Reason can still allow us to discover the moral facts, even if the moral facts don’t cause something. If you have 13 cakes, you can’t divide them into two equal halves. The number 2 doesn’t cause this but it explains that feature of reality. See also the Enoch paper that I reference for more on this.
We can communicate the meaning of mathematical facts in ways you can’t communicate the meaning of irreducibly normative moral facts. The former are intelligible, the latter aren’t. So it’s not clear you can even present us with an intelligible set of propositions in the form of putative “moral facts” for us to entertain whether or not reason could allow us to discover them. “Discover what?” We can ask, and you won’t be able to intelligibly communicate what it is we’re supposedly discovering. The kind of moral realism you endorse isn’t merely false, it’s not even intelligible.
Reason can still allow us to discover the moral facts, even if the moral facts don’t cause something. If you have 13 cakes, you can’t divide them into two equal halves. The number 2 doesn’t cause this but it explains that feature of reality. See also the Enoch paper that I reference for more on this.
We can communicate the meaning of mathematical facts in ways you can’t communicate the meaning of irreducibly normative moral facts. The former are intelligible, the latter aren’t. So it’s not clear you can even present us with an intelligible set of propositions in the form of putative “moral facts” for us to entertain whether or not reason could allow us to discover them. “Discover what?” We can ask, and you won’t be able to intelligibly communicate what it is we’re supposedly discovering. The kind of moral realism you endorse isn’t merely false, it’s not even intelligible.
You and I have talked about this a lot before, so no need to rehash it.