I entertain the notion that outside view might be a bad way of analyzing some situations, the post is a question on what this class might look like, and how do we know a situation belongs to such class? I’d definitely take outside view as a default type of reasoning—inside view by definition has no evidence of even as little as lack of systemic bias behind it.
The way you describe my heuristic is not accurate. There are cases where something highly unusual happen, but these tend to be extremely difficult to reliably predict—even if they’re really easy to explain away as bound to happen with benefit of hindsight.
For example I’ve heard plenty of people being absolutely certain that fall of the Soviet Union was virtually certain and caused by something they like to believe—usually without even the basic understanding of facts, but many experts make identical mistake. The fact is—nobody predicted it (ignoring background noise of people who “predict” such things year in year out) - and relevant reference classes showed quite low (not zero, but far lower than one) probability of it happening.
For example I’ve heard plenty of people being absolutely certain that fall of the Soviet Union was virtually certain and caused by something they like to believe—usually without even the basic understanding of facts, but many experts make identical mistake. The fact is—nobody predicted it (ignoring background noise of people who “predict” such things year in year out) - and relevant reference classes showed quite low (not zero, but far lower than one) probability of it happening.
Everyone I knew from the Intelligence community in 1987 − 1989 were of the opinion that the Soviet Union had less than 5 years, 10 at tops. Between 1985 and 1989, they had massive yearly increases in the contacts from Soviets either wishing to defect or to pass information about the toppling of the control structures. None of them were people who made yearly predictions about a fall, and every one of them was not happy about the situation (as every one of us lost our jobs as a result). I’d hardly call that noise.
Probably not. I could probably track down an ex-girlfriend’s brother who was in the CIA, who also had looming fears dating from the mid-80s (He’s who explained it to me, orginally)...
Now, there may be books written about the subject (I would expect there to be a few), but I can’t imagine anyone in any crowd I have ever hung with being into them. I’ll check with some Military Historians I know to see.
Edit: After checking with a course from the Journal of International Security, he says that there is all kinds of anecdotal evidence of guys standing around the water cooler speculating about the end of the Cold War (on all Mil/Intel fronts), yet there are only two people who made any sort of hard prediction (and one of those was kinda after the fact—I am sure that will draw a question or two. The after the fact guy was from Stanford, he will forward a name as soon as he checks his facts).
He also says that all sorts of Policy Wanks managed to pull quotes from past papers citing that they had predicted such a thing, yet if one examines their work, one would find that they also had made many other wild predictions regarding the Soviet Union eventually eclipsing the West.
Now that I have looked into this, I am anxious to know more.
OH! As for the defection rates. Most of that is still classified, but I’d bet that there is some data on it. I completely forgot to ask about that part.
I entertain the notion that outside view might be a bad way of analyzing some situations, the post is a question on what this class might look like, and how do we know a situation belongs to such class?
inside view by definition has no evidence of even as little as lack of systemic bias behind it.
Not ‘by definition’; if you justify using IV by noting that it’s worked on this class of problems before, you’re still using IV. Semantic quibbles aside, this really sounds to me like someone trying to believe something interpersonally justifiable (or more justifiable than their opponent), not be right.
What objective source did you consult to find the relevant reference classes or to decide who was noise? Is this a case of “all sheep are black and there is a 1% experimental error”?
I entertain the notion that outside view might be a bad way of analyzing some situations, the post is a question on what this class might look like, and how do we know a situation belongs to such class? I’d definitely take outside view as a default type of reasoning—inside view by definition has no evidence of even as little as lack of systemic bias behind it.
The way you describe my heuristic is not accurate. There are cases where something highly unusual happen, but these tend to be extremely difficult to reliably predict—even if they’re really easy to explain away as bound to happen with benefit of hindsight.
For example I’ve heard plenty of people being absolutely certain that fall of the Soviet Union was virtually certain and caused by something they like to believe—usually without even the basic understanding of facts, but many experts make identical mistake. The fact is—nobody predicted it (ignoring background noise of people who “predict” such things year in year out) - and relevant reference classes showed quite low (not zero, but far lower than one) probability of it happening.
Everyone I knew from the Intelligence community in 1987 − 1989 were of the opinion that the Soviet Union had less than 5 years, 10 at tops. Between 1985 and 1989, they had massive yearly increases in the contacts from Soviets either wishing to defect or to pass information about the toppling of the control structures. None of them were people who made yearly predictions about a fall, and every one of them was not happy about the situation (as every one of us lost our jobs as a result). I’d hardly call that noise.
Is this track record documented anywhere?
Probably not. I could probably track down an ex-girlfriend’s brother who was in the CIA, who also had looming fears dating from the mid-80s (He’s who explained it to me, orginally)...
Now, there may be books written about the subject (I would expect there to be a few), but I can’t imagine anyone in any crowd I have ever hung with being into them. I’ll check with some Military Historians I know to see.
Edit: After checking with a course from the Journal of International Security, he says that there is all kinds of anecdotal evidence of guys standing around the water cooler speculating about the end of the Cold War (on all Mil/Intel fronts), yet there are only two people who made any sort of hard prediction (and one of those was kinda after the fact—I am sure that will draw a question or two. The after the fact guy was from Stanford, he will forward a name as soon as he checks his facts).
He also says that all sorts of Policy Wanks managed to pull quotes from past papers citing that they had predicted such a thing, yet if one examines their work, one would find that they also had made many other wild predictions regarding the Soviet Union eventually eclipsing the West.
Now that I have looked into this, I am anxious to know more.
OH! As for the defection rates. Most of that is still classified, but I’d bet that there is some data on it. I completely forgot to ask about that part.
The Outside View’s Domain
Not ‘by definition’; if you justify using IV by noting that it’s worked on this class of problems before, you’re still using IV. Semantic quibbles aside, this really sounds to me like someone trying to believe something interpersonally justifiable (or more justifiable than their opponent), not be right.
What objective source did you consult to find the relevant reference classes or to decide who was noise? Is this a case of “all sheep are black and there is a 1% experimental error”?