Are you truly saying that if the Qu’ran is firmly embedded in the physics of the world, that’s uncorrelated to Islam having validity?
I see no reason to presume anything about this correlation. P(the Qu’ran is embedded in pi or similar) is so low as to render the probability of anything conditional on the hypothesis incalculable. That is what I mean by the reference to blue tentacle scenarios.
I repeat, why would discovering a large and complex yet parochial assertion, such as the Qu’ran, embedded eternally in the world without human agency, lead you to believe it? You have done no more than assert this as “obvious”.
Okay, simple logic here: There’s a number of given possibilities. A) The Qu’ran is a completely human construction, much like any other work of literature. B) The Qu’ran is a false message by some non-human (but still located within our universe) entity to humanity (e.g. teenage alien pranksters, fairies, Satan, whatever) C) The Qu’ran is a false message by some entity/entities that constructed (or helped construct) the universe (e.g. lying “simulators”) D) The Qu’ran is a true message by God to humanity E) …other possibilities I may be neglecting.
These options must sum up to 100%.
(A) is what I (and pretty much all other atheists) currently believe. (B) is believed by e.g. those Christians who think that Qu’ran is the work of the devil. (D) is what Muslims believe.
If we have enough data to exclude possibilities (A) and (B), don’t you see that this must increase the probability of both (C) and (D)? That now the possibilities (C) and (D) must sum up to almost 100%, much like probabilities (A), (B), (C) and (D) previously did?
That now the possibilities (C) and (D) must sum up to almost 100%, much like probabilities (A), (B), (C) and (D) previously did?
I don’t think this is obvious. Since (E) is nonzero and unspecified, it might be significant once (A) and (B) are excluded. Probably after excluding (A) and (B), it would be worth spending some time fleshing out (E) a bit better.
In my case, the priors on (C) and (D) are so low I’d just as well include them in (E) from the outset.
I can’t see why (B) got excluded, but more significantly, what happened to (E)? In blue tentacle scenarios, that’s the most important one, the unknown unknowns. You list it explicitly, then completely ignore it.
Unknown unknowns are important long before the outer wilds of twenty sigma. It’s those that kill you when you thought you had all bases covered. And out in the weird realms where parochial messages can be hidden in eternal mathematics or cosmological engineering, it is impossible to conceive what else may be lurking there.
I can’t see why (B) got excluded, but more significantly, what happened to (E)?
You’re missing the point. Keep including (B) as a possibility if you like (I could debate with you on the probability of aliens so powerful that they can alter the fundamental constants of the universe they inhabit and be willing to do so just to prank humanity with a religion—but it’s not worth the trouble). Also add as many (E)s, (F)s, (G)s you like. Add a hundred different possibilities if you want.
Either way, if (A) gets significantly reduced as a probability, and we have no reason to simultaneously reduce the probability of (D) (or adjust the relative likelihood of the remaining probabilities in a manner that disadvantages (D)), then (D)’s estimated probability must increase by a factor analogous to the weight that (A) previously held.
If I currently believe (A) to be 99.99% percent likely, then its exclusion automatically increases the probability of (D) by a factor of 10,000 -- no matter how many alternate possibilities Es, Fs, Gs you also provide.
At this point I think you’re just being allergic at the idea of anything even hypothetically increasing the probability of Islam being true. What hypothetical amount of evidence would cause you to believe in Islam, if the scenario I provided isn’t sufficient?
Either way, if (A) gets significantly reduced as a probability, and we have no reason to simultaneously reduce the probability of (D) (or adjust the relative likelihood of the remaining probabilities in a manner that disadvantages (D)), then (D)’s estimated probability must increase by a factor analogous to the weight that (A) previously held.
E too, obviously, likewise with C.
But the question that began this thread was about (D), not about (C) or any Es. So that’s what I’m talking about.
End of conversation.
Seriously? You got offended after I patiently spend long paragraphs explaining basic probability to you? And you don’t even bother answering my question, after I answer all of yours?
I’ll keep this in mind next time I am tempted to respond to you.
I see no reason to presume anything about this correlation. P(the Qu’ran is embedded in pi or similar) is so low as to render the probability of anything conditional on the hypothesis incalculable. That is what I mean by the reference to blue tentacle scenarios.
I repeat, why would discovering a large and complex yet parochial assertion, such as the Qu’ran, embedded eternally in the world without human agency, lead you to believe it? You have done no more than assert this as “obvious”.
Okay, simple logic here: There’s a number of given possibilities.
A) The Qu’ran is a completely human construction, much like any other work of literature.
B) The Qu’ran is a false message by some non-human (but still located within our universe) entity to humanity (e.g. teenage alien pranksters, fairies, Satan, whatever)
C) The Qu’ran is a false message by some entity/entities that constructed (or helped construct) the universe (e.g. lying “simulators”)
D) The Qu’ran is a true message by God to humanity
E) …other possibilities I may be neglecting.
These options must sum up to 100%.
(A) is what I (and pretty much all other atheists) currently believe.
(B) is believed by e.g. those Christians who think that Qu’ran is the work of the devil.
(D) is what Muslims believe.
If we have enough data to exclude possibilities (A) and (B), don’t you see that this must increase the probability of both (C) and (D)? That now the possibilities (C) and (D) must sum up to almost 100%, much like probabilities (A), (B), (C) and (D) previously did?
This is obvious to me.
I don’t think this is obvious. Since (E) is nonzero and unspecified, it might be significant once (A) and (B) are excluded. Probably after excluding (A) and (B), it would be worth spending some time fleshing out (E) a bit better.
In my case, the priors on (C) and (D) are so low I’d just as well include them in (E) from the outset.
I can’t see why (B) got excluded, but more significantly, what happened to (E)? In blue tentacle scenarios, that’s the most important one, the unknown unknowns. You list it explicitly, then completely ignore it.
Unknown unknowns are important long before the outer wilds of twenty sigma. It’s those that kill you when you thought you had all bases covered. And out in the weird realms where parochial messages can be hidden in eternal mathematics or cosmological engineering, it is impossible to conceive what else may be lurking there.
You’re missing the point. Keep including (B) as a possibility if you like (I could debate with you on the probability of aliens so powerful that they can alter the fundamental constants of the universe they inhabit and be willing to do so just to prank humanity with a religion—but it’s not worth the trouble). Also add as many (E)s, (F)s, (G)s you like. Add a hundred different possibilities if you want.
Either way, if (A) gets significantly reduced as a probability, and we have no reason to simultaneously reduce the probability of (D) (or adjust the relative likelihood of the remaining probabilities in a manner that disadvantages (D)), then (D)’s estimated probability must increase by a factor analogous to the weight that (A) previously held.
If I currently believe (A) to be 99.99% percent likely, then its exclusion automatically increases the probability of (D) by a factor of 10,000 -- no matter how many alternate possibilities Es, Fs, Gs you also provide.
At this point I think you’re just being allergic at the idea of anything even hypothetically increasing the probability of Islam being true. What hypothetical amount of evidence would cause you to believe in Islam, if the scenario I provided isn’t sufficient?
Why D in particular? Why not E?
End of conversation.
E too, obviously, likewise with C. But the question that began this thread was about (D), not about (C) or any Es. So that’s what I’m talking about.
Seriously? You got offended after I patiently spend long paragraphs explaining basic probability to you? And you don’t even bother answering my question, after I answer all of yours?
I’ll keep this in mind next time I am tempted to respond to you.
B got excluded because in-universe agents don’t write the universe’s laws.
If pi is a normal number, which it likely is, then the Qu’ran is embedded in it, and so is any other text.