Is ethical objectivism (“moral claims have subject-independent truth values”) true, IYO?
No.
And doing things that aren’t really beneficial at all isn’t really beneficial at all.
Yes, that’s true.
Explain how you justified the truth of the claim “what Dave values is beneficial”
Increasing it has consequences I value.
Epistemology is about truth.
No, epistemology is about knowledge. For example, unknowable truths are not within the province of epistemology.
So you no longer reject metaethics on the basis that it doesn’t explain your observations?
If you point me to where in this discussion I rejected metaethics on the basis that it doesn’t explain my observations, I will tell you if I still stand by that rejection. As it stands I don’t know how to answer this question.
And doing things that aren’t really beneficial at all isn’t really beneficial at all.
Yes, that’s true.
So you have beliefs that you have done beneficial things, but you don’t know if you have, because you don’t know what is beneficial, because you have never tried to find out, because you have assumed there is no answer to the question?
Explain how you justified the truth of the claim “what Dave values is beneficial”
Increasing it has consequences I value.
That boils down to “what Dave values, Dave values”.
Epistemology is about truth.
No, epistemology is about knowledge. For example, unknowable truths are not within the province of epistemology
“Epistemic Logic: A Survey of the Logic of Knowledge” by Nicholas Rescher has a chapter on unknowable truth.
But that is not the point. The point was unobservable truth. You seem to have decided, in line with your previous comments, that what is unobservable is unknowable. But logical and mathematical truths are well-known examples of unobservable (non empirical truths).
So you have beliefs that you have done beneficial things, but you don’t know if you have, because you don’t know what is beneficial, because you have never tried to find out, because you have assumed there is no answer to the question?
That doesn’t seem to follow from what we’ve said thus far.
That boils down to “what Dave values, Dave values”.
Absolutely. Which, IIRC, is what I said in the first place that inspired this whole conversation, so it certainly ought not surprise you that I’m saying it now.
The point was unobservable truth. You seem to have decided, in line with your previous comments, that what is unobservable is unknowable. But logical and mathematical truths are well-known examples of unobservable (non empirical truths).
(shrug) All right. Let’s assume for the sake of comity that you’re right, that we can come to know moral truths about our existence through a process divorced from observation, just like, on your account, we come to know logical and mathematical truths about our existence through a process divorced from observation.
So what are the correct grounds for deciding what is in the set of knowable unobserved objective moral truths?
For example, consider the claim “angles between 85 and 95 degrees, other than 90 degrees, are bad.”
There are no observations (actual or anticipated) that would lead me to that conclusion, so I’m inclined to reject the claim on those grounds. But for the sake of comity I will set that standard aside, as you suggest. So… is that claim a knowable unobserved objective moral truth? A knowable unobserved objective moral falsehood? A moral claim whose unobserved objective truth-value is unknowable? A moral claim without an unobserved objective truth-value? Not a moral claim at all? Something else?
How do you approach that question so as to avoid mistaking one of those other things for knowable unobserved objective moral truths?
So you have beliefs that you have done beneficial things, but you don’t know if you have, because you don’t know what is beneficial, because you have never tried to find out, because you have assumed there is no answer to the question?
That doesn’t seem to follow from what we’ve said thus far.
Have you a) seen outcomes which are beneficial, and which you know to be beneficial? or b) seen outcomes which you believe to be beneficial?
That boils down to “what Dave values, Dave values”.
Absolutely. Which, IIRC, is what I said in the first place that inspired this whole conversation, so it certainly ought not surprise you that I’m saying it now.
AFAIC, this conversation is about your claim that ethical objectivism is false. That claim cannot be justified by a
tautology like ” “what Dave values, Dave values”.
The point was unobservable truth. You seem to have decided, in line with your previous comments, that what is unobservable is unknowable. But logical and mathematical truths are well-known examples of unobservable (non empirical truths).
(shrug) All right. Let’s assume for the sake of comity that you’re right, that we can come to know moral truths about our existence through a process divorced from observation, just like, on your account, we come to know logical and mathematical truths about our existence through a process divorced from observation.
So what are the correct grounds for deciding what is in the set of knowable unobserved objective moral truths?
It’s being a special case of an overaching principle such as “”Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law.”, or “increase aggregate utility”.
For example, consider the claim “angles between 85 and 95 degrees, other than 90 degrees, are bad.”
There are no observations (actual or anticipated) that would lead me to that conclusion, so I’m inclined to reject the claim on those grounds. But for the sake of comity I will set that standard aside, as you suggest. So… is that claim a knowable unobserved objective moral truth?
AFAIC, this conversation is about your claim that ethical objectivism is false.
I started all of this by saying:
I ought not behave as though objective, scientific facts exist until I have some grounds for doing so, and that “some people think their intuitions reflect objective, scientific facts” doesn’t qualify as a ground for doing so. At this point, one could ask “well, OK, what qualifies as a ground for behaving as though objective, scientific facts exist?” and the conversation can progress in a vaguely sensible direction. I would similarly ask (popping your metaphorical stack) “what qualifies as a ground for behaving as though objective moral facts exist?” and refrain from behaving as though they do until some such ground is demonstrated.
As far as I can tell, no such ground has been demonstrated throughout our whole discussion. So I continue to endorse not behaving as though objective moral facts exist.
But as far as you’re concerned, what we’re discussing instead is whether I’m justified in claiming that ethical objectivism is false. (shrug) OK. I retract that claim. If that ends this discussion, I’m OK with that.
Have you a) seen outcomes which are beneficial, and which you know to be beneficial? or b) seen outcomes which you believe to be beneficial?
I have seen outcomes that I’m confident are beneficial. I don’t think the relationship of such confidence to knowledge or belief is a question you and I can profitably discuss.
So what are the correct grounds for deciding what is in the set of knowable unobserved objective moral truths? It’s being a special case of an overaching principle such as “”Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law.”, or “increase aggregate utility”.
This just triggers regress. That is, OK, I’m evaluating moral claim X, for which I have no observed evidence, to see whether it’s a knowable unobserved objective moral truth. To determine this, I first evaluate whether I can will that X should become a universal law. OK, fine… what are the correct grounds for deciding whether I can will that X be a universal law?
But you additionally suggest that “increase aggregate utility” is the determiner here… which suggests that if X increases the aggregate utility of everything everywhere, I can will that X should become a universal law, and therefore can know that X is an objective moral truth.
Yes? Have I understood your view correctly?
How does it even relate to action?
Well, if angles between 85 and 95 degrees, other than 90 degrees, are bad, then it seems to follow that given a choice of angle between 85 and 95 degrees, I should choose 90 degrees. That sure sounds like a relationship to an action to me. So, to repeat my question, is “angles between 85 and 95 degrees, other than 90 degrees, are bad” a knowable unobserved objective moral truth, or not?
By the standard you describe above, I should ask whether choosing 90 degrees rather than other angles between 85 and 95 degrees increases aggregate utility. If it does, then “angles between 85 and 95 degrees, other than 90 degrees, are bad” is an objective moral truth, otherwise it isn’t. Yes?
I have seen outcomes that I’m confident are beneficial.
Confidence isn;t knowledge. So: b). You have only seen outcomes which you believe to be beneficial.
I don’t think the relationship of such confidence to knowledge or belief is a question you and I can profitably discuss.
Why not?
OK, fine… what are the correct grounds for deciding whether I can will that X be a universal law?
If considering murder, you ask yourself whether you would want everyone to be able ot murder you, willy-nilly. Far from regressing, the answer to that grounds out in one of those kneejerk obvioulsy-not-valuable-to-Dave intuitions you have been appealing to throughout this discussion.,
increase aggregate utility”
Does your murdering someone increase aggregate utility?
, I should choose 90 degrees.
How does that affect other people? Choices that effect only yourself are aesthetics, not ethics.
Actually, on further thought… by “moral claims have subject-independent truth values” do you mean “there exists at least one moral claim with a subject-independent truth value”? Or “All moral claims have subject-independent truth values”?
I’m less confident regarding the falsehood of the former than the latter
No.
Yes, that’s true.
Increasing it has consequences I value.
No, epistemology is about knowledge. For example, unknowable truths are not within the province of epistemology.
If you point me to where in this discussion I rejected metaethics on the basis that it doesn’t explain my observations, I will tell you if I still stand by that rejection. As it stands I don’t know how to answer this question.
So you have beliefs that you have done beneficial things, but you don’t know if you have, because you don’t know what is beneficial, because you have never tried to find out, because you have assumed there is no answer to the question?
That boils down to “what Dave values, Dave values”.
“Epistemic Logic: A Survey of the Logic of Knowledge” by Nicholas Rescher has a chapter on unknowable truth.
But that is not the point. The point was unobservable truth. You seem to have decided, in line with your previous comments, that what is unobservable is unknowable. But logical and mathematical truths are well-known examples of unobservable (non empirical truths).
That doesn’t seem to follow from what we’ve said thus far.
Absolutely. Which, IIRC, is what I said in the first place that inspired this whole conversation, so it certainly ought not surprise you that I’m saying it now.
(shrug) All right. Let’s assume for the sake of comity that you’re right, that we can come to know moral truths about our existence through a process divorced from observation, just like, on your account, we come to know logical and mathematical truths about our existence through a process divorced from observation.
So what are the correct grounds for deciding what is in the set of knowable unobserved objective moral truths?
For example, consider the claim “angles between 85 and 95 degrees, other than 90 degrees, are bad.”
There are no observations (actual or anticipated) that would lead me to that conclusion, so I’m inclined to reject the claim on those grounds. But for the sake of comity I will set that standard aside, as you suggest. So… is that claim a knowable unobserved objective moral truth? A knowable unobserved objective moral falsehood? A moral claim whose unobserved objective truth-value is unknowable? A moral claim without an unobserved objective truth-value? Not a moral claim at all? Something else?
How do you approach that question so as to avoid mistaking one of those other things for knowable unobserved objective moral truths?
Have you
a) seen outcomes which are beneficial, and which you know to be beneficial?
or
b) seen outcomes which you believe to be beneficial?
AFAIC, this conversation is about your claim that ethical objectivism is false. That claim cannot be justified by a tautology like ” “what Dave values, Dave values”.
It’s being a special case of an overaching principle such as “”Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law.”, or “increase aggregate utility”.
How does it even relate to action?
How does it even relate to action?
I started all of this by saying:
As far as I can tell, no such ground has been demonstrated throughout our whole discussion.
So I continue to endorse not behaving as though objective moral facts exist.
But as far as you’re concerned, what we’re discussing instead is whether I’m justified in claiming that ethical objectivism is false. (shrug) OK. I retract that claim. If that ends this discussion, I’m OK with that.
I have seen outcomes that I’m confident are beneficial. I don’t think the relationship of such confidence to knowledge or belief is a question you and I can profitably discuss.
This just triggers regress. That is, OK, I’m evaluating moral claim X, for which I have no observed evidence, to see whether it’s a knowable unobserved objective moral truth. To determine this, I first evaluate whether I can will that X should become a universal law. OK, fine… what are the correct grounds for deciding whether I can will that X be a universal law?
But you additionally suggest that “increase aggregate utility” is the determiner here… which suggests that if X increases the aggregate utility of everything everywhere, I can will that X should become a universal law, and therefore can know that X is an objective moral truth.
Yes? Have I understood your view correctly?
Well, if angles between 85 and 95 degrees, other than 90 degrees, are bad, then it seems to follow that given a choice of angle between 85 and 95 degrees, I should choose 90 degrees. That sure sounds like a relationship to an action to me. So, to repeat my question, is “angles between 85 and 95 degrees, other than 90 degrees, are bad” a knowable unobserved objective moral truth, or not?
By the standard you describe above, I should ask whether choosing 90 degrees rather than other angles between 85 and 95 degrees increases aggregate utility. If it does, then “angles between 85 and 95 degrees, other than 90 degrees, are bad” is an objective moral truth, otherwise it isn’t. Yes?
So, OK. How do I determine that?
Confidence isn;t knowledge. So: b). You have only seen outcomes which you believe to be beneficial.
Why not?
If considering murder, you ask yourself whether you would want everyone to be able ot murder you, willy-nilly. Far from regressing, the answer to that grounds out in one of those kneejerk obvioulsy-not-valuable-to-Dave intuitions you have been appealing to throughout this discussion.,
Does your murdering someone increase aggregate utility?
How does that affect other people? Choices that effect only yourself are aesthetics, not ethics.
Tapping out here.
I’ll address your example after you address mine.
Actually, on further thought… by “moral claims have subject-independent truth values” do you mean “there exists at least one moral claim with a subject-independent truth value”? Or “All moral claims have subject-independent truth values”?
I’m less confident regarding the falsehood of the former than the latter
The former.
Fair enough. So, which moral claims have subject-independent truth values, on your account?
Mot of them. But there may be some claims that are self-reflexive, eg “to be the best person I can be, I should get a PhD”.