What I meant to say is “morality is absolute as reality.” I hope that clears everything.
Given that I experience God or anything supernatural empirically and I can reasonably exclude that I am suffering from hallucinations, then it is more probable for me to believe that the phenomena was supernatural rather than an improbable quantum mechanical phenonemon. Maybe what I call God is actually Frud. Maybe God “is a tuna sandwich I once made that had a special property, it created the universe, past and future.” I don’t expect to realise all of God’s properties from a single experience.
Predictive power is not always required. Historians have quite a problem predicting things based on what they read on Caesar. You can’t thus say that there are no historical facts (fact as factual as in “objective” news reporting).
You point out a context that does not require predictive power, but you have not shown that this context is equivalent to testing for God’s existence empirically. Without a common context, your example is irrelevant to the issue.
I don’t get you. What is your understanding of “testing for God’s existence empirically?”
I did read the article “No Universal Argument” you linked to and couldn’t find any convincing rebuttal to my arguments.
I just read “Making Beliefs Pay Rent” and if I got it right, then it says that science is good (and absolute) because it can predict things while normative theories don’t. That is a good point.
My belief in an absolute morality gives me the foundation to enquire moral problems. I’ll try to figure out what the “absoulute good” is and try to life my life according to that.
We can predict and explain the “decision-making” of inanimate objects using scientific theories. We can understand the decision-making of moral agents (humans) using normative theories (we might be able to predict their actions using scientific theories, but we won’t understand or *explain” it without normative theories).
What about alien intelligence? If we can establish an intersubjective consensus with them and we realise that they have a value system that we can understand, then we can use our own system of normative theories to understand and explain their “decision-making”.
If we can’t establish an intersubjective consensus with them, then we might be able to predict their actions using scientific theories, but we won’t be able to understand their “motives”. They would act according to an absolute AI-morality, to which we have no access lacking the intersubjective consensus with them.
To recap and rectify my argument: Intersubjective consensus of the physical world leads us to believe in an absolute physical reality. Intersubjective consensus of the moral/value world leads us to believe in an absolute morality. No intersubjective consensus—no belief in absolute whatever.
Maybe, and I believe, the moral world is an emergent property of the physical world. Thus, we might be able to use physical theories to predict the actions of moral agents within the physical world, but we won’t be able to fully understand it only using physical theories since these don’t capture the emergent properties (values, desires, dislikes, et cetera).
Therefore, morality is not as absolute as reality, but it is analogously absolute. (That is/might be a correction to my current position.)
So, if alien intelligence has a value system that we can understand, then we live within the same absolute morality. If alien intelligence acts based on some other emergent properties we cannot understand, then well, bad luck. (Another additon to my current position, thanks to this discussion.)
That’s unfortunate, I thought you saw where I was coming from.