If there are any Christians in the audience who know Bayes’s Theorem (no numerophobes, please) might I inquire of you what situation would convince you of the truth of Islam?
Why does this need to go out to Christians? I suspect that most, if not all, people reading this are non-Muslims who know Bayes’s Theorem. What would convince you of the truth of Islam?
If some fundamental constant, or the ratio between two fundamental constants, encoded in its binary digits the Qu’ran, that would cause me to believe with greater than 50% certainty in the truth of Islam.
It’s believed by some (but not proven) that you can find any sequence of digits you’d like in Pi.
And even though everybody knows that 2Pi is the much more sensible constant, that transformation helpfully changes the sequence of binary digits not at all.
It’s believed by some (but not proven) that you can find any sequence of digits you’d like in Pi.
But you generally need a number that has about as many bits as the sequence itself just to pinpoint which digit to start reading from.
If that number is represented by some other constant, that counts. If we just have to figure it out ourselves, in the same way that we’d be able to figure out which digit to start if we wanted to find “The Hobbit” encoded in the digits of pi, it doesn’t count.
In just commonsense ways, e.g. it must not be encoded in a way so arbitrary that you would be able to derive any other similar-length piece of literature by similar methodologies.
Why? It would certainly be an astounding thing (subject to the obvious caveats about the complexity of the encoding scheme), but why would it imply that the encoded material was true?
If I find the text of Moby Dick suitably encoded (whatever that means) into the foundation of a building, and I don’t find other texts encoded into that building, it seems reasonable to take seriously the theory that there exists some process or entity which has a special relationship both with that building, and with the text of Moby Dick, different from the relationship it has with any other text.
If I find the text of the Koran suitably encoded into the fundamental constants of the universe, it seems equally reasonable to take seriously the theory that there exists some process or entity which has a special relationship both with that universe, and with the text of the Koran, different from the relationship it has with any other text.
You’re right, of course, that it doesn’t follow from that that either the Koran or Moby Dick is true. Neither does it follow from the truth of the Koran (whatever that means) that Islam is true (whatever that means).
OTOH, converting to a belief in Islam on the basis of that evidence seems more justified than remaining indifferent to Islam in the face of that evidence.
Of course, those aren’t the only options.
Granted, it’s not really clear to me what is a reasonable response to that evidence. “Investigate the Koran,” of course, but I have no sense of what such an investigation might even look like.
I don’t think it’s a question that deserves an answer, if you’re truly asking whether finding the Qu’ran embedded into the physical/mathematical structure of the universe should be considered evidence supporting the truth of Islam.
It would quite obviously not be evidence AGAINST Islam, nor would it be evidence UNCORRELATED to the reality of Islam. As such it can only be evidence in support of Islam.
If you’re just arguing that it shouldn’t make me raise my confidence level to over 50%, to what percentage do you think one should raise it to, given such a finding?
Downvoted for lack of clarity. What exactly are you saying here? Are you truly saying that if the Qu’ran is firmly embedded in the physics of the world, that’s uncorrelated to Islam having validity? Stop being coy with your responses please, then perhaps I”ll also be able to answer whatever-your-ACTUAL-question-is better.
Are you truly saying that if the Qu’ran is firmly embedded in the physics of the world, that’s uncorrelated to Islam having validity?
I see no reason to presume anything about this correlation. P(the Qu’ran is embedded in pi or similar) is so low as to render the probability of anything conditional on the hypothesis incalculable. That is what I mean by the reference to blue tentacle scenarios.
I repeat, why would discovering a large and complex yet parochial assertion, such as the Qu’ran, embedded eternally in the world without human agency, lead you to believe it? You have done no more than assert this as “obvious”.
Okay, simple logic here: There’s a number of given possibilities. A) The Qu’ran is a completely human construction, much like any other work of literature. B) The Qu’ran is a false message by some non-human (but still located within our universe) entity to humanity (e.g. teenage alien pranksters, fairies, Satan, whatever) C) The Qu’ran is a false message by some entity/entities that constructed (or helped construct) the universe (e.g. lying “simulators”) D) The Qu’ran is a true message by God to humanity E) …other possibilities I may be neglecting.
These options must sum up to 100%.
(A) is what I (and pretty much all other atheists) currently believe. (B) is believed by e.g. those Christians who think that Qu’ran is the work of the devil. (D) is what Muslims believe.
If we have enough data to exclude possibilities (A) and (B), don’t you see that this must increase the probability of both (C) and (D)? That now the possibilities (C) and (D) must sum up to almost 100%, much like probabilities (A), (B), (C) and (D) previously did?
That now the possibilities (C) and (D) must sum up to almost 100%, much like probabilities (A), (B), (C) and (D) previously did?
I don’t think this is obvious. Since (E) is nonzero and unspecified, it might be significant once (A) and (B) are excluded. Probably after excluding (A) and (B), it would be worth spending some time fleshing out (E) a bit better.
In my case, the priors on (C) and (D) are so low I’d just as well include them in (E) from the outset.
I can’t see why (B) got excluded, but more significantly, what happened to (E)? In blue tentacle scenarios, that’s the most important one, the unknown unknowns. You list it explicitly, then completely ignore it.
Unknown unknowns are important long before the outer wilds of twenty sigma. It’s those that kill you when you thought you had all bases covered. And out in the weird realms where parochial messages can be hidden in eternal mathematics or cosmological engineering, it is impossible to conceive what else may be lurking there.
I can’t see why (B) got excluded, but more significantly, what happened to (E)?
You’re missing the point. Keep including (B) as a possibility if you like (I could debate with you on the probability of aliens so powerful that they can alter the fundamental constants of the universe they inhabit and be willing to do so just to prank humanity with a religion—but it’s not worth the trouble). Also add as many (E)s, (F)s, (G)s you like. Add a hundred different possibilities if you want.
Either way, if (A) gets significantly reduced as a probability, and we have no reason to simultaneously reduce the probability of (D) (or adjust the relative likelihood of the remaining probabilities in a manner that disadvantages (D)), then (D)’s estimated probability must increase by a factor analogous to the weight that (A) previously held.
If I currently believe (A) to be 99.99% percent likely, then its exclusion automatically increases the probability of (D) by a factor of 10,000 -- no matter how many alternate possibilities Es, Fs, Gs you also provide.
At this point I think you’re just being allergic at the idea of anything even hypothetically increasing the probability of Islam being true. What hypothetical amount of evidence would cause you to believe in Islam, if the scenario I provided isn’t sufficient?
Either way, if (A) gets significantly reduced as a probability, and we have no reason to simultaneously reduce the probability of (D) (or adjust the relative likelihood of the remaining probabilities in a manner that disadvantages (D)), then (D)’s estimated probability must increase by a factor analogous to the weight that (A) previously held.
E too, obviously, likewise with C.
But the question that began this thread was about (D), not about (C) or any Es. So that’s what I’m talking about.
End of conversation.
Seriously? You got offended after I patiently spend long paragraphs explaining basic probability to you? And you don’t even bother answering my question, after I answer all of yours?
I’ll keep this in mind next time I am tempted to respond to you.
Yeah. As someone said here, even true “miracles” aren’t proof of a theistic God (much less a particular version of one) - it might be e.g. some alien teenagers pulling a prank.
“even”? The evidence I mentioned would be much more impressive than a mere miracle. And the Qu’ran is quite clearly indicative of the Islamic version of God.
And you may also be an alien teenager pulling a prank, but I’m nonetheless convinced you’re human.
Demanding an infinite amount of proof before you’re convinced of anything isn’t actually rationality. Nobody’s talking about 100% certainty here.
Your point is that you’re forgetting about priors. This should also be Multiheaded’s point, however poorly expressed.
Our prior for “alien pranksters” is not high—the question is just how low it is compared to alternate explanations. Any reasonable priors assign vastly more probability that Multiheaded is human than… well, anything else, but even if we rejected that it would take a while before we got to aliens. The question of whether aliens or the supernatural is to be assigned higher probability when faced with something as striking as apparent manipulation of the physical constants underlying this universe is a much harder question.
Why does this need to go out to Christians? I suspect that most, if not all, people reading this are non-Muslims who know Bayes’s Theorem. What would convince you of the truth of Islam?
If some fundamental constant, or the ratio between two fundamental constants, encoded in its binary digits the Qu’ran, that would cause me to believe with greater than 50% certainty in the truth of Islam.
It’s believed by some (but not proven) that you can find any sequence of digits you’d like in Pi.
And even though everybody knows that 2Pi is the much more sensible constant, that transformation helpfully changes the sequence of binary digits not at all.
But you generally need a number that has about as many bits as the sequence itself just to pinpoint which digit to start reading from.
If that number is represented by some other constant, that counts.
If we just have to figure it out ourselves, in the same way that we’d be able to figure out which digit to start if we wanted to find “The Hobbit” encoded in the digits of pi, it doesn’t count.
Are you constraining the encoding scheme at all?
In just commonsense ways, e.g. it must not be encoded in a way so arbitrary that you would be able to derive any other similar-length piece of literature by similar methodologies.
Why? It would certainly be an astounding thing (subject to the obvious caveats about the complexity of the encoding scheme), but why would it imply that the encoded material was true?
If I find the text of Moby Dick suitably encoded (whatever that means) into the foundation of a building, and I don’t find other texts encoded into that building, it seems reasonable to take seriously the theory that there exists some process or entity which has a special relationship both with that building, and with the text of Moby Dick, different from the relationship it has with any other text.
If I find the text of the Koran suitably encoded into the fundamental constants of the universe, it seems equally reasonable to take seriously the theory that there exists some process or entity which has a special relationship both with that universe, and with the text of the Koran, different from the relationship it has with any other text.
You’re right, of course, that it doesn’t follow from that that either the Koran or Moby Dick is true. Neither does it follow from the truth of the Koran (whatever that means) that Islam is true (whatever that means).
OTOH, converting to a belief in Islam on the basis of that evidence seems more justified than remaining indifferent to Islam in the face of that evidence.
Of course, those aren’t the only options.
Granted, it’s not really clear to me what is a reasonable response to that evidence. “Investigate the Koran,” of course, but I have no sense of what such an investigation might even look like.
I don’t think it’s a question that deserves an answer, if you’re truly asking whether finding the Qu’ran embedded into the physical/mathematical structure of the universe should be considered evidence supporting the truth of Islam.
It would quite obviously not be evidence AGAINST Islam, nor would it be evidence UNCORRELATED to the reality of Islam. As such it can only be evidence in support of Islam.
If you’re just arguing that it shouldn’t make me raise my confidence level to over 50%, to what percentage do you think one should raise it to, given such a finding?
Where did you pull that out of? I mean, we’re talking blue tentacle scenarios here.
A blue tentacle scenario, however unlikely, is not evidence against the hypothesis that I am a changeling from the octopus people.
Hehe, it shouldn’t be long until someone demands rule 34 of this.
Downvoted for lack of clarity. What exactly are you saying here? Are you truly saying that if the Qu’ran is firmly embedded in the physics of the world, that’s uncorrelated to Islam having validity? Stop being coy with your responses please, then perhaps I”ll also be able to answer whatever-your-ACTUAL-question-is better.
I see no reason to presume anything about this correlation. P(the Qu’ran is embedded in pi or similar) is so low as to render the probability of anything conditional on the hypothesis incalculable. That is what I mean by the reference to blue tentacle scenarios.
I repeat, why would discovering a large and complex yet parochial assertion, such as the Qu’ran, embedded eternally in the world without human agency, lead you to believe it? You have done no more than assert this as “obvious”.
Okay, simple logic here: There’s a number of given possibilities.
A) The Qu’ran is a completely human construction, much like any other work of literature.
B) The Qu’ran is a false message by some non-human (but still located within our universe) entity to humanity (e.g. teenage alien pranksters, fairies, Satan, whatever)
C) The Qu’ran is a false message by some entity/entities that constructed (or helped construct) the universe (e.g. lying “simulators”)
D) The Qu’ran is a true message by God to humanity
E) …other possibilities I may be neglecting.
These options must sum up to 100%.
(A) is what I (and pretty much all other atheists) currently believe.
(B) is believed by e.g. those Christians who think that Qu’ran is the work of the devil.
(D) is what Muslims believe.
If we have enough data to exclude possibilities (A) and (B), don’t you see that this must increase the probability of both (C) and (D)? That now the possibilities (C) and (D) must sum up to almost 100%, much like probabilities (A), (B), (C) and (D) previously did?
This is obvious to me.
I don’t think this is obvious. Since (E) is nonzero and unspecified, it might be significant once (A) and (B) are excluded. Probably after excluding (A) and (B), it would be worth spending some time fleshing out (E) a bit better.
In my case, the priors on (C) and (D) are so low I’d just as well include them in (E) from the outset.
I can’t see why (B) got excluded, but more significantly, what happened to (E)? In blue tentacle scenarios, that’s the most important one, the unknown unknowns. You list it explicitly, then completely ignore it.
Unknown unknowns are important long before the outer wilds of twenty sigma. It’s those that kill you when you thought you had all bases covered. And out in the weird realms where parochial messages can be hidden in eternal mathematics or cosmological engineering, it is impossible to conceive what else may be lurking there.
You’re missing the point. Keep including (B) as a possibility if you like (I could debate with you on the probability of aliens so powerful that they can alter the fundamental constants of the universe they inhabit and be willing to do so just to prank humanity with a religion—but it’s not worth the trouble). Also add as many (E)s, (F)s, (G)s you like. Add a hundred different possibilities if you want.
Either way, if (A) gets significantly reduced as a probability, and we have no reason to simultaneously reduce the probability of (D) (or adjust the relative likelihood of the remaining probabilities in a manner that disadvantages (D)), then (D)’s estimated probability must increase by a factor analogous to the weight that (A) previously held.
If I currently believe (A) to be 99.99% percent likely, then its exclusion automatically increases the probability of (D) by a factor of 10,000 -- no matter how many alternate possibilities Es, Fs, Gs you also provide.
At this point I think you’re just being allergic at the idea of anything even hypothetically increasing the probability of Islam being true. What hypothetical amount of evidence would cause you to believe in Islam, if the scenario I provided isn’t sufficient?
Why D in particular? Why not E?
End of conversation.
E too, obviously, likewise with C. But the question that began this thread was about (D), not about (C) or any Es. So that’s what I’m talking about.
Seriously? You got offended after I patiently spend long paragraphs explaining basic probability to you? And you don’t even bother answering my question, after I answer all of yours?
I’ll keep this in mind next time I am tempted to respond to you.
B got excluded because in-universe agents don’t write the universe’s laws.
If pi is a normal number, which it likely is, then the Qu’ran is embedded in it, and so is any other text.
Yeah. As someone said here, even true “miracles” aren’t proof of a theistic God (much less a particular version of one) - it might be e.g. some alien teenagers pulling a prank.
“even”? The evidence I mentioned would be much more impressive than a mere miracle. And the Qu’ran is quite clearly indicative of the Islamic version of God.
And you may also be an alien teenager pulling a prank, but I’m nonetheless convinced you’re human.
Demanding an infinite amount of proof before you’re convinced of anything isn’t actually rationality. Nobody’s talking about 100% certainty here.
That’s because I’m interacting with you in an entirely ordinary human way and not displaying any “miracles” or such.
I think we must be having different discussions, because I don’t understand what your point is, and you don’t seem to understand my point either.
Your point is that you’re forgetting about priors. This should also be Multiheaded’s point, however poorly expressed.
Our prior for “alien pranksters” is not high—the question is just how low it is compared to alternate explanations. Any reasonable priors assign vastly more probability that Multiheaded is human than… well, anything else, but even if we rejected that it would take a while before we got to aliens. The question of whether aliens or the supernatural is to be assigned higher probability when faced with something as striking as apparent manipulation of the physical constants underlying this universe is a much harder question.