Traditional usage defines those terms to exclude the possibility of being both. The standard definition of a moral realist is someone who believes that moral judgments express mind-independent facts; while the standard definition of a moral subjectivist is someone who believes moral judgments express mind-dependent facts.
So I don’t know quite what you mean.
a non psycho human moral universalist.
You mean someone who doesn’t believe that there are moral universals among humans? One too many adjectives for me.
And I don’t think you get a compelling answer from some smuggled self recursion, but from your best estimate of what people actually are.
If I understand this right: you’re contrasting trying to come up with some self-justifying method for resolving disagreement (recursively finding consensus on how to find consensus) with… descriptive moral psychology? I’m not sure I follow.
The standard definition of a moral realist is someone who believes that moral judgments express mind-independent facts; while the standard definition of a moral subjectivist is someone who believes moral judgments express mind-dependent facts.
My point being that the categories themselves are not used consistently, so that I can be called either one or the other depending on usage.
Definitions tend to be theory bound themselves, so that mind dependent and mind independent are not clear cut. If I think that eating cows is fine, but I wouldn’t if I knew more and thought longer, which represents my mind—both, neither, the first, the second?
For example, if you go to the article in La Wik on Ethical Subjectvism, they talk about “opinions” and not minds. In this case, my opinion would be that eating cows is fine, but it would not be my extrapolated values.
Some would call my position realism, and some would call it subjectivism. Me, I don’t care what you call it. I recognize that my position could be called either within the bounds of normal usage.
non psycho human moral universalist.
Someone who believes that what is moral is universal across humans who are not psychos.
Traditional usage defines those terms to exclude the possibility of being both. The standard definition of a moral realist is someone who believes that moral judgments express mind-independent facts; while the standard definition of a moral subjectivist is someone who believes moral judgments express mind-dependent facts.
So I don’t know quite what you mean.
You mean someone who doesn’t believe that there are moral universals among humans? One too many adjectives for me.
If I understand this right: you’re contrasting trying to come up with some self-justifying method for resolving disagreement (recursively finding consensus on how to find consensus) with… descriptive moral psychology? I’m not sure I follow.
My point being that the categories themselves are not used consistently, so that I can be called either one or the other depending on usage.
Definitions tend to be theory bound themselves, so that mind dependent and mind independent are not clear cut. If I think that eating cows is fine, but I wouldn’t if I knew more and thought longer, which represents my mind—both, neither, the first, the second?
For example, if you go to the article in La Wik on Ethical Subjectvism, they talk about “opinions” and not minds. In this case, my opinion would be that eating cows is fine, but it would not be my extrapolated values.
Some would call my position realism, and some would call it subjectivism. Me, I don’t care what you call it. I recognize that my position could be called either within the bounds of normal usage.
Someone who believes that what is moral is universal across humans who are not psychos.
I think you’re getting the point there.