rstarkov

• rstarkov 15 Apr 2014 13:59 UTC

  2 points

  in reply to: raisin’s comment on: Ra­tion­al­ity Quotes April 2014

  Indeed, terse “explanations” that handwave more than explain are a pet peeve of mine. They can be outright confusing and cause more harm than good IMO. See this question on phrasing explanations in physics for some examples.

• rstarkov 1 Mar 2014 14:27 UTC

  4 points

  on: A Fer­vent Defense of Fre­quen­tist Statistics

  One useful definition of Bayesian vs Frequentist that I’ve found is the following. Suppose you run an experiment; you have a hypothesis and you gather some data.

  • if you try to obtain the probability of the data, given your hypothesis (treating the hypothesis as fixed), then you’re doing it the frequentist way

  • if you try to obtain the probability of the hypothesis, given the data you have, then you’re doing it the Bayesian way.

  I’m not sure whether this view holds up to criticism, but if so, I sure find the latter much more interesting than the former.

• rstarkov 5 Dec 2013 2:52 UTC

  18 points

  on: 2013 Less Wrong Cen­sus/​Survey

  This has been the most fun, satisfying survey I’ve ever been part of :) Thanks for posting this. Can’t wait to see the results!

  One question I’d find interesting is closely related to the probability of life in the universe. Namely, what are the chances that a randomly sampled spacefaring lifeform would have an intelligence similar enough to ours for us to be able to communicate meaningfully, both in its “ways” and in general level of smarts, if we were to meet.

  Given that I enjoyed taking part in this, may I suggest that more frequent and in-depth surveys on specialized topics might be worth doing?

• rstarkov 26 Jul 2013 15:15 UTC

  9 points

  on: The Robots, AI, and Unem­ploy­ment Anti-FAQ

  Maybe we’ve finally reached the point where there’s no work left to be done

  If so, this is superb! This is the end goal. A world in which there is no work left to be done, so we can all enjoy our lives, free from the requirement to work.

  The thought that work is desirable has been hammered into our heads so hard that it’s a really, really dubious proposition that actually a world where nobody has to work is the ultimate goal. Not one in which everyone works. That world sucks. That’s world in which 85% of us live today.

• rstarkov 8 Feb 2013 7:52 UTC

  2 points

  on: Ta­boo Your Words

  I’ve first read this about two years ago and it has been an invaluable tool. I’m sure it has saved countless hours of pointless arguments around the world.

  When I realise that an inconsistency in how we interpret a specific word is a problem in a certain argument and apply this tool, it instantly transforms arguments which actually are about the meaning of the word to make them a lot more productive (it turns out it can be unobvious that the actual disagreement is about what a specific word means). In other cases it just helps get back on the right track instead of getting distracted by what we mean when we say a certain word that is actually beside the point.

  It does occasionally take a while to convince the other party to the argument that I’m not trying to fool or trick them when I ask for us to apply this method. Another observation is that the article on Empty Labels has transformed my attitude towards the meaning of words, so when it turns out we disagree about meanings, I instantly lose interest and this can confuse the other party.

Solv­ing the two en­velopes problem

• rstarkov 5 Aug 2012 18:58 UTC

  3 points

  in reply to: VincentYu’s comment on: Solv­ing the two en­velopes problem

  Addressed by making a few edits to the “Solution” section. Thank you!

• rstarkov 5 Aug 2012 15:02 UTC

  1 point

  in reply to: Douglas_Knight’s comment on: Solv­ing the two en­velopes problem

  All fair points. I did want to post this to main, but decided against it in the end. Didn’t know I could move it to main afterwards. Will work on the title, after I’ve fixed the error pointed out by VincentYu.

• rstarkov 31 Aug 2011 15:17 UTC

  0 points

  in reply to: hairyfigment’s comment on: New­comb’s Prob­lem and Re­gret of Rationality

  I’ve reviewed the language of the original statement and it seems that the puzzle is set in essentially the real world with two major givens, i.e. facts in which you have 100% confidence.

  Given #1: Omega was correct on the last 100 occurrences.

  Given #2: Box B is already empty or already full.

  There is no leeway left for quantum effects, or for your choice affecting in any way what’s in box B. You cannot make box B full by consciously choosing to one-box. The puzzle says so, after all.

  If you read it like this, then I don’t see why you would possibly one-box. Given #2 already implies the solution. 100 successful predictions must have been achieved through a very low probability event, or a trick, e.g by offering the bet only to those people whose answer you can already predict, e.g. by reading their LessWrong posts.

  If you don’t read it like this, then we’re back to the “gooey vagueness” problem, and I will once again insist that the puzzle needs to be fully defined before it can be attempted. For example, by removing both givens, and instead specifying exactly what you know about those past 100 occurrences. Were they definitely not done on plants? Was there sampling bias? Am I considering this puzzle as an outside observer, or am I imagining myself being part of that universe—in the latter case I have to put some doubt into everything, as I can be hallucinating. These things matter.

  With such clarifications, the puzzle becomes a matter of your confidence in the past statistics vs. your confidence about the laws of physics precluding your choice from actually influencing what’s in box B.

• rstarkov 31 Aug 2011 0:14 UTC

  0 points

  in reply to: FAWS’s comment on: New­comb’s Prob­lem and Re­gret of Rationality

  I’m not sure I understand correctly, but let me phrase the question differently: what sort of confidence do we have in “99.9%” being an accurate value for Omega’s success rate?

  From your previous comment I gather the confidence is absolute. This removes one complication while leaving the core of the paradox intact. I’m just pointing out that this isn’t very clear in the original specification of the paradox, and that clearing it up is useful.

  To explain why it’s important, let me indeed think of an AI like hairyfigment suggested. Suppose someone says they have let 100 previous AIs flip a fair coin 100 times each and it came out heads every single time, because they have magic powers that make it so. This someone presents me video evidence of this feat.

  If faced with this in the real world, an AI coded by me would still bet close to 50% on tails if offered to flip its own fair coin against this person, because I have strong evidence that this someone is a cheat, and their video evidence is fake. Just something I know from a huge amount of background information that was not explicitly part of this scenario.

  However, when discussing such scenarios, it is sometimes useful to assume hypothetical scenarios unlike the real world. For example, we could state that this someone has actually performed the feat, and that there is absolutely no doubt about that. That’s impossible in our real world, but it’s useful for the sake of discussing bayesianism. Surely any bayesianist’s AI would expect heads with high probability in this hypothetical universe.

  So, are we looking at “Omega in the real world where someone I don’t even know tells me they are really damn good at predicting the future”, or “Omega in some hypothetical world where they are actually known with absolute certainty to be really good at predicting the future”?

• rstarkov 29 Aug 2011 16:38 UTC

  0 points

  in reply to: FAWS’s comment on: New­comb’s Prob­lem and Re­gret of Rationality

  While I disagree that one-boxing still wins, I’m most interested in seeing the “no future peeking” and the actual Omega success rate being defined as givens. It’s important that I can rely on the 99.9% value, rather than wondering whether it is perhaps inferred from their past 100 correct predictions (which could, with a non-negligible probability, have been a fluke).

• rstarkov 22 May 2011 18:28 UTC

  −5 points

  in reply to: Amanojack’s comment on: New­comb’s Prob­lem and Re­gret of Rationality

  It’s only controversial because it’s dressed up in wooey vagueness

  I also happen to think that under-specification of this puzzle adds significantly to the controversy.

  What the puzzle doesn’t tell us is the properties of the universe in which it is set. Namely, whether the universe permits future to influence the past, which I’ll refer to as “future peeking”.

  (alternatively, whether the universe somehow allows someone within the universe to precisely simulate the future faster than it actually comes—a proposition I don’t believe is ever true in any universe defined mathematically).

  This is important because if the future can’t influence the past, then it is known with absolute certainty that taking two boxes won’t possibly change what’s in them (this is, after all, a basic given of the universe). Whether Omega has predicted something before is completely irrelevant now that the boxes are placed.

  Alas, we aren’t told what the universe is like. If that is intentionally part of the puzzle then the only way to solve it would be to enumerate all possible universes, assigning each one a probability of being ours based on all the available evidence, and essentially come up with a probability that “future peeking” is impossible in our universe. One would then apply simple arithmetic to calculate the expected winnings.

  Unfortunately P(“future peeking allowed”) it’s one of those probabilities that is completely incalculable for any practical purpose. Thus if “no future peeking” isn’t a given, the best answer is “I don’t know if taking two boxes is best because there’s this one probability I can’t actually calculate in practice”.

• rstarkov 25 Mar 2011 11:42 UTC

  2 points

  in reply to: rstarkov’s comment on: “Is there a God” for noobs

  To expand a bit on the first paragraph, I feel that such reasonable arguments are to many people about the same as the proof of Poincaré conjecture is to me: I fully understand the proposition, but I’m not nearly smart enough to follow the proof sufficiently well to be confident it’s right.

  Importantly, I can also follow the outline of the proof, to see how it’s intended to work, but this is of course insufficient to establish the validity of the proof.

  So the only real reason I happen to trust this proof is that I already have a pre-established trust in the community who reviewed the proof. But of course the same is also true of a believer who has a pre-established trust in the theist community.

  So the guide would require a section on “how to pick authorities to trust”, which would explain why it’s necessary (impractical to verify everything yourself) and why the scientific community is the best one to trust (highest rate of successful predictions and useful conclusions).

• rstarkov 25 Mar 2011 11:37 UTC

  3 points

  on: “Is there a God” for noobs

  I have found that the logical approach like this one works much more rarely than it doesn’t, simply because it appears that people can manage not to trust reason, or to doubt the validity of the (more or less obvious) inferences involved.

  Additionally, belief is so emotional that even people who see all the logic, and truly seem to appreciate that believing in God is completely silly, still can’t rid themselves of the belief. It’s like someone who knows household spiders are not dangerous in any way and yet are more terrified of them than, say, an elephant.

  Perhaps what’s needed in addition to this is a separate “How to eschew the idea of god from your brain” guide. It would include practical advice collected from various self-admitted ex-believers. Importantly, I think people who have never believed should avoid contributing to such a guide unless they have reasons to believe that they have an extraordinary amount of insight into a believer’s mind.

• rstarkov 25 Mar 2011 3:54 UTC

  3 points

  in reply to: AlephNeil’s comment on: The “su­per­nat­u­ral” category

  Of course I’d argue that the game of life is not an isolated universe if one can toggle cells in it, and if you consider the whole lot then there’s nothing supernatural about the process of cells being toggled.

  But this is a good example. I asked about what others mean by “supernatural” and this sounds very close indeed!

• rstarkov 25 Mar 2011 0:39 UTC

  1 point

  in reply to: Manfred’s comment on: The “su­per­nat­u­ral” category

  Sounds like a reasonable way of putting it. So a weapon shooting invisible (to the human eye) bullets would be classified as “supernatural” by someone from the stone age, because to them, killing someone requires direct contact with a visible weapon or projectile, that has appreciable travel time. Right?

  Although “hard science” would have to be excluded from this, even though it contains lots of stuff that doesn’t obey the same laws as most stuff we see.

• rstarkov 24 Mar 2011 23:53 UTC

  1 point

  in reply to: ShardPhoenix’s comment on: The “su­per­nat­u­ral” category

  I suppose it’s not the most concise post I’ve ever written. Thanks for the feedback!

• rstarkov 24 Mar 2011 23:18 UTC

  3 points

  on: The “su­per­nat­u­ral” category

  So from the negative votes I’m guessing that this is not something you guys find appropriate in “discussion”? It would help me as a newcomer if you also suggested what makes it bad :)

The “su­per­nat­u­ral” category

• rstarkov 24 Mar 2011 15:36 UTC

  11 points

  in reply to: Roland2’s comment on: Prob­a­bil­ity is in the Mind

  Even more important, I think, is the realization that, to decide how much you’re willing to bet on a specific outcome, all of the following are essentially the same:

  • you do have the information to calculate it but haven’t calculated it yet

  • you don’t have the information to calculate it but know how to obtain such information.

  • you don’t have the information to calculate it

  The bottom line is that you don’t know what the next value will be, and that’s the only thing that matters.