estimate the probability that the Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics is more or less correct.
This doesn’t make any sense to me. MWI is an interpretation of QM—it’s just a piece of poetry that you put next to the maths to make yourself feel good. It doesn’t make any predictions that are not made by the maths, so it can’t be correct or incorrect. It can just be “a pleasing piece of poetry” or “a displeasing piece of poetry”.
It doesn’t make any predictions that are not made by the maths, so it can’t be correct or incorrect.
It makes the null prediction that the standard laws of QM apply in all situations, as opposed at least to collapse interpretations, which predict that some systems that should stay coherent won’t; this is getting more testable every day.
Oh, OK. But I thought that no-one actually believed in collapse interpretations any more? Anyway, if you take the “collapse” interpretation of QM, that’s a different mathematical theory, not merely a different interpretation pf the same maths.
Seriously, is there anyone left who actually believes in collapse any more?
Anyway, if you take the “collapse” interpretation of QM, that’s a different mathematical theory, not merely a different interpretation pf the same maths.
Good catch.
Seriously, is there anyone left who actually believes in collapse any more?
Roger Penrose, at least (and he believes it for physical reasons, not because of his philosophy of mind).
Collapse actually looks better to me than anything else that’s not MWI, though I haven’t studied the issue in much depth – I don’t understand what any interpretations besides MWI, collapse, and Bohm/hidden-variables are even saying ontologically, and Bohm has serious zombie problems.
No. You think there’s no real difference between one world being real and all worlds being real? Lots of alternate Rokos disagree.
Thinking that the only thing that’s real is the experiences you anticipate, and all talk of where these experiences come from is “poetry”, is a very odd kind of solipsism.
You think there’s no real difference between one world being real and all worlds being real?
I don’t understand what the word “real” means here. This may be a case where your mind contains a attribute IsReal which has no counterpart in the world.
Thinking that the only thing that’s real is the experiences you anticipate, and all talk of where these experiences come from is “poetry”, is a very odd kind of solipsism.
Again, the word “real” is causing trouble here. What does it mean for (e.g.) me to think Steven is “real” vs. Steven is “not real”, subject to the condition that I have identical experience anticipations? “real” seems to be a null word—it adds nothing.
Wikipedia on Solipsism:
Solipsism is an epistemological or ontological position that knowledge of anything outside the mind is unjustified.
So, based on this I don’t think I’m adopting a solipsistic position. My knowledge about the world is contained in the mathematical laws of quantum mechanics. “interpretations” of quantum mechanics aren’t knowledge because they have no predictive power.
One day, a traveler came to Joshu’s monastery bearing an ancient map. The map showed verdant forests, majestic mountains, winding rivers. And Joshu said, “do we not live in a wondrous world, that has such terrain features in it?”
The traveler frowned. “This we do not know! All we can say is that when we travel to these places, it looks as if there are forests, it feels as if there are mountains, it sounds as if there are rivers. Geography deals not with the land, but with what we can say about the land. The rest is poetry, religion, metaphysics.”
Joshu went to the other room to fetch a scroll, and inscribed on it a crude schematic representation of the map the traveler brought. He then wound the scroll up and used it to beat the traveler over the head. At that moment, the traveler was enlightened.
Strictly speaking, knowledge doesn’t need to have predictive power, as your utility may depend on a piece of knowledge, in which case you don’t expect to observe anything else differently, but you prefer to act differently. That knowledge fixed in a belief still pays rent, but not in expectation.
This doesn’t make any sense to me. MWI is an interpretation of QM—it’s just a piece of poetry that you put next to the maths to make yourself feel good. It doesn’t make any predictions that are not made by the maths, so it can’t be correct or incorrect. It can just be “a pleasing piece of poetry” or “a displeasing piece of poetry”.
Yes?
It makes the null prediction that the standard laws of QM apply in all situations, as opposed at least to collapse interpretations, which predict that some systems that should stay coherent won’t; this is getting more testable every day.
Oh, OK. But I thought that no-one actually believed in collapse interpretations any more? Anyway, if you take the “collapse” interpretation of QM, that’s a different mathematical theory, not merely a different interpretation pf the same maths.
Seriously, is there anyone left who actually believes in collapse any more?
Good catch.
Roger Penrose, at least (and he believes it for physical reasons, not because of his philosophy of mind).
Collapse actually looks better to me than anything else that’s not MWI, though I haven’t studied the issue in much depth – I don’t understand what any interpretations besides MWI, collapse, and Bohm/hidden-variables are even saying ontologically, and Bohm has serious zombie problems.
They all seem to reduce to many worlds, hidden variables, collapse, or gibberish.
As Mike Price of the MWI FAQ liked to say, “Bohm+Ockham=Everett”.
No. You think there’s no real difference between one world being real and all worlds being real? Lots of alternate Rokos disagree.
Thinking that the only thing that’s real is the experiences you anticipate, and all talk of where these experiences come from is “poetry”, is a very odd kind of solipsism.
I don’t understand what the word “real” means here. This may be a case where your mind contains a attribute IsReal which has no counterpart in the world.
Again, the word “real” is causing trouble here. What does it mean for (e.g.) me to think Steven is “real” vs. Steven is “not real”, subject to the condition that I have identical experience anticipations? “real” seems to be a null word—it adds nothing.
Wikipedia on Solipsism:
So, based on this I don’t think I’m adopting a solipsistic position. My knowledge about the world is contained in the mathematical laws of quantum mechanics. “interpretations” of quantum mechanics aren’t knowledge because they have no predictive power.
One day, a traveler came to Joshu’s monastery bearing an ancient map. The map showed verdant forests, majestic mountains, winding rivers. And Joshu said, “do we not live in a wondrous world, that has such terrain features in it?”
The traveler frowned. “This we do not know! All we can say is that when we travel to these places, it looks as if there are forests, it feels as if there are mountains, it sounds as if there are rivers. Geography deals not with the land, but with what we can say about the land. The rest is poetry, religion, metaphysics.”
Joshu went to the other room to fetch a scroll, and inscribed on it a crude schematic representation of the map the traveler brought. He then wound the scroll up and used it to beat the traveler over the head. At that moment, the traveler was enlightened.
Not content with the emptiness of mere talk,
he prefers to talk about talking.
Does he not know that to take one step back
is to slide into the abyss?
Strictly speaking, knowledge doesn’t need to have predictive power, as your utility may depend on a piece of knowledge, in which case you don’t expect to observe anything else differently, but you prefer to act differently. That knowledge fixed in a belief still pays rent, but not in expectation.