I’ve reviewed the language of the original statement and it seems that the puzzle is set in essentially the real world with two major givens, i.e. facts in which you have 100% confidence.
Given #1: Omega was correct on the last 100 occurrences.
Given #2: Box B is already empty or already full.
There is no leeway left for quantum effects, or for your choice affecting in any way what’s in box B. You cannot make box B full by consciously choosing to one-box. The puzzle says so, after all.
If you read it like this, then I don’t see why you would possibly one-box. Given #2 already implies the solution. 100 successful predictions must have been achieved through a very low probability event, or a trick, e.g by offering the bet only to those people whose answer you can already predict, e.g. by reading their LessWrong posts.
If you don’t read it like this, then we’re back to the “gooey vagueness” problem, and I will once again insist that the puzzle needs to be fully defined before it can be attempted. For example, by removing both givens, and instead specifying exactly what you know about those past 100 occurrences. Were they definitely not done on plants? Was there sampling bias? Am I considering this puzzle as an outside observer, or am I imagining myself being part of that universe—in the latter case I have to put some doubt into everything, as I can be hallucinating. These things matter.
With such clarifications, the puzzle becomes a matter of your confidence in the past statistics vs. your confidence about the laws of physics precluding your choice from actually influencing what’s in box B.
I’ve reviewed the language of the original statement and it seems that the puzzle is set in essentially the real world with two major givens, i.e. facts in which you have 100% confidence.
Given #1: Omega was correct on the last 100 occurrences.
Given #2: Box B is already empty or already full.
There is no leeway left for quantum effects, or for your choice affecting in any way what’s in box B. You cannot make box B full by consciously choosing to one-box. The puzzle says so, after all.
If you read it like this, then I don’t see why you would possibly one-box. Given #2 already implies the solution. 100 successful predictions must have been achieved through a very low probability event, or a trick, e.g by offering the bet only to those people whose answer you can already predict, e.g. by reading their LessWrong posts.
If you don’t read it like this, then we’re back to the “gooey vagueness” problem, and I will once again insist that the puzzle needs to be fully defined before it can be attempted. For example, by removing both givens, and instead specifying exactly what you know about those past 100 occurrences. Were they definitely not done on plants? Was there sampling bias? Am I considering this puzzle as an outside observer, or am I imagining myself being part of that universe—in the latter case I have to put some doubt into everything, as I can be hallucinating. These things matter.
With such clarifications, the puzzle becomes a matter of your confidence in the past statistics vs. your confidence about the laws of physics precluding your choice from actually influencing what’s in box B.