I appreciate the thoughtful response and that you seem to take the ideas seriously.
That is a fundamental aspect of how experience works now. That’s also a result of evolution wiring us to pay more attention to bad things than good things.
I do think it’s a fundamental aspect of how experience works, independently of how our brains are disposed to thinking about it, however I definitely think it’s possible to prophylactically shield or consciousness against the depths of suffering by modifying the substrate. I can’t tell whether we’re disagreeing or not.
I don’t know exactly how to phrase It, but I think a fundamental aspect of the universe is that as suffering increases in magnitude, it becomes less and less clear that there is (or can be) a commensurate value on the positive side which can negate it(trade off against it, even things out). I don’t think it’s true of the reverse.
Are you making the claim that this view is a faulty conclusion owing to the contingent disposition of my human brain?
Or are you making the claim that the disposition of my human brain can be modified so as to prevent exposure to the depths of suffering?
Thanks! No pressure to respond
Basically I think within the space of all possible varieties and extents of conscious experience, suffering starts to become less and less Commensurable with positive experience the further you go towards the extremes.
If option (A) is to experience the worst possible suffering for 100 years, prior to experiencing the greatest possible pleasure for N number of years, and option (B) is non existence, I would choose option (B), regardless of the value of N.
Should this count as evidence against their views? It seems clear to me that if you’re trying to understand the nature of qualitative states, first hand experience with extreme states is an asset.
I have personally experienced prolonged states of consciousness which were far worse than non-existence. Should that not play a part in informing my views? Currently I’m very happy, I fear death, I’ve experienced extraordinary prolonged pleasure states. Would you suggest I’m just not acquainted with levels of wellbeing which would cause me to meaningfully revaluate my view?
I think there’s also a sort of meta issue where people with influence are systematically less acquainted with direct experience of the extremes of suffering. Meaning that discourse and decision making will tend to systematically underweight experiences of suffering as a direct data source.
I agree with your last paragraph.