Theories need to work for the difficult cases as well as the easy ones. The pebbles are an easy case because there is an intrinsic twoness to two pebbles and two sheep.
ETA
A harder case is when non iconic symbols are used. You can’t tell that “sheep”corresponds to sheep by examining the shape of the letters. But there are right and wrong ways to use “sheep”. It is tempting to say that a sentence is true then it corresponds, and corresponds when it is correct, and is correct when all the words in it are used correctly. But that is circular, because truth has been explained in terms of correctness.
Normativity is in general difficult to cash out reductionalistically, because to find norms you have to look outward to contexts, not inwards to implementation details.
Also, there is the problem of finding chunks of reality for thoughts and words to correspond to. Different languages slice and dice reality differently, so if reality really does contain pre-existing chunks corresponding to all known languages, it must be very complex, and suspiciously conveniently arranged for us humans. OTOH, if it doesn’t , the naive picture of sentences and thoughts corresponding to pre existing chunks has to be abandoned. But if the slicing and dicing is done by language and thought, what is reality supplying as a truth maker?
And then there the problem of what true statements about abstractions (morality, maths, etc) are corresponding to...
Not that I have a better theory than correspondence...
Theories need to work for the difficult cases as well as the easy ones.
Show me some, and I will see what I have to say about them.
The pebbles are an easy case because there is an intrinsic twoness to two pebbles and two sheep.
What is “intrinsic twoness”? How does this make the pebbles an easy case? I don’t need to know any numbers, to be able to match up pebbles and sheep, and to do it in my head, I only need a long enough, reproducible sequence of mental entities. A bard could just as easily use lines of epic poetry.
This is broadening the issue from the truth of sentences to the meaning of words. On which, see this sequence.
There is no magic about how “sheep” refers to sheep. Sheep are a clearly identifiable class of things in the world, they matter to us, and we make a name for them.
Different languages slice and dice reality differently, so if reality really does contain pre-existing chunks corresponding to all known languages, it must be very complex, and suspiciously conveniently arranged for us humans.
The world does not provide chunks for our concepts; our concepts arise from seeing chunks. Different people, different cultures even, can see and name different chunks. That our words generally fit the world is no odder than the exact fit of a puddle of water to the depression it sits in. I see no mystery here. The world is complex. It provides vast numbers of joints we might divide it at and give names to. There is even a recreation of inventing names for things no-one has yet found it useful to name.
What is a reductive theory if truth going to reduce sentences to, if not words?
Since when were meaning and truth unrelated?
I have already said that correspondence is unmagical. My point is that the naive theory, and we don’t have a reductive theory that can deal with the hard cases. You haven’t presented one.
If you are going to say that chunking arises from perception, you have already taken a step away from the fully naive theory.
How potential chunks get turned into actual chunks needs explaining.
Theories need to work for the difficult cases as well as the easy ones. The pebbles are an easy case because there is an intrinsic twoness to two pebbles and two sheep.
ETA
A harder case is when non iconic symbols are used. You can’t tell that “sheep”corresponds to sheep by examining the shape of the letters. But there are right and wrong ways to use “sheep”. It is tempting to say that a sentence is true then it corresponds, and corresponds when it is correct, and is correct when all the words in it are used correctly. But that is circular, because truth has been explained in terms of correctness.
Normativity is in general difficult to cash out reductionalistically, because to find norms you have to look outward to contexts, not inwards to implementation details.
Also, there is the problem of finding chunks of reality for thoughts and words to correspond to. Different languages slice and dice reality differently, so if reality really does contain pre-existing chunks corresponding to all known languages, it must be very complex, and suspiciously conveniently arranged for us humans. OTOH, if it doesn’t , the naive picture of sentences and thoughts corresponding to pre existing chunks has to be abandoned. But if the slicing and dicing is done by language and thought, what is reality supplying as a truth maker?
And then there the problem of what true statements about abstractions (morality, maths, etc) are corresponding to...
Not that I have a better theory than correspondence...
Show me some, and I will see what I have to say about them.
What is “intrinsic twoness”? How does this make the pebbles an easy case? I don’t need to know any numbers, to be able to match up pebbles and sheep, and to do it in my head, I only need a long enough, reproducible sequence of mental entities. A bard could just as easily use lines of epic poetry.
See edit above
This is broadening the issue from the truth of sentences to the meaning of words. On which, see this sequence.
There is no magic about how “sheep” refers to sheep. Sheep are a clearly identifiable class of things in the world, they matter to us, and we make a name for them.
The world does not provide chunks for our concepts; our concepts arise from seeing chunks. Different people, different cultures even, can see and name different chunks. That our words generally fit the world is no odder than the exact fit of a puddle of water to the depression it sits in. I see no mystery here. The world is complex. It provides vast numbers of joints we might divide it at and give names to. There is even a recreation of inventing names for things no-one has yet found it useful to name.
What is a reductive theory if truth going to reduce sentences to, if not words? Since when were meaning and truth unrelated?
I have already said that correspondence is unmagical. My point is that the naive theory, and we don’t have a reductive theory that can deal with the hard cases. You haven’t presented one.
If you are going to say that chunking arises from perception, you have already taken a step away from the fully naive theory.
How potential chunks get turned into actual chunks needs explaining.