We clearly disagree strongly on the probabilities here. I agree that all things being equal you have a better shot at convincing him than I do, but I think it is small. We both do the same thing in the Defector case. In the co-operator course, he believes you with probability P+Q and me with probability P. Assuming you know if he trusts you in this case (we count anything else as deceivers) you save (P+Q) 2 +(1-P-Q) 1, I save (P) 3+(1-P) 1, both times the percentage of co-operators R. So you have to be at least twice as successful as I am even if there are no deceivers on the other side. Meanwhile, there’s some percentage A who are decievers and some probability B that you’ll believe a deceiver, or just A and 1 if you count anyone you don’t believe as a simple Defector.
You think that R (P+Q) 2 + R (1-P-Q) 1 > R P 3 + R (1-P) 1 + A B 1. I strongly disagree. But if you convinced me otherwise, I would change my opinion.
In the co-operator course, he believes you with probability P+Q and me with probability P.
That may be for one step, but my point is that the truth ultimately should win over lies. If you proceed to the next point of argument, you expect to distinguish Cooperator from Defector a little bit better, and as the argument continues, your ability to distinguish the possibilities should improve more and more.
The problem may be that it’s not a fast enough process, but not that there is some fundamental limitation on how good the evidence may get. If you study the question thoroughly, you should be able to move long way away from uncertainty in the direction of truth.
We clearly disagree strongly on the probabilities here. I agree that all things being equal you have a better shot at convincing him than I do, but I think it is small. We both do the same thing in the Defector case. In the co-operator course, he believes you with probability P+Q and me with probability P. Assuming you know if he trusts you in this case (we count anything else as deceivers) you save (P+Q) 2 +(1-P-Q) 1, I save (P) 3+(1-P) 1, both times the percentage of co-operators R. So you have to be at least twice as successful as I am even if there are no deceivers on the other side. Meanwhile, there’s some percentage A who are decievers and some probability B that you’ll believe a deceiver, or just A and 1 if you count anyone you don’t believe as a simple Defector.
You think that R (P+Q) 2 + R (1-P-Q) 1 > R P 3 + R (1-P) 1 + A B 1. I strongly disagree. But if you convinced me otherwise, I would change my opinion.
Here’s an older thread about this
That may be for one step, but my point is that the truth ultimately should win over lies. If you proceed to the next point of argument, you expect to distinguish Cooperator from Defector a little bit better, and as the argument continues, your ability to distinguish the possibilities should improve more and more.
The problem may be that it’s not a fast enough process, but not that there is some fundamental limitation on how good the evidence may get. If you study the question thoroughly, you should be able to move long way away from uncertainty in the direction of truth.