I do not understand the point of the essay http://yudkowsky.net/rational/the-simple-truth/ . The preface says that it “is meant to restore a naive view of truth”, but all I see is strawmanning everything Eliezer dislikes. What is that “naive view of truth”?
Some things are true, some things are false, like
“My name is ‘Ben’.”—True
“My name is Alfred’.”—False
When it comes to factual questions, you should believe in their truth the more you have evidence for them. If well-researched statistics indicate that one country has a higher homicide rate than another, then you should believe it (unless you have other, really good evidence to the contrary). If well-formulated studies come back in, and a certain brand of alternative medicine has been discovered to be ‘ineffectual’, then you should believe it (unless you have other, really good evidence to the contrary). One should not start arguing about “well, what is truth really?” or “how can we ever know anything really?”. If one actually thought like this, I think it was Feynman who noted that these people would soon die of starvation, because they’d never really know if that yellow thing was a banana, and that they could eat it. These arguments are simply ways of dismissing really good evidence, and you should not use them.
The purpose of the essay, is so that when you’re in an argument, you provide evidence, and the person goes “but all truth is relative” or “nothing is true, it’s all just oppression of the many by the powerful” you can send it them and say “stop evading the actual evidence!”.
The purpose of the essay, is so that when you’re in an argument, you provide evidence, and the person goes “but all truth is relative” or “nothing is true, it’s all just oppression of the many by the powerful” you can send them …
… to jump off a cliff. I can certainly get behind this approach. But I doubt that this is the main point of this convoluted if entertaining essay.
Often I have seen – especially on Internet mailing lists – that amidst other conversation, someone says “X is true”, and then an argument breaks out over the use of the word ‘true’. This essay is not meant as an encyclopedic reference for that argument. Rather, I hope the arguers will read this essay, and then go back to whatever they were discussing before someone questioned the nature of truth.
I see. Preventing tangential arguments about the nature of truth is the intended point of the essay, just poorly expressed, as far as I can tell. Thanks.
Correspondence appears not to involve anything supernatural, but no one knows how to reduce it,which keeps it an open philosophical question.
The correspondence between the bucket of pebbles and the sheep seems clear enough to me, and not in need of further explanation. If instead of using pebbles I count “one, two, three...” as the sheep leave the pen, and the same when they return, it is equally clear to me how that works. What is the open question?
Theories need to work for the difficult cases as well as the easy ones. The pebbles are an easy case because there is an intrinsic twoness to two pebbles and two sheep.
ETA
A harder case is when non iconic symbols are used. You can’t tell that “sheep”corresponds to sheep by examining the shape of the letters. But there are right and wrong ways to use “sheep”. It is tempting to say that a sentence is true then it corresponds, and corresponds when it is correct, and is correct when all the words in it are used correctly. But that is circular, because truth has been explained in terms of correctness.
Normativity is in general difficult to cash out reductionalistically, because to find norms you have to look outward to contexts, not inwards to implementation details.
Also, there is the problem of finding chunks of reality for thoughts and words to correspond to. Different languages slice and dice reality differently, so if reality really does contain pre-existing chunks corresponding to all known languages, it must be very complex, and suspiciously conveniently arranged for us humans. OTOH, if it doesn’t , the naive picture of sentences and thoughts corresponding to pre existing chunks has to be abandoned. But if the slicing and dicing is done by language and thought, what is reality supplying as a truth maker?
And then there the problem of what true statements about abstractions (morality, maths, etc) are corresponding to...
Not that I have a better theory than correspondence...
Theories need to work for the difficult cases as well as the easy ones.
Show me some, and I will see what I have to say about them.
The pebbles are an easy case because there is an intrinsic twoness to two pebbles and two sheep.
What is “intrinsic twoness”? How does this make the pebbles an easy case? I don’t need to know any numbers, to be able to match up pebbles and sheep, and to do it in my head, I only need a long enough, reproducible sequence of mental entities. A bard could just as easily use lines of epic poetry.
This is broadening the issue from the truth of sentences to the meaning of words. On which, see this sequence.
There is no magic about how “sheep” refers to sheep. Sheep are a clearly identifiable class of things in the world, they matter to us, and we make a name for them.
Different languages slice and dice reality differently, so if reality really does contain pre-existing chunks corresponding to all known languages, it must be very complex, and suspiciously conveniently arranged for us humans.
The world does not provide chunks for our concepts; our concepts arise from seeing chunks. Different people, different cultures even, can see and name different chunks. That our words generally fit the world is no odder than the exact fit of a puddle of water to the depression it sits in. I see no mystery here. The world is complex. It provides vast numbers of joints we might divide it at and give names to. There is even a recreation of inventing names for things no-one has yet found it useful to name.
What is a reductive theory if truth going to reduce sentences to, if not words?
Since when were meaning and truth unrelated?
I have already said that correspondence is unmagical. My point is that the naive theory, and we don’t have a reductive theory that can deal with the hard cases. You haven’t presented one.
If you are going to say that chunking arises from perception, you have already taken a step away from the fully naive theory.
How potential chunks get turned into actual chunks needs explaining.
As said in another comment, if preventing tangential arguments about the nature of truth is the intended point of the essay, I can certainly get behind the intent, if not the execution.
all I see is strawmanning everything Eliezer dislikes
It would probably help to have a link to specific people/books who have inspired specific sections, to see how much they were strawmanned.
I remember talking with a few people who refused to be reasonable about anything, defending it with more and more meta nonsense, typically up to “how do you even know there is such thing as a reality or truth?” Using LW lingo, you can evaluate maps by compating then with the terrority, but what if someone’s map contains a large text “there is no such thing as territory”? Even if you show them that your map fits the territory better, they will point out that matching the territory counts as an improvement only according to your map, not according to their map, so you didn’t really demonstrate anything beyond your maps being different, which both of you already knew.
Reading the article reminded me of some of their techniques. Yeah, that didn’t really mean disproving them. But I was nice to know I wasn’t the only one who finds these discussion techniques irritating.
It would probably help to have a link to specific people/books who have inspired specific sections, to see how much they were strawmanned.
Yes, it would, but I am no expert in the area, hence my question here.
what if someone’s map contains a large text “there is no such thing as territory”?
Well, mine does, but I am quite happy to get by with a sequence of ever-more predictive (you would call them accurate) maps. One can certainly avoid relying on the map/territory metaphysics and still behave at least as rationally as someone who does. However, I agree that
“how do you even know there is such thing as a reality or truth?”
is generally a copout in reply to an argument someone is willing but unable to counter and thus holds no value when used for this purpose only. Presumably Mark in the story is one of those, though grotesquely strawmanned:
“But what’s the actual answer?”
“Now, I’d like to move on to the issue of how logic kills cute baby seals—”
“Now, I’d like to move on to the issue of how logic kills cute baby seals—”
The real-life equivalents are more like: “You know who else disagreed with religion? Stalin did!” or “You know who else said there are differences between people? Hitler did!” This is supposed to somehow prove religion and disprove evolution.
I really wanted to help, because you’re helping me with the free will thing, but I could only manage to skim the essay. I take it that the naive view of truth is supposed to be the disquotational or deflationary view. This is to say that the assertion
‘Snow is white’ is true.
is identical content-wise to the assertion
Snow is white.
To say that something is true is just to assert that thing, and asserting it is sufficient to say that it’s true. In other words, we can for most purposes just do without the word ‘true’ (though things are more complicated for ‘false’).
we can for most purposes just do without the word ‘true’
One useful distinction is between asserting a proposition and explaining its meaning. The meaning of “snow is white” can be discussed apart from the question of whether it’s true, so saying that it’s true serves to indicate that we are discussing its truth and not (just) its meaning.
I do not understand the point of the essay http://yudkowsky.net/rational/the-simple-truth/ . The preface says that it “is meant to restore a naive view of truth”, but all I see is strawmanning everything Eliezer dislikes. What is that “naive view of truth”?
The naive view of truth:
Some things are true, some things are false, like “My name is ‘Ben’.”—True “My name is Alfred’.”—False
When it comes to factual questions, you should believe in their truth the more you have evidence for them. If well-researched statistics indicate that one country has a higher homicide rate than another, then you should believe it (unless you have other, really good evidence to the contrary). If well-formulated studies come back in, and a certain brand of alternative medicine has been discovered to be ‘ineffectual’, then you should believe it (unless you have other, really good evidence to the contrary). One should not start arguing about “well, what is truth really?” or “how can we ever know anything really?”. If one actually thought like this, I think it was Feynman who noted that these people would soon die of starvation, because they’d never really know if that yellow thing was a banana, and that they could eat it. These arguments are simply ways of dismissing really good evidence, and you should not use them.
The purpose of the essay, is so that when you’re in an argument, you provide evidence, and the person goes “but all truth is relative” or “nothing is true, it’s all just oppression of the many by the powerful” you can send it them and say “stop evading the actual evidence!”.
… to jump off a cliff. I can certainly get behind this approach. But I doubt that this is the main point of this convoluted if entertaining essay.
-The Simple Truth
I see. Preventing tangential arguments about the nature of truth is the intended point of the essay, just poorly expressed, as far as I can tell. Thanks.
“Snow is white” is true if and only if snow is white.
A map works by being in correspondence with the territory.
There is nothing magical about the correspondence. It is completely reducible to physics.
Do you not understand what Eliezer is saying, or are you just disagreeing with it?
Correspondence appears not to involve anything supernatural, but no one knows how to reduce it,which keeps it an open philosophical question.
The correspondence between the bucket of pebbles and the sheep seems clear enough to me, and not in need of further explanation. If instead of using pebbles I count “one, two, three...” as the sheep leave the pen, and the same when they return, it is equally clear to me how that works. What is the open question?
Theories need to work for the difficult cases as well as the easy ones. The pebbles are an easy case because there is an intrinsic twoness to two pebbles and two sheep.
ETA
A harder case is when non iconic symbols are used. You can’t tell that “sheep”corresponds to sheep by examining the shape of the letters. But there are right and wrong ways to use “sheep”. It is tempting to say that a sentence is true then it corresponds, and corresponds when it is correct, and is correct when all the words in it are used correctly. But that is circular, because truth has been explained in terms of correctness.
Normativity is in general difficult to cash out reductionalistically, because to find norms you have to look outward to contexts, not inwards to implementation details.
Also, there is the problem of finding chunks of reality for thoughts and words to correspond to. Different languages slice and dice reality differently, so if reality really does contain pre-existing chunks corresponding to all known languages, it must be very complex, and suspiciously conveniently arranged for us humans. OTOH, if it doesn’t , the naive picture of sentences and thoughts corresponding to pre existing chunks has to be abandoned. But if the slicing and dicing is done by language and thought, what is reality supplying as a truth maker?
And then there the problem of what true statements about abstractions (morality, maths, etc) are corresponding to...
Not that I have a better theory than correspondence...
Show me some, and I will see what I have to say about them.
What is “intrinsic twoness”? How does this make the pebbles an easy case? I don’t need to know any numbers, to be able to match up pebbles and sheep, and to do it in my head, I only need a long enough, reproducible sequence of mental entities. A bard could just as easily use lines of epic poetry.
See edit above
This is broadening the issue from the truth of sentences to the meaning of words. On which, see this sequence.
There is no magic about how “sheep” refers to sheep. Sheep are a clearly identifiable class of things in the world, they matter to us, and we make a name for them.
The world does not provide chunks for our concepts; our concepts arise from seeing chunks. Different people, different cultures even, can see and name different chunks. That our words generally fit the world is no odder than the exact fit of a puddle of water to the depression it sits in. I see no mystery here. The world is complex. It provides vast numbers of joints we might divide it at and give names to. There is even a recreation of inventing names for things no-one has yet found it useful to name.
What is a reductive theory if truth going to reduce sentences to, if not words? Since when were meaning and truth unrelated?
I have already said that correspondence is unmagical. My point is that the naive theory, and we don’t have a reductive theory that can deal with the hard cases. You haven’t presented one.
If you are going to say that chunking arises from perception, you have already taken a step away from the fully naive theory.
How potential chunks get turned into actual chunks needs explaining.
As said in another comment, if preventing tangential arguments about the nature of truth is the intended point of the essay, I can certainly get behind the intent, if not the execution.
It would probably help to have a link to specific people/books who have inspired specific sections, to see how much they were strawmanned.
I remember talking with a few people who refused to be reasonable about anything, defending it with more and more meta nonsense, typically up to “how do you even know there is such thing as a reality or truth?” Using LW lingo, you can evaluate maps by compating then with the terrority, but what if someone’s map contains a large text “there is no such thing as territory”? Even if you show them that your map fits the territory better, they will point out that matching the territory counts as an improvement only according to your map, not according to their map, so you didn’t really demonstrate anything beyond your maps being different, which both of you already knew.
Reading the article reminded me of some of their techniques. Yeah, that didn’t really mean disproving them. But I was nice to know I wasn’t the only one who finds these discussion techniques irritating.
Yes, it would, but I am no expert in the area, hence my question here.
Well, mine does, but I am quite happy to get by with a sequence of ever-more predictive (you would call them accurate) maps. One can certainly avoid relying on the map/territory metaphysics and still behave at least as rationally as someone who does. However, I agree that
is generally a copout in reply to an argument someone is willing but unable to counter and thus holds no value when used for this purpose only. Presumably Mark in the story is one of those, though grotesquely strawmanned:
The real-life equivalents are more like: “You know who else disagreed with religion? Stalin did!” or “You know who else said there are differences between people? Hitler did!” This is supposed to somehow prove religion and disprove evolution.
The naive version (with added parenthesis) :
(‘Snow is white’ is true) if and only if (snow is white)
I really wanted to help, because you’re helping me with the free will thing, but I could only manage to skim the essay. I take it that the naive view of truth is supposed to be the disquotational or deflationary view. This is to say that the assertion
is identical content-wise to the assertion
To say that something is true is just to assert that thing, and asserting it is sufficient to say that it’s true. In other words, we can for most purposes just do without the word ‘true’ (though things are more complicated for ‘false’).
One useful distinction is between asserting a proposition and explaining its meaning. The meaning of “snow is white” can be discussed apart from the question of whether it’s true, so saying that it’s true serves to indicate that we are discussing its truth and not (just) its meaning.
As far as I can tell, Eliezer is arguing for the correspondence theory of truth.
The naive view is that “‘true’ is true.”
Trying to parse… There is some universal, objective and intuitive concept that is labeled as “true”?