This is broadening the issue from the truth of sentences to the meaning of words. On which, see this sequence.
There is no magic about how “sheep” refers to sheep. Sheep are a clearly identifiable class of things in the world, they matter to us, and we make a name for them.
Different languages slice and dice reality differently, so if reality really does contain pre-existing chunks corresponding to all known languages, it must be very complex, and suspiciously conveniently arranged for us humans.
The world does not provide chunks for our concepts; our concepts arise from seeing chunks. Different people, different cultures even, can see and name different chunks. That our words generally fit the world is no odder than the exact fit of a puddle of water to the depression it sits in. I see no mystery here. The world is complex. It provides vast numbers of joints we might divide it at and give names to. There is even a recreation of inventing names for things no-one has yet found it useful to name.
What is a reductive theory if truth going to reduce sentences to, if not words?
Since when were meaning and truth unrelated?
I have already said that correspondence is unmagical. My point is that the naive theory, and we don’t have a reductive theory that can deal with the hard cases. You haven’t presented one.
If you are going to say that chunking arises from perception, you have already taken a step away from the fully naive theory.
How potential chunks get turned into actual chunks needs explaining.
This is broadening the issue from the truth of sentences to the meaning of words. On which, see this sequence.
There is no magic about how “sheep” refers to sheep. Sheep are a clearly identifiable class of things in the world, they matter to us, and we make a name for them.
The world does not provide chunks for our concepts; our concepts arise from seeing chunks. Different people, different cultures even, can see and name different chunks. That our words generally fit the world is no odder than the exact fit of a puddle of water to the depression it sits in. I see no mystery here. The world is complex. It provides vast numbers of joints we might divide it at and give names to. There is even a recreation of inventing names for things no-one has yet found it useful to name.
What is a reductive theory if truth going to reduce sentences to, if not words? Since when were meaning and truth unrelated?
I have already said that correspondence is unmagical. My point is that the naive theory, and we don’t have a reductive theory that can deal with the hard cases. You haven’t presented one.
If you are going to say that chunking arises from perception, you have already taken a step away from the fully naive theory.
How potential chunks get turned into actual chunks needs explaining.