PhilGoetz

• PhilGoetzJan 4, 2024, 6:18 PM

  2 points

  in reply to: DanielLC’s comment on: Ends Don’t Jus­tify Means (Among Hu­mans)

  You have it backwards. The difference between a Friendly AI and an unfriendly one is entirely one of restrictions placed on the Friendly AI. So an unfriendly AI can do anything a friendly AI could, but not vice-versa.

  The friendly AI could lose out because it would be restricted from committing atrocities, or at least atrocities which were strictly bad for humans, even in the long run.

  Your comment that they can commit atrocities for the good of humanity without worrying about becoming corrupt is a reason to be fearful of “friendly” AIs.

• PhilGoetzOct 7, 2023, 11:35 PM

  2 points

  0

  in reply to: Charlie Steiner’s comment on: On my AI Fable, and the im­por­tance of de re, de dicto, and de se refer­ence for AI alignment

  By “just thinking about IRL”, do you mean “just thinking about the robot using IRL to learn what humans want”? ’Coz that isn’t alignment.

  ‘But potentially a problem with more abstract cashings-out of the idea “learn human values and then want that”’ is what I’m talking about, yes. But it also seems to be what you’re talking about in your last paragraph.

  “Human wants cookie” is not a full-enough understanding of what the human really wants, and under what conditions, to take intelligent actions to help the human. A robot learning that would act like a paper-clipper, but with cookies. It isn’t clear whether a robot which hasn’t resolved the de dicto /​ de re /​ de se distinction in what the human wants will be able to do more good than harm in trying to satisfy human desires, nor what will happen if a robot learns that humans are using de se justifications.

  Here’s another way of looking at that “nor what will happen if” clause: We’ve been casually tossing about the phrase “learn human values” for a long time, but that isn’t what the people who say that want. If AI learned human values, it would treat humans the way humans treat cattle. But if the AI is to learn to desire to help humans satisfy their wants, it isn’t clear that the AI can (A) internalize human values enough to understand and effectively optimize for them, while at the same time (B) keeping those values compartmentalized from its own values, which make it enjoy helping humans with their problems. To do that the AI would need to want to propagate and support human values that it disagrees with. It isn’t clear that that’s something a coherent, let’s say “rational”, agent can do.

• PhilGoetzOct 6, 2023, 2:43 AM

  2 points

  in reply to: Gray’s comment on: Ap­plause Lights

  How is that de re and de dicto?

• PhilGoetzOct 5, 2023, 10:29 PM

  2 points

  0

  in reply to: Charlie Steiner’s comment on: On my AI Fable, and the im­por­tance of de re, de dicto, and de se refer­ence for AI alignment

  You’re looking at the logical form and imagining that that’s a sufficient understanding to start pursuing the goal. But it’s only sufficient in toy worlds, where you have one goal at a time, and the mapping between the goal and the environment is so simple that the agent doesn’t need to understand the value, or the target of “cookie”, beyond “cookie” vs. “non-cookie”. In the real world, the agent has many goals, and the goals will involve nebulous concepts, and have many considerations and conditions attached, eg how healthy is this cookie, how tasty is it, how hungry am I. It will need to know /​why/​ it, or human24, wants a cookie in order to intelligently know when to get the cookie, and to resolve conflicts between goals, and to do probability calculations which involve the degree to which different goals are correlated in the higher goals they satisfy.

  There’s a confounding confusion in this particular case, in which you seem to be hoping the robot will infer that the agent of the desired act is the human, both in the case of the human, and of the AI. But for values in general, we often want the AI to act in the way that the human would act, not to want the human to do something. Your posited AI would learn the goal that it wants human24 to get a cookie.

  What it all boils down to is: You have to resolve the de re /​ de dicto /​ de se interpretation in order to understand what the agent wants. That means an AI also has to resolve that question in order to know what a human wants. Your intuitions about toy examples like “human 24 always wants a cookie, unconditionally, forever” will mislead you, in the ways toy-world examples misled symbolic AI researchers for 60 years.

• PhilGoetzOct 5, 2023, 1:25 AM

  2 points

  on: [AN #58] Mesa op­ti­miza­tion: what it is, and why we should care

  So, “mesa” here means “tabletop”, and is pronounced “MAY-suh”?

On my AI Fable, and the im­por­tance of de re, de dicto, and de se refer­ence for AI alignment

• PhilGoetzOct 5, 2023, 12:36 AM

  2 points

  0

  on: The 99% prin­ci­ple for per­sonal problems

  I think your insight is that progress counts—that counting counts. It’s overcoming the Boolean mindset, in which anything that’s true some of the time, must be true all of the time. That you either “have” or “don’t have” a problem.

  I prefer to think of this as “100% and 0% are both unattainable”, but stating it as the 99% rule might be more-motivating to most people.

• PhilGoetzSep 2, 2023, 3:14 AM

  2 points

  in reply to: romeostevensit’s comment on: The Poin­t­ers Prob­lem: Hu­man Values Are A Func­tion Of Hu­mans’ La­tent Variables

  What do you mean by a goodhearting problem, & why is it a lossy compression problem? Are you using “goodhearting” to refer to Goodhart’s Law?

• PhilGoetzSep 2, 2023, 3:07 AM

  2 points

  on: The Poin­t­ers Prob­lem: Hu­man Values Are A Func­tion Of Hu­mans’ La­tent Variables

  I’ll preface this by saying that I don’t see why it’s a problem, for purposes of alignment, for human values to refer to non-existent entities. This should manifest as humans and their AIs wasting some time and energy trying to optimize for things that don’t exist, but this seems irrelevant to alignment. If the AI optimizes for the same things that don’t exist as humans do, it’s still aligned; it isn’t going to screw things up any worse than humans do.

  But I think it’s more important to point out that you’re joining the same metaphysical goose chase that has made Western philosophy non-sense since before Plato.

  You need to distinguish between the beliefs and values a human has in its brain, and the beliefs & values it expresses to the external world in symbolic language. I think your analysis concerns only the latter. If that’s so, you’re digging up the old philosophical noumena /​ phenomena distinction, which itself refers to things that don’t exist (noumena).

  Noumena are literally ghosts; “soul”, “spirit”, “ghost”, “nature”, “essence”, and “noumena” are, for practical purposes, synonyms in philosophical parlance. The ghost of a concept is the metaphysical entity which defines what assemblages in the world are and are not instances of that concept.

  But at a fine enough level of detail, not only are there no ghosts, there are no automobiles or humans. The Buddhist and post-modernist objections to the idea that language can refer to the real world are that the referents of “automobiles” are not exactly, precisely, unambiguously, unchangingly, completely, reliably specified, in the way Plato and Aristotle thought words should be. I.e., the fact that your body gains and loses atoms all the time means, for these people, that you don’t “exist”.

  Plato, Aristotle, Buddhists, and post-modernists all assumed that the only possible way to refer to the world is for noumena to exist, which they don’t. When you talk about “valuing the actual state of the world,” you’re indulging in the quest for complete and certain knowledge, which requires noumena to exist. You’re saying, in your own way, that knowing whether your values are satisfied or optimized requires access to what Kant called the noumenal world. You think that you need to be absolutely, provably correct when you tell an AI that one of two words is better. So those objections apply to your reasoning, which is why all of this seems to you to be a problem.

  The general dissolution of this problem is to admit that language always has slack and error. Even direct sensory perception always has slack and error. The rationalist, symbolic approach to AI safety, in which you must specify values in a way that provably does not lead to catastrophic outcomes, is doomed to failure for these reasons, which are the same reasons that the rationalist, symbolic approach to AI was doomed to failure (as almost everyone now admits). These reasons include the fact that claims about the real world are inherently unprovable, which has been well-accepted by philosophers since Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.

  That’s why continental philosophy is batshit crazy today. They admitted that facts about the real world are unprovable, but still made the childish demand for absolute certainty about their beliefs. So, starting with Hegel, they invented new fantasy worlds for our physical world to depend on, all pretty much of the same type as Plato’s or Christianity’s, except instead of “Form” or “Spirit”, their fantasy worlds are founded on thought (Berkeley), sense perceptions (phenomenologists), “being” (Heidegger), music, or art.

  The only possible approach to AI safety is one that depends not on proofs using symbolic representations, but on connectionist methods for linking mental concepts to the hugely-complicated structures of correlations in sense perceptions which those concepts represent, as in deep learning. You could, perhaps, then construct statistical proofs that rely on the over-determination of mental concepts to show almost-certain convergence between the mental languages of two different intelligent agents operating in the same world. (More likely, the meanings which two agents give to the same words don’t necessarily converge, but agreement on the probability estimates given to propositions expressed using those same words will converge.)

  Fortunately, all mental concepts are over-determined. That is, we can’t learn concepts unless the relevant sense data that we’ve sensed contains much more information than do the concepts we learned. That comes automatically from what learning algorithms do. Any algorithm which constructed concepts that contained more information than was in the sense data, would be a terrible, dysfunctional algorithm.

  You are still not going to get a proof that two agents interpret all sentences exactly the same way. But you might be able to get a proof which shows that catastrophic divergence is likely to happen less than once in a hundred years, which would be good enough for now.

  Perhaps what I’m saying will be more understandable if I talk about your case of ghosts. Whether or not ghosts “exist”, something exists in the brain of a human who says “ghost”. That something is a mental structure, which is either ultimately grounded in correlations between various sensory perceptions, or is ungrounded. So the real problem isn’t whether ghosts “exist”; it’s whether the concept “ghost” is grounded, meaning that the thinker defines ghosts in some way that relates them to correlations in sense perceptions. A person who thinks ghosts fly, moan, and are translucent white with fuzzy borders, has a grounded concept of ghost. A person who says “ghost” and means “soul” has an ungrounded concept of ghost.

  Ungrounded concepts are a kind of noise or error in a representational system. Ungrounded concepts give rise to other ungrounded concepts, as “soul” gave rise to things like “purity”, “perfection”, and “holiness”. I think it highly probable that grounded concepts suppress ungrounded concepts, because all the grounded concepts usually provide evidence for the correctness of the other grounded concepts. So probably sane humans using statistical proofs don’t have to worry much about whether every last concept of theirs is grounded, but as the number of ungrounded concepts increases, there is a tipping point beyond which the ungrounded concepts can be forged into a self-consistent but psychotic system such as Platonism, Catholicism, or post-modernism, at which point they suppress the grounded concepts.

  Sorry that I’m not taking the time to express these things clearly. I don’t have the time today, but I thought it was important to point out that this post is diving back into the 19th-century continental grappling with Kant, with the same basic presupposition that led 19th-century continental philosophers to madness. TL;DR: AI safety can’t rely on proving statements made in human or other symbolic languages to be True or False, nor on having complete knowledge about the world.

• PhilGoetzAug 1, 2023, 3:32 PM

  2 points

  on: Progress, hu­man­ism, agency: An in­tel­lec­tual core for the progress movement

  When you write of A belief in human agency, it’s important to distinguish between the different conceptions of human agency on offer, corresponding to the 3 main political groups:

  • The openly religious or reactionary statists say that human agency should mean humans acting as the agents of God. (These are a subset of your fatalists. Other fatalists are generally apolitical.)

  • The covertly religious or progressive statists say human agency can only mean humans acting as agents of the State (which has the moral authority and magical powers of God). This is partly because they think individual humans are powerless and/​or stupid, and partly because, ontologically, they don’t believe individual humans exist, where to exist is to have an eternal Platonic Form. (Plato was notoriously vague on why each human has an individual soul, when every other category of thing in the world has only one collective category soul; and people in the Platonic line of thought have wavered back and forth over this for millenia.) This includes Rousseau, Hegel, Marx, and the Social Justice movement.

    • The Nazis IMHO fall into both categories at the same time, showing how blurry and insignificant the lines between these 2 categories are. Most progressives are actually reactionaries, as most believe in the concept of “perfection”, and that perfection is the natural state of all things in the absence of evil actors, so that their “progress” is towards either a mythical past perfection in exactly the same way as that of the Nazis, or towards a perfection that was predestined at creation, as in left Hegelians such as Marxists and Unitarian Universalists.

  • The empiricists believe that individual humans can and should each have their own individual agency. (The reasons why empiricist epistemology is naturally opposed to statism is too complex for me to explain right now. It has to do with the kind of ontology that leads to statism being incompatible with empirical investigation and individual freedom, and opposition to individual freedom being incompatible with effective empirical investigation.)

  Someone who wants us united under a document written by desert nomads 3000 years ago, or someone who wants the government to force their “solutions” down our throats and keep forcing them no matter how many people die, would also say they believe in human agency; but they don’t want private individuals to have agency.

  This is a difficult but critical point. Big progressive projects, like flooding desert basins, must be collective. But movements that focus on collective agency inevitably embrace, if only subconsciously, the notion of a collective soul. This already happened to us in 2010, when a large part of the New Atheist movement split off and joined the Social Justice movement, and quickly came to hate free speech, free markets, and free thought.

  I think it’s obvious that the enormous improvements in material living standards in the last ~200 years you wrote of was caused by the Enlightenment, and can be summarized as the understanding of how liberating individuals leads to economic and social progress. Whereas modernist attempts to deliberately cause economic and social progress are usually top-down and require suppressing individuals, and so cause the reverse of what they intend. This is the great trap that we must not fall into, and it hinges on our conception of human agency.

  A great step forward, or backwards (towards Athens), was made by the founders of America when they created a nation based in part on the idea of competition and compromise as being good rather than bad, basically by applying Adam Smith’s invisible hand to both economics and politics. One way forward is to understand how to do large projects that have a noble purpose. That is, progressive capitalism. Another way would be to understand how governments have sometimes managed to do great things, like NASA’s Apollo project, without them degenerating into economic and social disasters like Stalin’s or Mao’s 5-Year-Plans. Either way, how you conceptualize human agency will be a decisive factor in whether you produce heaven or hell.

• PhilGoetzApr 10, 2023, 4:47 PM

  −10 points

  in reply to: Phil_Goetz5’s comment on: That Tiny Note of Discord

  It sounds like I didn’t consider the possibility that Eliezer isn’t trying to be moral—that his concern about AI replacing humans is just self-interested racism, with no need for moral justification beyond the will to power.

• PhilGoetzJan 15, 2023, 3:29 AM

  29 points

  38

  in reply to: Valentine’s comment on: Here’s the exit.

  I think it would be more-graceful of you to just admit that it is possible that there may be more than one reason for people to be in terror of the end of the world, and likewise qualify your other claims to certainty and universality.

  That’s the main point of what gjm wrote. I’m sympathetic to the view you’re trying to communicate, Valentine; but you used words that claim that what you say is absolute, immutable truth, and that’s the worst mind-killer of all. Everything you wrote just above seems to me to be just equivocation trying to deny that technical yet critical point.

  I understand that you think that’s just a quibble, but it really, really isn’t. Claiming privileged access to absolute truth on LessWrong is like using the N-word in a speech to the NAACP. It would do no harm to what you wanted to say to use phrases like “many people” or even “most people” instead of the implicit “all people”, and it would eliminate a lot of pushback.

• PhilGoetzNov 19, 2022, 3:15 AM

  14 points

  3

  in reply to: Alexander Gietelink Oldenziel’s comment on: Alexan­der Gietelink Ol­den­z­iel’s Shortform

  I say that knowing particular kinds of math, the kind that let you model the world more-precisely, and that give you a theory of error, isn’t like knowing another language. It’s like knowing language at all. Learning these types of math gives you as much of an effective intelligence boost over people who don’t, as learning a spoken language gives you above people who don’t know any language (e.g., many deaf-mutes in earlier times).

  The kinds of math I mean include:

  • how to count things in an unbiased manner; the methodology of polls and other data-gathering

  • how to actually make a claim, as opposed to what most people do, which is to make a claim that’s useless because it lacks quantification or quantifiers

    • A good example of this is the claims in the IPCC 2015 report that I wrote some comments on recently. Most of them say things like, “Global warming will make X worse”, where you already know that OF COURSE global warming will make X worse, but you only care how much worse.

    • More generally, any claim of the type “All X are Y” or “No X are Y”, e.g., “Capitalists exploit the working class”, shouldn’t be considered claims at all, and can accomplish nothing except foment arguments.

  • the use of probabilities and error measures

  • probability distributions: flat, normal, binomial, poisson, and power-law

  • entropy measures and other information theory

  • predictive error-minimization models like regression

  • statistical tests and how to interpret them

  These things are what I call the correct Platonic forms. The Platonic forms were meant to be perfect models for things found on earth. These kinds of math actually are. The concept of “perfect” actually makes sense for them, as opposed to for Earthly categories like “human”, “justice”, etc., for which believing that the concept of “perfect” is coherent demonstrably drives people insane and causes them to come up with things like Christianity.

  They are, however, like Aristotle’s Forms, in that the universals have no existence on their own, but are (like the circle , but even more like the normal distribution ) perfect models which arise from the accumulation of endless imperfect instantiations of them.

  There are plenty of important questions that are beyond the capability of the unaided human mind to ever answer, yet which are simple to give correct statistical answers to once you know how to gather data and do a multiple regression. Also, the use of these mathematical techniques will force you to phrase the answer sensibly, e.g., “We cannot reject the hypothesis that the average homicide rate under strict gun control and liberal gun control are the same with more than 60% confidence” rather than “Gun control is good.”

  What links here?

  • In­ter­est in Leet­code, but for Ra­tion­al­ity? by Gregory (Oct 16, 2024, 5:54 PM; 74 points)

• PhilGoetzNov 19, 2022, 2:40 AM

  4 points

  2

  in reply to: Daniel Kokotajlo’s comment on: Daniel Koko­ta­jlo’s Shortform

  Agree. Though I don’t think Turing ever intended that test to be used. I think what he wanted to accomplish with his paper was to operationalize “intelligence”. When he published it, if you asked somebody “Could a computer be intelligent?”, they’d have responded with a religious argument about it not having a soul, or free will, or consciousness. Turing sneakily got people to look past their metaphysics, and ask the question in terms of the computer program’s behavior. THAT was what was significant about that paper.

• PhilGoetz 19 Nov 2022 2:35 UTC

  6 points

  in reply to: Gunnar_Zarncke’s comment on: Gun­nar_Zarncke’s Shortform

  It’s a great question. I’m sure I’ve read something about that, possibly in some pop book like Thinking, Fast & Slow. What I read was an evaluation of the relationship of IQ to wealth, and the takeaway was that your economic success depends more on the average IQ in your country than it does on your personal IQ. It may have been an entire book rather than an article.

  Google turns up this 2010 study from Science. The summaries you’ll see there are sharply self-contradictory.

  First comes an unexplained box called “The Meeting of Minds”, which I’m guessing is an editorial commentary on the article, and it says, “The primary contributors to c appear to be the g factors of the group members, along with a propensity toward social sensitivity.”

  Next is the article’s abstract, which says, “This “c factor” is not strongly correlated with the average or maximum individual intelligence of group members but is correlated with the average social sensitivity of group members, the equality in distribution of conversational turn-taking, and the proportion of females in the group.”

  These summaries directly contradict each other: Is g a primary contributor, or not a contributor at all?

  I’m guessing the study of group IQ is strongly politically biased, with Hegelians (both “right” and “left”) and other communitarians, wanting to show that individual IQs are unimportant, and individualists and free-market economists wanting to show that they’re important.

• PhilGoetz 8 Nov 2022 0:21 UTC

  6 points

  0

  in reply to: Zack_M_Davis’s comment on: Where I agree and dis­agree with Eliezer

  But what makes you so confident that it’s not possible for subject-matter experts to have correct intuitions that outpace their ability to articulate legible explanations to others?

  That’s irrelevant, because what Richard wrote was a truism. An Eliezer who understands his own confidence in his ideas will “always” be better at inspiring confidence in those ideas in others. Richard’s statement leads to a conclusion of import (Eliezer should develop arguments to defend his intuitions) precisely because it’s correct whether Eliezer’s intuitions are correct or incorrect.

• PhilGoetz 18 Sep 2022 14:33 UTC

  8 points

  2

  in reply to: romeostevensit’s comment on: The Debtor’s Revolt

  The way to dig the bottom deeper today is to get government bailouts, like bailing out companies or lenders, and like Biden’s recent tuition debt repayment bill. Bailouts are especially perverse because they give people who get into debt a competitive advantage over people who don’t, in an unpredictable manner that encourages people to see taking out a loan as a lottery ticket.

• PhilGoetz 1 Apr 2022 17:57 UTC

  12 points

  on: Re­plac­ing Karma with Good Heart To­kens (Worth $1!)

  Finding a way for people to make money by posting good ideas is a great idea.

  Saying that it should be based on the goodness of the people and how much they care is a terrible idea. Privileging goodness and caring over reason is the most well-trodden path to unreason. This is LessWrong. I go to fimfiction for rainbows and unicorns.

• PhilGoetz 3 Nov 2021 14:53 UTC

  10 points

  0

  in reply to: [deleted]’s comment on: The Cluster Struc­ture of Thingspace

  No; most philosophers today do, I think, believe that the alleged humanity of 9-fingered instances *homo sapiens* is a serious philosophical problem. It comes up in many “intro to philosophy” or “philosophy of science” texts or courses. Post-modernist arguments rely heavily on the belief that any sort of categorization which has any exceptions is completely invalid.

• PhilGoetz 3 Nov 2021 14:31 UTC

  13 points

  0

  on: The Cluster Struc­ture of Thingspace

  I’m glad to see Eliezer addressed this point. This post doesn’t get across how absolutely critical it is to understand that {categories always have exceptions, and that’s okay}. Understanding this demolishes nearly all Western philosophy since Socrates (who, along with Parmenides, Heraclitus, Pythagoras, and a few others, corrupted Greek “philosophy” from the natural science of Thales and Anaximander, who studied the world to understand it, into a kind of theology, in which one dictates to the world what it must be like).

  Many philosophers have recognized that Aristotle’s conception of categories fails; but most still assumed that that’s how categories must work in order to be “real”, and so proving that categories don’t work that way proved that categorizations “aren’t real”. They them became monists, like the Hindus /​ Buddhists /​ Parmenides /​ post-modernists. The way to avoid this is to understand nominalism, which dissolves the philosophical understanding of that quoted word “real”, and which I hope Eliezer has also explained somewhere.