It is rational for a being-who-has-no-preference-for-survival, but it’s not obvious that any human however unusual or deformed can actually have this sort of preference.
Lots of people demonstrate a revealed preference for non-survival by committing suicide and a variety of other self-destructive acts; others willingly choose non-survival as the means towards an altruistic (or some other sort of) goal. Or do you mean that it is not obvious that humans could lack the preference for survival even under the most favorable state of affairs?
Revealed preference as opposed to actual preference, what they would prefer if they were much smarter, knew much more, had unlimited time to think about it. We typically don’t know our actual preference, and don’t act on it.
If the actual preference is neither acted upon, nor believed in, how is it a preference?
It is something you won’t regret giving as a goal to an obsessive world-rewriting robot that takes what you say its goals are really seriously and very literally, without any way for you to make corrections later. Most revealed preferences, you will regret, exactly for the reasons they differ from the actual preferences: on reflection, you’ll find that you’d rather go with something different.
That definition may be problematic in respect to life-and-death decisions such as cryonics: Once I am dead, I am not around to regret any decision. So any choice that leads to my death could not be considered bad.
For instance, I will never regret not having signed up for cryonics. I may however regret doing it if I get awakened in the future and my quality of life is too low. On the other hand, I am thinking about it out of sheer curiosity for the future. Thus, signing up would simply help me increasing my current utility by having a hope of more future utility. I am just noticing, this makes the decision accessible to your definition of preference again, by posing the question to myself: “If I signed up for cryonics today, would I regret the [cost of the] decision tomorrow?”
This, however, is not the usual meaning of the term “preference.” In the standard usage, this word refers to one’s favored option in a given set of available alternatives, not to the hypothetical most favorable physically possible state of the world (which, as you correctly note, is unlikely to be readily imaginable). If you insist on using the term with this meaning, fair enough; it’s just that your claims sound confusing when you don’t include an explanation about your non-standard usage.
That said, one problem I see with your concept of preference is that, presumably, the actions of the “obsessive world-rewriting robot” are supposed to modify the world around you to make it consistent with your preferences, not to modify your mind to make your preferences consistent with the world. However, it is not at all clear to me whether a meaningful boundary between these two sorts of actions can be drawn.
That said, one problem I see with your concept of preference is that, presumably, the actions of the “obsessive world-rewriting robot” are supposed to modify the world around you to make it consistent with your preferences, not to modify your mind to make your preferences consistent with the world. However, it is not at all clear to me whether a meaningful boundary between these two sorts of actions can be drawn.
Preference in this sense is a rigid designator, defined over the world but not determined by anything in the world, so modifying my mind couldn’t make my preference consistent with the world; a robot implementing my preference would have to understand this.
As with most (all?) questions of whether an emotion is rational, it depends on what you value and what situation you’re facing. If you can save a hundred lives by risking yours, and there’s no less risky way nor (hypothetically) any way for you to save more people by other means while continuing to live, and you want to save lives, and if fear of death would stop you from going through with it, then it’s irrational to fear death in that case. But in general, when you’re not in a situation like that, you should feel as strongly as necessary whatever emotion best motivates you to keep living and avoid things that would stop you from living (assuming you like living). Whether that’s fear of death or love of life or whatever else, feel it.
If you’re talking about “fear of death” as in constant paranoia over things that might kill you, then that’s probably irrational for most people’s purposes. Or if you’re not too attached to being alive, then it’s not too irrational to not fear death, though that’s an unfortunate state of affairs. But for most people, generally speaking, I don’t see anything irrational about normal levels of fear of death.
(Keeping in mind the distinction between believing that you are not too attached to being alive and actually not having a strong preference for being alive, and the possibility of the belief being incorrect.)
Since I can see literally nothing to fear in death—in nonexistence itself—I don’t really understand why cryonics is seen by so many here as such an essentially “rational” choice. Isn’t a calm acceptance of death’s inevitability preferable to grasping at a probably empty hope of renewed life simply to mollify one’s instinct for survival?
I live and value my life, but since post-death I won’t be around to feel one way or another about it, I really don’t see why I should not seek to accept death rather than counter it. In its promise of “eternal” life, cryonics has the whiff of religion to me.
It’s certainly best to accept that death is inevitable if you know for a fact that death is inevitable. Which emotion should accompany that acceptance (calm, depression, etc.) depends on particular facts about death—and perhaps some subjective evaluation.
However, the premise seems very much open to question. Death is not “inevitable”, it strikes me as something very much evitable, that is which “can be avoided”. People used to die when their teeth went bad: dental care has provided ways to avoid that kind of death. People used to die when they suffered infarctus, the consequences of which were by and large unavoidable. Fibrillators are a way to avoid that. And so on.
Historically, every person who ever lived has died before reaching two hundred years of age; but that provides no rational grounds for assuming a zero probability that a person can enjoy a lifespan vastly exceeding that number.
Is it “inevitable” that my life shall be confined to a historical lifespan? Not (by definition) if there is a way to avoid it. Is there a way to avoid it? Given certain reasonable assumptions as to what consciousness and personal identity consist of, there could well be. I am not primarily the cells in my body, I am still me if these cells die and get replaced by functional equivalents. I suspect that I am not even primarily my brain, i.e. that I would still be me if the abstract computation that my brain implements were reproduced on some other substrate.
This insight—“I am a substrate independent computation”—builds on relatively recent scientific discoveries, so it’s not surprising it is at odds with historical culture. But it certainly seems to undermine the old saw “death comes to all”.
Is it rational to feel hopeful once one has assigned substantial probability to this insight being correct? Yes.
The corollary of this insight is that death, by which I mean information theoretical death (which historically has always followed physical death) holds no particular horrors. It is nothing more and nothing less than the termination of the abstract computation I identify with “being me”. I am much more afraid of pain that I am of death, and I view my own death now with something approaching equanimity.
So it seems to me that you’re setting up a false opposition here. One can live in calm acceptance of what death entails yet fervently (and rationally) hope for much longer and better life.
Good arguments and I largely agree. However postponable does not equal evitable. At some point any clear minded self (regardless of the substratum) is probably going to have to come to accept that it is either going to end or be transformed to the point where definition of the word “self” is getting pretty moot.
I guess my point remains that post-death nonexistence contains absolute zero horrors in any case. In a weirdly aesthetic sense, the only possible perfect state is non-existence. To paraphrase Sophocles, perhaps the best thing is never to have been born at all.
Now given a healthy love of life and a bit of optimism it feels best to soldier on, but to hope really to defeat death is a delusional escape from the mature acceptance of death. None of those people who now survive their bad teeth or infarctus have had their lives “saved” (an idiotic metaphor) merely prolonged. Now if that’s what you want fine—but it strikes me as irrational as a way to deal with death itself.
to hope really to defeat death is a delusional escape from the mature acceptance of death
Let’s rephrase this with the troublesome terms unpacked as per the points you “largely agree” with: “to hope for a life measured in millenia is a delusional escape from the mature acceptance of a hundred-year lifespan”.
In a nutshell: no! Hoping to see a hundred was not, in retrospect, a delusional escape from the mature acceptance of dying at fourty-something which was the lot of prehistoric humans. We don’t know yet what changes in technology are going to make the next “normal” lifespan, but we know more about it than our ancestors did.
it strikes me as irrational as a way to deal with death itself
I can believe that it strikes you as weird, and I understand why it could be so. A claim that some argument is irrational is a stronger and less subjective claim. You need to substantiate it.
Your newly introduced arguments are: a) if you don’t die you will be transformed beyond any current sense of identity, and b) “the only possible perfect state is non-existence”. The latter I won’t even claim to understand—given that you choose to continue this discussion rather than go jump off a tall building I can only assume your life isn’t a quest for a “perfect state” in that sense.
As to the former, I don’t really believe it. I’m reasonably certain I could live for millenia and still choose, for reasons that belong only to me, to hold on to some memories from (say) the year 2000 or so. Those memories are mine, no one else on this planet has them, and I have no reason to suppose that someone else would choose to falsely believe the memories are theirs.
I view identity as being, to a rough approximation, memories and plans. Someone who has (some of) my memories and shares (some of) my current plans, including plans for a long and fun-filled life, is someone I’d identify as “me” in a straightforward sense, roughly the same sense that I expect I’ll be the same person in a year’s time, or the same sense that makes it reasonable for me to consider plans for my retirement.
Perhaps my discomfort with all this is in cryogenic’s seeming affinity with the sort of fear mongering about death that’s been the bread and butter of religion for millennia. It just takes it as a fundamental law of the universe that life is better than non life—not just in practice, not just in terms of our very real, human, animal desire to survive (which I share) - but in some sort of essential, objective, rational, blindingly obvious way. A way that smacks of dogma to my ears.
If you really want to live for millennia, go ahead. Who knows I might decide to join you. But in practice I think cryonics for many people is more a matter of escaping death, of putting our terrified, self-centered, hubristic fear of mortality at the disposal of another dubious enterprise.
As for my own view of “identity”: I see it as a kind of metapattern, a largely fictional story we tell ourselves about the patterns of our experience as actors, minds and bodies. I can’t quite bring myself to take it so seiously that I’m willing to invest in all kinds of extraordinary measures aimed at its survival.
If I found myself desperately wanting to live for millennia, I’d probably just think “for chrissakes get over yourself”.
Please, please, please don’t let the distaste of a certain epistemic disposition interfere with a decision that has a very clear potential for vast sums of positive or negative utility. Argument should screen off that kind of perceived signaling. Maybe it’s true that there is a legion of evil Randian cryonauts that only care about sucking every last bit out of their mortal lives because the Christian background they’ve almost but not quite forgotten raised them with an almost pitiable but mostly contemptible fear of death. Folks like you are much more enlightened and have read up on your Hofstadter and Buddhism and Epicureanism; you’re offended that these death-fearing creatures that are so like you didn’t put in the extra effort to go farther along the path of becoming wiser. But that shouldn’t matter: if you kinda sorta like living (even if death would be okay too), and you can see how cryonics isn’t magical and that it has at least a small chance of letting you live for a long time (long enough to decide if you want to keep living, at least!), then you don’t have to refrain from duly considering those facts out of a desire to signal distaste for the seemingly bad epistemic or moral status of those who are also interested in cryonics and the way their preachings sound like the dogma of a forgotten faith. Not when your life probabilistically hangs in the balance.
(By the way, I’m not a cryonaut and don’t intend to become one; I think there are strong arguments against cryonics, but I think the ones you’ve given are not good.)
I’m not so sure that if it’s possible to choose to keep specific memories, then it will be impossible to record and replay memories from one person to another. It might be a challenge to do so from one organic brain to another, it seems unlikely to be problematic between uploads of different people unless you get Robin Hanson’s uneditable spaghetti code upolads.
There still might be some difference in experiencing the memory because different people would notice different things in it.
Perhaps “replay” memories has the wrong connotations—the image it evokes for me is that of a partly transparent overlay over my own memories, like a movie overlaid on top of another. That is too exact.
What I mean by keeping such memories is more like being able, if people ask me to tell them stories about what it was like back in 2010, to answer somewhat the same as I would now—updating to conform to the times and the audience.
This is an active process, not a passive one. Next year I’ll say things like “last year when we were discussing memory on LW”. In ten years I might say “back in 2010 there was this site called LessWrong, and I remember arguing this and that way about memory, but of course I’ve learned a few things since so I’d now say this other”. In a thousand years perhaps I’d say “back in those times our conversations took place in plain text over Web browsers, and as we only approximately understood the mind, I had these strange ideas about ‘memory’ - to use a then-current word”.
Keeping a memory is a lot like passing on a story you like. It changes in the retelling, though it remains recognizable.
I live and value my life, but since post-death I won’t be around to feel one way or another about it, I really don’t see why I should not seek to accept death rather than counter it.
Apply this argument to drug addiction: “I value not being an addict, but since post-addiction I will want to continue experiencing drugs, and I-who-doesn’t-want-to-be-an-addict won’t be around, I really don’t see why I should stay away from becoming an addict”. See the problem? Your preferences are about the whole world, with all of its past, present and future, including the time when you are dead. These preferences determine your current decisions; the preferences of future-you or of someone else are not what makes you make decisions at present.
I suppose I’d see your point if I believed that drug addiction was inevitable and knew that everyone in the history of everything had eventually become a drug addict. In short, I’m not sure the analogy is valid. Death is a special case, especially since “the time when you are dead” is from one’s point of view not a “time” at all. It’s something of an oxymoron. After death there IS no time—past present or future.
I suppose I’d see your point if I believed that drug addiction was inevitable and knew that everyone in the history of everything had eventually become a drug addict.
Whether something is inevitable is not an argument about its moral value. Have you read the reversal test reference?
After death there IS no time—past present or future.
1) Who said anything about morality? I’m asking for a defence of the essential rationality of cryogenics.
2) Please read the whole paragraph and try to understand subjective point of view—or lack thereof post-death. (Which strikes me as the essential point of reference when talking about fear of death)
1) Who said anything about morality? I’m asking for a defense of the essential rationality of cryogenics.
See What Do We Mean By “Rationality”?. When you ask about a decision, its rationality is defined by how well it allows to achieve your goals, and “moral value” refers to the way your goals evaluate specific options, with the options of higher “moral value” being the same as options preferred according to your goals.
2) Please read the whole paragraph and try to understand subjective point of view—or lack thereof post-death.
Consider the subjective point of view of yourself-now, on the situation of yourself dying, or someone else dying for that matter, not the point of view of yourself-in-the-future or subjective point of view of someone-else. It’s you-now that needs to make the decision, and rationality of whose decisions we discuss.
Clearly, I’m going to need to level up about this. I really would like to understand it in a satisfactory way; not just play a rhetorical game. That said the phrase “the situation of yourself dying” strikes me as an emotional ploy. The relevant (non)”situation” is complete subjective and objective non-existence, post death. The difficulty and pain etc of “dying” is not at issue here.
I will read your suggestions and see if I can reconcile all this. Thanks.
That said the phrase “the situation of yourself dying” strikes me as an emotional ploy.
This wasn’t my intention. You can substitute that phrase with, say, “Consider the subjective point of view of yourself-now, on the situation of yourself being dead for a long time, or someone else being dead for a long time for that matter.” The salient part was supposed to be the point of view, not what you look at from it.
Fair enough but I still think think that the “situation of yourself being dead” is still ploy-like in that it imagines non-existence as a state or situation rather than an absence of state or situation. Like mistaking a map for an entirely imaginary territory.
You can think about a world that doesn’t contain any minds, and yours in particular. The property of a world to not contain your mind does not say “nothing exists in this world”, it says “your mind doesn’t exist in this world”. Quite different concepts.
Of course I can think about such a world. Where people get into trouble is where they think of themselves as “being dead” in such a world rather than simply “not being” i.e. having no more existence than anything else that doesn’t exist. It’s a distinction that has huge implications and rarely finds its way into the discussion. No matter how rational people try to be, they often seem to argue about death as if it were a state of being—and something to be afraid of.
Clearly some of my underlying assumptions are flawed. There’s no doubt I could be more rigorous in my use of the terminology. Still, I can’t help but feel that some of the concepts in the sequences obfuscate as much as they clarify on this issue.
Sorry if I have wasted your time. Thanks again for trying.
Is it so irrational to not fear death?
Surely you aren’t implying that a desire to prolong one’s lifespan can only be motivated by fear.
No, that could be perfectly rational, but many who claim not to fear death tend to look before crossing the road, take medicine when sick and so on.
It is rational for a being-who-has-no-preference-for-survival, but it’s not obvious that any human however unusual or deformed can actually have this sort of preference.
Lots of people demonstrate a revealed preference for non-survival by committing suicide and a variety of other self-destructive acts; others willingly choose non-survival as the means towards an altruistic (or some other sort of) goal. Or do you mean that it is not obvious that humans could lack the preference for survival even under the most favorable state of affairs?
Revealed preference as opposed to actual preference, what they would prefer if they were much smarter, knew much more, had unlimited time to think about it. We typically don’t know our actual preference, and don’t act on it.
If the actual preference is neither acted upon, nor believed in, how is it a preference?
It is something you won’t regret giving as a goal to an obsessive world-rewriting robot that takes what you say its goals are really seriously and very literally, without any way for you to make corrections later. Most revealed preferences, you will regret, exactly for the reasons they differ from the actual preferences: on reflection, you’ll find that you’d rather go with something different.
See also this thread.
That definition may be problematic in respect to life-and-death decisions such as cryonics: Once I am dead, I am not around to regret any decision. So any choice that leads to my death could not be considered bad.
For instance, I will never regret not having signed up for cryonics. I may however regret doing it if I get awakened in the future and my quality of life is too low. On the other hand, I am thinking about it out of sheer curiosity for the future. Thus, signing up would simply help me increasing my current utility by having a hope of more future utility. I am just noticing, this makes the decision accessible to your definition of preference again, by posing the question to myself: “If I signed up for cryonics today, would I regret the [cost of the] decision tomorrow?”
This, however, is not the usual meaning of the term “preference.” In the standard usage, this word refers to one’s favored option in a given set of available alternatives, not to the hypothetical most favorable physically possible state of the world (which, as you correctly note, is unlikely to be readily imaginable). If you insist on using the term with this meaning, fair enough; it’s just that your claims sound confusing when you don’t include an explanation about your non-standard usage.
That said, one problem I see with your concept of preference is that, presumably, the actions of the “obsessive world-rewriting robot” are supposed to modify the world around you to make it consistent with your preferences, not to modify your mind to make your preferences consistent with the world. However, it is not at all clear to me whether a meaningful boundary between these two sorts of actions can be drawn.
Preference in this sense is a rigid designator, defined over the world but not determined by anything in the world, so modifying my mind couldn’t make my preference consistent with the world; a robot implementing my preference would have to understand this.
As with most (all?) questions of whether an emotion is rational, it depends on what you value and what situation you’re facing. If you can save a hundred lives by risking yours, and there’s no less risky way nor (hypothetically) any way for you to save more people by other means while continuing to live, and you want to save lives, and if fear of death would stop you from going through with it, then it’s irrational to fear death in that case. But in general, when you’re not in a situation like that, you should feel as strongly as necessary whatever emotion best motivates you to keep living and avoid things that would stop you from living (assuming you like living). Whether that’s fear of death or love of life or whatever else, feel it.
If you’re talking about “fear of death” as in constant paranoia over things that might kill you, then that’s probably irrational for most people’s purposes. Or if you’re not too attached to being alive, then it’s not too irrational to not fear death, though that’s an unfortunate state of affairs. But for most people, generally speaking, I don’t see anything irrational about normal levels of fear of death.
(Keeping in mind the distinction between believing that you are not too attached to being alive and actually not having a strong preference for being alive, and the possibility of the belief being incorrect.)
Yes, it seems to be irrational, even if you talk about fear in particular and not preferring-to-avoid in general. (See also: Emotion, Reversal test.)
Since I can see literally nothing to fear in death—in nonexistence itself—I don’t really understand why cryonics is seen by so many here as such an essentially “rational” choice. Isn’t a calm acceptance of death’s inevitability preferable to grasping at a probably empty hope of renewed life simply to mollify one’s instinct for survival? I live and value my life, but since post-death I won’t be around to feel one way or another about it, I really don’t see why I should not seek to accept death rather than counter it. In its promise of “eternal” life, cryonics has the whiff of religion to me.
It’s certainly best to accept that death is inevitable if you know for a fact that death is inevitable. Which emotion should accompany that acceptance (calm, depression, etc.) depends on particular facts about death—and perhaps some subjective evaluation.
However, the premise seems very much open to question. Death is not “inevitable”, it strikes me as something very much evitable, that is which “can be avoided”. People used to die when their teeth went bad: dental care has provided ways to avoid that kind of death. People used to die when they suffered infarctus, the consequences of which were by and large unavoidable. Fibrillators are a way to avoid that. And so on.
Historically, every person who ever lived has died before reaching two hundred years of age; but that provides no rational grounds for assuming a zero probability that a person can enjoy a lifespan vastly exceeding that number.
Is it “inevitable” that my life shall be confined to a historical lifespan? Not (by definition) if there is a way to avoid it. Is there a way to avoid it? Given certain reasonable assumptions as to what consciousness and personal identity consist of, there could well be. I am not primarily the cells in my body, I am still me if these cells die and get replaced by functional equivalents. I suspect that I am not even primarily my brain, i.e. that I would still be me if the abstract computation that my brain implements were reproduced on some other substrate.
This insight—“I am a substrate independent computation”—builds on relatively recent scientific discoveries, so it’s not surprising it is at odds with historical culture. But it certainly seems to undermine the old saw “death comes to all”.
Is it rational to feel hopeful once one has assigned substantial probability to this insight being correct? Yes.
The corollary of this insight is that death, by which I mean information theoretical death (which historically has always followed physical death) holds no particular horrors. It is nothing more and nothing less than the termination of the abstract computation I identify with “being me”. I am much more afraid of pain that I am of death, and I view my own death now with something approaching equanimity.
So it seems to me that you’re setting up a false opposition here. One can live in calm acceptance of what death entails yet fervently (and rationally) hope for much longer and better life.
Good arguments and I largely agree. However postponable does not equal evitable. At some point any clear minded self (regardless of the substratum) is probably going to have to come to accept that it is either going to end or be transformed to the point where definition of the word “self” is getting pretty moot. I guess my point remains that post-death nonexistence contains absolute zero horrors in any case. In a weirdly aesthetic sense, the only possible perfect state is non-existence. To paraphrase Sophocles, perhaps the best thing is never to have been born at all. Now given a healthy love of life and a bit of optimism it feels best to soldier on, but to hope really to defeat death is a delusional escape from the mature acceptance of death. None of those people who now survive their bad teeth or infarctus have had their lives “saved” (an idiotic metaphor) merely prolonged. Now if that’s what you want fine—but it strikes me as irrational as a way to deal with death itself.
Let’s rephrase this with the troublesome terms unpacked as per the points you “largely agree” with: “to hope for a life measured in millenia is a delusional escape from the mature acceptance of a hundred-year lifespan”.
In a nutshell: no! Hoping to see a hundred was not, in retrospect, a delusional escape from the mature acceptance of dying at fourty-something which was the lot of prehistoric humans. We don’t know yet what changes in technology are going to make the next “normal” lifespan, but we know more about it than our ancestors did.
I can believe that it strikes you as weird, and I understand why it could be so. A claim that some argument is irrational is a stronger and less subjective claim. You need to substantiate it.
Your newly introduced arguments are: a) if you don’t die you will be transformed beyond any current sense of identity, and b) “the only possible perfect state is non-existence”. The latter I won’t even claim to understand—given that you choose to continue this discussion rather than go jump off a tall building I can only assume your life isn’t a quest for a “perfect state” in that sense.
As to the former, I don’t really believe it. I’m reasonably certain I could live for millenia and still choose, for reasons that belong only to me, to hold on to some memories from (say) the year 2000 or so. Those memories are mine, no one else on this planet has them, and I have no reason to suppose that someone else would choose to falsely believe the memories are theirs.
I view identity as being, to a rough approximation, memories and plans. Someone who has (some of) my memories and shares (some of) my current plans, including plans for a long and fun-filled life, is someone I’d identify as “me” in a straightforward sense, roughly the same sense that I expect I’ll be the same person in a year’s time, or the same sense that makes it reasonable for me to consider plans for my retirement.
Perhaps my discomfort with all this is in cryogenic’s seeming affinity with the sort of fear mongering about death that’s been the bread and butter of religion for millennia. It just takes it as a fundamental law of the universe that life is better than non life—not just in practice, not just in terms of our very real, human, animal desire to survive (which I share) - but in some sort of essential, objective, rational, blindingly obvious way. A way that smacks of dogma to my ears.
If you really want to live for millennia, go ahead. Who knows I might decide to join you. But in practice I think cryonics for many people is more a matter of escaping death, of putting our terrified, self-centered, hubristic fear of mortality at the disposal of another dubious enterprise.
As for my own view of “identity”: I see it as a kind of metapattern, a largely fictional story we tell ourselves about the patterns of our experience as actors, minds and bodies. I can’t quite bring myself to take it so seiously that I’m willing to invest in all kinds of extraordinary measures aimed at its survival. If I found myself desperately wanting to live for millennia, I’d probably just think “for chrissakes get over yourself”.
Please, please, please don’t let the distaste of a certain epistemic disposition interfere with a decision that has a very clear potential for vast sums of positive or negative utility. Argument should screen off that kind of perceived signaling. Maybe it’s true that there is a legion of evil Randian cryonauts that only care about sucking every last bit out of their mortal lives because the Christian background they’ve almost but not quite forgotten raised them with an almost pitiable but mostly contemptible fear of death. Folks like you are much more enlightened and have read up on your Hofstadter and Buddhism and Epicureanism; you’re offended that these death-fearing creatures that are so like you didn’t put in the extra effort to go farther along the path of becoming wiser. But that shouldn’t matter: if you kinda sorta like living (even if death would be okay too), and you can see how cryonics isn’t magical and that it has at least a small chance of letting you live for a long time (long enough to decide if you want to keep living, at least!), then you don’t have to refrain from duly considering those facts out of a desire to signal distaste for the seemingly bad epistemic or moral status of those who are also interested in cryonics and the way their preachings sound like the dogma of a forgotten faith. Not when your life probabilistically hangs in the balance.
(By the way, I’m not a cryonaut and don’t intend to become one; I think there are strong arguments against cryonics, but I think the ones you’ve given are not good.)
I’m not so sure that if it’s possible to choose to keep specific memories, then it will be impossible to record and replay memories from one person to another. It might be a challenge to do so from one organic brain to another, it seems unlikely to be problematic between uploads of different people unless you get Robin Hanson’s uneditable spaghetti code upolads.
There still might be some difference in experiencing the memory because different people would notice different things in it.
Perhaps “replay” memories has the wrong connotations—the image it evokes for me is that of a partly transparent overlay over my own memories, like a movie overlaid on top of another. That is too exact.
What I mean by keeping such memories is more like being able, if people ask me to tell them stories about what it was like back in 2010, to answer somewhat the same as I would now—updating to conform to the times and the audience.
This is an active process, not a passive one. Next year I’ll say things like “last year when we were discussing memory on LW”. In ten years I might say “back in 2010 there was this site called LessWrong, and I remember arguing this and that way about memory, but of course I’ve learned a few things since so I’d now say this other”. In a thousand years perhaps I’d say “back in those times our conversations took place in plain text over Web browsers, and as we only approximately understood the mind, I had these strange ideas about ‘memory’ - to use a then-current word”.
Keeping a memory is a lot like passing on a story you like. It changes in the retelling, though it remains recognizable.
Apply this argument to drug addiction: “I value not being an addict, but since post-addiction I will want to continue experiencing drugs, and I-who-doesn’t-want-to-be-an-addict won’t be around, I really don’t see why I should stay away from becoming an addict”. See the problem? Your preferences are about the whole world, with all of its past, present and future, including the time when you are dead. These preferences determine your current decisions; the preferences of future-you or of someone else are not what makes you make decisions at present.
I suppose I’d see your point if I believed that drug addiction was inevitable and knew that everyone in the history of everything had eventually become a drug addict. In short, I’m not sure the analogy is valid. Death is a special case, especially since “the time when you are dead” is from one’s point of view not a “time” at all. It’s something of an oxymoron. After death there IS no time—past present or future.
Whether something is inevitable is not an argument about its moral value. Have you read the reversal test reference?
Please believe in physics.
1) Who said anything about morality? I’m asking for a defence of the essential rationality of cryogenics. 2) Please read the whole paragraph and try to understand subjective point of view—or lack thereof post-death. (Which strikes me as the essential point of reference when talking about fear of death)
See What Do We Mean By “Rationality”?. When you ask about a decision, its rationality is defined by how well it allows to achieve your goals, and “moral value” refers to the way your goals evaluate specific options, with the options of higher “moral value” being the same as options preferred according to your goals.
Consider the subjective point of view of yourself-now, on the situation of yourself dying, or someone else dying for that matter, not the point of view of yourself-in-the-future or subjective point of view of someone-else. It’s you-now that needs to make the decision, and rationality of whose decisions we discuss.
Clearly, I’m going to need to level up about this. I really would like to understand it in a satisfactory way; not just play a rhetorical game. That said the phrase “the situation of yourself dying” strikes me as an emotional ploy. The relevant (non)”situation” is complete subjective and objective non-existence, post death. The difficulty and pain etc of “dying” is not at issue here. I will read your suggestions and see if I can reconcile all this. Thanks.
This wasn’t my intention. You can substitute that phrase with, say, “Consider the subjective point of view of yourself-now, on the situation of yourself being dead for a long time, or someone else being dead for a long time for that matter.” The salient part was supposed to be the point of view, not what you look at from it.
Fair enough but I still think think that the “situation of yourself being dead” is still ploy-like in that it imagines non-existence as a state or situation rather than an absence of state or situation. Like mistaking a map for an entirely imaginary territory.
You can think about a world that doesn’t contain any minds, and yours in particular. The property of a world to not contain your mind does not say “nothing exists in this world”, it says “your mind doesn’t exist in this world”. Quite different concepts.
Of course I can think about such a world. Where people get into trouble is where they think of themselves as “being dead” in such a world rather than simply “not being” i.e. having no more existence than anything else that doesn’t exist. It’s a distinction that has huge implications and rarely finds its way into the discussion. No matter how rational people try to be, they often seem to argue about death as if it were a state of being—and something to be afraid of.
I give up for now, and suggest reading the sequences, maybe in particular the guide to words and map-territory.
Clearly some of my underlying assumptions are flawed. There’s no doubt I could be more rigorous in my use of the terminology. Still, I can’t help but feel that some of the concepts in the sequences obfuscate as much as they clarify on this issue. Sorry if I have wasted your time. Thanks again for trying.
Re: “Is it so irrational to not fear death?”
Fear of death should be “managable”:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terror_management_theory#Criticism