And the point I am trying to make is that p-zombies are not only a coherent idea, but compatible with human-standard brains as generally modelled on LW. That they don’t in any way demonstrate the point they were intended to make is quite another thing.
And the point I am trying to make is that p-zombies are not only a coherent idea, but compatible with human-standard brains as generally modelled on LW.
Yes, it merely requires redefining things like ‘conscious’ or ‘experience’ (whatever you decide p-zombies do not have) to be something epiphenomenal and incidentally non-existent.
Um, could you please explain this comment? I think there’s a fair chance you’ve stumbled into the middle of this discussion and don’t know what I’m actually talking about (except that it involves p-zombies, I guess.)
I think there’s a fair chance you’ve stumbled into the middle of this discussion and don’t know what I’m actually talking about (except that it involves p-zombies, I guess.)
I know only the words spoken, not those intended. (And concluded early in the conversation that the entire subthread should be truncated and replaced with a link). So much confusion and muddled thinking!)
Seems reasonable. For reference, then, I suggested the analogous thought experiment of fairies using magic to reproduce all the effects of cats on the environment. Also, there are epiphenomenal ghost cats that occupy the same space and are otherwise identical to the fairies’ illusions, down to the subatomic level. An outside observer would, of course, have no reason to postulate these epiphenomenal cats, but if the cats themselves were somehow conscious, they would.
This was intended to help with understanding p-zombies, since it avoids the … confusing … aspects.
Well, I personally find it an interesting concept. It’s basically a reformulation of standard Sequences stuff, though, so it shouldn’t be surprising, at least ’round here.
The point I am trying to make is that P-zombies are nonsensical. I’m demonstrating that they are equally sensible as an absurd thing.
And the point I am trying to make is that p-zombies are not only a coherent idea, but compatible with human-standard brains as generally modelled on LW. That they don’t in any way demonstrate the point they were intended to make is quite another thing.
Yes, it merely requires redefining things like ‘conscious’ or ‘experience’ (whatever you decide p-zombies do not have) to be something epiphenomenal and incidentally non-existent.
Um, could you please explain this comment? I think there’s a fair chance you’ve stumbled into the middle of this discussion and don’t know what I’m actually talking about (except that it involves p-zombies, I guess.)
I know only the words spoken, not those intended. (And concluded early in the conversation that the entire subthread should be truncated and replaced with a link). So much confusion and muddled thinking!)
Seems reasonable. For reference, then, I suggested the analogous thought experiment of fairies using magic to reproduce all the effects of cats on the environment. Also, there are epiphenomenal ghost cats that occupy the same space and are otherwise identical to the fairies’ illusions, down to the subatomic level. An outside observer would, of course, have no reason to postulate these epiphenomenal cats, but if the cats themselves were somehow conscious, they would.
This was intended to help with understanding p-zombies, since it avoids the … confusing … aspects.
Like brains and rotting flesh?
Whoops. Changed it to “confusing”.
How is it that something which is physically identical to a human and has a physical difference from a human is a coherent concept?
It’s not. I meant that we can replace the soul or whatever with a neurotypical human brain and still get a coherent thought experiment.
Were you saying that the results of that experiment were completely uninteresting?
Well, I personally find it an interesting concept. It’s basically a reformulation of standard Sequences stuff, though, so it shouldn’t be surprising, at least ’round here.