, no such ground has been demonstrated throughout our whole discussion.
So I continue to endorse not behaving as though objective moral facts exist.
But as far as you’re concerned, what we’re discussing instead is whether I’m justified in claiming that ethical objectivism is false. (shrug) OK. I retract that claim. If that ends this discussion, I’m OK with that.
I have seen outcomes that I’m confident are beneficial. I don’t think the relationship of such confidence to knowledge or belief is a question you and I can profitably discuss.
This just triggers regress. That is, OK, I’m evaluating moral claim X, for which I have no observed evidence, to see whether it’s a knowable unobserved objective moral truth. To determine this, I first evaluate whether I can will that X should become a universal law. OK, fine… what are the correct grounds for deciding whether I can will that X be a universal law?
But you additionally suggest that “increase aggregate utility” is the determiner here… which suggests that if X increases the aggregate utility of everything everywhere, I can will that X should become a universal law, and therefore can know that X is an objective moral truth.
Yes? Have I understood your view correctly?
Well, if angles between 85 and 95 degrees, other than 90 degrees, are bad, then it seems to follow that given a choice of angle between 85 and 95 degrees, I should choose 90 degrees. That sure sounds like a relationship to an action to me. So, to repeat my question, is “angles between 85 and 95 degrees, other than 90 degrees, are bad” a knowable unobserved objective moral truth, or not?
By the standard you describe above, I should ask whether choosing 90 degrees rather than other angles between 85 and 95 degrees increases aggregate utility. If it does, then “angles between 85 and 95 degrees, other than 90 degrees, are bad” is an objective moral truth, otherwise it isn’t. Yes?
So, OK. How do I determine that?
Confidence isn;t knowledge. So: b). You have only seen outcomes which you believe to be beneficial.
Why not?
If considering murder, you ask yourself whether you would want everyone to be able ot murder you, willy-nilly. Far from regressing, the answer to that grounds out in one of those kneejerk obvioulsy-not-valuable-to-Dave intuitions you have been appealing to throughout this discussion.,
Does your murdering someone increase aggregate utility?
How does that affect other people? Choices that effect only yourself are aesthetics, not ethics.
Tapping out here.
I’ll address your example after you address mine.
Actually, on further thought… by “moral claims have subject-independent truth values” do you mean “there exists at least one moral claim with a subject-independent truth value”? Or “All moral claims have subject-independent truth values”?
I’m less confident regarding the falsehood of the former than the latter
The former.
Fair enough. So, which moral claims have subject-independent truth values, on your account?
Mot of them. But there may be some claims that are self-reflexive, eg “to be the best person I can be, I should get a PhD”.