OK, it’s just that the statement “if something is reproducing the effect of cats on the world we have no reason to posit cats as existing” declares that something that is not really a “cat” the way we perceive it, but only an “effect of a cat”, then it does not “exist”. Ergo, if you are only an effect of a cat, you don’t exist as a cat.
Maybe your objection is that we should taboo and dissolve that whole “existing” thing?
Wouldn’t that be nice, but unfortunately EY-style realism and my version of instrumentalism seem to diverge at that definition.
Re qualia, I don’t understand what you are asking. The term means no more to me than a subroutine in a reasonably complex computer program, if currently run on a different substrate.
And, if I understand correctly, this subroutine exists (and is felt / has effect on its host program) whether or not it “exists as qualia” in the particular sense that some clever arguer wants to define qualia as anything other than that subroutine. The fact that there is an effect of the subroutine is all that is required for the subroutine to exist in the first sense, while whether it is “the subroutine” or only a mimicking effect is only relevant for the second sense of “exist”, which is irrelevant to you.
In this case, feel free to assume no-one ever tries to observe cat brains. The “simulation” only has to reproduce your actions, which it does with magic.
Oh, well there’s your problem then. You’re not part of “the effect of cats”. That’s stuff like air displacement, reflected light, purring, that sort of thing.
If you’re using some nonstandard epistemology that doesn’t distinguish between observations that point to something and the thing itself, then nothing. Otherwise the difference between a liar and a reality warper.
Interesting point. Observations are certainly effects, but you’re right, not all effects are observations. Of course, the example wouldn’t be hurt by my specifying that they only bother faking effects that will lead to observations ;)
the example wouldn’t be hurt by my specifying that they only bother faking effects that will lead to observations ;)
I think it would. I think it’s not the same example at all anymore.
Something that reproduces all effects of cats is effectively producing all the molecular interactions and neurons and flesh and blood and fur that we think are what produces our observations of cats.
On the other hand, something that only reproduces the effects that lead directly to observations is, in its simplest form, something that analyzes minds and finds out where to inject data into them to make these minds have the experiences of the presence of cats, and analyzes what other things in the world a would-be-cat would change, and just change those directly (i.e. if a cat would’ve drank milk and produced feline excrement, then milk disappears and feline excrement appears, and a human’s brain is modified such that the experience of seeing a cat drink milk and make poo is simulated).
Something that reproduces all effects of cats is effectively producing all the molecular interactions and neurons and flesh and blood and fur
Not unless something is somehow interacting with their neurons, which I stated isn’t happening for simplicity, and most of the time not for the blood or flesh.
On the other hand, something that only reproduces the effects that lead directly to observations is, in its simplest form, something that analyzes minds and finds out where to inject data into them to make these minds have the experiences of the presence of cats, and analyzes what other things in the world a would-be-cat would change, and just change those directly (i.e. if a cat would’ve drank milk and produced feline excrement, then milk disappears and feline excrement appears, and a human’s brain is modified such that the experience of seeing a cat drink milk and make poo is simulated).
Oh, I meant the interactions occur where they would if the cat was real, but these increasingly-godlike fairies are lazy and don’t bother producing them if their magic tells them it wouldn’t lead to an observation.
My (admittedly lacking) understanding of Information Theory precludes any possibility of perfectly reproducing all effects of the presence of cats throughout the universe (or multiverse or whatever) without having in some form or another a perfect model or simulation of all the individual interactions of the base elements which cats are made of. This would, as it contains the same patterns within the model which when made of “physical matter” produce cats, essentially still produce cats.
So if there’s a mechanism somewhere making sure that the reproduction is perfect, it’s almost certainly (to my knowledge) “simulating” the cats in some manner, in which case the cats are in that simulation and perceive the same experiences they would if they were “really” there in atoms instead of being in the simulation.
If you posit some kind of ontologically basic entity that somehow magically makes a universal consistency check for the exact worldstates that could plausibly be computed if the cat were present, without actually simulating any cat, then sure… but I think that’s also not the same problem anymore. And it requires accepting a magical premise.
Oh, right. Yup, anything simulating you that perfectly is gonna be conscious—but it might be using magic. For example, perhaps they pull their data out of parallel universe where you ARE real. Or maybe they use some black-swan technique you can’t even imagine. They’re fairies, for godssake. And you’re an invisible cat. Don’t fight the counterfactual.
Haha, that one made me laugh. Yes, it’s fighting the counterfactual a bit, but I think that this is one of the reasons why there was a chasm of misunderstandings in this and other sub-threads.
Anyway, I don’t see any tangible things left to discuss here.
So if something were shown to be reproducing the effect of human minds on the world, you would have no reason to posit yourself as existing anyway?
If you are an artifact of such a reproduction, would you call yourself existing in the same way as if you weren’t?
I would.
That’s a bit why I’m confused as to why you’re (it seems to me) claiming we have no reason to posit self-existence in such a case.
Maybe your objection is that we should taboo and dissolve that whole “existing” thing?
OK, it’s just that the statement “if something is reproducing the effect of cats on the world we have no reason to posit cats as existing” declares that something that is not really a “cat” the way we perceive it, but only an “effect of a cat”, then it does not “exist”. Ergo, if you are only an effect of a cat, you don’t exist as a cat.
Wouldn’t that be nice, but unfortunately EY-style realism and my version of instrumentalism seem to diverge at that definition.
Oh. Then we agree, I think, on the fundamentals of what makes a cat “exist” or not.
Does this also imply the same exist-”exist” perception problem with qualia in your model, or am I horribly misinterpreting your thoughts?
Re qualia, I don’t understand what you are asking. The term means no more to me than a subroutine in a reasonably complex computer program, if currently run on a different substrate.
And, if I understand correctly, this subroutine exists (and is felt / has effect on its host program) whether or not it “exists as qualia” in the particular sense that some clever arguer wants to define qualia as anything other than that subroutine. The fact that there is an effect of the subroutine is all that is required for the subroutine to exist in the first sense, while whether it is “the subroutine” or only a mimicking effect is only relevant for the second sense of “exist”, which is irrelevant to you.
Is this an accurate description?
Pretty much, as I don’t consider this “second sense” to be well defined.
But I specifically stated you were a cat, not an effect of a cat.
I’m not sure how to tell the difference, or even if there is one.
In this case, feel free to assume no-one ever tries to observe cat brains. The “simulation” only has to reproduce your actions, which it does with magic.
Could you taboo the bolded phrase, please?
Sure. an artifact of such a reproduction = whatever you mean by “effect of cats” in your original statement.
Oh, well there’s your problem then. You’re not part of “the effect of cats”. That’s stuff like air displacement, reflected light, purring, that sort of thing.
Where do effects of cats stop and cats begin?
If you’re using some nonstandard epistemology that doesn’t distinguish between observations that point to something and the thing itself, then nothing. Otherwise the difference between a liar and a reality warper.
Looks like we have an insurmountable inferential distance problem both ways, so I’ll stop here.
Fair enough.
Careful, effects are not the same things as observations.
Interesting point. Observations are certainly effects, but you’re right, not all effects are observations. Of course, the example wouldn’t be hurt by my specifying that they only bother faking effects that will lead to observations ;)
I think it would. I think it’s not the same example at all anymore.
Something that reproduces all effects of cats is effectively producing all the molecular interactions and neurons and flesh and blood and fur that we think are what produces our observations of cats.
On the other hand, something that only reproduces the effects that lead directly to observations is, in its simplest form, something that analyzes minds and finds out where to inject data into them to make these minds have the experiences of the presence of cats, and analyzes what other things in the world a would-be-cat would change, and just change those directly (i.e. if a cat would’ve drank milk and produced feline excrement, then milk disappears and feline excrement appears, and a human’s brain is modified such that the experience of seeing a cat drink milk and make poo is simulated).
Not unless something is somehow interacting with their neurons, which I stated isn’t happening for simplicity, and most of the time not for the blood or flesh.
Oh, I meant the interactions occur where they would if the cat was real, but these increasingly-godlike fairies are lazy and don’t bother producing them if their magic tells them it wouldn’t lead to an observation.
My (admittedly lacking) understanding of Information Theory precludes any possibility of perfectly reproducing all effects of the presence of cats throughout the universe (or multiverse or whatever) without having in some form or another a perfect model or simulation of all the individual interactions of the base elements which cats are made of. This would, as it contains the same patterns within the model which when made of “physical matter” produce cats, essentially still produce cats.
So if there’s a mechanism somewhere making sure that the reproduction is perfect, it’s almost certainly (to my knowledge) “simulating” the cats in some manner, in which case the cats are in that simulation and perceive the same experiences they would if they were “really” there in atoms instead of being in the simulation.
If you posit some kind of ontologically basic entity that somehow magically makes a universal consistency check for the exact worldstates that could plausibly be computed if the cat were present, without actually simulating any cat, then sure… but I think that’s also not the same problem anymore. And it requires accepting a magical premise.
Oh, right. Yup, anything simulating you that perfectly is gonna be conscious—but it might be using magic. For example, perhaps they pull their data out of parallel universe where you ARE real. Or maybe they use some black-swan technique you can’t even imagine. They’re fairies, for godssake. And you’re an invisible cat. Don’t fight the counterfactual.
Haha, that one made me laugh. Yes, it’s fighting the counterfactual a bit, but I think that this is one of the reasons why there was a chasm of misunderstandings in this and other sub-threads.
Anyway, I don’t see any tangible things left to discuss here.
Victory! Possibly for both sides, that could well be what’s causing the chasm.