unless it can be shown that either are exemplified.
The literature suggests that p-zombies can be significant if they are only conceptually possible. In fact, zombie theorists like Chalmers think they are naturalistically impossible and so cannot be exemplified. You may not like arguments from conceptiual possibility, but he has argued for his views, where you have so far only expressed opinion.
Then the literature suggests that magicians can be significant if they are only conceptually possible. And the conceptual possibility of non-physicalism disproves physicalism.
Magicians are defined as physically identical to humans and p-zombies but they have magic. Magic has no physical effects, doesn’t even trigger neurons, but humans with magic experience it and regular humans and p-zombies don’t.
So it has all of the characteristics of qualia. Any evidence for qualia is also evidence for this type of magic.
Yes. The argument of the grandparent is logically consistent AFAICT.
P-zombies are (Non-self-contradictory) IFF qualia comes from nonlogics and nonphysics.
Qualia comes from nonlogics and nonphysics IFF nonlogics and nonphysics are possible. (this is trivially obvious)
P(Magicians | “nonlogics and nonphysics are possible”) > P(Magicians | ¬”nonlogics and nonphysics are possible”)
ETA: That last one is probably misleading / badly written. Is there a proper symbol for “No definite observation of X or ¬X”, AKA the absence of this piece of evidence?
If qualia is defined such that is is conceptually possible that one person can experience qualia while a physically identical person cannot the other does not, then qualia are defined to be non physical.
Didn’t we have his exact same argument? Even if qualia are generated by our (physical) brains, this doesn’t mean that they could counterfactually be epiphenomenal if something was reproducing the effects they have on our bodies.
The same could be said of cats: Even if cats are part of the physical universe, they could counterfactually be epiphenomenal if something was reproducing the effects they have on the world.
How does the argument apply to qualia and not to cats?
Generating effects indistinguishable from the result of an ordinary cat—from reflected light to half-eaten mice. Of course, there are a few … extra effects in there. So you know none of you are ordinary cats.
The epiphenomenal cats, on the other hand, are completely undetectable. Except to themselves.
I’m not granting cats a point of view for this discussion: they are something that we can agree clearly exists and we can describe their boundaries with a fair degree of precision.
What do these ‘extra effects’ look like, and are they themselves proof that physicalism is wrong?
The whole point was that if the cats have a point of view, then they have the information to posit themselves; even though an outside observer wouldn’t.
It’s subjective information. I can’t exactly show my qualia to you; I can describe them, but so can a p-zombie.
Didn’t I say I wasn’t going to discuss qualia with you until you actually knew what they were? Because you’re starting to look like a troll here. Not saying you are one, but …
So, you’re saying that it is subjective whether qualia have a point of view, or the ability to posit themselves?
Because I have all of the observations needed to say that cats exist, even if they don’t technically exist. I do not have the observations needed to say that there is a non-physical component to subjective experience.
Y’know, I did say I wasn’t going to discuss qualia with you unless you knew what they were. Do some damn research, then come back here and start arguments about them.
I’m very confused. Are you implying that experiencing qualia is no reason to posit that qualia exists, period?
Or maybe you’re just saying “Hey, unless the cats have conscious self-aware minds that can experience cats, then they still can’t either!”—which I took for granted and assumed the jump from there to “assuming cats have the required mental parts” was a trivial inference to make.
OK, it’s just that the statement “if something is reproducing the effect of cats on the world we have no reason to posit cats as existing” declares that something that is not really a “cat” the way we perceive it, but only an “effect of a cat”, then it does not “exist”. Ergo, if you are only an effect of a cat, you don’t exist as a cat.
Maybe your objection is that we should taboo and dissolve that whole “existing” thing?
Wouldn’t that be nice, but unfortunately EY-style realism and my version of instrumentalism seem to diverge at that definition.
Re qualia, I don’t understand what you are asking. The term means no more to me than a subroutine in a reasonably complex computer program, if currently run on a different substrate.
And, if I understand correctly, this subroutine exists (and is felt / has effect on its host program) whether or not it “exists as qualia” in the particular sense that some clever arguer wants to define qualia as anything other than that subroutine. The fact that there is an effect of the subroutine is all that is required for the subroutine to exist in the first sense, while whether it is “the subroutine” or only a mimicking effect is only relevant for the second sense of “exist”, which is irrelevant to you.
In this case, feel free to assume no-one ever tries to observe cat brains. The “simulation” only has to reproduce your actions, which it does with magic.
Oh, well there’s your problem then. You’re not part of “the effect of cats”. That’s stuff like air displacement, reflected light, purring, that sort of thing.
If you’re using some nonstandard epistemology that doesn’t distinguish between observations that point to something and the thing itself, then nothing. Otherwise the difference between a liar and a reality warper.
Interesting point. Observations are certainly effects, but you’re right, not all effects are observations. Of course, the example wouldn’t be hurt by my specifying that they only bother faking effects that will lead to observations ;)
the example wouldn’t be hurt by my specifying that they only bother faking effects that will lead to observations ;)
I think it would. I think it’s not the same example at all anymore.
Something that reproduces all effects of cats is effectively producing all the molecular interactions and neurons and flesh and blood and fur that we think are what produces our observations of cats.
On the other hand, something that only reproduces the effects that lead directly to observations is, in its simplest form, something that analyzes minds and finds out where to inject data into them to make these minds have the experiences of the presence of cats, and analyzes what other things in the world a would-be-cat would change, and just change those directly (i.e. if a cat would’ve drank milk and produced feline excrement, then milk disappears and feline excrement appears, and a human’s brain is modified such that the experience of seeing a cat drink milk and make poo is simulated).
Something that reproduces all effects of cats is effectively producing all the molecular interactions and neurons and flesh and blood and fur
Not unless something is somehow interacting with their neurons, which I stated isn’t happening for simplicity, and most of the time not for the blood or flesh.
On the other hand, something that only reproduces the effects that lead directly to observations is, in its simplest form, something that analyzes minds and finds out where to inject data into them to make these minds have the experiences of the presence of cats, and analyzes what other things in the world a would-be-cat would change, and just change those directly (i.e. if a cat would’ve drank milk and produced feline excrement, then milk disappears and feline excrement appears, and a human’s brain is modified such that the experience of seeing a cat drink milk and make poo is simulated).
Oh, I meant the interactions occur where they would if the cat was real, but these increasingly-godlike fairies are lazy and don’t bother producing them if their magic tells them it wouldn’t lead to an observation.
My (admittedly lacking) understanding of Information Theory precludes any possibility of perfectly reproducing all effects of the presence of cats throughout the universe (or multiverse or whatever) without having in some form or another a perfect model or simulation of all the individual interactions of the base elements which cats are made of. This would, as it contains the same patterns within the model which when made of “physical matter” produce cats, essentially still produce cats.
So if there’s a mechanism somewhere making sure that the reproduction is perfect, it’s almost certainly (to my knowledge) “simulating” the cats in some manner, in which case the cats are in that simulation and perceive the same experiences they would if they were “really” there in atoms instead of being in the simulation.
If you posit some kind of ontologically basic entity that somehow magically makes a universal consistency check for the exact worldstates that could plausibly be computed if the cat were present, without actually simulating any cat, then sure… but I think that’s also not the same problem anymore. And it requires accepting a magical premise.
Oh, right. Yup, anything simulating you that perfectly is gonna be conscious—but it might be using magic. For example, perhaps they pull their data out of parallel universe where you ARE real. Or maybe they use some black-swan technique you can’t even imagine. They’re fairies, for godssake. And you’re an invisible cat. Don’t fight the counterfactual.
Haha, that one made me laugh. Yes, it’s fighting the counterfactual a bit, but I think that this is one of the reasons why there was a chasm of misunderstandings in this and other sub-threads.
Anyway, I don’t see any tangible things left to discuss here.
Oh, you mean we shouldn’t assume we’re the same as the other cats. Obviously there’s some possibility that we’re unique, but (assuming our body is “simulated” as well, obviously) it seems like all “cats” probably contain epiphenomenal cats as well. Do you think everyone else is a p-zombie? Obviously it’s a remote possibility, but...
Oh, you mean we shouldn’t assume we’re the same as the other cats.
No, I did not mean that, unless one finds some good evidence supporting this additional assumption. My point was quite the opposite, that your statement “if something is reproducing the effect of cats on the world we have no reason to posit cats as existing” does not need a qualifier.
No, I did not mean that, unless one finds some good evidence supporting this additional assumption. My point was quite the opposite, that your statement “if something is reproducing the effect of cats on the world we have no reason to posit cats as existing” does not need a qualifier.
Look, if all “cats” are actually magical fairies using their magic to reproduce the effect of cats, yet I find myself as a cat—whose effect on the world consists of a fairy pretending to be me so well even I don’t notice (except just now, obviously.). Thus, for the one epiphenomenal cat I can know about—myself—I am associated with a “cat” that perfectly duplicates my actions. I can’t check if all “cats” have similar cats attached, since they would be epiphenomenal, but it seems likely, based on myself, that there are.
Do you think everyone else is a p-zombie?
Not sure why you bring that silly concept up...
Because the whole point of this cat metaphor was to make a point about p-zombies. That’s what they are. They’re p-zombies for cats instead of qualia.
Because the whole point of this cat metaphor was to make a point about p-zombies. That’s what they are. They’re p-zombies for cats instead of qualia.
Well, the point was to point out that we only think things exist because we experience them, and therefore that anything which duplicates the experience is as real as the original artifact.
Suppose there were to be no cats, but only a magical fairy which knocks things from the mantlepiece and causes us to hallucinate in a consistent manner (among other things). There is no reason to consider that world distinguishable, even in principle, from the standard model.
Now, suppose that you couldn’t see cats, but instead could see the ‘cat fairy’. What is different now, assuming that the cat fairy is working properly and providing identical sensory input as the cats?
There are two differences: the presence of the fairy (which can be observed … somehow) and the possibility of deviating from the mind. P-zombies are described as acting just like humans, but lack consciousness. “Cats” are generally like the human counterparts to p-zombies (who act just the same—by definition—but have epiphenomenal consciousness.)
TL;DR: it’s observable in principle. But I, as author, have decreed that you arn’t getting to check if your friends are cats as well as “cats”.
Y’know, I’m starting to think this may have been a poor example. It’s a little complicated.
If the fairy is observable despite being in principle not observable… I break.
If it is in principle possible to experience differently from what a quantum scan of the brain and body would indicate, but behave in accordance with physicalism … how would you know if what you experienced was different from what you thought you experienced, or if what you thought was different from what you honestly claimed that you thought?
That would seem to be close to several types of abnormal brain function, where a person describes themself as not in control of their body. I think those cases are better explained by abnormal internal brain communication, but further direct evidence may show that the ‘reasoning’ and ‘acting’ portions of some person are connected similarly enough to normal brains that they should be working the same way, but aren’t. If there is a demonstrated case either of a pattern of neurons firing corresponding to similar behavior in all typical brains and a different behavior in a class of brains of people with such abnormal functioning (or in physically similar neurons firing differently under similar stimuli), then I would accept that as evidence that the fairy perceived by those people existed.
If the fairy is observable despite being in principle not observable… I break.
It’s observable. The cats are epiphenomenal, and thus unobservable, except to themselves.
If it is in principle possible to experience differently from what a quantum scan of the brain and body would indicate, but behave in accordance with physicalism … how would you know if what you experienced was different from what you thought you experienced, or if what you thought was different from what you honestly claimed that you thought?
Pardon?
That would seem to be close to several types of abnormal brain function, where a person describes themself as not in control of their body. I think those cases are better explained by abnormal internal brain communication, but further direct evidence may show that the ‘reasoning’ and ‘acting’ portions of some person are connected similarly enough to normal brains that they should be working the same way, but aren’t. If there is a demonstrated case either of a pattern of neurons firing corresponding to similar behavior in all typical brains and a different behavior in a class of brains of people with such abnormal functioning (or in physically similar neurons firing differently under similar stimuli), then I would accept that as evidence that the fairy perceived by those people existed.
Well, if they can tell you what the problem is then they clearly have some control. More to the point, it is a known feature of the environment that all observed cats are actually illusions produced by fairies. It is a fact, although not generally known, that there are also epiphenomenal (although acted upon by the environment) cats; these exist in exactly the same space as the illusions and act exactly the same way. If you are a human, this is all fine and dandy, if bizarre. But if you are a sentient cat (roll with it) then you have evidence of the epiphenomenal cats, even though this evidence is inherently subjective (since presumably the illusions are also seemingly sentient, in this case.)
If it is in principle possible to experience differently from what a quantum scan of the brain and body would indicate, but behave in accordance with physicalism … how would you know if what you experienced was different from what you thought you experienced, or if what you thought was different from what you honestly claimed that you thought?
Pardon?
How could you tell if you were experiencing something differently from the way a p-zombie would (or, if you are a p-zombie, if you were experiencing something differently from the way a human would)?
But if you are a sentient cat (roll with it) then you have evidence of the epiphenomenal cats, even though this evidence is inherently subjective (since presumably the illusions are also seemingly sentient, in this case.)
In every meaningful way, the cat fairy is a cat. There is no way for an epiphenomenal sentient cat to differentiate itself from a cat fairy, nor any way for a cat fairy to differentiate itself from whatever portions of ‘cats’ it controls (without violating the constraints on cat fairy behavior). Of course, there’s also the conceivability of epiphenomenal sentient ghosts which cannot have any effect on the world but still observe. (That’s one of my death nightmares—remaining fully perceptive and cognitive but unable to act in any way.)
You seem to be somewhat confused about the notion of a p-zombie. A p-zombie is something physically identical to a human, but without consciousness. A p-zombie does not experience anything in any way at all. P-zombies are probably self-contradictory.
How could you tell if you were experiencing something differently from the way a p-zombie would (or, if you are a p-zombie, if you were experiencing something differently from the way a human would)?
I am experiencing something, therefore I am not a p-zombie.
Consider the possibility that you are not experiencing everything that humans do. Can you provide any evidence, even to yourself, that you are? Could a p-zombie provide that same evidence?
Are you asking what I would experience? Because I wouldn’t. Not to mention that such a thing can’t happen if, as I expect, subjective experience arises from physics.
i you cannot find any experimental differences betweenn you and a you NOT experiencing
I cannot present you with evidence that I am experiencing, except maybe by analogy with yourself. I, however, know that I experience because I experience it.
How could you tell if you were experiencing something differently from the way a p-zombie would (or, if you are a p-zombie, if you were experiencing something differently from the way a human would)?
Because p-zombies aren’t conscious. By definition.
In every meaningful way, the cat fairy is a cat. There is no way for an epiphenomenal sentient cat to differentiate itself from a cat fairy, nor any way for a cat fairy to differentiate itself from whatever portions of ‘cats’ it controls (without violating the constraints on cat fairy behavior). Of course, there’s also the conceivability of epiphenomenal sentient ghosts which cannot have any effect on the world but still observe. (That’s one of my death nightmares—remaining fully perceptive and cognitive but unable to act in any way.)
Well, the cat does have an associated cat fairy. So, since the only cat fairy who’s e-cat it could observe (its own) has one, I think it should rightly conclude that all cat fairies have cats. But yes, epiphenomenal sentient “ghosts” are possible, and indeed the p-zombie hypothesis requires that the regular humans are in fact such ghosts. They just don’t notice. Yes, there are people arguing this is true in the real world, although not all of them have worked out the implications.
Now conceive of something which is similar to consciousness, but distinct; like consciousness, it has no physical effects on the world, and like consciousness, anyone who has it experiences it in a manner distinct from their physicality. Call this ‘magic’, and people who posses it ‘magi’.
What aspect does magic lack that consciousness has, such that a p-zombie cannot consider if it is conscious, but a human can ask if they are a magi?
Who said consciousness has no effects on the physical world? Apart from those idiots making the p-zombie argument that is. Pretty much everyone here thinks that’s nonsense, including me and, statistically, probably srn347 (although you never know, I guess.)
Regarding your Magi, if it affects their brain, it’s not epiphenomenal. So there’s that.
And the point I am trying to make is that p-zombies are not only a coherent idea, but compatible with human-standard brains as generally modelled on LW. That they don’t in any way demonstrate the point they were intended to make is quite another thing.
And the point I am trying to make is that p-zombies are not only a coherent idea, but compatible with human-standard brains as generally modelled on LW.
Yes, it merely requires redefining things like ‘conscious’ or ‘experience’ (whatever you decide p-zombies do not have) to be something epiphenomenal and incidentally non-existent.
Um, could you please explain this comment? I think there’s a fair chance you’ve stumbled into the middle of this discussion and don’t know what I’m actually talking about (except that it involves p-zombies, I guess.)
I think there’s a fair chance you’ve stumbled into the middle of this discussion and don’t know what I’m actually talking about (except that it involves p-zombies, I guess.)
I know only the words spoken, not those intended. (And concluded early in the conversation that the entire subthread should be truncated and replaced with a link). So much confusion and muddled thinking!)
Seems reasonable. For reference, then, I suggested the analogous thought experiment of fairies using magic to reproduce all the effects of cats on the environment. Also, there are epiphenomenal ghost cats that occupy the same space and are otherwise identical to the fairies’ illusions, down to the subatomic level. An outside observer would, of course, have no reason to postulate these epiphenomenal cats, but if the cats themselves were somehow conscious, they would.
This was intended to help with understanding p-zombies, since it avoids the … confusing … aspects.
Well, I personally find it an interesting concept. It’s basically a reformulation of standard Sequences stuff, though, so it shouldn’t be surprising, at least ’round here.
Unless you actually understand what “qualia” means, I’m not going to bother discussing the topic with you. If you have, if fact, done the basic research necessary to discuss p-zombies, than I’m probably misinterpreting you in some way. But I don’t think I am.
The literature suggests that p-zombies can be significant if they are only conceptually possible. In fact, zombie theorists like Chalmers think they are naturalistically impossible and so cannot be exemplified. You may not like arguments from conceptiual possibility, but he has argued for his views, where you have so far only expressed opinion.
Then the literature suggests that magicians can be significant if they are only conceptually possible. And the conceptual possibility of non-physicalism disproves physicalism.
The literature does not talk about magicians.
Magicians are defined as physically identical to humans and p-zombies but they have magic. Magic has no physical effects, doesn’t even trigger neurons, but humans with magic experience it and regular humans and p-zombies don’t.
So it has all of the characteristics of qualia. Any evidence for qualia is also evidence for this type of magic.
No.Qulia are not defined as epiphenomenal or non physical.
Yes. The argument of the grandparent is logically consistent AFAICT.
P-zombies are (Non-self-contradictory) IFF qualia comes from nonlogics and nonphysics.
Qualia comes from nonlogics and nonphysics IFF nonlogics and nonphysics are possible. (this is trivially obvious)
P(Magicians | “nonlogics and nonphysics are possible”) > P(Magicians | ¬”nonlogics and nonphysics are possible”)
ETA: That last one is probably misleading / badly written. Is there a proper symbol for “No definite observation of X or ¬X”, AKA the absence of this piece of evidence?
If qualia is defined such that is is conceptually possible that one person can experience qualia while a physically identical person cannot the other does not, then qualia are defined to be non physical.
No, they are just implied to be. There is an infinty of facts implied by the definition of “2” but they are not in the definiion, which is finite.
Didn’t we have his exact same argument? Even if qualia are generated by our (physical) brains, this doesn’t mean that they could counterfactually be epiphenomenal if something was reproducing the effects they have on our bodies.
The same could be said of cats: Even if cats are part of the physical universe, they could counterfactually be epiphenomenal if something was reproducing the effects they have on the world.
How does the argument apply to qualia and not to cats?
Gravity!
I think I’m seeing a pattern in this topic of discussion. And it is reminiscent of a certain single-sided geometric figure.
Well, if something is reproducing the effect of cats on the world we have no reason to posit cats as existing anyway, unless we are cats.
What about all of the observations of cats? Aren’t they adequate reason to posit cats as existing?
Um, no. Not if something is reproducing them.
Taboo ‘reproducing’.
Generating effects indistinguishable from the result of an ordinary cat—from reflected light to half-eaten mice. Of course, there are a few … extra effects in there. So you know none of you are ordinary cats.
The epiphenomenal cats, on the other hand, are completely undetectable. Except to themselves.
I’m not granting cats a point of view for this discussion: they are something that we can agree clearly exists and we can describe their boundaries with a fair degree of precision.
What do these ‘extra effects’ look like, and are they themselves proof that physicalism is wrong?
The whole point was that if the cats have a point of view, then they have the information to posit themselves; even though an outside observer wouldn’t.
Are you saying that qualia have a point of view, or are positing themselves?
It’s subjective information. I can’t exactly show my qualia to you; I can describe them, but so can a p-zombie.
Didn’t I say I wasn’t going to discuss qualia with you until you actually knew what they were? Because you’re starting to look like a troll here. Not saying you are one, but …
So, you’re saying that it is subjective whether qualia have a point of view, or the ability to posit themselves?
Because I have all of the observations needed to say that cats exist, even if they don’t technically exist. I do not have the observations needed to say that there is a non-physical component to subjective experience.
Who’s talking about non-physical components? “Qualia” has more than one meaning.
Y’know, I did say I wasn’t going to discuss qualia with you unless you knew what they were. Do some damn research, then come back here and start arguments about them.
or even if we were.
I’m very confused. Are you implying that experiencing qualia is no reason to posit that qualia exists, period?
Or maybe you’re just saying “Hey, unless the cats have conscious self-aware minds that can experience cats, then they still can’t either!”—which I took for granted and assumed the jump from there to “assuming cats have the required mental parts” was a trivial inference to make.
I just don’t see the need for the exception in MugaSofer’s statement, whether you agree with the statement itself or not.
So if something were shown to be reproducing the effect of human minds on the world, you would have no reason to posit yourself as existing anyway?
If you are an artifact of such a reproduction, would you call yourself existing in the same way as if you weren’t?
I would.
That’s a bit why I’m confused as to why you’re (it seems to me) claiming we have no reason to posit self-existence in such a case.
Maybe your objection is that we should taboo and dissolve that whole “existing” thing?
OK, it’s just that the statement “if something is reproducing the effect of cats on the world we have no reason to posit cats as existing” declares that something that is not really a “cat” the way we perceive it, but only an “effect of a cat”, then it does not “exist”. Ergo, if you are only an effect of a cat, you don’t exist as a cat.
Wouldn’t that be nice, but unfortunately EY-style realism and my version of instrumentalism seem to diverge at that definition.
Oh. Then we agree, I think, on the fundamentals of what makes a cat “exist” or not.
Does this also imply the same exist-”exist” perception problem with qualia in your model, or am I horribly misinterpreting your thoughts?
Re qualia, I don’t understand what you are asking. The term means no more to me than a subroutine in a reasonably complex computer program, if currently run on a different substrate.
And, if I understand correctly, this subroutine exists (and is felt / has effect on its host program) whether or not it “exists as qualia” in the particular sense that some clever arguer wants to define qualia as anything other than that subroutine. The fact that there is an effect of the subroutine is all that is required for the subroutine to exist in the first sense, while whether it is “the subroutine” or only a mimicking effect is only relevant for the second sense of “exist”, which is irrelevant to you.
Is this an accurate description?
Pretty much, as I don’t consider this “second sense” to be well defined.
But I specifically stated you were a cat, not an effect of a cat.
I’m not sure how to tell the difference, or even if there is one.
In this case, feel free to assume no-one ever tries to observe cat brains. The “simulation” only has to reproduce your actions, which it does with magic.
Could you taboo the bolded phrase, please?
Sure. an artifact of such a reproduction = whatever you mean by “effect of cats” in your original statement.
Oh, well there’s your problem then. You’re not part of “the effect of cats”. That’s stuff like air displacement, reflected light, purring, that sort of thing.
Where do effects of cats stop and cats begin?
If you’re using some nonstandard epistemology that doesn’t distinguish between observations that point to something and the thing itself, then nothing. Otherwise the difference between a liar and a reality warper.
Looks like we have an insurmountable inferential distance problem both ways, so I’ll stop here.
Fair enough.
Careful, effects are not the same things as observations.
Interesting point. Observations are certainly effects, but you’re right, not all effects are observations. Of course, the example wouldn’t be hurt by my specifying that they only bother faking effects that will lead to observations ;)
I think it would. I think it’s not the same example at all anymore.
Something that reproduces all effects of cats is effectively producing all the molecular interactions and neurons and flesh and blood and fur that we think are what produces our observations of cats.
On the other hand, something that only reproduces the effects that lead directly to observations is, in its simplest form, something that analyzes minds and finds out where to inject data into them to make these minds have the experiences of the presence of cats, and analyzes what other things in the world a would-be-cat would change, and just change those directly (i.e. if a cat would’ve drank milk and produced feline excrement, then milk disappears and feline excrement appears, and a human’s brain is modified such that the experience of seeing a cat drink milk and make poo is simulated).
Not unless something is somehow interacting with their neurons, which I stated isn’t happening for simplicity, and most of the time not for the blood or flesh.
Oh, I meant the interactions occur where they would if the cat was real, but these increasingly-godlike fairies are lazy and don’t bother producing them if their magic tells them it wouldn’t lead to an observation.
My (admittedly lacking) understanding of Information Theory precludes any possibility of perfectly reproducing all effects of the presence of cats throughout the universe (or multiverse or whatever) without having in some form or another a perfect model or simulation of all the individual interactions of the base elements which cats are made of. This would, as it contains the same patterns within the model which when made of “physical matter” produce cats, essentially still produce cats.
So if there’s a mechanism somewhere making sure that the reproduction is perfect, it’s almost certainly (to my knowledge) “simulating” the cats in some manner, in which case the cats are in that simulation and perceive the same experiences they would if they were “really” there in atoms instead of being in the simulation.
If you posit some kind of ontologically basic entity that somehow magically makes a universal consistency check for the exact worldstates that could plausibly be computed if the cat were present, without actually simulating any cat, then sure… but I think that’s also not the same problem anymore. And it requires accepting a magical premise.
Oh, right. Yup, anything simulating you that perfectly is gonna be conscious—but it might be using magic. For example, perhaps they pull their data out of parallel universe where you ARE real. Or maybe they use some black-swan technique you can’t even imagine. They’re fairies, for godssake. And you’re an invisible cat. Don’t fight the counterfactual.
Haha, that one made me laugh. Yes, it’s fighting the counterfactual a bit, but I think that this is one of the reasons why there was a chasm of misunderstandings in this and other sub-threads.
Anyway, I don’t see any tangible things left to discuss here.
Victory! Possibly for both sides, that could well be what’s causing the chasm.
So you’re saying we shouldn’t believe in ourselves?
To paraphrase EY, What do you think you know [about yourself], and how do you think you know it?
Oh, you mean we shouldn’t assume we’re the same as the other cats. Obviously there’s some possibility that we’re unique, but (assuming our body is “simulated” as well, obviously) it seems like all “cats” probably contain epiphenomenal cats as well. Do you think everyone else is a p-zombie? Obviously it’s a remote possibility, but...
No, I did not mean that, unless one finds some good evidence supporting this additional assumption. My point was quite the opposite, that your statement “if something is reproducing the effect of cats on the world we have no reason to posit cats as existing” does not need a qualifier.
Not sure why you bring that silly concept up…
Look, if all “cats” are actually magical fairies using their magic to reproduce the effect of cats, yet I find myself as a cat—whose effect on the world consists of a fairy pretending to be me so well even I don’t notice (except just now, obviously.). Thus, for the one epiphenomenal cat I can know about—myself—I am associated with a “cat” that perfectly duplicates my actions. I can’t check if all “cats” have similar cats attached, since they would be epiphenomenal, but it seems likely, based on myself, that there are.
Because the whole point of this cat metaphor was to make a point about p-zombies. That’s what they are. They’re p-zombies for cats instead of qualia.
Well, the point was to point out that we only think things exist because we experience them, and therefore that anything which duplicates the experience is as real as the original artifact.
Suppose there were to be no cats, but only a magical fairy which knocks things from the mantlepiece and causes us to hallucinate in a consistent manner (among other things). There is no reason to consider that world distinguishable, even in principle, from the standard model.
Now, suppose that you couldn’t see cats, but instead could see the ‘cat fairy’. What is different now, assuming that the cat fairy is working properly and providing identical sensory input as the cats?
There is no (observable) difference. That’s the point. But presumably someone found a way to check for fairies.
If there is no observable (even in principle) difference, what’s the difference? P-zombies are not intended or described as equivocal to humans.
There are two differences: the presence of the fairy (which can be observed … somehow) and the possibility of deviating from the mind. P-zombies are described as acting just like humans, but lack consciousness. “Cats” are generally like the human counterparts to p-zombies (who act just the same—by definition—but have epiphenomenal consciousness.)
TL;DR: it’s observable in principle. But I, as author, have decreed that you arn’t getting to check if your friends are cats as well as “cats”.
Y’know, I’m starting to think this may have been a poor example. It’s a little complicated.
Complicated isn’t a bad thing;
If the fairy is observable despite being in principle not observable… I break.
If it is in principle possible to experience differently from what a quantum scan of the brain and body would indicate, but behave in accordance with physicalism … how would you know if what you experienced was different from what you thought you experienced, or if what you thought was different from what you honestly claimed that you thought?
That would seem to be close to several types of abnormal brain function, where a person describes themself as not in control of their body. I think those cases are better explained by abnormal internal brain communication, but further direct evidence may show that the ‘reasoning’ and ‘acting’ portions of some person are connected similarly enough to normal brains that they should be working the same way, but aren’t. If there is a demonstrated case either of a pattern of neurons firing corresponding to similar behavior in all typical brains and a different behavior in a class of brains of people with such abnormal functioning (or in physically similar neurons firing differently under similar stimuli), then I would accept that as evidence that the fairy perceived by those people existed.
Well, it’s proving hard to explain.
It’s observable. The cats are epiphenomenal, and thus unobservable, except to themselves.
Pardon?
Well, if they can tell you what the problem is then they clearly have some control. More to the point, it is a known feature of the environment that all observed cats are actually illusions produced by fairies. It is a fact, although not generally known, that there are also epiphenomenal (although acted upon by the environment) cats; these exist in exactly the same space as the illusions and act exactly the same way. If you are a human, this is all fine and dandy, if bizarre. But if you are a sentient cat (roll with it) then you have evidence of the epiphenomenal cats, even though this evidence is inherently subjective (since presumably the illusions are also seemingly sentient, in this case.)
How could you tell if you were experiencing something differently from the way a p-zombie would (or, if you are a p-zombie, if you were experiencing something differently from the way a human would)?
In every meaningful way, the cat fairy is a cat. There is no way for an epiphenomenal sentient cat to differentiate itself from a cat fairy, nor any way for a cat fairy to differentiate itself from whatever portions of ‘cats’ it controls (without violating the constraints on cat fairy behavior). Of course, there’s also the conceivability of epiphenomenal sentient ghosts which cannot have any effect on the world but still observe. (That’s one of my death nightmares—remaining fully perceptive and cognitive but unable to act in any way.)
You seem to be somewhat confused about the notion of a p-zombie. A p-zombie is something physically identical to a human, but without consciousness. A p-zombie does not experience anything in any way at all. P-zombies are probably self-contradictory.
I am experiencing something, therefore I am not a p-zombie.
Consider the possibility that you are not experiencing everything that humans do. Can you provide any evidence, even to yourself, that you are? Could a p-zombie provide that same evidence?
How is this relevant? My point is that I’m experiencing what I’m experiencing.
And p-zombies are experiencing what they’re experiencing. You can’t use a similarity to distinguish.
P-zombies aren’t experiencing anything. By definition.
Those two statements are both tautologically true and do not contradict one another.
What would be different, to you, if you weren’t experiencing anything, but were physically identical?
I wouldn’t be experiencing anything.
I thought it had been established that wasn’t a difference.
Are you asking what I would experience? Because I wouldn’t. Not to mention that such a thing can’t happen if, as I expect, subjective experience arises from physics.
Sorry, I thought you were disagreeing with me.
It is relevant because i you cannot find any experimental differences betweenn you and a you NOT experiencing, then maybe there is no such difference.
I cannot present you with evidence that I am experiencing, except maybe by analogy with yourself. I, however, know that I experience because I experience it.
Because p-zombies aren’t conscious. By definition.
Well, the cat does have an associated cat fairy. So, since the only cat fairy who’s e-cat it could observe (its own) has one, I think it should rightly conclude that all cat fairies have cats. But yes, epiphenomenal sentient “ghosts” are possible, and indeed the p-zombie hypothesis requires that the regular humans are in fact such ghosts. They just don’t notice. Yes, there are people arguing this is true in the real world, although not all of them have worked out the implications.
What would be the subjective difference to you if you weren’t ‘conscious’?
To have a subjective anything, you have to be conscious. By definition, if you consider whether you’re a P-zombie, you’re conscious and hence not one.
Now conceive of something which is similar to consciousness, but distinct; like consciousness, it has no physical effects on the world, and like consciousness, anyone who has it experiences it in a manner distinct from their physicality. Call this ‘magic’, and people who posses it ‘magi’.
What aspect does magic lack that consciousness has, such that a p-zombie cannot consider if it is conscious, but a human can ask if they are a magi?
Who said consciousness has no effects on the physical world? Apart from those idiots making the p-zombie argument that is. Pretty much everyone here thinks that’s nonsense, including me and, statistically, probably srn347 (although you never know, I guess.)
Regarding your Magi, if it affects their brain, it’s not epiphenomenal. So there’s that.
The point I am trying to make is that P-zombies are nonsensical. I’m demonstrating that they are equally sensible as an absurd thing.
And the point I am trying to make is that p-zombies are not only a coherent idea, but compatible with human-standard brains as generally modelled on LW. That they don’t in any way demonstrate the point they were intended to make is quite another thing.
Yes, it merely requires redefining things like ‘conscious’ or ‘experience’ (whatever you decide p-zombies do not have) to be something epiphenomenal and incidentally non-existent.
Um, could you please explain this comment? I think there’s a fair chance you’ve stumbled into the middle of this discussion and don’t know what I’m actually talking about (except that it involves p-zombies, I guess.)
I know only the words spoken, not those intended. (And concluded early in the conversation that the entire subthread should be truncated and replaced with a link). So much confusion and muddled thinking!)
Seems reasonable. For reference, then, I suggested the analogous thought experiment of fairies using magic to reproduce all the effects of cats on the environment. Also, there are epiphenomenal ghost cats that occupy the same space and are otherwise identical to the fairies’ illusions, down to the subatomic level. An outside observer would, of course, have no reason to postulate these epiphenomenal cats, but if the cats themselves were somehow conscious, they would.
This was intended to help with understanding p-zombies, since it avoids the … confusing … aspects.
Like brains and rotting flesh?
Whoops. Changed it to “confusing”.
How is it that something which is physically identical to a human and has a physical difference from a human is a coherent concept?
It’s not. I meant that we can replace the soul or whatever with a neurotypical human brain and still get a coherent thought experiment.
Were you saying that the results of that experiment were completely uninteresting?
Well, I personally find it an interesting concept. It’s basically a reformulation of standard Sequences stuff, though, so it shouldn’t be surprising, at least ’round here.
How does that not apply to qualia, unless we are qualia?
We experience qualia. Just like the cats experience being cats.
EDIT: are you arguing we have insufficient evidence to posit qualia?
I experience qualia in exactly the same sense that I experience cats.
All of the evidence I have to posit qualia is due to effects that qualia have on me. Likewise for cats.
I’m pretty sure this comment means you don’t understand the concept of “qualia”.
How do you experience cats?
Unless you actually understand what “qualia” means, I’m not going to bother discussing the topic with you. If you have, if fact, done the basic research necessary to discuss p-zombies, than I’m probably misinterpreting you in some way. But I don’t think I am.
Oddly enough, I feel that if you had done the basic research and explored the same lines of though I did, you would agree with me.
My questions, by the way, aren’t rhetorical. I’m trying to pin down where your understanding differs from mine.
Neither are mine.